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Abstract 
This thesis is focused on the socialist federal dissolutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s, and on a legal rule related to 
state succession, uti possidetis (juris). Briefly, uti possidetis transforms former internal administrative borders 
into international borders at the moment of state dissolution, with all the legal ramifications this status change 
entails. The thesis reconstructs from the events an evolutionary process that led the international community 
to choose a specific version of uti possidetis regarding the socialist federal dissolutions. After demonstrating 
the mistakes made in this process, the thesis provides a proposal for an updated version of uti possidetis that 
can rebalance the legal principles of self-determination and territorial integrity in future state dissolution cases.  
Part I poses the research question of what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions for 
international law in general and the post-federal successor states in particular? It claims that by a virtue of 
being a general legal principle, uti possidetis has to evolve alongside the shifting paradigm of the international 
legal order. After accounting for the evolution of uti possidetis with its application in the decolonization cases 
since the 1800s, the thesis concludes that this vital process was disrupted in the early 1990s. The chosen mode 
of application failed to take into account two legally crucial factors: the evolution of the right to self-
determination and the unique socialist federal model. As uti possidetis was not updated to factor in these 
changed circumstances, it was misapplied, causing national fragmentation in the successor states. This has 
directly contributed to territorial conflicts, out of which Kosovo and Crimea are the most prominent.  
Part II introduces the two components of a proposed uti possidetis update. Chapter 3 exhibits the internal 
component, the last applicable legal order of the dissolving state. Chapter 4 presents the external component, 
the international legal rules regarding the dissolution. The combination of the two at the moment of dissolution 
generates an update of uti possidetis, titled ‘uti possidetis meritus’. It calls for expanded recognition of internal 
borders and draws legitimacy from its compatibility with the existing uti possidetis framework.  
Part III presents the legal aftermath of the socialist federal dissolutions and proposes the meritus formula as a 
remedy. Chapter 5 gives a comprehensive review of how the right to self-determination was realized in the 
socialist federal dissolutions and how this caused territorial conflicts. Chapter 6 concludes the argument by 
exhibiting two potential forms of application for meritus: it can be used to help settle already existing conflicts, 
as well as to minimize territorial fragmentation in the future state dissolution or independence cases.  
In sum, the vital evolution of uti possidetis was disrupted in its transformation into a non-colonial context. 
The legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions are the distortion of uti possidetis and the lack of balance 
between self-determination and territorial integrity in the successor states. Meritus aims to remedy both. 
vi 
 
Contents  
PART I: UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS ................................................................................................................ 1 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1 Research Question ................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Uti Possidetis Juris and Its Evolutionary Cycles .................................................................................... 3 
1.3 The Two Components of the Third Cycle: Ethnofederalism and Internal Self-Determination .............. 6 
1.4 Previous Research on Uti Possidetis and the Socialist Federal Dissolutions .......................................... 8 
1.5 The Argument ....................................................................................................................................... 11 
1.6 The Proposal for Uti Possidetis Meritus ............................................................................................... 12 
1.7 The Structure of the Dissertation .......................................................................................................... 17 
2. The Evolutionary Cycles of Uti Possidetis Juris ......................................................................................... 19 
2.1 Original and Modern Versions of Uti Possidetis Juris ......................................................................... 20 
2.2 The First Cycle: Decolonization of Spanish America ........................................................................... 22 
2.3 The Second Cycle: Decolonization of Africa and South-Asia .............................................................. 25 
2.4 The Legal Categorization of the Right to Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis ................................ 30 
2.5 The Third Cycle: The Socialist Federal Dissolutions ........................................................................... 38 
      2.5.1 The Socialist Ethnofederal Model ................................................................................................ 38 
      2.5.2 The Breakdown of the Socialist Federal Systems ........................................................................ 41 
      2.5.3 The Socialist Federal Dissolutions and Uti Possidetis Juris ........................................................ 44 
2.6 The Fourth Cycle: A ‘Non-Precedent’ .................................................................................................. 54 
2.7 Conclusion: An Indeterminate Rule ...................................................................................................... 60 
PART II: THE TWO COMPONENTS OF UTI POSSIDETIS MERITUS .............................................. 62 
3. The Internal Component: Socialist Ethnofederalism ................................................................................... 63 
3.1 The Ideological Foundations of Ethnofederalism: Historical Materialism and the ‘National Question’
 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 63 
      3.1.1 The Philosophical Origins of Historical Materialism ................................................................... 63 
      3.1.2 The Materialist Conception of History ......................................................................................... 65 
      3.1.3 Inevitability of Progress ............................................................................................................... 67 
      3.1.4 Nationalism under Historical Materialism ................................................................................... 69 
3.2 The Early Years of the Bolshevik Rule ................................................................................................. 72 
      3.2.1 The First Stage: ‘War Communism’, 1917-1921 ......................................................................... 72 
      3.2.2 Reconsolidation of the Bolshevik Rule ........................................................................................ 73 
      3.2.3 The Second Stage: New Economic Policy and the Idea of a Federation ..................................... 74 
      3.2.4 The ‘Assimilationists’ versus the ‘Autonomists’ ......................................................................... 75 
3.3 The Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ............................................................. 77 
      3.3.1 The Dual Structure of the Soviets and the Government ............................................................... 77 
      3.3.2 The 1922 Union Treaty ................................................................................................................ 77 
vii 
 
      3.3.3 The 1924 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.............................................. 78 
3.4 The Organizational Structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ......................................... 79 
3.5 The Soviet Ethnofederal Structure: An Asymmetrical Federation........................................................ 81 
      3.5.1 The Soviet Socialist Republics ..................................................................................................... 84 
      3.5.2 The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics ............................................................................... 84 
      3.5.3 The Autonomous Oblasts and the Autonomous Okrugs .............................................................. 86 
3.6 The Changing Tides of the Soviet National Policy: Korenizatsiia, Sblizhenie, and Sliyanie ............... 86 
3.7 The Disintegration of the Ethnofederal Structure ................................................................................. 88 
      3.7.1 The ‘Pre-Crisis’ Situation............................................................................................................. 89 
      3.7.2 Perestroika, Glasnost, and the Effects to the Soviet National Policy .......................................... 91 
      3.7.3 The Parade of Sovereignties ......................................................................................................... 92 
      3.7.4 The 1990 Reforms of the Federal System .................................................................................... 94 
      3.7.5 New Union Treaty and the Referendum on the Future of the USSR (1991)................................ 96 
3.8 The Dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ................................................................. 98 
3.9 Conclusion: Dissolution and Uti Possidetis Meritus ............................................................................. 99 
4. The External Component: The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination .......................................... 104 
4.1 Self-Determination in the United Nations Era .................................................................................... 104 
      4.1.1 Self-Determination as a Principle, 1945-1966 ........................................................................... 104 
      4.1.2 Self-Determination as a Right, 1966-1991 ................................................................................. 106 
      4.1.3 Internal and External Self-Determination .................................................................................. 110 
      4.1.4 The Coincidental Evolution of Uti Possidetis and the Right to Self-Determination ................. 112 
4.2 Self-Determination and the National Question in the Yugoslav Context ........................................... 114 
      4.2.1 The Origins of the National Question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ....................................... 114 
      4.2.2 The Socialist Solution: Ethnofederalism and ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ .................................... 116 
      4.2.3 The 1950s: ‘Yugoslavism’ and the Integration of the World ..................................................... 119 
      4.2.4 The 1960s: De-Centralization .................................................................................................... 120 
      4.2.5 The 1974 Constitution: An Asymmetrical Federation or a Confederation? ............................... 122 
      4.2.6 The 1974 Constitution and Uti Possidetis Juris ......................................................................... 126 
      4.2.7 The Endgame of Yugoslavia: Disintegration of the Federal and Party Structures, 1987-1990 . 127 
4.3 External Intervention: The EC Declarations, The Hague Peace Conference, and the Badinter 
Commission Opinions ............................................................................................................................... 133 
      4.3.1 The Right to Self-Determination as Portrayed by the EC in 1991 ............................................. 133 
      4.3.2 The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia ............................................................................ 135 
      4.3.3 The Badinter Commission Opinions .......................................................................................... 137 
4.4 Conclusion: Dissolution and the Badinter Commission Opinions ...................................................... 145 
PART III: THE LEGAL LEGACIES OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL DISSOLUTIONS .............. 154 
5. The Right to Self-Determination in a State Dissolution Context .............................................................. 155 
5.1 Introduction: Three Versions of Self-Determination in the Post-Dissolution Framework ................. 156 
viii 
 
5.2 The Continuation State: The Russian Federation ................................................................................ 163 
      5.2.1 Russia and the First Version of the Right to Self-Determination ............................................... 163 
      5.2.2 Russian National Question ......................................................................................................... 164 
      5.2.3 The Final Ethnofederal Developments of the Soviet Era, 1990-1991 ........................................ 165 
      5.2.4 The 1992 Federal Treaty ............................................................................................................ 166 
      5.2.5 The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation ...................................................................... 167 
      5.2.6 The Power-Sharing Treaties ....................................................................................................... 168 
      5.2.7 The Chechnya Debacle............................................................................................................... 169 
      5.2.8 Dismantling Russian Federalism ................................................................................................ 170 
      5.2.9 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 171 
5.3 Ethnofederalism Retained: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine ........................................................ 173 
      5.3.1 Uzbekistan and Karakalpakstan ................................................................................................. 173 
      5.3.2 Tajikistan and Gorno-Badakhshan ............................................................................................. 175 
      5.3.3 Ukraine and Crimea ................................................................................................................... 176 
      5.3.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 182 
5.4 Ethnofederalism Rejected: Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia .......................................................... 183 
      5.4.1 Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh ...................................................................... 183 
      5.4.2 Moldova: Gagauzia and Transnistria ......................................................................................... 188 
      5.4.3 Georgia: Ajara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia ............................................................................ 194 
      5.4.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 200 
5.5 Ethnofederalism Distorted: Yugoslavia and the Third Level of Self-Determination .......................... 201 
      5.5.1 Introduction: The Long Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia .............. 202 
      5.5.2 Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo .................................................................................................. 204 
      5.5.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska ............................................................................... 210 
      5.5.4 Macedonia and Ilirida ................................................................................................................ 213 
      5.5.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 215 
5.6 The Contemporary International Mediation Framework of the Frozen Conflicts .............................. 216 
      5.6.1 Nagorno-Karabakh ..................................................................................................................... 221 
      5.6.2 Transnistria ................................................................................................................................. 222 
      5.6.3 Kosovo ....................................................................................................................................... 224 
      5.6.4 Abkhazia and South Ossetia ....................................................................................................... 226 
      5.6.5 Donbas and Crimea .................................................................................................................... 227 
      5.6.6 Conclusions on International Mediation Efforts ........................................................................ 229 
      5.7 Between Peoplehood and Minority: Conclusions on the Socialist Federal Dissolutions .............. 231 
6. The Theory of Orderly State Dissolution: Uti Possidetis Meritus............................................................. 234 
6.1 Introduction: Two Sides of Uti Possidetis Meritus ............................................................................. 234 
6.2 Uti Possidetis Meritus as a Mediation Tool ........................................................................................ 238 
      6.2.1 Territorial Autonomy ................................................................................................................. 240 
ix 
 
      6.2.2 A Power-Sharing Agreement ..................................................................................................... 240 
      6.2.3 A Consociation Agreement ........................................................................................................ 246 
      6.2.4 International Guarantees and Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution ........................................... 249 
      6.2.5 Special Provisions ...................................................................................................................... 250 
      6.2.6 Conclusions on Meritus as a Mediation Tool ............................................................................. 251 
6.3 Uti Possidetis Meritus as a Principle of the Preservation of Boundaries ............................................ 252 
      6.3.1 Expanded Recognition of Internal Borders in Accordance with the Internal and External Self-
Determination Dichotomy ......................................................................................................................... 253 
      6.3.2 Inheriting Territorial Autonomy and Constitutional Power-Sharing ......................................... 255 
      6.3.3 The Need for Compromises and the Authority of Uti Possidetis ............................................... 258 
      6.3.4 International Guarantees ............................................................................................................ 259 
      6.3.5 State Recognition and Soft Power Tools .................................................................................... 259 
6.4 Case Study: Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Uti Possidetis Meritus .......................................... 260 
6.5 Conclusion: Resolving Territorial Conflicts with Territorial Solutions .............................................. 263 
7. Conclusions: Salvaging Uti Possidetis Juris ............................................................................................. 266 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................. 272 
Cases .............................................................................................................................................................. 272 
Other Official Sources ................................................................................................................................... 273 
Books and Articles ........................................................................................................................................ 282

1 
 
PART I: UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS  
2 
 
1. Introduction  
This dissertation is focused on a particular set of events - the socialist federal dissolutions of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) in the early 1990s - and on a particular legal rule, uti possidetis (juris). Briefly, uti possidetis 
(in English ‘as you possess, so you may possess’) is an international law principle that transforms 
former internal administrative borders into international borders, with all the legal ramifications this 
status change entails.1 The dissertation reconstructs from the events an evolutionary process that led 
the international community to choose a particular version of uti possidetis regarding these 
dissolutions. It demonstrates the mistakes made in this process that ended up producing fragile 
successor states. Consequently, I provide a proposal for an updated version of the rule - uti possidetis 
meritus - that can be used to rebalance the legal principles of the right to self-determination and 
territorial integrity in the cases of state dissolution.  
1.1 Research Question 
The research question that I am posing is what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal 
dissolutions for international law in general and the post-federal successor states in particular?  
In order to answer this question, I first address a series of sub-questions, the main of which are: 
1) What mistakes were made with the application of uti possidetis in the socialist federal 
dissolutions? 
2) What would be a more orthodox application of uti possidetis?  
                                                 
1 For articles and other scholarly publications of the uti possidetis doctrine, in general or in a decolonization context, see, inter alia, J. 
Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’ 69(1) British Yearbook of International Law (1998) 85-117; 
R. McCorquodale and R. Pangalangan, ‘Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries’ 12(5) European Journal of 
International Law (2001) 867-888; E. Hasani, ‘Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo’ 27(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 
(2003) 85-94 (<http://hdl.handle.net/10427/76986>. References to online sources are accurate as on 9 June 2020); P. Hensel, M. 
Allison and A. Khanani, ‘Territorial Integrity Treaties, Uti Possidetis, and Armed Conflict Over Territory’, paper in the conference 
‘Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics’ (2006) 1-41; F. Jankov and V. Ćorić, The Legality of Uti Possidetis 
in the Definition of Kosovo’s Legal Status, Conference Paper, 2nd European Society of International Law, 2007); and P. Muwanguzi, 
Reconciling Uti Possidetis and Self Determination: The Concept of Interstate Boundary Disputes (Social Science Research Network, 
2007). For research more concentrated on the dissolution of the USSR and the SFRY and the role uti possidetis played there, see, inter 
alia, D. Türk, ‘Recognition of States: A Comment’ 4(1) European Journal of International Law (1993) 182-185; R. Rich, ‘Recognition 
of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’ 4(1) European Journal of International Law (1993) 36-65; R. Hayden, 
Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (University of Michigan Press, 1999); E. Milano, 
‘Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo’s Territorial Status’ 14(5) European Journal of 
International Law (2003) 999-1022; P. Korchnak, The Collapse of Federations: Elite Political Mobilization in the Dissolutions of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (VDM Verlag, 2008); and L. Anderson, ‘Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional 
Arrangement…?’ 39(1) International Security (2014) 165-204. While these lists are far from all-inclusive, I conclude that the research 
on uti possidetis has been undertaken only on a limited scale, especially in light of the latest major transformation of the doctrine in 
relation to the socialist federal dissolutions of the 1990s.  
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3) In conclusion, what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions?  
My methodological perspective is threefold. After this introductory Chapter, I demonstrate the 
evolutionary nature of uti possidetis (Chapter 2). I then present the two components that together 
constitute my uti possidetis meritus proposal, the internal (Chapter 3), and external (Chapter 4) legal 
frameworks at the moment of the dissolution or independence. The next two Chapters focus on the 
legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions. Chapter 5 analyzes the realization of the right to 
self-determination in the state dissolution context and analyzes the various statuses that the minorities 
ignored by the application of uti possidetis have been offered in the successor states. Chapter 6 then 
introduces my proposal for (uti possidetis) meritus, which has two potential uses. First, it can help to 
mediate the current post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav ethnic conflicts - i.e., the legal legacies of the 
socialist federal dissolutions. Second, it can be used in future cases of state dissolution or 
independence to achieve solutions that respect both territorial integrity of states and the right to self-
determination of peoples and, thus, to promote peaceful solutions to overlapping claims on territory.  
1.2 Uti Possidetis Juris and Its Evolutionary Cycles 
To clarify my arguments and the proposal for meritus, I first introduce the uti possidetis juris doctrine 
and its evolutionary logic. I then delineate the parameters that make the third cycle of this evolution 
stand out - the socialist ethnofederalist model and the right to internal self-determination.  
The uti possidetis doctrine is based on a Roman civil law principle, according to which, when there 
was a completing claim on a property, an official edict would grant provisional possession of the 
property in question during litigation to the person who already was physically possessing it. When 
the doctrine was transformed into the international law sphere in the early 1800s, it acquired the status 
of a general principle that transfers sovereignty over a particular territory. However, as an 
international legal principle, every practical application of uti possidetis has called for its adjustment 
to the changing paradigms of international law. I have identified four distinct cycles that have 
contributed to the evolution of the doctrine. These are Decolonization of Latin America (1808-1836), 
Decolonization of Africa (1960s), the Socialist Federal Dissolutions (1990s), and the Independence 
of Kosovo (2008). Each cycle has in its turn updated the doctrine into contemporary international law 
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system. My argument is that this necessary evolutionary process was partially disrupted in the third 
cycle, amounting to misapplication of the rule and subsequent territorial conflicts.2  
The first international legal application of uti possidetis took place with the decolonization of Latin 
America in the early 1800s. According to this international adaptation, the old administrative borders 
established by the former sovereign - Spain and Portugal - became international borders at the 
moment of independence. For instance, a former Spanish administrative unit of the Viceroyalty of 
the Rio de la Plata was transformed into a state of Argentina, corresponding to the territory of the 
former unit. Here, the uti possidetis juris variant of the doctrine won over uti possidetis de facto, and 
thus only the former legal administrative borders were taken into account, not the actual (de facto) 
possession of a territory.3 Since that time, the doctrine has further evolved alongside the changing 
paradigms of international law with every application cycle. One thing remains constant: uti 
possidetis is only a subsidiary rule to be used in case there is not a peaceful agreement on borders. 
The doctrine is not indispensable in a sense that it can be ignored if all the stakeholders agree. That 
being said, the doctrine’s history demonstrates that there rarely is an agreement, and uti possidetis 
becomes, time and time again, the default position.  
By the time of the second cycle in the 1960s, international law had developed to prohibit the use of 
force. Uti possidetis was used to ‘internationalize’ and thus provide international law protection to 
new African borders. Additionally, unlike in Latin America, there were several types of colonial 
borders in Africa, both between the colonizers and within their colonial territories. The complexity 
of borders required a choice of which ones to internationalize. The new leaders of now independent 
African states eventually chose to honor all former colonial borders, despite their arbitrariness and 
non-correspondence with the ethnic or cultural divisions of the continent.  
The third cycle in the 1990s was a watershed moment for uti possidetis, with two distinct modes of 
application. In the USSR, the Soviet Socialist Republics that constituted the federation agreed upon 
                                                 
2 There are dissenting views that deny the cyclical role of the socialist federal dissolutions altogether (for example, M. Johanson, Self-
Determination and Borders: The Obligation to Show Consideration for the Interests of Others (Åbo, 2004); S. Lalonde, Determining 
Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (Montreal, 2003); and J. Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International 
Law: The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice (Hart Publishing, 2013)). According to these views, uti possidetis 
remains a decolonization rule - therewith rendering it obsolete in contemporary international law - and the dissolution of the SFRY 
was a series of illegal secessions. However, in my opinion, the role of uti possidetis as a general principle of international law is 
established outside decolonization context (For instance, see the cases by the International Court of Justice in the Frontier Dispute case 
(Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, I.C.J Reports (1986) 554, para. 20; and Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J Reports (2001) 40, paras. 10, 148). From this, I deduce that 
the application of uti possidetis has to take into account other general principles of international law and that this did not take place in 
the third cycle. 
3 Brazil tried in vain to argue for uti possidetis de facto in relation to its borders with the neighboring states. 
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the dissolution and the application of uti possidetis, thus producing 15 independent states. In contrast, 
Serbia and Montenegro were unwilling to allow secessions from the SFRY and disputed the 
dissolution of the federation altogether. Moreover, once they were finally ready to accept dissolution, 
they still would not accept uti possidetis. The European Community (EC) chose to intervene in an 
attempt to prevent a civil war and insisted over the federal authorities that the SFRY was dissolving 
and that uti possidetis could be used to draw the boundaries of the emerging states.  
On 16 December 1991, the EC published the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union.4 The Guidelines made the EC recognition contingent upon criteria 
and promised to award recognition to any of the six Yugoslav Republics that fulfilled it. The list was 
in effect a codification of international law principles as they stood in the early 1990s. Two new 
developments were especially notable in contrast to the second cycle of the 1960s. First, the principle 
of self-determination had been codified into international covenants with a new division into internal 
and external self-determination variants. Second, a completely new human rights paradigm had 
emerged.5 Correspondingly, the Guidelines criteria included the re-affirmation of the principle of 
self-determination, respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights, guarantees for the rights 
of ethnic groups and minorities, and the inviolability of the uti possidetis borders.6  
The Yugoslav Republics were asked to send applications for recognition to an ad hoc judicial body, 
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, which then made recommendations 
for the EC. In essence, the Arbitration Commission acted as a kind of an uti possidetis court, 
evaluating how the applicants fared in relation to the Guidelines principles. I conclude that through 
the Guidelines and the work of the Arbitration Commission, the human rights paradigm was 
successfully incorporated into uti possidetis. Yet, the division of self-determination was bypassed 
with lasting negative consequences for both the doctrine and the successor states. This was due to the 
failure to understand the relation between the ethnofederal model and self-determination.  
The distortions in the third cycle produced fragmented successor states prone to territorial challenges. 
The first reckoning came in 2008 with the proclaimed independence of Kosovo. This fourth cycle 
                                                 
4 Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, European Community, 16 December 1991, 
31 ILM 1486. 
5 The codification of human rights had started to emerge after the Second World War, starting with the 1945 UN Charter and the 1948 
Human Rights Declaration. Between 1948 and 1991, at least seven major international conventions were prohibiting various human 
rights violations. G. Stokes, ‘Independence and the Fate of Minorities, 1991-1992’ in C. Ingrao and T. Emmert (Eds), Confronting the 
Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (Purdue, 2013) 82-113 at 99. 
6 Guidelines (n 4) paras. 1 and 3-5. 
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differs fundamentally from the third, as Kosovo had not been a Yugoslav Republic but an autonomous 
province within one, namely Serbia. Nevertheless, due to numerous factors, many states decided to 
recognize Kosovo independent within its uti possidetis borders. In this profound transformation, uti 
possidetis was not applied universally: over 40% of the countries in the world have not thus far 
recognized Kosovo.7 In addition, the justifications for recognition have been rather peculiar. The 
recognizers have been insisting on linking the independence and the dissolution of the SFRY, but in 
the absence of legal reasoning, it remains unclear why this should be the case. I claim that this is a 
byproduct of trying to fix the misapplication of the third cycle without admitting the mistakes made.  
1.3 The Two Components of the Third Cycle: Ethnofederalism and Internal Self-
Determination 
As I claim that the misapplication of uti possidetis in the third cycle produced the fourth cycle and 
the continuing fragmentation in the successor states of the USSR and the SFRY, let me now account 
for the two factors that caused it: ethnofederalism and the right to internal self-determination. 
According to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the socialist states consisting of several ethnic groups 
had to make sure that the right to self-determination was respected through the creation of territorial 
autonomies. This was a compromise between the need to demonstrate progressiveness of the socialist 
national policy in the area of national self-determination without allowing the peoples of the former 
Russian Empire to secede, and the need to build a functioning central-planned economy based on 
territorial units. Under this ideological framework called ‘ethnofederalism’, the peoples of the USSR 
and the SFRY were given a piece of territory and were put into a hierarchy based on their progression 
level towards socialism. The right to self-determination was based on this status, and an upgrade was 
possible through merit. In the USSR, the most progressive nations were awarded the title Soviet 
Socialist Republics (SSRs), followed by the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs).8 In the 
SFRY, the SSRs were called the Socialist Republics (SRs), and the ASSRs the Socialist Autonomous 
Provinces (SAPs). The SSRs and the ASSRs - and their Yugoslav counterparts - were constitutionally 
guaranteed to have elements of statehood and an ensemble of national symbols.  
                                                 
7 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, by 9 June 2020, 114 UN member states have recognized Kosovo. 
<http://www.mfa-ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483>.  
8 The ethnofederal system consisted of altogether four levels. Below the ARRSs, there were the Autonomous Oblasts and the 
Autonomous Okrugs, respectively. However, since the SFRY did not have units that were similar to the lower two levels, for clarity’s 
sake I will look into the other units in Chapter 3. 
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Meanwhile, in the public international law framework, self-determination had been codified into two 
significant international covenants on 16 December 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
Covenants). During the drafting stage, the Western powers were focusing on the guarantees for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. In contrast, the USSR - supported by the developing 
countries - advocated for the need to enshrine the right of peoples to self-determination to the 
Covenants.9 The USSR view won support and, in the end, both the Covenants have an identical 
Article 1, stating that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’.10 The Covenants made self-determination a treaty-based, general entitlement right.11 
In addition, by recognizing self-determination outside decolonization, the Covenants demonstrated 
that the principle can be applied both internally and externally, and many consider them to provide a 
legal right to internal self-determination.12 The SFRY and the USSR were bound by the Covenants 
and, accordingly, had guaranteed the right to internal self-rule to their subjects in their last federal 
Constitutions of 1974 and 1977 that remained in force at the moment of their dissolutions.  
When the socialist federations started dissolving in 1991, the then European Community, in the 
absence of any realistic alternatives, decided to insist upon the application of uti possidetis. However, 
a major mistake was made when only the highest level - the SSRs of the USSR and the SRs of 
Yugoslavia - were taken into account and the second-level units - ASSRs and SAPs - were invariably 
denied any kind of status recognition. This relentless categorization and all rights/no rights dichotomy 
between the self-determination units inevitably jeopardized the promotion of internal self-
                                                 
9 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 47. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA res. 2200A (XXI), and International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, UNGA res. 2200A (XXI), both adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966. Both Covenants entered 
into force in 1976 and have more than 160 signatory states. 
11 S. Oeter, ‘Self-Determination’ in B. Simma (Ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume 1 (3rd Ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 313-334 at 322; H. Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ 34(1) Virginia Journal of International Law 
(1993) 1-69 at 19.  
12 E.g., Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions?’ 13(4) International Community Law 
Review (2011) 413-436 at 414; A. Rosas, ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ in A. Rosas and J. Helgesen (Ed), Human Rights in a 
Changing East-West Perspective (Pinter, 1990) 30-34; S. Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States’ 
90(4) American Journal of International Law (1996) 590-624 at 611; and Cassese (n 9) 48-52. According to New York City Bar, ‘[t]he 
norm of self-determination is not a general right of secession. It is the right of a people to decide on their culture, language, and 
government. It has evolved into the concepts of “internal self-determination,” the protection of minority rights within a state, and 
“external self-determination,” secession from a state’. Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, ‘Executive 
Summary: Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova’ 14 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 449 (2008) 379-390 at 383-84. 
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determination, as provided in several international conventions and instruments.13 Predictably, 
following their independence, most of the former first-level units that had second-level units within 
their territories abolished these autonomies, creating separatist movements out of the disillusioned 
minorities. Since the Guidelines made recognition of the successor states contingent upon, inter alia, 
respecting the guarantees for the rights of national groups and minorities, I claim that the greatest 
failure was not to recognize the minority regimes already in place. I further claim that the ASSRs and 
the SAPs, as constituent units of the federations, possessed a right to internal self-determination 
independently from their host state and these legitimate expectations should have been recognized. 
For Kosovo, the right to independent self-government was guaranteed in the Constitutions of the 
SFRY, the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (all 1974). 
For the ASSRs, this was guaranteed in the 1977 USSR Constitution, the individual ASSR 
Constitutions, and the early 1990s Soviet Constitutional amendments. These autonomic statuses were 
seen as an integral component, even a condition, of the second-level unit being a part of the first-level 
unit. Ignoring this was a grave breach of the right to self-determination, and disrupted the evolution 
of the uti possidetis doctrine, undermining its legitimacy in the process.14  
1.4 Previous Research on Uti Possidetis and the Socialist Federal Dissolutions 
Given the pivotal role that uti possidetis has played in the creation of the majority of the United 
Nations (UN) member states, it has not been studied with the corresponding intensity. Notably, the 
impact of the socialist federal dissolutions to uti possidetis’ evolution has received scarce attention, 
with the notable exceptions (in chronological order) of Pellet,15 Craven,16 Shaw,17 Ratner,18 Bartos,19 
                                                 
13 For instance by the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe’s Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, Chapter VIII; and 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 22 November 1990); and by the UN General Assembly (Enhancing the Effectiveness of the 
Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, GA Res. 48/131, 20 December 1993, preamble).  
14 I am using the definition of ‘legitimacy’ by Thomas Franck, according to which legitimacy is ‘a property of a rule or rule-making 
institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule 
or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’. T. Franck, The Power 
of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990) at 24.  
15 A. Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’ 3(1) 
European Journal of International Law (1992) 178-185. 
16 M. Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’ 66(1) British Yearbook of International Law (1995) 
333-413.  
17 M. Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’ 67(1) The British Yearbook of International Law 
(1996) 75-154; and M. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ 8(3) European Journal of International Law (1997) 478-507. 
18 Ratner (n 12). 
19 T. Bartos, ‘Uti Possidetis, Quo Vadis?’ 18 Australian Yearbook of International Law 37 (1997) 37-96. 
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Radan,20 Lalonde,21 Johanson,22 Vidmar,23 Mirzayev,24 Peters,25 and Sarvarian.26 Next, I summarize 
these authors’ views on uti possidetis in relation to the socialist federal dissolutions.  
Pellet and Craven see the establishment of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia as an essential organ to award legitimacy to the uti possidetis borders. Pellet concludes 
that such an international instrument can also be useful in solving future ethno-territorial conflicts. 
Craven argues that in the absence of effective control, uti possidetis was used to give the emerging 
states both their shape as well as an international personality as states.27 Shaw is firmly of the opinion 
that uti possidetis is a general principle, basing his analysis on the International Court of Justice’s 
(ICJ) Territorial Dispute case and the state practice from the early 1990s onwards.28 To him, uti 
possidetis is both factual and legal concept that remains a framework rule. Regardless, the borders it 
creates can be changed, either by an agreement of the parties in question or by a coordinated collective 
policy of recognition in the interest of international peace and security.29  
Ratner and Lalonde deliver a very critical take on the application of uti possidetis outside 
decolonization context. Ratner nevertheless insists that it is, despite its misgivings, a customary 
norm.30 In his conclusion, he proposes a new version of uti possidetis that goes back to the original 
Roman doctrine and awards only a provisional title of territory, which will remain until the parties 
accept the costs and benefits of those borders or new ones after negotiating.31 This is significant, as 
proposals for reforming or re-interpreting the uti possidetis doctrine are otherwise almost 
nonexistent.32 Lalonde draws a different conclusion and argues that uti possidetis never had such a 
                                                 
20 P. Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’ 24(1) Melbourne 
University Law Review (2000) 50-76. 
21 Lalonde (n 2). 
22 Johanson (n 2). 
23 Vidmar (n 2). 
24 F. Mirzayev, Uti Possidetis v Self-Determination: The Lessons of the Post-Soviet Practice (Leicester, 2014). 
25 A. Peters, ‘The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris: How Relevant is it for Issues of Secession’ in C. Walter, A. von Ungern-Sternberg 
and K. Abushov (Ed), Self-Determination and Secession in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 95-137. 
26 A. Sarvarian, ‘Uti Possidetis Iuris in the Twenty-First Century: Consensual or Customary?’ 22(4) International Journal of Minority 
and Group Rights (2015) 511-532.  
27 Craven (n 16) 390.  
28 Shaw (n 17, ‘The Heritage’) 497-499.  
29 Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 154.  
30 Ratner (n 12) 598.  
31 Ibid. at 617-618. 
32 Silverburg has suggested that the Palestinian question could be answered by a slightly tempered version of uti possidetis. S. 
Silverburg, ‘Uti Possidetis and a Pax Palestiniana: A Proposal’ 16 Duquesne Law Review (1977–1978) 757-780 at 778-779. His 
proposal, however, tried to settle only the dispute over territory in Palestine, and not to provide a new formulation of uti possidetis for 
any future territorial disputes. In addition, Bartos presents his own proposal for a norm that would be used in dissolution cases instead 
of uti possidetis, which he terms a ‘norm of collective intervention’. Bartos (n 19) 84-85.  
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binding status as was awarded to it in Yugoslavia and that the version applied in that context was an 
entirely new version, which cannot draw legitimacy from its colonial precedents.  
Equally critical, both Bartos and Radan argue that the application of uti possidetis in the 1990s was 
not the same as the old decolonization rule. In Radan’s analysis, this uti possidetis application - which 
he terms ‘Badinter Borders Principle’ - was a political choice and ended up breaching the right to 
self-determination. He concludes that internationally supervised plebiscites in contested areas would 
have yielded better and more legally sound results.33 Bartos also determines a new rule emerging 
from the dissolutions, but he observes that this new rule can jeopardize the promotion of internal self-
determination.34 He argues that the application of uti possidetis outside decolonization context can 
have many negative consequences, concluding that it should not be applied in the future.35  
Johanson is perhaps the greatest critic of uti possidetis, denying its applicability even in the 
decolonization context due to the lack of usus and opinio juris.36 Both Vidmar and Sarvarian conclude 
that uti possidetis is not - at least automatically - applicable outside decolonization context.37 Vidmar 
finds it still desirable, as it creates an emerging practice of the creation of democratic political systems 
along with the creation of new states. Sarvarian rejects the notion of forcing successor states to accept 
uti possidetis, viewing it as just one of the possible methods of territorial limitation that may be 
adopted by the common consent of the parties.  
Peters and Mirzayev are the only ones addressing the correlation of uti possidetis and self-
determination in the post-Soviet area. Peters addresses what she terms the ‘CIS problématique’ of the 
post-Soviet secessionist entities through uti possidetis, concluding that they cannot lawfully rely on 
the doctrine for their quest for independence. Mirzayev concurs, concluding that when the principles 
of uti possidetis and external self-determination conflict, uti possidetis prevails and protects the 
territorial integrity of the successor states. 
A comprehensive legal analysis of the evolution of uti possidetis up to and beyond the socialist federal 
dissolutions has not been made,38 and this is one of my major contributions to the research field. 
Moreover, the previous research seems to take for granted the borders chosen in the socialist federal 
                                                 
33 Radan (n 20) 76. 
34 Bartos (n 19) 85-86. 
35 Ibid. at 95-96. 
36 Johanson (n 2) 123-124.  
37 Vidmar (n 2) 9-10, Sarvarian (n 26) 531-532.  
38 Only Ratner gives a complete chronological timeline on the evolution of uti possidetis, and his analysis concludes that its application 
in the socialist federal dissolutions was a mistake to begin with and, subsequently, he does not draw any conclusions from those cases. 
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dissolutions, whereas my research contests this very notion. After analyzing these dissolutions, I then 
move to my second, even more indispensable component of this dissertation: a proposal for the 
reformulated and updated version of uti possidetis, in accordance with its evolutionary logic.  
1.5 The Argument 
My argument consists of several sub-claims, each elaborated in turn in different Chapters. My first 
claim is that by a virtue of being a general principle of international law,39 uti possidetis has to evolve 
alongside the shifting paradigm of the international legal order. However, this natural and necessary 
evolution process was disrupted in the third cycle. The disruption was an unintentional byproduct of 
the doctrine’s raison d’etre - to advance the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes by upholding a 
version of a status quo. This noble aim was not achieved, since the application failed to take into 
account the combination of two legally crucial factors: the evolution of the principle of people’s right 
to self-determination and the ethnofederal model in place in the socialist federations at the moment 
of the dissolutions. Thus, uti possidetis was not updated to account for the changed circumstances of 
a non-decolonization context, and was subsequently misapplied.  
My second claim is that this misapplication has caused national anti-cohesion and fragmentation in 
many of the successor states. In 2008, this led to the fourth cycle: the proclaimed independence of 
Kosovo, followed by puzzled reactions by the international community. The reactions have varied 
between a rather absurd ‘sui generis’ (i.e., one of a kind) argumentation to justify recognition and a 
Russian policy of utilizing the Kosovo ‘precedent’ to further Moscow’s political goals in the post-
Soviet space. I further claim that the independence of Kosovo is indeed a ‘precedent’ in the sense that 
                                                 
39 For the authoritative statements of qualifying uti possidetis as a general principle, see the ICJ’s Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 20; Qatar 
v. Bahrain (n 2) paras. 10, 148; The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between Indian and Pakistan, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XVII, 19 February 1968, 1-576 at 527; Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, Court of Arbitration, 
19 October 1981, in E. Lauterpacht and C. Greenwood (Ed), International Law Reports Vol. 91 (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
549-680 at 579; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening), Judgement, I.C.J 
Reports 351 (1992), para. 386L; Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 3, 11 January 1992, para. 2. For additional 
supporting scholarly views, see, among others, G. Naldi, ‘The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Africa and its Relevance to the 
Palestinian/Israeli Peace Process’ X Palestinian Yearbook of International Law (Kluwer, 1998/1999) 27-42 at 39; Shaw (n 17, 
‘Peoples’) 503; J. Scott, ‘The Swiss Decision in the Boundary Dispute between Colombia and Venezuela’ 16(3) American Journal of 
International Law (1992) 428-431 at 428-429; and the Counter Memorial of Yemen (‘in the dismemberment of an empire like the 
Ottoman Empire, there is a presumption, both legal and political in character, that the boundaries of the independent states which 
replace the Empire will correspond to the boundaries of the administrative units of which the dismembered Empire was constituted’). 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea - Yemen Arbitration (First Stage: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute). ILM, Vol. 
40, No. 4, 2001, pp. 900-982. 
There are also dissenting opinions. For instance, concentrating on the African context, see D. Ahmed, Boundaries and Secession in 
Africa and International Law: Challenging Uti Possidetis (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 32-35; and, in general, S. Torres 
Bernández, ‘The “Uti Possidetis Juris Principle” in Historical Perspective’ in K. Ginther (Ed), Völkerrect zwischen normativem 
Anspruch und politischer Realität: Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot, 1994) 417-438 at 435. 
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it has solidified the ‘frozen’ state of several post-Soviet territorial conflicts.40 I posit that the 
international community did a twofold mistake with uti possidetis. The first was to misapply it in the 
early 1990s, but at least consistently. The second mistake was made by 114 UN member states41 from 
early 2008 onwards, where they breached the flawed logic of the third cycle by recognizing the 
independence of one of the mistreated minorities and calling that case unique. Some have joined 
Russia in claiming that this has created a legal precedent for all the post-soviet territorial disputes, 
and especially the separatist leaders have been eagerly invoking this argument.  
Therewith, the main argument that I present in this dissertation is the following: the vital evolution 
of uti possidetis was disrupted in its transformation into a non-colonial context, generating a series of 
territorial conflicts in the affected areas. The main legal legacy of the socialist federal dissolutions is 
twofold. In relation to international law in general, these events led to the distortion of the uti 
possidetis doctrine. In relation to the successor states in particular, the failure to update uti possidetis 
in the socialist federal dissolutions have led to a lack of balance between the peoples’ right to self-
determination and the territorial integrity of states. Therewith, the doctrine’s distorted application has 
transformed it into having a potential to generate rather than to prevent territorial disputes. The 
seemingly perpetual conflicts plaguing the successor states of the SFRY and the USSR - Kosovo, 
Abkhazia and Crimea being the most proverbial - are all symptoms of this legacy.  
1.6 The Proposal for Uti Possidetis Meritus 
After having explained the causes of the misapplication of uti possidetis in the socialist federal 
dissolutions, the main goal of this dissertation is to re-interpret the doctrine to be applicable in other 
cases and to factor in the changes that have taken place in international law since its last successful 
application in the 1960s. Hence, I now present a proposal for an updated version of uti possidetis in 
consistence with its evolutionary logic.  
Both internal and external borders are created in a particular political context. While the SFRY was 
throughout its existence an undemocratic state, its creation on a federal basis in 1946 was a result 
                                                 
40 Many scholars have insisted on the precedential value of the independence of Kosovo. For example, Chris Borgen has argued that, 
since those states recognizing Kosovo’s independence refused to argue that Kosovo is owed sovereignty as a legal right, they had no 
choice but to resort to the sui generis argumentation. This, in turn, has led to a situation where, ‘while there is not (as of yet) a Kosovo 
“precedent” in international law, there is now, based on the reactions of the TMR (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic) and other 
secessionist entities, as well as Russia, a Kosovo argument in international diplomacy’. C. Borgen, ‘Imagining Sovereignty, Managing 
Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s “Frozen Conflicts”’ 9 Oregon Review of International Law (2007) 477-535 at 524-525.  
41 N 7.  
13 
 
from considerable internal national negotiations. Some scholars have argued that the logic of keeping 
certain borders without the political context can and should be called into question.42 Yet, uti 
possidetis does not work that way. The doctrine cannot question the juris situation without a causal 
sequence that might prove disastrous for the international peace and security. Thus, the last federal 
constitutions need to be the starting point on any legal analysis in relation to uti possidetis. According 
to these constitutions, some of the SSRs’ and the SRs’ borders were delineated, even conditioned, on 
them having highly autonomous self-determination units within those borders.43  
There are two distinct types of intra-state borders: federal and internal. Federal borders are less 
susceptible to change because they are a result of negotiations, whereas internal borders are more 
often based on unitary decisions.44 If there are no exceptional grounds for rebutting a presumption 
that the entities entered their close relationship for historical reasons, this presumption and the 
continuation of internal self-determination will prevail. In addition, in both variants of the right to 
self-determination, scholars and states tend to view this not as a single-use, but rather a continuing 
right.45 Johanson, in her well-defined analysis, has separated the purpose, functionality, and the 
effects of borders, which in turn reveals the desired and the actual effects of a border. The desired 
effect explains why the internal border was constructed, what effects it was supposed to have, and the 
consequences of internationalizing it.46 In other words, the political context has to be addressed. 
Notably, the application of uti possidetis in the socialist federal dissolutions failed to address these 
issues. For example, in the case of Serbia, its external borders were internationalized and its internal 
                                                 
42 For instance, Johanson argues that the internal borders of the SFRY should have been modified after the dissolution, since they were 
created only to make the federation possible as a state. Once this goal became obsolete, there was no reason to maintain them (Johanson 
(n 2) 244). However, I claim that it is impossible to define the original reasoning behind certain borders. In order for uti possidetis to 
function, the borders need to be assumed to ‘reflect the wishes of the people and, thus, satisfy self-determination’. J. Summers, The 
Idea of the People: The Right of Self-Determination, Nationalism and the Legitimacy of International Law (PhD Thesis, University of 
Helsinki, 2004) at 149.  
43 See, e.g., B. Rrecaj, ‘A Contemporary Interpretation of the Principles of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination, 
and the Kosovo Conundrum’ in J. Summers (Ed), Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and 
implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 109-142 at 115 (‘Kosovo was 
a de facto republic lacking formal arrangements’); R. Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in 
Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 114 (‘the 1974 constitution gave the Kosovo Autonomous Region de facto powers of 
a full-fledged republic’); and M. Pavlović, ‘Yugoslavia - The Constitution of 1974 and Some Political Results’, Transconflict, 19 April 
2013 <http://www.transconflict.com/2013/04/yugoslavia-the-constitution-of-1974-and-some-political-results-19/.> at 55-56 (‘In 
effect, the federal constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo de facto republican status, but not de jure status’). 
44 J. Presscot, Boundaries and Frontiers (London, 1978) at 167.  
45 According to UNESCO, self-determination ‘is not confined to a right to be enjoyed by formerly colonized peoples. It is not a right 
to be enjoyed once only and thereafter to be forever lost’. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/6, para. 3(d). The representative of Jordan 
echoed this in a report to the UN Human Rights Committee, stating that ‘the principle of self-determination is a continuous process 
and does not end with the declaration of independence’. Jordan, CCPR Report, UN Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.55 (1981) at 2. See also O. 
Kimnich, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession’ in C. Tomuschat (Ed), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer, 1993) 83-98 at 90. 
46 Johanson (n 2) 196-197. In order to understand the desired effects of the Kosovo-Serbia internal SFRY border, the political context 
needs to be addressed. See subchapter 4.2.5. 
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divisions (i.e., political context) were completely ignored.47 Those applying uti possidetis were not 
prepared for the multidimensional borders of the socialist federations. While the internationalized 
borders were chosen in the same seemingly impartial manner as in the case of decolonization, this 
time around there were numerous lower-level subunits with extensive legal guarantees. It would have 
been essential to respect the existing autonomous arrangements. The history of those successor states 
that decided to reject their ethnofederal legacy speaks volumes for the need to update uti possidetis.48  
The proposed updated version of uti possidetis takes into account new developments in international 
law, especially the codification of internal self-determination in international Conventions. In 
addition, it considers the transnational context and takes into account the actual political situation on 
the ground at the moment of independence. In other words, I propose a more in-depth understanding 
of the nature of borders and the regimes around and the purposes of those borders. I call this proposal 
uti possidetis meritus, that can be roughly translated ‘as you have earned, so you may possess’. It is 
a formula for expanded recognition of internal borders in accordance with the internal and external 
self-determination dichotomy. It draws legitimation from its conformity with the existing uti 
possidetis framework.49 According to the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute case, uti possidetis ‘applies to 
the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing. The principle of uti 
possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back the hands’.50 
While this is an entertaining metaphor, uti possidetis, in its current form, is not simply a ‘photograph’ 
of the territorial situation then existing. It is rather a sketch, or a photograph after some photoshopping 
has taken place. Uti possidetis affirms the borders after there has been a critical choice of which 
borders to include in the picture. The closer you zoom into the original picture, the more dividing 
                                                 
47 Some authors have argued that The Hague Peace Conference should have put pressure to negotiate on borders. For example, see B. 
Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia’ 48(4) World Politics 
(1996) 482-521 at 495; V. Jovanovic, ‘The Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations’ 21(5) Fordham 
International Law Journal (1997) 1719-1736 at 1724; D. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction 
of Yugoslavia (Vanderbilt, 2009) at 11, 77; and E. Hasani, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The 
Case of Yugoslavia (Bilkent University, 2001) at 216-217. However, ‘natural borders’ are almost nonexistent in the world, and the 
federal internal borders at least tend to result from negotiations and to be more acceptable ones (e.g., Presscot (n 44) 167). In the SFRY, 
there had been negotiations that had produced the internal borders that were in place in the early 1990s - including those of Serbia. 
48 See Chapter 5. 
49 Many scholars have called for reformation of the uti possidetis doctrine after the third cycle of the socialist federal dissolutions. For 
instance, Klabbers and Lefeber have argued that the collision between self-determination and uti possidetis should be resolved either 
by using uti possidetis with justice and equity considerations, or by using self-determination with considerations of stability mitigating 
its effects (J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ in C. Brölmann (Ed) Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 37-76 at 76). Allen and Castellino have emphasized the need for 
modern international law to reassess the relationship between the rights to self-determination and its ‘attendant doctrine’ uti possidetis 
in order to develop a more equitable approach to the resolution of such territorial disputes (S. Allen and J. Castellino, ‘Reinforcing 
Territorial Regimes: Uti Possidetis and the Right to Self-Determination in Modern International Law’ 48 Amicus Curiae, July/August 
(2003) 20-25 at 24). The uti possidetis meritus formula is premeditated to address these issues. 
50 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 30. 
15 
 
administrative lines appear. A value choice takes place, after which the chosen borders are highlighted 
and the rest are photoshopped out of the picture. Before the third cycle, this value choice was made 
by the emerging states in question. In the early 1990s, the SSRs of the USSR were likewise able to 
agree on the utilization of uti possidetis, albeit over the heads of the lower-level units. However, the 
dissolution of the SFRY was the first time that an outside requisite made uti possidetis applicable. 
While the EC did not command the states of the SFRY to dissolve according to the administrative 
lines, it had a major lever to use, the issue of recognition. Based on the constitutive theory of 
recognition, the EC simply informed the states of the SFRY that if fulfilling the criteria, they would 
be recognized within their former administrative borders. The Draft Convention of 4 November 1991 
had tried to highlight all the internal borders, but eventually the EC highlighted only the internal 
borders between the SRs and photoshopped out the internal borders of the SAP of Kosovo.  
After the socialist federal dissolutions, it became apparent that the contemporary understanding of 
self-determination and the ideologically determined level-structure of self-determination in these 
federations would be breached by this kind of cognizant elimination of the lower-level internal self-
determination rights in place. For example, on top of individual minority rights, the USSR had four 
levels of self-determination units with varying degrees of self-rule. As the ICJ elaborated in 2005: 
‘the uti possidetis juris principle requires not only that reliance be placed on existing legal titles, but also 
that account be taken of the manner in which those titles were interpreted and applied by the competent 
public authorities of the colonial Power’.51 
Disregarding the colonial reference as the case was about an old colonial border, the key statement 
here is the about how ‘titles were interpreted and applied by the competent public authorities’. It is 
impossible to deny that the modern understanding of ‘territorial title’ has developed into a more 
complex set of manifestations.52 In sum, in the early 1990s, both the international legal framework 
and the potential target group of uti possidetis were fundamentally different from the previous cycles.  
The uti possidetis meritus formula is based on the premise that uti possidetis is a general principle of 
international law that needs to be interpreted alongside the other international law principles. Thus, 
uti possidetis has to continue to evolve at the same phase with the principle of self-determination, or 
it will conflict with it and lose its ability to promote the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.53 
                                                 
51 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgement, I.C.J Reports (2005) 148, para. 140. 
52 Indeed, this is apparent with the definition of the right to self-determination in the 1966 Covenants (n 10). 
53 According to Koskenniemi, ‘[t]he apparent validity of the conflicting principles of uti possidetis and national self-determination has 
long been an international lawyer’s favorite paradox.’ M. Koskenniemi, ‘Report of the Director of Studies of the English-Speaking 
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Accordingly, uti possidetis meritus bases recognition in acknowledgement of the political divisions 
in place at the moment of the dissolution. It is a formula for a comprehensive interpretation of the 
‘photograph’ of the frozen ‘territorial title’ as portrayed by the ICJ in 1986.  
The uncompromising attitude in the application of uti possidetis, combined with the justified and 
legitimate expectations of the lower-level subunits, has led to several territorial conflicts and foreign 
interventions since 1991.54 In 1995, the Dayton Accords - the peace treaty that ended the Bosnian 
War - simultaneously broke the earlier uti possidetis logic and neglected to address the status of 
Kosovo, making the situation worse. As an afterthought, there was a final but ultimately unsuccessful 
international attempt to force the FRY to re-establish Kosovo’s autonomy in 1999.55 The consequent 
military intervention serves as a demonstration of the failure of the chosen version of uti possidetis 
to advance the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. 
By its very definition, uti possidetis is often challenged by minorities. Without any generally accepted 
solution to the clash between the external right to self-determination and territorial integrity of a state, 
uti possidetis has to address the grievances of these minorities. Since the FRY chose the road of 
complete denial of minority rights, its clashes with the EC Guidelines and later with the separatist 
Kosovo Liberation Army became unavoidable. Therefore, I claim that the independence of Kosovo 
was a direct byproduct of the chosen version of uti possidetis. The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 
tried to readjust the doctrine into the new international legal system, but ultimately failed in relation 
to Kosovo. If the current version of uti possidetis is reapplied, it has enormous potential to fail again.  
Hence, there is an urgent need to renew the doctrine. Meritus seeks to prevent any further 
disintegration in times of territorial changes. In this sense, it shares the paramount goal of uti 
possidetis, which has previously demonstrated an ability to learn from the past and to transform along 
with the changing international legal context. This has to happen again in order for it to remain 
relevant in the future. Finally, I want to emphasize that I am not simply arguing with the benefit of 
hindsight that the continuation of the second-level units’ autonomies would have produced more 
                                                 
Section of the Center’ in P. Eisemann and M. Koskenniemi, State Succession: Codification Tested against the Facts (The Hague, 2000) 
65-132 at 102. 
54 While this introduction has been mostly discussing Kosovo, in the former USSR there were numerous armed conflicts between the 
newly independent successor states and their formerly autonomous minorities. I focus on these issues in Chapter 3.  
55 The Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, S/1999/648, would have restored Kosovo’s 
autonomy with international guarantees. However, its framework was hopelessly late, as by 1999 the FRY political leadership was 
unable to compromise, and the Albanian leadership was refusing to settle for anything less than full independence.  
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desirable results. I argue that according to the evolutionary logic of uti possidetis, my interpretation 
of uti possidetis meritus would have been more in accordance with international law. 
1.7 The Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2, The Evolutionary Cycles of Uti Possidetis Juris, presents the original version of uti 
possidetis and demonstrates its evolutionary logic through the main evolution cycles. After dissecting 
the complex relationship between uti possidetis and the right to self-determination, Chapter concludes 
that uti possidetis was the right doctrine, but the wrong version, in the socialist federal dissolutions. 
Part II, The Two Components of Uti Possidetis Meritus, introduces the internal and external 
components of the meritus proposal. Chapter 3, The Internal Component: Socialist Ethnofederalism, 
exhibits the first component - the last applicable internal legal order of the dissolving state. It analyzes 
in detail the concepts of nationality, nationalism and self-determination in the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, including the ethnofederal concept that was supposed to provide an answer for the ‘national 
question’.56 It explains the four-tier ethnofederal structure, how the ‘progressiveness’ of a people was 
designated and how this contributed to their legitimate expectations (meritus) prior to the dissolution.  
Chapter 4, The External Component: The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination, presents the 
second component - the international legal framework at the moment of the federal dissolutions. It 
accounts for the evolution of the right to self-determination since the 1960s second cycle of uti 
possidetis. It then disentangles the double mistake made by the international community by first 
excluding the second-level ethnofederal entities altogether, and then recognizing one of them 
independent and calling it ‘unique’. This has hastened the fragmentation of those successor states that 
had inherited the socialist ‘solution’, and distorted the contemporary right to self-determination. 
Part III, The Legal Legacies of the Socialist Federal Dissolutions, concludes the dissertation by 
enumerating the legal aftermath of the 1990s federal dissolutions and by proposing the meritus 
formula as a remedy to the endemic separatism of the post-Soviet space. Chapter 5, The Right to Self-
Determination in a State Dissolution Context, combines the evidence gathered in the other Chapters. 
It gives a comprehensive review of how the right to self-determination was realized in the socialist 
federal dissolutions, how the successor states confronted their former autonomous subjects, and why 
the subsequent international mediation efforts have failed to settle the overlapping territorial claims.  
                                                 
56 This essential question had to be answered since the original theory had a significant ideological problem with nationalism and its 
self-proclaimed progressiveness could not allow exercising Great Power chauvinism against minorities. See n 179. 
18 
 
Chapter 6, The Theory of Orderly State Dissolution: Uti Possidetis Meritus, concludes the argument 
by exhibiting two potential forms of application for my proposal. First, meritus can be used to gain 
insights into the parties’ demands and thus to help settle already existing conflicts in the post-Soviet 
and post-Yugoslav spaces. Second, as a general principle, it can be used to minimize territorial 
fragmentation and subsequent conflicts in the future state dissolution or independence cases. 
Finally, Chapter 7, Conclusions: Salvaging Uti Possidetis Juris, rounds up the dissertation by 
summarizing the findings of the other Chapters and by presenting my final conclusions.  
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2. The Evolutionary Cycles of Uti Possidetis Juris  
This Chapter presents the evolution of international law doctrine of uti possidetis, with its two 
variants, uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis de facto. I focus predominantly on the former variant, 
as the doctrine’s evolutionary nature has made the latter obsolete. From a legal point of view, my 
main interest is on the doctrinal and hierarchical relations of uti possidetis with the principles of self-
determination of peoples and territorial integrity of states.  
Uti possidetis is a constantly evolving international legal doctrine. I have identified four distinct 
cycles of this evolution, with each cycle developing the doctrine by either changing its substance or 
enlarging its target group. These are Decolonization of Spanish America (1808-1836); 
Decolonization of Africa and South Asia (the 1960s); Socialist Federal Dissolutions (the 1990s); and 
the Independence of Kosovo (2008).57 Originally a Roman private law doctrine, uti possidetis was 
transferred to the international law sphere in the early 1800s. Since then, uti possidetis has been 
increasingly conflicting with other legal principles, especially self-determination of peoples. This is 
not surprising, as it is a byproduct of uti possidetis’ historical evolution - its main goal has always 
been to avoid violence at any cost, with the demands of self-determination given only secondary 
importance. While the ambiguous legal position of uti possidetis seems to suggest that it could only 
be used as a default rule when there are no other competing rules in place, in practice - as 
demonstrated by the second and third cycles - it seems to overrule any competing norms.  
While the doctrine is often applied with some unease, and its track record shows mixed results and 
dissatisfaction with the borders that it has created, it is nevertheless periodically utilized due to the 
lack of credible alternatives. Notably, with uti possidetis’ main existential reason being to resolve 
territorial conflicts peacefully, it suffered a major defeat when applied outside decolonization context 
in the early 1990s Yugoslavia and violence broke out.58  
In this Chapter, I first give a limited summary of the origins and the first two historical evolutionary 
cycles of the legal doctrine of uti possidetis. I then assess the its difficult and often contradictory 
relationship with the international law principles of self-determination of peoples and territorial 
                                                 
57 This is by no means a conclusive list of the application cycles of uti possidetis, but I have chosen these instances as they have 
transformed the doctrine in meaningful ways. Other application rounds include the creation of multiple states with the breakup of the 
Federal Republic of Central America (1841), in the aftermath of the end of the First World War (1917-1923), and the gradual 
decolonization of the Middle East before and after the Second World War. However, in these instances, there were other legal factors 
at play (such as defeat in a major war), and no references to uti possidetis as a legitimating factor were made.  
58 The application of uti possidetis outside decolonization context has been legally disputed by a significant amount of scholars. For 
example, see Ratner (n 12); Radan (n 20) 50-76; Jankov and Ćorić (n 1); Lalonde (n 2); and Hasani (n 1).  
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integrity of states - both undisputedly established by the 1960s - by placing them into an international 
legal hierarchy. Finally, after analyzing the latest two cycles outside the decolonization context, I 
present my conclusions of the evolution of the uti possidetis doctrine. 
2.1 Original and Modern Versions of Uti Possidetis Juris 
The uti possidetis doctrine is derived from the ancient Roman civil law principle of uti possidetis, ita 
possideatis.59 According to its original form, when there was a dispute between two claims on 
property, an official edict would grant provisional possession of the property in question during the 
litigation to one of the parties unless the other party had obtained it by violence or in a form 
revocable.60 When the doctrine was transferred to the international law sphere, the original clause that 
excluded even provisional possession if it was accomplished by the use or force was reversed. This 
was understandable, given that the use of unlimited military force was considered a legitimate tool of 
coercion between states under international law of that time.61  
The modern, international version of uti possidetis creates a new, territorially sovereign state by 
transforming previous administrative borders into international borders at the moment of 
independence. For example, in 1957, the United Kingdom accepted the independence of its colony, 
British Ghana. The doctrine of uti possidetis then legally established within which borders new state 
would be constituted. The mere administrative unit of British Ghana turned overnight - with the aid 
of universal international recognition and the admission to the UN - into the Republic of Ghana within 
these former administrative borders and with full sovereignty over this territory.62 Correspondingly, 
uti possidetis insists that states emerging from colonial administrative control must accept the pre-
                                                 
59 Ratner (n 12) 593; Hensel et al. (n 1) 8. 
60 The Roman Praetor was applying a legal formula of ‘[u]ti eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero 
possidetis, quominus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto’ (‘As you possess the house in question, the one not having obtained by force, 
clandestinely, or by permission from the other, I forbid force to be used to the end that you may not continue to possess it’). Peters (n 
25) 97. See also Ratner (n 12) 592-593.  
61 See, inter alia, L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht (Ed), International Law: A Treatise (7th Ed., London, Longman 1952) 598-599; 
and T. Baty, ‘Can an Anarchy be a State?’ 28(3) American Journal of International Law (1934) 444-455 at 444, 446, 454.  
62 Ghana Independence Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 (1957) at 1. There were, however, several notable inconsistencies with the application of uti 
possidetis in Africa, and Ghana is an interesting example of this. While Republic of Ghana did succeed into the territory of the British 
Ghana, it also received and annexed the former administrative unit of British Togoland in the process, after the former had held a 
plebiscite on the question of union. This could be seen as a violation of the uti possidetis doctrine, since the people of Togoland were 
not given a chance to vote for independence, but rather to join either Ghana or French Togo. Report by His Majesty’s Government in 
the United Kingdom to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of Togoland under United Kingdom 
Trusteeship, for the Years 1949-1955, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1950-1956. 
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existing colonial boundaries. The conceptual logic is that a change of sovereignty by itself does not 
change the status of a boundary.63 The ICJ has clarified the doctrine in the following manner:  
‘By becoming independent, a new State acquires sovereignty with the territorial base and boundaries left 
to it by the colonial power. International law - and consequently the principle of uti possidetis - applies 
to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards. 
It applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing. The 
principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back the hands’.64 
This transformation poses a challenge, as internal and external borders tend to serve very different 
purposes, and states do not regulate their internal borders as possible candidates for external ones.65 
Yet, despite these apparent shortcomings uti possidetis has been systematically applied and strongly 
endorsed by the ICJ on several occasions. It has evolved from the decolonization context of the first 
two cycles to the dissolution of federations in the early 1990s.66 During these evolutionary cycles, the 
potential target group of uti possidetis has been expanded, and it is solidifying its status as a general 
principle of international law and the doctrine of choice in the cases of state dissolution.67  
Notwithstanding, the constant evolution has come with a price of unpredictability. Uti possidetis 
appears to have potential for both over and under inclusiveness, i.e. it might include future cases we 
would not want it to include and exclude cases that we would want it to include.68 While this is a 
common problem in international law, it is a particularly delicate matter with uti possidetis, since the 
rules of territory and sovereignty are essential in an international system of equal sovereign states. 
Primarily for this reason, there have been no universal codification attempts of uti possidetis, and it 
remains a somewhat vague rule without incontrovertible source. While the ICJ has attempted at times 
to remove this ambiguity by clarifying the doctrine’s content and place in the international legal 
hierarchy, it has done so very carefully, realizing the potential risks involved. One thing does not 
seem to change - uti possidetis is needed, time and time again, to delineate borders when there are 
unexpected changes in the political map of the world. It then requires an expansive legal interpretation 
                                                 
63 McCorquodale and Pangalangan (n 1) 874.  
64 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 30. 
65 Malcolm Shaw has described the difference thus: ‘Internal or admin borders are established by domestic law for a variety of purely 
domestic purposes, and they may alter widely over time. While internal boundaries fix permanent lines and have important 
consequences concerning international responsibility and jurisdiction, internal boundaries possess none of these characteristics’. Shaw 
(n 17, ‘The Heritage’) 489-490.  
66 It can be argued that the doctrine has evolved even beyond the dissolution of a federation context in the case of Kosovo and Serbia. 
67 N 39. 
68 About the commonality of this problem in international law, see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 591-592. 
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from the previous cases to be justified in a new situation. Thus, the doctrine’s content is only defined 
through these problematic situations where it needs to be applied.  
2.2 The First Cycle: Decolonization of Spanish America 
The first application of uti possidetis took place in the context of the dissolution of the Spanish 
Empire. After the Napoleonic invasion and especially due to the abdication of Ferdinand VII of Spain 
in 1808, the local criollo leaders of the American colonies demanded self-government. They 
legitimized their actions through traditional law and the sovereignty of the people in the absence of a 
legitimate king.69 This so-called retroversion of the sovereignty to the people was a precursor of the 
notion of popular sovereignty in Spanish America.70 It was premised on the basis that the colonies 
were a personal possession of the King, not of Spain. Hence, when the legitimate ruler was illegally 
removed, the principle insisted that the sovereignty would return to the people, who had a right to 
accept or to reject the authority of the new ruler in Madrid.71 Spain was unwilling to accept this 
retroversion, insisting on its legitimate colonial rights and a long period of wars and instability 
followed, with the complete decolonization of Spanish America legally finished only in 1836.72  
From 1826 to 1884, there were altogether three inter-state conferences on the subject of creating a 
continent-wide Latin American Confederation.73 In the end, all the plans ended up being rejected by 
the revolutionary leaders due to the lack of communications, political experience, and common 
traditions between the newly independent states.74 Thus, with the colonies having achieved de facto 
independence but having rejected the plans for confederation, there was a pressing need to delineate 
                                                 
69 The legal foundations of these claims were derived from the old ‘Seven-Part Code’ of traditional Spanish law, compiled during the 
reign of Alfonso X of Castile (1252-1284). The original text has been codified and compiled in Spanish, for instance, in Las Siete 
Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso X, El Sabio, 1, (Impr. Real, 1807). 
70 The doctrine of popular sovereignty submits that the authority - or legitimacy - of the government is created and sustained by the 
consent of its people, who are the true source of political power. The origins of the doctrine is with the social contract philosophers, 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Anne Peters well summarizes the modern version of popular sovereignty: ‘the standard view is now that 
the internal sovereignty of a government depends on its legitimacy and that its legitimacy is the basis of its sovereignty’. A. Peters, 
‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ 20(3) European Journal of International Law (2009) 513-544 at 517.  
71 N. Goldman, Nuevas perspectivas en la Historia de la Revolución de Mayo (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1998). For the critical 
view on immovability of sovereignty see P. Gratton, ‘A “Retro-version” of Power: Agamben via Foucault on Sovereignty’ 9(3) Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2006) 445-459.  
72 The Spanish Empire collapsed in 1820 when a great internal upheaval in Madrid forced the returned King Ferdinand VII to restore 
the 1812 Constitution. The new liberal government in Spain - rather naively - assumed that the Latin American insurgents were fighting 
for a liberal cause and that there could be reconciliation based on the 1812 Constitution. However, the colonial leaders rejected any 
notions of the return to the Spanish rule. Finally, in 1836 Spain renounced its sovereignty over all of continental America. Even though 
it took Spain much longer to recognize them independent, from 1836 onwards there were no competing claims on sovereignty over 
their territories. M. Costeloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) at 165-171.  
73 The conferences were held in 1826, 1847-1848, and 1884. 
74 A. Alvarez, ‘Latin America and International Law’ 3(2) American Journal of International Law (1909) 269-310 at 278-281, 288.  
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the new territorial units. Eventually, all the Latin American colonies apart from the Portuguese colony 
of Brazil75 chose to utilize the altered version of the Roman doctrine of uti possidetis, ita possideatis. 
However, this took place with a considerable delay, as the majority of the colonies affirmed the 
application of uti possidetis only in 1848, thereby giving a retroactive effect to the 1810 
administrative borders.76 Notably, the decision for the first international application of uti possidetis 
was made by the local peoples, and there was no outside pressure to adopt these particular borders. 
The doctrine was understandably desirable from the colonies’ point of view. First, it ensured that 
there would be no area of terra nullius, which would be inviting any re-colonization by Spain or other 
European powers. Second, the acceptance of Spanish administrative borders would ensure that the 
independent colonies would not start fighting each other for the location of these borders. Finally, uti 
possidetis provided the new states with a territorial legitimization, enabling them to proclaim 
judicially acceptable nature of the state’s territorial definition, both internally and externally.77  
Additionally, there was a conflict of the two versions of uti possidetis. The previous legal practice 
was that a secessionist attempt was condemned or recognized, pending on whether an entity enjoyed 
effective control over the territory.78 Some scholars and revolutionary criollos continued to advance 
this idea of uti possidetis de facto, arguing that the borders between American states should be drawn 
according to the effective possession at the time of independence. Comparably, uti possidetis juris 
held that only the Spanish legal documents could determine the location of borders. In the end, juris 
became the dominant variant and was used, for example, in 1933 by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice to settle a border dispute between Honduras and Guatemala.79  
Most of the Latin American states proceeded to codify uti possidetis into their constitutions and 
international treaties.80 From the doctrinal point of view, this was a significant definition of policy 
                                                 
75 P. La Pradelle, La Frontiére: Etude de Droit International (Paris, 1928) at 79-83. 
The Portuguese colony of Brazil was administrated as one colonial unit. After Napoleon was defeated in 1815, King John VI of Portugal 
raised de jure status of Brazil to an equal and integral part of a ‘United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves’ (Reino Unido 
de Portugal, Brasil e Algarves, Law issued by the Prince Regent on 16 December 1815). However, in 1820 a Constitutionalist 
Revolution erupted in Portugal. A new constituent assembly demanded a gradual undermining of the Brazilian sovereignty, igniting 
an armed uprising for independence. After years of fighting, King accepted the independence of Brazil in Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, 29 
August 1825. The separatist leaders wanted to keep the previous administrative unit intact and, since there were no competing claims, 
with the Treaty of 1825, the sovereignty over the whole Brazil was transferred to the newly proclaimed Empire of Brazil.  
76 This was done in the Treaty of Confederation (Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and New Granada), 8 February 1848. 
77 Shaw (n 17, ‘The Heritage’) 97.  
78 Johanson (n 2) 106.  
79 Honduras Borders Case (Guatemala v. Honduras), PCIJ Series A, No. 2 (1933) 1309, at 1323. 
80 For example, see Constitución Política de la República de Ecuador, 23 September 1830, Art. 4; Constitución de la República de 
Honduras, 8 February 1848, Art. IV; Constitución de Venezuela de 1830, 1 January 1830, Art. V; Definitive Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship (Bolivia and Peru), 8 November 1831, Art. XVI; Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance (Equator and Peru), 25 January 
1860; Treaty of Peace (Colombia and Peru), 22 September 1829, Art. V; Treaty between Colombia and Venezuela for Submitting to 
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relating to the acceptance of the uti possidetis borders. The close to uniform acceptance of the doctrine 
in Latin America gives a strong presumption that there was emerging at least a local customary 
international law rule. For example, the Swiss Federal Council summarized the doctrine in their 1922 
arbitral award between Colombia and Venezuela as ‘the basis of South American public law’.81 
Concerning other legal principles, it should be noted that at the time of Spanish American 
decolonization, the principle of self-determination of peoples that could have conflicted with uti 
possidetis had not yet emerged. That being said, uti possidetis did collide with the notion of territorial 
integrity of the Spanish Empire. This was explained away with the previously mentioned retroversion 
of sovereignty. The colonial leaders saw the legal status of the colonies to be fundamentally tied to 
the figure of the legitimate King - the ultimate possessor of the colonies - and not the country of Spain 
per se. When the King was overthrown, the colonies decided not to submit under the authority of 
Madrid but saw the sovereignty over the territory having returned to its inhabitants. Therewith, 
territorial integrity was not breached. After their hard-fought independence had been achieved, the 
new states could and subsequently did claim themselves an uncontested right to territorial integrity, 
and this was accordingly recognized by the European great powers and the United States (US).  
The first cycle of uti possidetis altered the original Roman law doctrine in several ways. First, it was 
applied as a result of the use of force, something that the original version had unambiguously rejected. 
This version of the doctrine would not be applied later since by the time of the second cycle, there 
was an imperative against the use of force in international relations. Secondly, the uti possidetis juris 
- instead the original Roman uti possidetis de facto - variant took undisputed primacy. As the actual 
control over territory was in constant transition, the local leadership chose to honor the old Spanish 
administrative (juris) borders, instead of what they might have actually been territorially possessing 
at the moment of independence (de facto). Finally, the status of this possession of territorial 
                                                 
Arbitration the Question of the Boundary between the Two Republics, 14 September 1881; Semi-Official Conference of the 
Representatives of the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Equator, Mexico, Peru, Salvador, and Venezuela, 
14 August 1883; Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, 18 February 1977, Reports of Internal Arbitral 
Awards Vol. XXI, pp. 53-264 at 57; Colombia-Venezuela Boundary Case (1922), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. I (UN 
Sales 1948), at 223; and the Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906, 1960 I.C.J Reports 
57, at 30. For instance, Malcolm Shaw has been referring to the Latin American practice with codifying uti possidetis as ‘unequivocally 
supportive’. Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 99.  
81 ‘When the Spanish colonies of Central and South America proclaimed their independence in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, they adopted a principle of constitutional and international law to which they gave the name of uti possidetis juris of 1810. 
The principle laid down the rule that the boundaries of the newly established republics would be the frontiers of the Spanish provinces, 
which they were succeeding. This general principle offered the advantage of establishing the general rule that in law no territory of old 
Spanish America was without an owner. [...]. The principle also had the advantage; it was hoped, of doing away with boundary disputes 
between the new states’. Swiss Arbitration Award, ‘The Decision of the Swiss Federal Court’, signed at Bern, Switzerland, on 24 
March 1922, by the President and Chancellor of the Swiss Confederation, 428-429.  
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sovereignty was changed from the provisional one into a permanent one. The modern public 
international law version and a potential customary precedent of uti possidetis had emerged. 
2.3 The Second Cycle: Decolonization of Africa and South-Asia 
After 150 years had passed since the first cycle, uti possidetis was reapplied in the African and 
Asian decolonization context in the 1960s, in a very different international legal era. The 
subsequent evolution of the doctrine is derived from two main differences: the changes in other 
international law principles (such as the prohibition of the use of force), and in the legal framework 
from the state succession of only one sovereign (Spain) to several sovereigns (European colonial 
powers of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).  
Since there had not been any codification of the doctrine in international treaties outside Latin 
America, in order for uti possidetis to be legally applicable, there was a need for evidence of it 
being accepted as a customary international law rule or a general principle. The Statute of the ICJ 
describes customary international law as ‘a general practice accepted as law’.82 It is generally 
agreed that the existence of a customary international legal norm requires the presence of two 
elements, state practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is required, prohibited or allowed, as 
a matter of law (opinio juris sive necessitatis).83 However, since uti possidetis had been reapplied 
very scarcely and without explicit references to it,84 there was no evidence of usus or opinio juris. A 
choice had to be made between a wholesale redrawing of the African borders in an attempt to rectify 
the past injustices and an agreement to use colonial borders and uti possidetis.  
Decolonization movement drew legitimacy from the right to self-determination of peoples, which had 
been proclaimed first as a political principle in 1917. In 1945, this principle had been incorporated 
into Articles 2(1) and 55 of the UN Charter, but was considered too vague to provide a clear legal 
entitlement.85 However, decolonization had a definite momentum, and subsequent developments 
                                                 
82 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 (I) (b), 26 June 1945. 
83 L. Doswald-Beck, ‘Assessment of Customary International Law: Introduction’, International Committee of the Red Cross (2005) 1-
9 at 1. While these two constituent elements have been accepted uniformly by scholars, there remains different emphasizes on the 
relation between the two. For instance, professor Bin Cheng holds that the state practice being significant only as evidence of opinio 
juris, which is the crucial element in forming customary international rule. B. Cheng, ‘Custom: The Future of General State Practice 
in a Divided World’ in R. McDonald and D. Johnston (Eds), The Structure & Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, 
Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983) 513-532 at 515.  
84 N 57. 
85 I analyze the right to self-determination in much more detail in Chapter 4. 
Self-determination has never evolved from the vagueness relating to its exact legal content. According to Jan Klabbers, the ‘very norm 
of self-determination used to be (and still is) rather indeterminate, too indeterminate perhaps for uncontroversial judicial application’. 
J. Klabbers, ‘The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law’ 28(1) Human Rights Quarterly (2006) 186-
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made self-determination as a right in customary and treaty law. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples86 (1960 Declaration) made the decolonization 
process simply irreversible. According to Article 2,‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development’. It laid the legal foundation for the decolonization policy of the UN. 
In 1966, two crucial UN covenants established in their first articles the right to self-determination as 
a treaty right.87 In 1970, a Friendly Relations Declaration reaffirmed the right to self-determination 
and added that ‘[e]very State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter’.88 Finally, there have since been several authoritative elaborations in the auspices of 
the UN on the content of self-determination.89  
After the 1960 Declaration, most of the colonial empires in Africa dissolved rapidly. Since the 
colonialists had, in effect, no choice but to grant independence to all their subjugated peoples, they 
had to choose their future borders.90 At first, it seemed that the colonial powers would ally with the 
so-called Pan-Africanists and redraw the borders. In 1958, the All-African People’s Conference 
(AAPC) was held in Accra, the capital of then already independent Ghana. Delegates consisted of 
activists from the African states still under colonial rule, and of governmental bodies of already 
independent African states. The AAPC passed the resolution denouncing colonial boundaries as 
                                                 
206 at 189. For a comprehensive analysis of the divide that transforms the political idea into an international legal right of self-
determination, see Cassese (n 9). For more on the object of internal self-determination, see W. Twining, Issues of Self-Determination 
(Aberdeen University Press, 1991). For the legitimization of international law through self-determination and nationalism, see 
Summers (n 42). 
86 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA res. 1541 (XV), adopted by the General 
Assembly on 14 December 1960. The resolution went much further than a standard UN General Assembly declaration would have. 
There was, for instance, the establishment of a Special Committee, which was a United Nations entity devoted exclusively to the issue 
of decolonization and monitoring the implementation of the resolution 1514.  
87 N 10. 
88 The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples in Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA res. 2625 (XXV), 
24 October 1970. 
89 In 1984, the Human Rights Committee’s ‘General Comment’ on Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reaffirmed 
that peoples have the right to self-determination without clarifying who the people entitled to this right are. CCPR General Comment 
No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-determination) The Right to Self-determination of Peoples, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, adopted on 13 March 1984. In 1996, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), overseeing the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UNGA res. 2106 (XX), 21 December 1965) gave 
its ‘General Recommendation’ on the right to self-determination. It recalled that self-determination had both internal and external 
aspects and emphasized that none of its actions should be construed as being inconsistent with the principles of territorial integrity and 
national unity. General Recommendation 21, The Right to Self-Determination, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(Forty-eight session, 1996), U.N Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 125 (1996). 
90 The only legal restraint was the principle of nemo dat quod non habet, according to which the metropolitan state can only transfer to 
the successor state the territorial extent of its competence. D. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1967) at 273.  
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artificial and called for their abolition or adjustment according to the true wishes of the people.91 
Nevertheless, the majority of the indigenous elites opted for maintaining extant lines as the most 
feasible method for a swift end to colonialism,92 and the withdrawing colonialists allied with them.  
The apparent reasoning behind the retention of colonial borders was to use the legal precedent of uti 
possidetis to legitimize the new international borders in Africa. Therewith, the agreement was made 
to re-introduce uti possidetis and claim that it was already a universal customary rule. This uniformity 
gave uti possidetis universal applicability, making it legally so effectual that indeed it can be argued 
to have become an international customary rule.93 The ICJ has later enhanced this legal status in the 
cases concerning Latin American and African borders.94  
The doctrine was more clearly focused on the second cycle. Most of the colonial borders were clearly 
demarcated and, unlike in Latin America, most of the legal sovereigns accepted decolonization.95 The 
political leaders of the independent African states made a collective attempt to legitimize the uti 
possidetis borders in the auspices of the newly established Organization of African Unity (OAU). As 
a remarkable gesture - and mimicking the Latin American tendency to ratify the uti possidetis borders 
via international treaties - the 1963 Charter of the OAU enshrined the sanctity of the inherited colonial 
borders among its core principles.96 One year later, the OAU delegates met in Cairo and issued a 
collective declaration, pledging to ‘respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of 
independence’ while admitting that the borders in question ‘constitute a grave and permanent factor 
                                                 
91 Accoundted for in A. Cukwurah, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems: 1963-1973’ 
1(1) Nigerian Journal of International Studies (1975) 56-81. Peter Radan has additionally been gathering other dissenting statements 
by African leaders of the time, such as Tanzania’s President Nyerere, in Radan (n 20) 69-70.  
92 C. Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (Praeger, 1962) at 228, 231. 
93 Malcolm Shaw argues that uti possidetis is a customary rule and will override the right to self-determination in a conflict situation, 
Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 152. Most of the scholars arguing for the customary rule position of uti possidetis are deriving this from the 
ICJ’s Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 21. For example, Brian Sumner argues that the Court may have tacitly elevated the status of uti 
possidetis to that of customary international law, even though it has never acknowledged as much. B. Sumner, ‘Territorial Disputes at 
the International Court of Justice’ 53(6) Duke Law Journal (2004) 1779-1812 at 1809. See also M. Wesley, ‘Uti Possidetis: The 
Procrustean Bed of International Law?’, Paper presented at the ILA Conference of 21st Century Borders, 13 June 2014, at 2. He argues 
that very few international scholars argue against uti possidetis having attained the position of customary international law.  
94 N 39. 
95 In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies and in French Algeria there was a considerable delay and even tragic violent repressions.  
96 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 25 May 1963, Art. III.3. 
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of dissension’.97 While many scholars have pointed out the obvious paradox displayed in the Cairo 
Declaration,98 the African borders remain virtually unaltered to this day.99  
The application of uti possidetis and the Cairo Declaration have been criticized. According to Sumner, 
the ideological argumentations against colonial borders as inappropriate delimiters of territory ‘is 
essentially the antithesis of a uti possidetis claim’.100 Touval considers the African borders to be in 
contradiction to otherwise prevailing notion on the aim of building nation-states.101 Ravenhill points 
out the difficulties in Africa to build state-institutes in their ethnically, socially, and historically 
fragmented territories.102 Likewise, in his well-defined analysis on the national (dis)cohesion of the 
African countries, Okafor points the blame to the inherited borders.103 Davidson has argued that the 
European states left the new African states not only with artificial borders but with an artificial 
understanding of a nation-state. He concludes that there is a need in Africa to re-invent the state that 
is appropriate for a post-imperialist future.104 Notwithstanding, the chosen African boundaries are not 
without proponents. For instance, Herbst sees them as a rational response to otherwise unmanageable 
political terrain. He argues that the sacrosanctity of African borders has enforced the principle of 
territorial integrity and thus affected positively to the development of international law.105 
The application of uti possidetis produced better results in the decolonization of Asia, where there 
had been a significant amount of preservation of the earlier state traditions during the colonial 
times.106 Thus, the new Asian states inherited the borders of units with long, pre-colonial state 
traditions, which eventually amounted to a full restoration of the pre-colonial forms of the state 
organization. Consequently, uti possidetis borders were met with wider acceptance than in Africa.107 
A major exception was that of the partition of India and Pakistan, where a ‘Two-Nation Theory’ 
                                                 
97 Resolution on Border Disputes (‘the Cairo Declaration’), 10 September 1964, AGH/RES.16(I).  
98 See, inter alia, Sumner (n 93) 1809; Ratner (n 12) 599-600; J. Herbst, ‘The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in 
Africa’ 43(4) International Organization (1989) 673-692 at 673.  
99 Outside the decolonization context, there have been only two universally recognized border changes in the form of creation of new 
states: in Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011). The independence of Namibia (1990) was considered as an instance of delayed 
decolonization. Additionally, there are numerous territorial disputes, ‘failed states’ and unrecognized entities all over Africa.  
100 Quoted in Sumner (n 93) 1792. He cites A. Burghardt, ‘The Bases of Territorial Claims’ 63(2) Geographical Review (1973) 225-
245 at 239-240. 
101 S. Touval, ‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa’ 7(2) Journal of African History (1966) 279-293. 
102 J. Ravenhill, ‘Redrawing the Map of Africa’, in D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (Eds), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in 
Africa (Westview Press, 1988) 280-289 at 282-283. 
103 O. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2000) at 33-36. 
104 B. Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 1992) at 321. 
105 Herbst (n 98) 673-674 and 692. 
106 For example, J. Gerring, D. Ziblatt, J. Van Gorp, and J. Arévalo, ‘An Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule’ 63(3) World 
Politics (2011) 377-433 at 389-392; and M. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 30. 
107 R. Solomon, ‘Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia’ (Advanced Research Project Agency, 1969) 1-59 at 27-30.  
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produced a political movement that aspired for two separate nations from the former administrative 
unit of British India.108 Subsequent developments led to the establishment of separate Dominion of 
India and Dominion of Pakistan, which then became independent inheriting these borders.109  
As mentioned earlier, from a doctrinal point of view, there were two main differences between the 
first and second cycles of uti possidetis. First, the use of force among states had been prohibited in 
1928 with the ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.110 A universal prohibition was ratified into 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which all new member states have to adhere to. Additionally, the 
London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945,111 and subsequent affirmation by the UN General 
Assembly of that Charter must be assumed, according to Ian Brownlie, to have had the effect of 
underscoring the essential illegality of the use of force as a policy instrument.112 Therewith, at the 
time of decolonization, there was a general ban on the use of force between states, which led uti 
possidetis to be chosen in order to exclude any revisionist use of force. By internationalizing the 
former administrative borders, the doctrine made these new borders protected by international law 
and the prohibition of the use of force.113 This logic was repeated in the third cycle.  
Second, due to the nature of the borders in Africa, uti possidetis had to take into account both internal 
and external lines drawn by the colonizers. For instance, in Western Africa, there were recognized 
international borders between the British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonial possessions, as 
well as various types of administrative borders within each of these colonial areas. The choice of 
which borders to turn into international ones was left for the colonizer in question, which resulted in 
Africa having more international borders than any other continent.114 However, there did not emerge 
any single method of how to determine which borders to use, making the application of uti possidetis 
                                                 
108 The separation was manifested less on linguistic or ethnic and more on religious basis. Y. Kahn, The Great Partition: The Making 
of India and Pakistan (Yale University Press, 2007) at 18-19.  
109 There has been a significant amount of resentment, ethnic deportations, and violence related to the rejection of the borders. Among 
these incidents, there have been several wars over the control of Kashmir and, in the 1970s, a Pakistani Civil War and intervention by 
India led to independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. 
110 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), 27 August 1928, League of 
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 94, p. 57, Art. I. The treaty became effective on 24 July 1929 between the original signatory states of 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, British India, the Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, 
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111 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945.  
112 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford University Press, 1963) at 116. 
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determination, the interpretation by the Badinter Commission gave Yugoslav republics prima facie statehood irrespective of the 
effectiveness. He concludes that uti possidetis was used not only to give entities their shape but also to give them international 
personality as states. Craven (n 16) 389-390.  
114 Ratner (n 12) 596.  
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inconsistent.115 In the first cycle, the divisions within the Spanish colonial empire had been mainly 
political, not cultural. In the second cycle, the divisions were cultural rather than political. 
Nevertheless, only the latter was taken into account when delineating the borders.  
In sum, in the second cycle, uti possidetis was utilized for its perceived ability to prevent violence. 
This peace-project nature of the doctrine, aimed to be accomplished by the preservation of the status 
quo, is the main reason for it being reapplied in the early 1990s. The undesirable byproduct of this 
noble aim is that it fails to recognize the amount of resentment that the new international borders can 
create. While the uti possidetis borders were not without critics in Africa, there was a majority view 
- displayed, for instance, under the auspices of OAU - that any alternative to these borders would 
cause more fragmentation. Therefore, the right to self-determination belonged to territorial units 
rather than peoples, and the indigenous elites accepted this. This is the major difference to the third 
cycle, especially in Yugoslavia where the federal authorities contested the right to self-determination 
of territorial units and, thus, the peace-project failed.116  
Next, before continuing to the third cycle, I need to analyze the relation between uti possidetis and 
the general international law principles, most importantly, that of self-determination. The application 
of the doctrine in Africa and South-Asia did not happen in breach of territorial integrity of states since 
colonization had acquired an illegal character, and there was almost a universal acceptance of 
decolonization by the previous sovereigns.117 However, uti possidetis did conflict with the right to 
self-determination. In the end, new borders are only as consistent with the right to self-determination 
as the internal laws of the previous sovereign were.118 These laws do not necessarily include 
recognizing different peoples or drawing borders according to their wishes.  
2.4 The Legal Categorization of the Right to Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis  
The people’s right to self-determination took a notorious ‘false start’ at the end of the First World 
War, being applied only in Europe and lacking at the time any concrete legal base or a precise 
                                                 
115 To name but a few, the German colonies of Togo and German Kamerun were divided between the colonies of the United Kingdom 
and France, becoming later independent as parts of Ghana, Nigeria, and French Cameroons, respectively. British and Italian Somalia 
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formula.119 The principle had two great - albeit politically opposite - ideologues: Woodrow Wilson 
and Vladimir Lenin.120 Both leaders insisted on people’s right to determine their political future. Yet, 
the reality was more restrictive. Wilson’s version of the right was applicable only to the independence 
of the subjugated peoples under the fallen monarchies of Germany and Austro-Hungary.121 Lenin’s 
version applied only within the USSR, and even there for most of the Soviet period, the alleged right 
to self-determination, including the right to secession, would exist only in theory, not in practice. 
In 1920, the League of Nations appointed a body of Commission of Rapporteurs to solve a dispute 
between Finland and Sweden over the Åland Islands. In their report, the Commission represented a 
thorough assessment of self-determination. According to the rapporteurs’ categorization:  
‘The principle is not, properly speaking, a rule of international law and the League of Nations has not 
entered it in its Covenant […]. It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed by a vague and general 
formula which has given rise to most varied interpretations and differences of opinion’.122  
In 1945, the principle of self-determination was institutionalized in the UN Charter.123 However, the 
confusion about its meaning persisted throughout and after the drafting process.124  
The status of self-determination was enhanced when the 1966 Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights125 and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights126 made it a qualified legal right beyond 
decolonization context. Both Covenants have an identical Article 1(1) specifying that:  
‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.  
In 1970, the Friendly Relations Declaration added that ‘[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any 
forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights 
                                                 
119 This false start is accounted for, inter alia, in J. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-
Determination and Statehood (Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 7-27. Cassese (n 9) 11-33) concludes that Enlightenment and the 
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120 For more on how Lenin’s proclamation of the right to self-determination made Wilson respond directly with his Fourteen Points, 
see J. Breuilly, ‘Nationalism, National Self-Determination, and International Relations’ in J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens, The 
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123 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Art. 1(2).  
124 According to Quane, the divergence of the opinions over the content of self-determination, which existed between the future Security 
Council permanent member States, was not resolved during the drafting of the Charter. H. Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving 
Right to Self-Determination’ 47(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1998) 537-572 at 561.  
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 10).  
126 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 10).  
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and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence’.127 The 
general view is that self-determination has emerged as an operative legal right.128 Nonetheless, as 
pointed out by several scholars, despite these credentials, the principle remains problematic as an 
international law norm for its vagueness.129 In the 1970 Declaration, ‘self-determination has been 
equated to self-government rather than independent statehood’, apart from the exceptional cases of 
colonies and non-self-governing territories.130 Some have argued that it should not be seen as a single 
principle at all, but for instance, as explained by Buchanan, ‘a placeholder for a range of possible 
principles specifying various forms and degrees of independence’.131 As noted by Malcolm Shaw, 
‘[s]elf-determination is always constrained by virtue of its cautious definition in international law. 
Apart from isolated examples of special circumstances, and with the aim of preservation of peace, 
there have been no recognition of secession from post-independence units’.132 
From a standpoint of the law-making process, the categorization of uti possidetis has equally divided 
the scholarly opinion. There is no univocal academic ground on whether it is a general principle, a 
general or local custom, or a judicial decision,133 although the case for the general principle has been 
the strongest in the academic circles.134 Jankov and Ćorić see uti possidetis as a mere judicial decision 
that should always give away when it is conflicting with the jus cogens norm of self-determination.135 
Ratner has argued that uti possidetis could be either seen as a local custom in Latin America and 
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Africa or as a general customary rule connected to the process of decolonization.136 Finally, according 
to Shaw, the application of uti possidetis will ‘not be overridden by the norm of self-determination’.137  
The ICJ has endorsed uti possidetis on several occasions. In the 1992 Case Concerning Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening), the dispute was 
over a boundary between El Salvador and Honduras. The Court defined uti possidetis to be 
‘concerned as much with the title to territory as with the location of boundaries’, that the ‘key aspect 
of the principle is the denial of the possibility of terra nullius’ and that ‘uti possidetis is essentially a 
retrospective principle, investing as international boundaries administrative limits intended originally 
for quite different purposes’.138 Additionally, the Court re-affirmed the principle’s pivotal role in 
territorial disputes, when it stated that ‘[t]he award’s view of the uti possidetis juris position prevails 
and cannot now be questioned juridically, even it could be questioned historically’.139 
More information can be acquired from the 1986 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso v. Republic of Mali), which entails the greatest endorsement of uti possidetis by an international 
legal organ. The dispute was instigated by Mali, which - despite having endorsed the uti possidetis 
borders in the Cairo Declaration - had questioned its boundary with Burkina Faso. The parties chose 
to submit the case to the ICJ, and the Court analyzed their border in detail. Paragraph 19 of the 
judgement deals exclusively of the intangibility of the inherited borders: 
‘In the preamble to their Special Agreement, the Parties stated that the settlement of the dispute should 
be “based in particular on respect for the principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from 
colonization”, which recalls the principle expressly stated in resolution AGH/Res. 16 (I) adopted in Cairo 
in July 1964 at the first summit conference following the creation of the Organization of African Unity, 
whereby all member States “solemnly […] pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their 
achievement of national independence.”’140  
Paragraphs 20-26 focus solely on uti possidetis: 
‘Chamber cannot disregard the principle of uti possidetis juris, the application of which gives rise to this 
respect for intangibility of frontiers. It emphasizes the general scope of the principle in matters of 
decolonization and its exceptional importance for the African continent [...]. Although this principle was 
invoked for the first time in Spanish America, it is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of 
international law. It is a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the 
obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs […]. 
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The principle of uti possidetis juris accords pre-eminence to legal title over effective possession as a basis 
of sovereignty. Its primary aim is to secure respect for the territorial boundaries which existed at the time 
when independence was achieved […]. 
  
This principle of uti possidetis appears to conflict outright with the right of peoples to self-determination. 
In fact, however, the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest course 
[…]. If the principle of uti possidetis has kept its place among the most important legal principles, this is 
by a deliberate choice on the part of African States’.141 
 
There are several important observations to be made from this lengthy quote. The ICJ gives us a 
somewhat puzzling definition of uti possidetis, in the first paragraph referring to its general scope in 
matters of decolonization, while in the second insisting that it is a principle of general scope, logically 
connected with the obtainment of independence wherever it occurs. In 1991, the decision to apply uti 
possidetis to a non-colonial situation of the third cycle was based on this equivocal formulation. 
In the third quoted paragraph, the ICJ confirms the pre-eminence of uti possidetis juris over uti 
possidetis de facto.142 In the fourth paragraph, it affirms that the principle conflicts with the right to 
self-determination, but chooses the ‘wisest course’ of ignoring this. It also states uti possidetis to be 
among the most important legal principles since the African states chose to apply it so uniformly.  
Finally, excluding the possibility of using consideration of equity in establishing the boundaries, the 
Court made the following statement, which legally enhances the doctrine significantly:  
‘The Chamber would however stress more generally that to resort to the concept of equity in order to 
modify an established frontier would be quite unjustified […]. These frontiers, however unsatisfactory 
they may be, possess the authority of the uti possidetis and are thus fully in conformity with contemporary 
international law’.143  
Thus, it would seem that the judicial decisions of the ICJ could be read to either support uti possidetis 
as a customary rule tied directly to decolonization context,144 or as a general customary rule or 
principle, related to obtaining independence wherever it occurs.145 As I mentioned before, scholarly 
                                                 
141 Ibid. paras. 20-26.  
142 The Permanent Court of International Justice had already favored uti possidetis juris in its 1933 judgment in Honduras Borders 
Case (n 79). 
143 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 149.  
144 The scholars considering uti possidetis as being tied to the decolonization context include, inter alia, Ratner (n 12) who argues that 
the doctrine should not be applied unquestioningly in cases of the breakup of established states. Lalonde has suggested that the recent 
calls to extend and apply uti possidetis in non-colonial situations are based upon its purported success in the past in resolving conflicts 
over boundaries, which, she argues, is not that impressive. Lalonde (n 2) at 230. See also Radan (n 20) 50-76. 
145 This view was endorsed for example by Malcolm Shaw, Thomas Grant, Rein Müllerson (R. Müllerson, ‘The Continuity and 
Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’ 42(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1993) 473-494 at 486), Enver Hasani (n 1) and the Badinter Commission (Opinion No. 3 (n 39)).  
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opinion is divided over the legal categorization of uti possidetis. However, a majority is leaning 
towards acknowledging uti possidetis as a general principle. For example, Shaw has argued that 
‘[t]here was no need for Chamber in Territorial Dispute case to do more than to note that uti possidetis 
juris was applicable between the parties based on its inclusion in the compromise. Chamber chose to 
underline the fact that it applies to all decolonization situation and even beyond, in all situations where 
there was a movement from one sovereign authority to another - such statement by the court outside 
the strict ratio decidenci of a decision can constitute authoritative statements of the law’.146 
In the Beagle Channel case, the Court of Arbitration summarized uti possidetis having two main 
aspects. First, there was a presumption that all territory in South America is deemed to have been part 
of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule (vice-royalties, captaincies-
general, etc.),147 leaving no area terra nullius. Second, the title to any given locality is deemed to 
automatically rest in whatever state took over the administrative area in which it was situated.148 
Before moving forward to the third cycle, I need to establish a legal hierarchy between the right to 
self-determination and uti possidetis. Some scholars have argued that self-determination has the status 
of a jus cogens norm.149 These norms are the most fundamental international law principles that 
cannot be violated by any state through treaties, or local or even general customary rules.150 
According to the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties: 
‘A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm 
                                                 
146 Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 497.  
147 As Anne Peters has pointed out, there were quite diverse types of territorial entities in Latin America: ‘uti possidetis juris was not 
only applied to the boundaries between vice-rouyautés (vice-Kingdoms), but was likewise applied to administrative subdivisions 
(called audiencia or intendencia) within a single vice-kingdom […]. Uti possidetis was applied to the different types of boundaries 
without regard for the difference in status’. Peters (n 25) 122.  
148 Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel (n 80) para. 10.  
149 For instance, Mullerson has argued that self-determination is a fundamental principle, which informs the development of other 
aspects of international law. R. Mullerson, Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2000) at 166. McCorquodale has suggested that subsequent articulations of the right to self-determination in international instruments, 
such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970, n 88), and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (27 
June 1981 (Banjul), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3), have clarified the content of Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants, thereby giving the right 
to self-determination a fundamental place in international legal hierarchy. R. McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights 
Approach’ 43(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) 857-885 at 858-859. Saul has argued that the fact that there are 
167 states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reduces the need to question the fundamental customary 
legal base of the principle. M. Saul, ‘The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for Uncertainty in 
the Scope and Content of the Right?’ 11(4) Human Rights Law Review (2011) 609-644 at 625. See also Jankov and Ćorić (n 1) 15.  
150 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 
December 1998. 
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from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character’.151 
In my opinion, the cases before the ICJ seem to be awarding self-determination a bit more limited 
status. Most scholars have taken the view that while the right to self-determination is without a doubt 
an international law principle - and a very fundamental one at that - it nevertheless will give away to 
the more straightforward principle of uti possidetis.152 This conclusion does not signal the weakness 
of the right to self-determination but that it lacks a clear legal content when compared to uti possidetis. 
The ICJ is likewise giving a cautious support uti possidetis over self-determination in the Frontier 
Dispute case, in the paragraphs cited previously. It appears that uti possidetis is, at minimum, an 
international law principle that is able to overrule self-determination in a conflict situation.153  
All that being said, two crucial things need to be kept in mind as we proceed towards the re-emergence 
of uti possidetis in the third cycle with the federal state break-up. First, the colonial territories have 
an undisputed special legal status, confirmed by the UN Charter154 and the 1960 Declaration.155 After 
those instruments, colonization had accumulated a controversial character of being not in accordance 
with international law, and decolonization was a legal response to this development.156 The socialist 
federations that dissolved in the early 1990s - the USSR and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) - were not illegal as colonial empires or as states per se.157 This fact plays a role 
when the SFRY challenges the dissolution narrative. Moreover, as uti possidetis had previously been 
                                                 
151 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 64, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331. 
152 E.g., Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 152. I concur that the two principles are in the same level in legal hierarchy, and that in a situation of 
a conflict between them, uti possidetis is the stronger for it is much more concrete. Patrick Muwanguzi, after comparing the legal 
statuses of uti possidetis and self-determination, concludes that although self-determination is a universal right, it is restricted to a 
specific category of persons and usually is overridden. Muwanguzi (n 1) 1.  
153 After the third cycle, it could be even seen as a local customary rule with a massive geographical scope that does not require 
decolonization context to be applicable. 
154 Charter of the United Nations (n 123), Chapter XI, Arts. 73-74. 
155 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (n 86). 
156 Many scholars see the end of colonization being achieved through colonies exercising their right to self-determination. Yet, there 
are dissenting views on this. For instance, Koskenniemi sees the attempt to explain decolonization in terms of a right to self-
determination skeptically: it ‘may not have been necessary to achieve what had already been decreed by politics - namely the entry 
into statehood of some hundred former colonial territories’. M. Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal 
Theory and Practice’ 43(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) 241-269 at 249.  
While views have been expressed that the USSR was indeed a colonial empire (see, inter alia, W. Kolarz, Russia and her Colonies 
(New York, 1952)), most scholars refer to the UN approved ‘salt-water thesis’, according to which one criterion of a colony is that 
there is salt water separating it from its colonial master. Only such territories have been recognized as having the right to self-
determination since their separatism does not disrupt the territorial integrity of existing nation-states. In the UNGA resolution 637, the 
principle of self-determination was affirmed for the peoples of non-self-governing territories, as identified by the UN. Declaration of 
the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, UNGA res. 637 (VII) (1952). 
157 Therewith, a legal problem manifested itself when the SFRY refused to go down peacefully, claiming the peoples of Yugoslavia 
had used their right to self-determination when forming the federal state. For example, Hondius has argued that even if the right to self-
determination still existed, it did not rest with the republics because they were not parties to, but rather results of, the union of the 
peoples. F. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations (Mouton, 1968) at 250. 
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applied only in the decolonization context, there had to be a legally comparable situation in the federal 
dissolutions. The proposed legal formula presented in the next subchapter - ‘process of dissolution’ - 
achieved placing the SFRY into the legal framework of colonization.158 While this caused some 
controversy, the underlying logic lies within the doctrine’s fundamental aim as a peace project. As 
stated by the ICJ in paragraph 26 of the Frontier Dispute case, ‘uti possidetis appears to conflict 
outright with the right of peoples to self-determination. In fact, however, the maintenance of the 
territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest course’. While not resorting to the same line 
of argument in letter, it seems that the ‘process of dissolution’ formula follows it in spirit, thereby 
valuing the maintenance of the territorial status quo within the dissolving SFRY as the wisest 
course.159 
Second, in the previous cycles, there had been no dispute on former administrative borders becoming 
international borders, but over where these borders were. In the third cycle, it was the other way 
around: the location of the previous administrative borders was clear, but in many cases, the dispute 
was over whether these should become international borders. Additionally, there were different 
hierarchical levels of federal subunits, and it was not at all self-evident which of these borders should 
be internationalized and what would be the legal status of the rest of the borders.  
Two exceptional and peaceful cases from the early 1990s need to be singled out. In 1990, the two 
German States unified by leaving the old German Democratic Republic’s administrative divisions 
intact.160 This unification, while peaceful and based on agreement, involved four other state parties.161 
In 1993, the federal state of Czechoslovakia dissolved into its two constituent parts - the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia - after a mutual agreement.  
                                                 
158 According to most of the scholars dealing with uti possidetis, its appliance in the context of federal dissolutions, while legally 
arguably artificial, was the right choice. For instance, according to Shaw, any attempt to reconfigure the SFRY internal borders at the 
time of dissolution would have most likely produced even worse outcomes. ‘The absence of uti possidetis presumption would in place 
as the guiding principle only effective control as the principal criterion for the creation of international boundaries would be to invite 
the use of force as the inexorably first step’. Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 502. 
159 Vidmar has argued that the Badinter Commission artificially stretched the judgement in Frontier Dispute, as ‘an attempt at peace 
activism’. Vidmar (n 2) 207. Shaw has argued that this stretching of the judgement actually took place already within the Frontier 
Dispute case, where the ICJ said much more about uti possidetis as it needed to.  
160 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (‘Two Plus Four Agreement’), 12 September 1990, Moscow, Art. 23; and 
T. Stammen, ‘Federalism in Germany’ in P. Wagstaff (Ed), Regionalism in the European Union (Intellect Ltd, 1999) 98-118 at 98-99. 
161 The other four were the original occupier powers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the US. For more, see R. Piotrowicz 
and S. Blay, The Unification of Germany in International and Domestic Law (Amsterdam, 1997) at 99-100.  
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2.5 The Third Cycle: The Socialist Federal Dissolutions 
Having presented the uti possidetis doctrine and its primacy in a conflict situation over self-
determination, I proceed to the third cycle and the main legal issues of this dissertation. In essence, 
this subchapter outlines the most radical transformation of uti possidetis and demonstrates some of 
its tragic consequences. According to some scholars,162 the applicability of uti possidetis outside 
decolonization context was legally questionable. However, I am of the opinion that by 1991 uti 
possidetis had a status of a general principle of international law and there were no credible 
alternatives available.163 Some dissenting scholars have insisted that a more self-determination 
friendly set of borders could have been produced - perhaps through referendums - and blame the 
premature recognition decisions by the EC of blocking this alternative.164 Still, the majority of 
scholars support the application of uti possidetis, and the state practice demonstrates that opinio juris 
was also clearly in favor of its appliance in the socialist federal dissolutions of the 1990s.  
That being said, it would have been paramount to take into account the developments in international 
law since the second cycle and the non-colonial context of the socialist federal dissolutions. While 
the EC recognition framework and the international mediation efforts attempted this restructuring, 
some key elements, including the socialist federal model, were not understood. Thus, I argue, uti 
possidetis was misapplied. The legal repercussions of this still haunt the international community. 
2.5.1 The Socialist Ethnofederal Model 
Already during the Russian Civil War (1917-1922), the Bolsheviks165 had proclaimed equality and 
sovereignty of all the peoples in Russia, including the right to self-determination and free 
development of national minorities and ethnic groups.166 Despite the reality of ultra-centralized 
control from Moscow, the 1922 Union Treaty proclaimed the USSR as a federal state of sovereign 
nations.167 The fiction of voluntariness of their unification was maintained in all the Soviet 
                                                 
162 For instance, according to Ratner (n 12); Lalonde (n 2); and Bartos (n 19).  
163 According to Shaw, both Territorial Dispute and the Badinter Commission affirmations of the applicability of uti possidetis ‘are 
authoritative, particularly bearing in mind that there was no prior rule of international law precluding the application of the uti possidetis 
principle to post-colonial situations. In addition, the subsequent practice has been fully in conformity with the principle, while 
contradictory claims have met with international opposition’. Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 503.  
164 For instance, see Crawford (n 47) 495. Jonathan Widell has concluded that in the Yugoslavian context, one might argue that uti 
possidetis is nothing but a way to bestow legitimacy to what would otherwise be nothing but a case of premature recognition. J. Widell, 
‘The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Premature State Recognition’, Serbianna 22 October 2004 at 1-3.  
165 At this point their name was officially ‘All-Russian Communist Party’. 
166 Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, adopted by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian Socialist 
Federative Soviet Republic on 15 November 1917. 
167 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Договор об образовании СССР), adopted by the ‘First Congress 
of the Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’, Moscow, 30 December 1922. Treaty legalized the voluntary union of the 
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constitutions. Indeed, the Union Treaty was used throughout the Soviet history as a constituent basic 
norm,168 providing legitimacy to the USSR and to the ruling Party. The voluntariness aspect was 
essential: under Marxist-Leninist ideological variant, any coerced domination of distant peoples by 
Moscow would have been otherwise unjustifiable.169 In January 1924, the right to self-determination 
was accompanied by the right to secession in the first Constitution of the USSR, with Article 4 stating 
that ‘[e]ach one of the member Republics retains the right to freely withdraw from the Union’.  
According to the Soviet dogma, the Bolsheviks were creating the world’s first dictatorship of the 
proletariat that all the other countries would soon follow according to the materialist conception of 
history.170 Their unwavering belief on the inevitable triumph of socialism cannot be overemphasized. 
Most of their policy goals were dependent on a dialectic materialist vision of a world progressing 
towards a preordained path to the eventual victory of socialism. This would take place despite any 
action or inaction by the leaders of the countries in the world. A single individual, even in a 
commanding position, could only hasten or retard the natural flow of history in a minuscule scale.171 
This was equally applicable in the area of self-determination of peoples. The national differences and 
antagonisms were a result of a capitalist distortion, inevitably destined to disappear with the final 
worldwide victory of socialism. Therefore, the Bolshevik project to legislate and control the national 
relations within the USSR was meant to be merely a temporary solution to guarantee the survival of 
the revolutionary regime, while the ‘socialist spark’ would set the advanced capitalist states of Europe 
on fire.172 Nonetheless, since this vision was combined with the Marxist-Leninist ideological 
understanding of self-determination, the union of these progressive nations had to be ‘voluntary’.  
                                                 
original four constituent components of the Federation; Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.  
168 The concept of ‘basic norm’ is based on a need to find a point of origin of all law, from which any laws and the constitution gain 
their legitimacy More in-depth take on the basic norm concept can be found on with the Grundnorm analysis in H. Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1949).  
169 The first leader of the USSR, Vladimir Lenin, deciphered this need in December 1919 in an official letter: ‘We want a voluntary 
union of nations - a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another - a union founded on complete confidence, on a clear 
recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent’. V. Lenin, ‘Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine: Apropos 
of the Victories over Denikin’, in V. Lenin (Ed), Collected Works, Vol. 30 (Progress Publishers, 1965) 291-297 at 291.  
170 E.g., K. Shimp, ‘The Validity of Karl Marx’s Theory of Historical Materialism’, Major Themes in Economics (Spring 2009) 35-56.  
171 ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’. K. Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ 1 
Die Revolution (1852) 3-139 at 9. 
172 Accounted for in detail in R. Donaldson, J. Nogee and V. Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring 
Interests (Sharpe, 2014) at 40. In the 1930s, the national project became stationary with the ‘Socialism in One Country’ policy. The 
original theory held by Lenin and Leon Trotsky before the October Revolution of 1917 was that an isolated revolution, especially in 
backward Russia, would have no chance of survival without the revolution spreading to the advanced states of Germany, France, and 
England. However, as Lenin saw the ‘spark’ of the revolution dying out, he changed his stance and proclaimed that socialism could be 
built in Russia alone, but it would remain incomplete until the worldwide revolution. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky and Josif 
Stalin fought for the leadership position. Trotsky advocated the concept of ‘permanent revolution’ and claimed that the restoration of 
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In essence, the concept of a federation was used as ‘the post-revolutionary cure to the pre-
revolutionary tactical doctrine of self-determination’.173 In order for the Soviet government to 
demonstrate the progressive national policies of socialism, it created an ethnicity-based constitutional 
system called ‘ethnofederalism’.174 It was a very particular political federation model, where federal 
subunits reflected ethnic groups’ territorial distribution, but with a socialist twist that put subunits in 
a hierarchical order based on an alleged ‘progressive level’ of their development toward socialism.175  
There were four levels of self-determination statuses. The highest level consisted of the allegedly 
‘independent’ nations of fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), which were constitutionally 
considered sovereign and provided with the right to secession.176 The second-level consisted of sub-
state entities called the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), located within the borders 
of the SSRs. While they lacked the constitutional right to secede, the ASSRs had a relatively strong 
autonomy.177 The third level units were awarded the status of Autonomous Oblasts (AOs), which 
entailed a strictly limited autonomy within the host SSR without any relevant sovereign rights. The 
last level units were the Autonomous Okrugs located within an AO, with only minor cultural rights. 
This system was a combination of official ideology and tactical concession to the reality of numerous 
different peoples within the Russian domain. The simulation of the voluntariness of their union had 
to be maintained to provide internal and external acceptance and legitimacy to the new revolutionary 
state.178 However, while much of the content of national self-determination was a simulation, it should 
be noted that most of the ethnofederal units were acknowledged and created for the first time in 
history by the Soviet leadership, reflecting the revolutionary radicalism of the regime.  
The first Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), was dominated by the Serbs. 
When the communists emerged victorious in 1945, the right to self-determination was proclaimed to 
                                                 
capitalism was inevitable without the worldwide revolution. Stalin, who won the leadership position and, thus, the argument, advocated 
the concept of ‘socialism in one country’ where Russia would build a socialist economy that would be so advanced that the rest of the 
world would want to emulate it. One could argue that history eventually proved Trotsky right - or at least Stalin wrong. For more on 
the topic, see E. Van Ree, ‘Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment’ 50(2) Studies in East European Thought (1998) 77-117. 
173 Hasani (n 1) 59.  
174 See, inter alia, Anderson (n 1) 165; C. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars (New York University Press, 2007) at 23-32; and M. 
Beissinger, ‘Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism’ 18(3) Contemporary European History (2009) 331-347 at 334. 
175 See n 629. 
176 While the secession right was guaranteed in every constitution, it was meant to be read through the ideological lenses of the 
government. According to the official ideology, the nations had achieved a higher form of self-determination under socialism. 
According to the Soviet representative of Human Rights Committee in 1978, it is ‘inconceivable that a republic would want to secede, 
since there [is] a solid and unshakable bond uniting all the peoples and nations of the State’. U.N. Doc. CCPT/C/SR.108-09 (1978).  
177 The 1990 constitutional amendments gave the ASSRs a close-to-equal legal status with the SSRs. See subchapter 3.7.4. 
178 Zürcher (n 174) 22-27. The difference to the tsarist times was astonishing. The Russian Empire had been ruled as a monoculture 
Russian state, with a few recognized minorities and even fewer minority rights. After the establishment of the Bolshevik rule, all of 
this changed. For example, in the 1926 census, there were listed 176 recognized nationalities in the USSR. 
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all the peoples of Yugoslavia. In order to copy the proper ‘socialist solution’ to the so-called national 
question,179 the federal state model of Yugoslavia was based on the 1936 USSR Constitution and thus 
the SFRY became the second ethnofederal socialist state. Its six Socialist Republics (SRs) were made 
equivalent to the SSRs, and two Socialist Autonomous Provinces (SAPs) were made equivalent to 
the ASSRs. Therewith, the SFRY built the same constitutional time bombs and faced the same pattern 
of dissolution than the USSR when the legitimacy of the federal state was called into question.180 
2.5.2 The Breakdown of the Socialist Federal Systems 
Since the state demise of the socialist federations has been accounted for rigorously elsewhere,181 and 
they are elaborated in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, I give here only a brief overview of the events 
focusing on the application of uti possidetis.182 
                                                 
179 The original Marxist doctrine, while being somewhat abstract on the matter, was suggesting that states would wither away in a not-
too-distant future. Therefore, contemporary nationalism was a problem that needed to be solved. In the USSR, Lenin was already in 
1920 acquiescing that the national and state differences will continue to exist for a ‘very, very long time, even after the dictatorship of 
the proletariat has been established on a world scale’ (V. Lenin, ‘“Left Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder’ in V. Lenin (Ed), 
Collected Works, Vol. 31 17-118 at 107). Stalin continued on the same path, summarizing his view in the speech in 1929; ‘It would be 
a mistake to think that the first stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat will mark the beginning of the dying away 
of nations and national languages, the beginning of the formation of one common language. On the contrary, the first stage, during 
which national oppression will be completely abolished, will be a stage marked by the growth and flourishing of the formerly oppressed 
nations and national languages, the consolidation of equality among nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust, and the 
establishment and strengthening of international ties among nations’ (J. Stalin, ‘The National Question and Leninism - Reply to 
Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others’, speech on 18 March 1929). Therewith, under his rule, there was at first an actual 
strengthening of different national cultures, only to be replaced by severe oppression and ‘russification’ in the 1930s when the 
leadership started to see the strength of different national groups as a threat to the domination by Moscow.  
180 Several scholars have written about the ethnofederal model sowing the seeds for the later implosion of the USSR along the ethnic 
lines. See, for instance, R. Müllerson, International Law and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (Routledge, 1994) 
at 76; and R. Nalbandov, Not by Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin (Potomac, 2016) at 266. In addition, on 21 January 
2016, at the meeting of the Presidential Council for Science and Education, President Putin blamed Lenin and the Bolsheviks for the 
fall of the Soviet Union, by stating that ‘[t]here were many such ideas as providing regions with autonomy, and so on. They planted an 
atomic bomb under the building that is called Russia which later exploded’.  
181 See, inter alia, V. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007). He claims that the most decisive factor to the collapse of the Union in 1991 was an imperial overreach. 
Alternatively, Plokhy advances the position that the key to the breakup of the Soviet state was the 1991 inability of the Russian and 
Ukrainian republics to settle on the continued existence of a unified state. S. Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet 
Union (Basic Books, 2014). Kisak argues that the biggest single contributor to the collapse was Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative 
and the subsequent military overstretch of the USSR. P. Kisak, The End of the Soviet Union (Amazon Digital Services, 2015). A very 
comprehensive overview is given by Robert Strayer, listing, inter alia, great power conflict, imperial decline, revolution, ethnic conflict, 
economic development, totalitarian ideology, and transition to democracy among the sources of the Soviet collapse. R. Strayer, Why 
Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historic Change (Routledge, 1998). 
On the Yugoslavian side, the supply is equally encompassing. To name but a few, Finlan points out in his book The Collapse of 
Yugoslavia 1991-1999 (Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2004) the long process that it took for the federation to fall, including the late epilogue 
in Kosovo 1998-1999, which - arguably - still continues today. While many people point the blame to collapse of Yugoslavia to the 
1980s failure of the planned economy, Brian Hall takes another explanatory route in his book The Impossible Country: A Journey 
through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (Penguin Books, 1994). He claims that Yugoslavia, as a unified country, should never have been 
and was always doomed to a grand failure, whether it was socialist or not. Peter Korchnak has argued, in his intriguing comparisons 
between the SFRY and Czechoslovakian cases that the dissolutions were unintended side products of an attempt to modernize state 
socialism, which then led the ethnic elites to mobilize in order to gain more resources from the center. Korchnak (n 1). 
182 There are some unavoidable overlaps in narrative with this subchapter and the subchapter 4.3. 
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In the late 1980s, reforming attempts of the failing command-economy structure led to an economic 
collapse, delegitimizing both the ruling Party and the federal system. As dissent began to build up, 
ethnofederal entities started to claim their constitutional rights. The USSR collapsed faster and mostly 
without violence because the primus inter pares nation - Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) with over half the total Soviet population183 - chose not to preserve the Union. With the 
withdrawal of the RSFSR, there was no longer a self-sustaining center, and the USSR ceased to exist 
overnight on 26 December 1991.184 However, despite all the similarities, the SFRY dissolution took 
a different path for two reasons. First, Yugoslavia did not have a dominating nation in the same sense 
as the RSFSR had been in the USSR.185 Second, the leadership in the SR of Serbia chose to disregard 
the other SRs’ constitutional right of secession by calling in the army to preserve the Union by force.  
In the USSR, the final dissolution began with all the SSRs and many of the lower-level units 
proclaiming themselves ‘sovereign’ in 1988-1991.186 The Soviet leadership could not challenge these 
proclamations, as they had basis on the 1977 Constitution and were essential to the ‘normative 
mythology of Soviet federalism’.187 The USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to re-
legitimize the USSR with a New Union Treaty, but his decision to rebalance the federal system by 
promoting the ASSRs to a close-to-equal position with the SSRs escalated the national tensions.188 
Dissent on his rule among the Party elite built up, and in August 1991 they attempted a coup. While 
it failed, the coup attempt destroyed the credibility of Gorbachev’s visions for the federation and of 
him as a leader. At this point, the USSR as a unitary state was doomed.  
In the SFRY, there was likewise an attempt to renew the federation. After the death of President Tito 
in May 1980, the SFRY had been ruled by a collective presidency of the six SRs and two SAPs, called 
Presidium. It had a rotating one-year chairmanship for each federal unit.189 During the turbulent 
                                                 
183 In 1990, 50, 78% of the Soviet population of 293 million were Russians. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Soviet Union - People’, The 
World Factbook 1991. 
184 I have chosen to use this date as the final ‘end of the USSR’ because of the symbolism of the resignation of the last leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the Supreme Soviet dissolving itself, and the ceremonial lowering of the Soviet flag and raising of the Russian flag in the 
Kremlin. However, one may also argue that the USSR dissolved already on 8 December, which was the official line the CIS states took 
in their foundational documents. See subchapter 3.8 and n 216. 
185 The Russian Federation comprised of 76% or the territory and 51% of the population of the former USSR. In contrast, Serbia made 
up only 40% of the territory and 45% of the population (including Kosovo Albanians) of the SFRY in 1991. Craven (n 16) 370.  
186 More on this ‘parade of sovereignties’, see subchapter 3.7.3. 
187 E. Walker, Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Berkeley, 2003) at 60. As Hale has demonstrated, the 
SSRs with the most robust set of the sociopolitical institutions that cultivated ethnic identity and facilitated national mobilization were 
best equipped to make separatist demands. H. Hale, ‘The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting’ 
30 British Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 31-56 at 45. 
188 The ASSRs received most of the rights previously invested solely to the SSRs A. Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule 
(Routledge, 2010) at 294. For more on the early 1990s Soviet legislation, see subchapter 3.7.4. 
189 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Art. 313. Promulgated on 21 February 1974.  
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1980s, two visions of the future of the SFRY were competing in Presidium. Serbia’s vision was to 
re-centralize the SFRY by taking control over the collective presidency,190 while Slovenia and Croatia 
advocated for a loose confederal Yugoslavia with an undisputed right to secession for the SRs.191 The 
rift became permanent in January 1990, when the ruling Party broke down into eight factions.192 In 
May 1991, Serbia blocked the installation of the Croatian candidate for the rotating presidency, which 
led to the dissolution of the Presidium.193 With all the main federal organs in disarray, Slovenia and 
Croatia decided to abandon the Yugoslav project and to declare independence unilaterally.194  
The implosions of the socialist federations and the subsequent recognition requests by the subunits 
of the USSR and the SFRY caught the international community off guard. The US and the USSR 
gave the EC the lead to settle the situation, and thus the SSRs and SRs addressed their recognition 
requests to the EC from the summer of 1991 onwards.195 The task to establish a common position 
was formidable, given that the legal terrain of these dissolutions was equivocal and controversial. 
This was especially true in the SFRY, where the state organs refused to dissolve and threatened that 
any unilateral declaration of independence would be considered an illegal secession attempt. Thus, 
within the recognized borders of the SFRY, there were several competing claims on sovereignty over 
a particular territory. For instance, when the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, 
challenging this was the official SFRY claim of sovereignty over the area, as well as an unofficial 
attempt by the SRs of Croatia and Serbia to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between themselves.196  
In essence, the EC had to reconcile two fundamental but contradictory international law principles of 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. The position of international law in relation to 
                                                 
190 This was achieved by replacing the leadership of the SR of Montenegro in January 1989 and by revoking the autonomies of the two 
SAPs in March 1989. This gave Serbia four votes out of eight in Presidium. See subchapter 4.2.7. 
191 Accounted for in Hayden (n 1) 53-54. 
192 Accounted for in detail in D. Pauković, ‘Last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Causes, Consequences and 
Course of Dissolution’ 1(1) Contemporary Issues (2008) 21-33. The League of Communists was the only allowed political party 
according to the Preamble VIII of the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY.  
193 D. Busky: Communism in History and Theory: The European Experience (Praeger Publishers, 2002) at 36. After this event, Croatian, 
Slovenian, Bosnian, and Macedonian delegates started boycotting the sessions of Presidium. Serbian and Montenegrin delegates 
continued to attend the sessions until 1992.  
194 The EC was officially called the European Economic Community until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
195 In the case of the Baltic States, the EC welcomed the restoration of their independence on 27 August 1991, after Moscow had 
implied their acceptance. The USSR officially recognized the Baltic independence on 6 September 1991 and the Conference for 
Security and Co-Operation in Europe admitted the Baltic States as new members on 10 September 1991. I. Ziemele, State Continuity 
and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 
196 Croatian and Serbian presidents, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević met on 25 March 1991 at the Karađorđevo hunting ground 
in Northwest Serbia. This meeting did not produce any official record of the signed agreement, but it was widely believed that the two 
Presidents agreed on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina upon the breakup of Yugoslavia. This alleged agreement became known as 
the Karađorđevo agreement. J. Sadkovich, Tuđman - Prva politička biografija (Zagreb, 2010) at 393; and L. Danforth, ‘Nationalism 
in Eastern Europe: Nations, States, and Minorities’ 19(2) Cultural Survival (1995) 1.  
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this conflict of norms is that it does not grant sub-state entities a general right to secede, but neither 
does it prohibit secession.197 A growing number of scholars argue for a ‘remedial right’ to 
secession,198 but there is no univocal state practice to support this.199 Thus, although the SSR and the 
SRs had a constitutionally guaranteed right to secede,200 in general the internal law of a state is not a 
matter of international law.201 The EC did not feel competent to interpret the federal constitutions and 
remained indecisive over its recognition policy. Nevertheless, there was an urgent need to react, 
especially concerning the SFRY where violence seemed imminent.  
2.5.3 The Socialist Federal Dissolutions and Uti Possidetis Juris 
The original EC position was to support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.202 After Croatia and 
Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991,203 the EC mediated a three-month moratorium on 
these declarations in order to ease tensions. Notwithstanding, a civil war broke out soon after. The 
                                                 
197 For instance, see T. Franck, ‘Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the Reference’ in A. Bayefsky (Ed), Self-Determination in 
International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 75-84 at 83. 
198 Conditions for this ‘remedial right’ vary considerably. The first to introduce the concept was Lee Buchheit in 1978 (L. Buchheit, 
Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University Press, 1978) at 220-223. In 1991, Professor Allen Buchanan 
continued to develop the concept by outlining the limited right to secession under certain circumstances, mostly related to oppression 
by people of ethnic or racial groups, and especially those previously conquered by other peoples (Buchanan (n 131)). Other notable 
supporters of the right are, among others, David Gordon (D. Gordon (Ed), Secession, State and Liberty (Transaction Publishers, 2002)); 
Anthony Birch (A. Birch, ‘Another Liberal Theory of Secession’ 32(4) Political Studies (1984) 596-602); Jane Jacobs (J. Jacobs, The 
Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle over Sovereignty (Baraka Books, 1980)); and Robert McGee (R. McGee, ‘A Third 
Liberal Theory of Secession’ 14(1) Liverpool Law Review (1992) 45-66. Opponents of this alleged right include Jure Vidmar (J. 
Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ 6(1) St Anthony’s International Review (2010) 37-
56); Katherine Del Mar (K. Del Mar, ‘The Myth of Remedial Secession’ in D. French (Ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: 
Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 79-108); and Alexandros Ntovas (A. 
Ntovas, ‘The Paradox of Kosovo’s Parallel Legal Orders in the Reasoning of the Court’s Advisory Opinion’ in ibid. at 139-164). 
199 Vidmar (n 198) 37. 
200 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) sets out in Basic Principle I: ‘The nations of Yugoslavia proceedings from the right of every 
nation to self-determination, including the right to secession’.  
The 1977 USSR Constitution (Constitution and Fundamental Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 7 October 1977) sets out 
in Art. 72: ‘Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR’.  
The problem was that the Constitutions did not provide any specific formula for such a right. When the center was challenged with the 
secession claims, Gorbachev chose to introduce a new ‘law of secession’ to provide this formula (in reality, to postpone the 
independence enough to introduce the new Union Treaty. See J. Treiman, ‘The Soviet Secession Law is a Sham’ 36(3) Lithuanian 
Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences (1990) at 1-2). Conversely, the authorities in the SFRY chose to deny this right categorically.  
201 Indeed, in international law, the principle of non-intervention includes ‘the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. UN Charter, Art. 2(4). The principle of non-intervention also prohibits a 
State of intervening in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of other States. The ICJ has referred to ‘the element of coercion, which 
defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention’. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J Reports (1986), p. 14, para. 205. As 
Oppenheim puts it, ‘the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened 
against of control over the matter in question. Interference pure and simple is not intervention’ (L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht 
(Ed), International Law: A Treatise (9th Ed., London, Longman 1992) at 432. Whether there is an exception to the principle of non-
intervention in the case of assistance to peoples seeking to exercise the right of self-determination remains controversial. M. Jamnejad 
and M. Wood, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention’ 22(2) Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 345-381. In the end, the EC 
chose to interpret this as a case of state dissolution and not of a secession, thus invoking uti possidetis and making the domestic law of 
the SFRY and the USSR a matter of international law. 
202 G. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on 
Yugoslavia (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007) at 42. 
203 Slovenian Declaration of Independence, 25 June 1991. <http://www.slovenija2001.gov.si/10years/path/documents/declaration/>. 
Croatian Declaration of Independence, 25 June 1991. <http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1991_06_31_875.html>. 
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EC then arranged a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, which convened from 7 September 1991 
onwards. The Conference produced a series of Draft Conventions calling for the right to secession 
for the SRs and the right to autonomy for the SAPs. The Conventions were signed by all the SRs 
apart from Serbia.204 On 5 November 1991, the Conference was called off due to Serbian non-
cooperation. Thus, as the EC had failed to reach a political solution, they decided to have a legal 
solution instead by delegating the issue to an independent arbitration commission.  
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (also known as and hereinafter, the 
Badinter Commission)205 was established by the initiative of the Council of Ministers of the EC on 
27 August 1991 to provide legal advice over the questions of recognition. The mandate of the 
Commission was somewhat vague; while its rulings were envisaged to be binding decisions, they 
would have to be requested by the not specified ‘valid Yugoslavian authorities’. In reality, the 
representatives of the EC were making requests for the most critical questions.206 In the series of 15 
opinions, the Badinter Commission gave its interpretation on the applicability of uti possidetis and 
recommendations on the recognition of individual SRs. The main issue relating to uti possidetis was 
that while the principle of territorial integrity did not protect the colonial possessions of the European 
states (due to the illegitimacy of colonialism in the 1960s context) in the second cycle, it did protect 
the territorial integrity of the SFRY in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, according to the Commission’s 
legal interpretation, uti possidetis was applicable in Yugoslavia based on the 1986 Frontier Dispute 
case, where the ICJ delineated that the doctrine is a ‘principle of general scope, which is logically 
connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs’.207 
                                                 
204 For the details, see subchapter 4.3.2. During the Conference, there was constant lobbying in the EC by Germany, Italy, and Denmark 
of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, but the strong opposition of France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands balanced this out. 
A number of scholars have criticized the indecisiveness of the leaders of the EC. For instance, Lucarelli gives a chilling judgment, 
particularly to France, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the two most crucial moments of the dissolution of Yugoslavia: the 
diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and the debate over a possible military intervention. S. Lucarelli, Europe and the 
Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000). 
205 The five-member Commission consisted of Presidents of the constitutional courts from the EC member states. The members were 
Roman Herzog, President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Aldo Corasaniti, President of the Constitutional Court of 
Italy, Francisco Tomás y Valiente, President of the Constitutional Tribunal of Spain and Irene Petry, President of the Belgian Court of 
Arbitration. Robert Badinter, President of the Constitutional Council of France, chaired the Commission. Radan (n 20) 50-76.  
206 Pellet (n 15) 178.  
207 ‘Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general 
principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali […]. Nevertheless the principle is 
not a special rule which pertains to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with 
the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability 
of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles’. Opinion No. 3 (n 39) 1500. The Badinter Commission has been criticized, as 
some scholars such as Bartos (n 19) and Lalonde (n 2) argue that the previous sentence by the ICJ that states that uti possidetis ‘is a 
firmly established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned’ limits its applicability to decolonization context. 
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This interpretation had a potential to be a perilous legal precedent, breaking any state in the world 
‘wherever separatism occurs’. Therefore, the Commission had to make this a unique case. It 
considered the conditions that are normally used to define a state - a people with a territory, subject 
to an organized political authority - and then summarized the situation in the SFRY in late 1991. With 
three SRs having declared their independencies, 208 the federal organs no longer meeting ‘the criteria 
of participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state’,209 and an armed conflict taking 
place between the federal units, the Commission opined that this was not merely a secessionist 
conflict but a case of a federal dissolution.210 Thus, they determined in Opinion No. 1 that the SFRY 
was in the ‘process of dissolution’.211 
It cannot be over-emphasized that the independences of the SRs were recognized internationally in 
the context of dissolution of Yugoslavia in order not to establish a precedent, for remedial or any other 
kind, for unilateral secession. International law and, especially, opinio juris, seems unable to tackle 
the questions of secession, which cannot be either approved or prohibited. Therefore, the Badinter 
Commission chose a formulation that underlines the uniqueness of the case.212 Opinion No. 1 crossed 
the legal gap between a unitary federal state and a dissolving colonial empire, thus making uti 
possidetis applicable seemingly without the risk of creating a precedent of legal state destruction.  
Opinion No. 1 has been criticized.213 For example, James Crawford has pointed out that the 
Commission chose to proceed on the basis that the process of dissolution ‘was a matter of fact, and 
                                                 
208 The SRs of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia had declared themselves independent after having support for this confirmed in 
referendums, while the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared itself sovereign. Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina had scheduled an 
independence referendum for February 1992, as requested by the EC before it would proceed with its recognition. The Referendum on 
Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina: February 29-March 1, 1992, Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation of Europe, 1-21 at 2. 
209 Quote of Opinion 1 in Craven (n 16) 367. Craven adds that while representativeness of a government may influence the credibility 
of its claim to wield effective authority over a portion of its territory when facing a secession, the general distinguishing of a state based 
on this cannot be accepted. However, he continues that the test should be different between federations and unitary states since 
federations have been thought to be characterized by a constitutionally guaranteed division of power between central and regional 
government in which both forms of government exercise simultaneously independent and direct control over the population. Ibid. 
210 Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 31 ILM 1494 at 1495-1496. 
211 Ibid. at 1494. 
212 This is a reoccurring theme in the cases of unilateral secession. Correspondingly, see subchapter 2.6 on the independence of Kosovo. 
213 Critical stances on the ‘biased’ or ‘tendentious’ interpretation of the events by the Badinter Commission have been taken by, for 
example, E. Yalınkılıçlı, ‘The Dissolution of Former Yugoslavia’ Academic Perspective 13 September 2014; E. Pond, Endgame in the 
Balkans: Regime Change, European Style (Brookings Institution Press, 2006); D. Marolov, ‘The Policy of the USA and EU Towards 
the Disintegration of Yugoslavia’ 1(2) IJSST (2012) 1-16; and, most fiercely, P. Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International 
Law (Routledge, 2002) where the author was questioning all four claims that the Commission was utilizing to justify its stance on a 
dissolution taking place in the SFRY. More favoring stance has been taking by, inter alia, Sonja Biserko, the president of the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia in her Keynote speech, Third Annual Humanity in Action International Conference in Sarajevo, 
28 June 2012; and Vigan Qorrolli in his book on the dissolution process, V. Qorolli, The Dissolution Process and the Recognition of 
New States: Beyond ex-Yugoslav Context: Kosovo’s Statehood under International Law (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010).  
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that the emergence to independence of the constituent republics was a consequence of that fact’.214 
The situation could equally have been interpreted the other way around. Nevertheless, by late 1991 
the situation on the ground was indeed very precarious - the SFRY was no longer functioning and 
there was an ongoing ethnic conflict in which the Yugoslav leadership appeared complicit.215  
Following Opinion No. 1 and the unofficial dissolution of the USSR,216 the EC issued the ‘Guidelines 
on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’ on 16 December 1991.217 
The Guidelines presumed the dissolutions already taking place and laid down formative rules for the 
recognition of the newly emerging states. After mentioning ‘the principles of the Helsinki Act and 
the Charter of Paris, in particular the principle of the self-determination’ the Guidelines conditioned 
the recognition of the SSRs and the SRs on their fulfillment of the following criteria: re-affirmation 
of the principle of self-determination;218 respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights;219 
guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE);220 respect for the 
inviolability of the uti possidetis borders;221 acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;222 and a commitment to settle by agreement or arbitration 
all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes.223  
In addition, the EC took into account the different circumstances of the SFRY and the USSR. For the 
SFRY, the EC issued a ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ on 16 December 1991. It conditioned the 
recognition of the SRs on them accepting the conditions of the Guidelines and those laid down in the 
Draft Conventions - especially considering human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups - 
and supporting the continuation of The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.224 The SRs were 
advised to send their recognition applications to the Badinter Commission that would evaluate their 
cases based on the criteria of the Guidelines and the Declaration on Yugoslavia. For the USSR, the 
                                                 
214 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 401.  
215 Ibid. at 401.  
216 On 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs met in a Białowieża Forest in Belarus to sign an 
agreement where they established the Commonwealth of Independent States to replace the USSR. Agreement on the Establishment of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (Belavezha Accords), 8 December 1991, 31 ILM 138. 
217 Guidelines (n 4). 
218 Ibid. para. 1.  
219 Ibid. para. 3. 
220 Ibid. para. 4. 
221 Ibid. para. 5. 
222 Ibid. para. 6. 
223 Ibid. para. 7. This means that via an agreement between all the stakeholders there can be a deviation of the uti possidetis borders. 
They can likewise be changed later via mutual agreement.  
224 Declaration on Yugoslavia, European Community, 16 December 1991, 31 ILM 1485.  
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EC issued a Statement, which gave the SSRs notably less strict conditions to receive recognition. As 
their dissolution was seen to be taking place in a peaceful and consensual manner, they were only 
asked to fulfil the requirements listed in the Guidelines and to adhere shortly to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.225 Thus, in the third cycle, there were different rules to recognition, based on 
whether the dissolution was consensual (USSR) or not (SFRY).  
The SRs of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina send their applications to the 
Badinter Commission,226 whereas Serbia and Montenegro refused to apply for recognition, 
proclaiming instead that they continue the existence of the SFRY under the name of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).227 In contrast, the former SSRs of the USSR agreed upon the 
dissolution and the application of uti possidetis, similarly than in the second cycle decolonization.228 
In the auspices of the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), they decided 
                                                 
225 The European Community, Statement on 31 December 1991: ‘The Community and its Member States Welcome the assurance 
received from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan that they are prepared to 
fulfil the requirements contained in the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”. 
Consequently, they are ready to proceed with the recognition of these Republics. They reiterate their readiness also to recognize 
Kyrgyzstan and Tadzhikistan once similar assurances have been received. Recognition shall not be taken to imply acceptance by the 
EC and its Member States of the position of any of the republics concerning territory which is the subjects of a dispute between two or 
more Republics. Recognition will furthermore be extended on the understanding that all Republics participating with Russia in the CIS 
on whose territory nuclear weapons are stationed, will adhere shortly to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon 
states’. Quoted in I. Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) at 57-58. Moreover, in the Agreement on joint measures in relation to nuclear weapons 
(signed along with the Alma-Ata Declaration on 21 December 1991, n 230) it was proclaimed that there would be a united command 
and control over the nuclear weapons and strategic forces that were deployed in 1991 not only in Russia but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine. Under the agreement, the nuclear weapons from these states were to be transferred to Russia as the legal successor of the 
USSR by 1 July 1992. Due to political and technical circumstances, the weapons were either destroyed or were only transported to 
Russia by 1996. Y. Nikitina, ‘Security Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Area within the Collective Security Treaty Organization’, ISPI 
Analysis No. 152 (2013) at 2. 
The Russian Federation was not listed, as the CIS had jointly decided that Russia would legally continue the State existence of the 
USSR. Thus, Russia did not seek and did not receive any recognition by the international community.  
226 For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission decided that the independence should not be recognized, because unlike the other 
Republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet held a referendum on independence. Therefore, ‘the will of the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been successfully established’. 
Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 4, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 1501, para. 4. 
For Croatia, the Commission decided that independence should not be recognized because the new Croatian Constitution did not 
incorporate the protections for minorities required by the EC. Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 5, 11 January 1992, 
31 ILM 1503.  
For Macedonia, the Commission recommended the recognition. However, the EC did not recognize Macedonia because of the strong 
Greek opposition. Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 1507. 
For Slovenia, the Commission recommended the recognition. Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 7, 11 January 1992, 
31 ILM 1512. 
227 The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro had agreed on changing the name to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from early 
1992 onwards. In the Constitution of the FRY, it was maintained that this was a legal continuity of the SFRY, but excluding any 
territorial claims on the four seceding republics. UN Doc A/46/915, 7 May 1992.  
228 Only the Baltic States refused to accept the dissolution and uti possidetis in relation to their situation, as they held the opinion that 
they had nothing to do with the dissolution of the USSR, which they had never legally been a part of. However, below the SSR level 
there was considerable dissent by many of the ASSRs and the AOs against uti possidetis, and this would become a major factor to the 
internal cohesion of the successor states. See more in Chapter 3. 
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that Russia would continue the legal existence of the USSR,229 and that all their border adjustments 
would be settled by uti possidetis, if not agreed otherwise by the parties in question.230  
By early 1992, Belgrade was finally willing to accept the dissolution of the SFRY,231 but not based 
on the internal borders that would leave an unacceptable number of Serbs out of the FRY.232 The 
applicable SFRY Constitution was ambiguous as it stated that ‘the nations’ (ethnic designation) had 
a right to self-determination and secession, not the SRs.233 Yet, according to the Yugoslavian 
Constitutional Court, the rights of self-determination and secession belonged to ‘the peoples of 
Yugoslavia and their socialist republics’.234  
According to the Badinter Commission’s interpretation of the 1974 SFRY Constitution, only the SRs 
- not the SAPs or national minorities without territorial units - were entitled to the right to self-
determination, including secession based on their former administrative borders. The Badinter 
Commission reasoned that the uti possidetis ‘principle applies all the more readily to the Republics 
since the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that 
the Republics’ territories and boundaries could not be altered without their consent’.235 This was a 
problematic interpretation, given that this same right was afforded to the SAPs.236 
The dissolution of the SFRY stands out as a case where the conflict between the peoples’ right to 
self-determination and uti possidetis was at its most visible form.237 The SFRY had been built upon 
                                                 
229 Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States, ILM 31 (1992), para. 1. On 24 December 
1991, the President of Russia addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General, stating that Russia would continue the membership of 
the USSR in the UN. Letter of the President of the Russian Federation to the UN Secretary-General, ILM 31 (1992) 138. 
230 In the auspices of the CIS, the inviolability of their former internal borders has been affirmed in several treaties: Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (n 216) Art. 5; Alma-Ata Declaration (21 December 1991), 31 ILM 148, 
Preamble and Art. 1; Charter Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (22 January 1993), 34 ILM 128, Art. 3; and 
Declaration on Respect of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of Boundaries of Member States, Bulletin of International 
Agreements No. 7, Moscow 1994, 9-10.  
231 Already on 15 March 1991, speaking on Serbian State Television, President of Serbia and a de facto acting President of the SFRY, 
Slobodan Milošević, had declared that ‘Yugoslavia does not exist anymore’. J. Carter, I. Vamik and D. Volkan (Ed), Regional and 
Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines (Routledge, 2009) at 246. 
232 According to the Serb estimates, today, up to four million Serbs are living outside Serbia. Balkans Daily, 25 January 2013. In 
comparison, in the Republic of Serbia, there are, according to the 2014 estimate, 7, 2 million people, out of which 83% are Serbs. 
233 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Preamble 1; J. Headley, ‘The Way Opened, the Way Blocked: Assessing the Contrasting 
Fates of Chechnya and Kosovo’ in A. Pavković and P. Radan (Ed), On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalization (Ashgate, 
2008) 85-100 at 86. 
234 Quoted in P. Radan, ‘The Legal Regulation of Secession: Lessons from Yugoslavia and Canada’ in M. Jovanović and K. Henrard, 
Sovereignty and Diversity (Utrecht, 2008) 133-155 at 137.  
235 Opinion No. 3 (n 39) para. 2. 
236 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Art. 5, states this as such: ‘The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a 
single unified whole and consists of the territories of the Socialist Republics. The territory of a Republic may not be altered without 
the consent of that Republic, and the territory of an Autonomous Province - without the consent of that Autonomous Province’.  
237 The fact that external actors insisted on the dissolution taking place against the wishes of about 43,5% of Yugoslavs is a somewhat 
puzzling fact in the light of self-determination. According to the 1991 census, Serbia’s population was 40,9% and Montenegro’s 2,6% 
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a compromise that had been ungenerous to the Serbs, who had been in effect ‘weakened’ by the 
internal borders of the SFRY.238 The Serbs outside Serbia were not granted autonomy, and Serbia’s 
possession of the two SAPs of Kosovo and Vojvodina was conditioned on them being autonomous, 
making Serbia a federation within a federation.239 The lines drawn by the socialist government at the 
time involved a great deal of pragmatism for the future functioning of the federal structures. These 
choices need to be valued in the context of the Marxist perception of nationalism, the aim of which 
was only to settle national contentions within a state, never to create separate nation-states.240 
According to the rationale of the SFRY Constitutions, the nations of Yugoslavia had the right to self-
determination, but they had opted for a common federal state.241 Whatever internal territorial 
adjustments had taken place since were only manifestations of the joint exercising of sovereignty 
within the federation. Notwithstanding, according to the internal logic of uti possidetis the 
motivations behind borders do not matter - and, indeed, cannot be questioned - as long as they had 
been delineated under the applicable constitutional order of the state.242  
There are several important observations to be made of the peaceful dissolving of the USSR and the 
violent implosion of the SFRY. First, it cannot be over-emphasized that these were cases of 
dissolution. Even though republics had a constitutional right to secede, this was often referred to as 
‘constitutional fiction’,243 and no republic was recognized by exercising this alleged right. According 
to the Badinter Commission and the agreements reached by the Soviet successor states under the 
auspices of the CIS, there were no secessions from the socialist federations. Instead, there were two 
federal state dissolutions, which in effect broke them into their constitutive parts according to the 
                                                 
of the SFRY total. Yet, one should keep in mind that Serbia without the SAPs was limited to 24% and that many Serbs lived in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia.  
238 In all the Yugoslavian constitutions (1946, 1953, 1963, and 1974), Serbia was the only SR that had its territorial sovereignty 
compromised by autonomous units, which were gaining more and more legal rights every passing Constitution. Yet, while the Serbs 
were the largest national group outside their ‘own’ Republic, they did not subsequently receive autonomous units in other SRs.  
239 This was especially true after the 1974 constitution. H. Haug, Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the 
National Question (I.B Tauris, 2012) at 108-109.  
240 Ibid. at 113. 
241 Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 31 January 1946, Art. 1.  
242 The Serbs objected to the application of uti possidetis as it gave the other SRs no incentives to negotiate on borders before their 
independencies. Albanians were another ethnic group that felt it was not getting a fair deal in the dissolution. Although Kosovo was a 
constituent part of the SFRY according to the 1974 Constitution and its population was 90% Albanian, it had to remain within Serbia. 
The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Arts. 5, 291-292, 321, 375 and 398. While the international community ignored its independence 
aspirations, Kosovars organized a referendum on 22 September 1991, which affirmed the ‘Republic of Kosova’ to be a ‘sovereign and 
independent state’ by 99, 98% of the votes in favor, with a turnout of 87%. Ten percent Serb minority boycotted the referendum, which 
Yugoslavian authorities declared null and void. Direct Democracy, <http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ks011991>. 
243 For more about the constitutional fiction of secession in the SFRY, see, inter alia, S. Ramet and L. Adamović (Ed), Beyond 
Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Culture in a Shattered Community (Westview Press, 1995); and R. Geuss, History and Illusion 
in Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 105-106. About constitutional fiction in another context, see D. Haljan, 
Constitutionalizing Secession (Hart Publishing, 2014) at 336. 
51 
 
previous administrative borders. Hence, there was no state to secede from, only a state succession. 
Subsequently, there was no legal precedent for unilateral secession.244  
Second, when the borders of the new entities had to be delineated, there were no credible alternatives 
to uti possidetis. The logic behind ‘internationalizing’ the SFRY internal borders was that the 
successor states would then be protected by international law, for instance, by the UN Charter Article 
2(4).245 However, while the uti possidetis borders were clearly established internally, they were often 
too controversial to be a blueprint for the dissolution, leading to territorial conflicts.246 Therewith, the 
internal borders chosen by uti possidetis can be called into question. Even as the Guidelines insist on 
respecting all frontiers,247 the EC ignored the second-level units of the socialist federations, and the 
rest of the international community followed suit. Eventually, all the SSRs and the SRs were admitted 
to the UN as member states.248 In contrast, to this day, not a single former second-level territorial unit 
of either the USSR or the SFRY has been admitted, despite some of them having limited or even 
substantial international recognition.249  
Finally, uti possidetis, by virtue of being a general principle, needs to evolve alongside other trends 
of international law. In the third cycle, there were again new conditions to be taken into account in 
its application. These conditions were derived from the new human rights paradigm on international 
law, and many of these were outlined by the EC in late 1991 in the Guidelines, the Declaration on 
                                                 
244 Johanson has criticized the Badinter Commission Opinions heavily, claiming that they managed - while officially insisting on the 
prohibition of changing status quo by force - to protect armed secessionist attempts within the SFRY. Johanson (n 2) 105-106.  
245 There was also an attempt to make the successor states UN member states as swiftly as possible. Croatia, Slovenia and - most 
controversially - Bosnia-Herzegovina became members of the UN already in 1992. For instance, Robert Hayden has argued that the 
independence and recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was an example of negative sovereignty. According to him, it was recognized, 
not by Badinter criteria of a united population with organized political authority, but rather to deny large parts of the population to 
reject that authority. The only way to have a Bosnian state was to ignore a large part of the consent of those to be governed, creating 
minorities out of previously sovereign peoples. Hayden (n 1) 111-122.  
246 In Croatia, Serbs proclaimed a Republic of Serbian Krajina (Република Српска Крајина, Krajina is ‘frontier’ in Serbo-Croatian), 
existing from 1991 to 1995 without international recognition. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there were a Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia 
(Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna) that existed in 1991-1994, Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (Autonomna Pokrajina 
Zapadna Bosna) existing in 1993-1995 and Serbian Republika Srpska (Република Српскa), existing from 1992 to 1995 as an 
unrecognized breakaway state and from 1995 onwards as a constituent component of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
SAP of Kosovo declared independence first time around in 1991.  
247 ‘respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement’. Guidelines 
(n 4) para. 5. 
248 Serbia was finally admitted to the UN by the General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 on 1 November 2000, under the name 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after almost a decade of attempts to be seen as a legal continuator of the SFRY. Russia was the sole 
exception that did not apply for the membership, but instead was seen to be legal continuator of the USSR membership. 
249 The former SAP of Kosovo has received 114 recognitions worldwide (n 7). The former ASSRs of the USSR have been less 
successful. Chechnya received one international recognition in the 1990s, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia have received five since 
2008. If the votes against the UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 (UN Doc. A/RES/68/262, 27 March 2014) can be seen as legal 
support and recognition of Crimean independence and its subsequent joining of the Russian Federation, then Crimea has 11 
recognitions. However, I think this would be an apparent over-interpretation of the voting decision as no country apart from Russia has 
officially recognized these events. 
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Yugoslavia, The Hague Peace Conference’s 4 November 1991 Draft Convention, and the Statement 
on the USSR.250 The US fully endorsed the EC recognition policy, with minor changes in the 
formulation of the conditions.251 Eckert has concluded that the international community chose to 
value the new conditions - protection of human rights, observance of democratic governance and 
promotion of international peace and security - over the traditional Montevideo criteria, producing 
new states with noble ideals but without the capacity to fulfill their commitments.252  
In conclusion, there was a tragic flaw with the third cycle application of uti possidetis. The doctrine 
had previously adapted into the new legal terrain, but this time around the new dimensions of self-
determination were ignored.253 Even though the Badinter Commission advised the EC not to 
recognize any SR that did not fulfil all the criteria, the EC chose a dichotomy of two unequal units. 
Eventually, all the SRs were recognized independent and the SAPs were recognized to have no rights 
whatsoever. Lacking any international support, the SAPs had their autonomies abolished in the 1992 
FRY Constitution.254 A similar dynamic took place in the USSR context between the former SSRs 
and their ASSRs. Notably, the only major difference of the legal statuses of the first and second-level 
subunits was the former’s alleged right to secession. As there were no secessions,255 the application 
of uti possidetis should have also taken into account the lower-level units.  
I argue that while the black-or-white categorization of the rights of the first and second-level subunits 
by the EC might have been justifiable in the earlier cycles, this was a grand distortion of the modern 
right to internal self-determination in the early 1990s. Certainly, the legal nature and content of self-
determination had evolved into a more complex set of manifestations than merely the ‘either-or’ 
dichotomy that the EC chose to apply. Additionally, I argue that in order for uti possidetis to be 
applicable in the future, there has to be a new understanding of the following elements: the relevant 
                                                 
250 For example, in the Guidelines (n 4) the EC demanded that in order to gain recognition, the SSRs had to ‘[r]espect for the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, 
especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights’ and the ‘[g]uarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups 
and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE’.  
251 The four principles guiding the US recognition policy were stated as: 1) the US would accept any outcome chosen peacefully, 
democratically, and through negotiation; 2) the US would not recognize changes in internal or external borders achieved though force, 
intimidation, or threats; 3) the republics must be committed to resolving disputes through peaceful negotiation; and 4) the republics 
must be committed to respecting the human rights of all citizens, including the members of all ethnic groups. Cited in M. Halperin, D. 
Scheffer and P. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, 1992) at 36-37. 
252 A. Eckert, ‘Constructing States: The Role of the International Community in the Creation of New States’ 12 Journal of Public and 
International Affairs (2002) 19-39 at 19.  
253 Especially its division into internal and external self-determination variants since 1966. See subchapter 4.1.3. 
254 Additionally, while Serbia under Milošević was indeed oppressing the Albanians in Kosovo, the Serbs in Croatia would have 
nevertheless deserved a strong and constitutionally guaranteed set of minority rights. 
255 When the SRs put this ‘right’ to the test, it was denied by the SFRY authorities and was not applied. In the USSR, no SSR had time 
to try to use the lengthy Soviet Secession Law formula before the USSR dissolved in December 1991. 
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territorial boundaries that should be respected,256 and the content of ‘territorial title’ that uti possidetis 
freezes.257 The international community should not have recognized Kosovo’s independence in the 
early 1990s, but it should have used uti possidetis to ‘internationalize’ Kosovo’s borders.258  
Under the socialist federations, the ethnofederal subunits had possessed constitutional guarantees of 
their rights and many vestiges of a national state, such as own constitutions, legislatures, national 
flags, well-delineated borders, and substantial representative rights within the federal organs. After 
the dissolution, none of these rights were guaranteed, and most of the autonomies were abolished 
soon thereafter. After a ‘peaceful’ dissolution of the USSR, civil wars or ethnic clashes erupted in 
many of the successor states, most notably in Georgia,259 Azerbaijan,260 Moldova,261 and Russia.262 
In the FRY, the EC imposed decision that left Kosovo within the borders of Serbia without any 
guarantees over its status led to the Kosovo uprising (1998-1999)263 and to the controversial NATO 
intervention (1999).264 Thus, I conclude that the chosen version of uti possidetis in the third cycle 
produced the very armed conflicts over territory that it was aiming to preempt.  
                                                 
256 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 22-23. 
257 Ibid. at para. 30. 
258 Under this formula, the international recognition of the FRY could have been conditioned on respecting the internationally 
guaranteed autonomous borders of Kosovo, based primarily on the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention of The Hague Peace Conference 
on Yugoslavia. See more in subchapter 4.3.2. 
259 From the independence of Georgia on 22 December 1991 onwards there were inter-ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia (1991-1992) 
and Abkhazia (1992-1993). These conflicts were ignited by the decision of the first democratically elected President of Georgia, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, to abolish the autonomous statuses of these sub-entities of Georgia, as a response to Ossetian and Abkhazian demands 
for a recognition of their statuses in independent Georgia. See subchapter 5.4.3. 
260 The final collapse of the USSR in the form of nationalist separatist tendencies started from the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-
Karabakh in the SSR of Azerbaijan, which demanded to be transferred to the SSR of Armenia. After the independence of Azerbaijan 
(18 October 1991) there was a secession attempt - backed by neighboring independent Armenia - by Nagorno-Karabakh and a civil 
war lasting until the ceasefire in May of 1994. See subchapter 5.4.1. 
261 After the Moldovan independence (27 August 1991) the former Moldavian ASSR declared independence as Transnistria, leading 
into an armed conflict from 2 March to 21 July 1992. The Transnistrian case differs from the other ASSRs, as the Moldavian ASSR 
had not legally existed since 1940. Since it is within the rights of the previous sovereign to alter the internal boundaries according to 
its constitutional system, Transnistria is legally in a different position than the ASSRs that existed in 1991. See subchapter 5.4.2. 
262 On 26 November 1990, during the ‘parade of sovereignties’, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR declared ‘State Sovereignty of the Chechen-
Ingush Republic’. On 1 November 1991, an independent Chechen Republic was declared, leading into first and second Chechen wars.  
263 Accounted for, inter alia, in Z. Irwin, ‘The Uprising and NATO’s Intervention, 1998-1999’ in S. Ramet, A. Simkus and O. Listhaug 
(Eds), Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: History, Politics, and Value Transformation (Central European University Press, 2015) at 
93-118. 
264 The NATO intervention is a very controversial and much-debated event in the international law and political science scholarly 
circles. For the legality, or illegality, of the NATO intervention, see, for example, B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: 
Legal Aspects’ 10(4) European Journal of International Law (1999) 1-22; C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the NATO 
Intervention in Kosovo’ 49(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) 926-934; M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth 
Protest Too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law’ 65(2) The Modern Law Review (2002) 159-175; and L. Henkin, 
‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”’ 93(4) The American Journal of International Law (1999) 824-828. 
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2.6 The Fourth Cycle: A ‘Non-Precedent’ 
After the 1999 NATO intervention, the Security Council resolution 1244 established the UNMIK 
(United Nations Mission in Kosovo) to provide the former SAP with an interim administration until 
there would be a final political settlement over the province’s legal status.265 The resolution 1244 
maintained the third cycle uti possidetis stance and insisted upon respecting the territorial integrity of 
the FRY. While this seemingly excluded Kosovo’s independence, the resolution nevertheless 
established a ‘political process’ that was supposed to produce an equally acceptable compromise. 
After a full eight years under UNMIK and a series of failed negotiation attempts, Kosovo unilaterally 
proclaimed independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008.266 This declaration was made by the 
members of the Kosovo parliament under the ‘Provisional Institutions of the Self-Government’ 
(PISG), introducing themselves in this role as ‘we, the democratically elected leaders of our 
people’.267 The declaration was controversial, not least because of the ‘Common Document’ agreed 
upon on 5 November 2001 by the FRY and the PISG stipulated that the latter would not have an 
authority to take any steps towards resolving Kosovo’s final status.268 The decision on whether or not 
to recognize this independence - a major aberration of the third cycle uti possidetis borders - has 
divided the international community ever since.269  
After the third cycle, uti possidetis can be seen applicable in federal dissolutions. The problem is that 
the third cycle had deprived the second-level subunits of their right to self-determination, resulting in 
territorial conflicts. This is not the first clash of legal principles where the maintenance of peace, 
stability, and territorial integrity are valued over a right to self-determination.270 However, the logic 
of the third cycle was destroyed with the independence of Kosovo. After the Kosovo war of 1998-
1999, it had become incomprehensible that the Albanians could continue to live under the Serb rule.271 
                                                 
265 S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.  
266 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo, 17 February 2008. 
267 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm>. 
268 I. King and W. Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Cornell, 2006) at 122. 
269 Despite its efforts and a significant amount of international recognition (the amount of which is in constant flux due to Serbian 
attempts to ‘buy off’ Kosovo recognitions <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/15-countries-and-counting-revoke-
recognition-of-kosovo-serbia-says/>), Kosovo has not yet been accepted to the UN as a member state. Commenting on this, Kosovo’s 
deputy minister of foreign affairs, Petrit Selimi, was quoted saying that ‘[n]ational identities these days, they’re not so much based on 
memberships to these old-world organizations like the UN and Council of Europe. Those still matter, no dispute about that. But if you 
don’t have a team in Champions League in football; if your country is not on Facebook; if you don’t have a song in the Eurovision 
song contest, then are you a real country?’. <http://www.mfa-ks.net/sr/politika_single/3247>. 
270 E.g., the second cycle of uti possidetis. 
271 The denial of this possibility was affirmed by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, the former President of Finland Martti 
Ahtisaari, in his report to the Secretary-General after a prolonged series of negotiations between the parties. The Special Envoy gave 
his proposal on 26 March 2007, suggesting that the only plausible outcome would be a UN supervised independence, with the Serb 
55 
 
Yet, as any attempt to correct this situation would invite similar claims by the former ASSRs, there 
was no alternative to finding a legal justification for independence that would be limited to Kosovo.  
As the FRY was a federal state, theoretically another round of dissolution remained a possibility.272 
However, another forced state dismemberment on the Serbs would entail severe legal and political 
consequences. Moreover, in June 2006 the Yugoslav project was terminated with the independence 
of Montenegro. As Serbia was no longer a federation or in a federation,273 the decisions made by the 
EC in 1991-1992 came back with a vengeance. There was no formula to recognize Kosovo 
independent, but its return under Serbia control was not an alternative. In the end, the countries that 
recognized Kosovo chose again to take a road less travelled and came up with yet another sui generis 
(i.e., one of a kind) concept, not unlike the ‘process of dissolution’ in 1991.274 The legal argument 
was that the case of Kosovo was so unique that its particular circumstances - the dissolution of the 
SFRY, the atrocities committed by the FRY regime and the extensive international involvement - can 
never be repeated anywhere. Hence, Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any future secessions.  
Naturally, Kosovo is a sui generis case, in the same sense than the decision to apply uti possidetis 
outside decolonization context via the ‘process of dissolution’ formula was a sui generis case. Each 
new cycle of uti possidetis entails a unique transformation of the doctrine. The first cycle introduced 
it into the international legal sphere of sovereignty over territory. The second cycle transformed uti 
possidetis into a situation of several sovereigns and several external and international borders in the 
context of African decolonization. The third cycle made it applicable outside decolonization context, 
both by agreement (within the CIS) and by outside requisite (the Badinter Commission). In the latter 
case, the dissolution itself was taken as a fact, and this fact initiated a process comparable to 
decolonization, thus making uti possidetis applicable. Finally, the disputed independence of Kosovo 
can be legally categorized either as a fourth cycle of transformation of uti possidetis or as a breach of 
                                                 
minority rights secured by a new Kosovo Constitution. Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, Report of the Special 
Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status, 26 March 2007.  
272 Opinion No. 1 (n 210). 
273 After the Kosovo War (1999), Serbia had restored the autonomies of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the 2002 Constitution of the Union 
State of Serbia and Montenegro (adopted on 27 January 2003), and in the 2006 Constitution of Republic of Serbia (adopted on 30 
September 2006). However, the autonomies have not been as substantial or as guaranteed as in the SFRY era. According to the 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), ‘[w]ith respect to substantial autonomy, an examination 
of the Constitution, and more specifically of Part VII, makes it clear that this substantial autonomy of Kosovo is not at all guaranteed 
at the constitutional level, as the Constitution delegates almost every important aspect of this autonomy to the legislature’. European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, adopted by the Commission at its 70th plenary 
session (Venice, 17-18 March 2007), para. 7. 
274 Already prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was anticipating this formula when 
he said in an interview that ‘each situation need to be examined based on its unique circumstances’ and that Kosovo was a ‘highly 
distinctive situation’ because of the intervention of the international community. He, however, emphasized that decision of recognition 
is left to the UN member states. <https://web.archive.org/web/20080314204124/http://www.interfax.com/17/373003/Interview.aspx>. 
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the earlier logic and as an endorsement of a legal right to remedial secession, which opens up other 
legal questions outside the scope of this dissertation.  
I claim that the legal concept of sui generis that the recognizers of Kosovo are advancing is an empty 
shell. In essence, the argument insists that while there is usus (state practice) of recognizing Kosovo 
outside the Badinter Commission framework, there is no opinio juris (a belief that such practice is 
allowed in any other situation). The logic of the argument seems to be that since there is no 
combination of usus and opinio juris, there is no customary law and no dangerous precedent created. 
Nevertheless, you cannot have it both ways. If there is no opinio juris, then the independence of 
Kosovo cannot be in accordance with international law. If it was in accordance with international law 
- namely due to the dissolution of the SFRY, the atrocities committed, and the international 
involvement - then there is opinio juris, and there is a precedent. Without clear reasoning why Kosovo 
is not a precedent, the sui generis concept sounds merely as an unconvincing apology.275 
I argue for a middle ground between precedent and exception - that sui generisness should be 
endorsed by its legal connection to the uti possidetis federal dissolution. Marc Weller, who has been 
very much involved in both the Kosovo status process as well as theorizing about the concept of 
‘remedial secession’,276 has argued that in order to explain Kosovo’s independence, it might be 
tempting to ‘rediscover’ Kosovo’s status under the SFRY.277 After all, the only major difference 
between the supposedly ‘sui generis’ Kosovo and the ‘non-sui generis’ Croatia was constitutionally 
the latter’s right to secession, which was never applied. Thus, in my opinion the legal debate on the 
independence of Kosovo should be linked with the 1991 dissolution of the SFRY and the 
misapplication of uti possidetis. Only after this linkage has been understood, the post-Soviet territorial 
conflicts can be seen in a different light.  
If we dissect the legal argumentation supporting the ‘uniqueness’ of Kosovo, a pattern emerges. In 
1999, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented on the NATO intervention: ‘Some 
                                                 
275 As Morag Goodwin has pointed out, the main problem with the sui generis concept is that those advancing it are doing ‘so little to 
hide their political preferences’. M. Goodwin, ‘From Province to Protectorate to State: Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Gained?’ in J. 
Summers, Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and implications for Statehood, Self-
Determination and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 87-108 at 108.  
276 This dissertation will not focus on the concept of remedial secession in any detail. For more on remedial secession, see, inter alia, 
A. Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’ 26(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs (1997) 31-61; T. Simon, ‘Remedial Secession: What the 
Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo’ 40(105) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2011) 105-173; 
Vidmar (n 198); and C. Mueller, ‘Secession and Self-Determination - Remedial Right Only Theory Scrutinised’ 7 POLIS Journal 
(2012) 283-321. 
277 M. Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 272.  
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hope, and others fear, that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I 
would caution against any such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique’.278 In 2007, the 
Comprehensive Proposal by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General stated in its conclusion: 
‘Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other 
unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded 
to Milošević’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under 
temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary’.279 
In June 2007, 10 former foreign ministers of Western states published a plea in the New York Times 
under the title ‘Kosovo Must Be Independent’, insisting that ‘Kosovo is a unique situation that has 
required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts’.280 
However, the separatists in the former ASSRs and Russia were interpreting the possibility of Kosovo 
independence as a precedent. President Putin commented in the summer of 2006 that ‘[w]hen we hear 
that one approach is possible in one place (but) is unacceptable in another, it is difficult to understand 
and is even more difficult to explain to people’.281 Encouraged by this statement, the ASSR separatist 
representatives of Abkhazia,282 South Ossetia,283 and high Russian officials continued to warn about 
the Kosovo precedent before and after the independence declaration.284 
On 18 February 2008, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice justified recognition based on the 
‘unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation - including the context of Yugoslavia's 
breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended 
                                                 
278 M. Albright, Speech at the Council for Foreign Relations. Quoted in T. Onea, US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint 
versus Assertiveness from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 86. 
279 Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271) para. 15. 
280 <https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=16&nav_id=41838>. The former foreign ministers of the 
US, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Germany, Poland, Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and France signed the plea.  
281 ‘Putin urges uniform regional-conflict approaches’, Sputnik, 2 June 2006. He also said, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
that ‘Russia has never raised the issue of annexing any territories outside its current borders. We have no plans of the kind’.  
282 ‘President of Abkhazia: Solution to Kosovo will be a World Precedent’, Tanjug (Moscow), 28 March 2007. Reference in A. 
Trbovich, A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 417.  
283 President of South Ossetia hailed Putin’s ‘new approach’ as a break with the old double standards in ignoring the universally 
accepted right of peoples to self-determination. <http://www.rferl.org/a/1065315.html>. In addition, in March 2007, Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Azerbaijan, Araz Azimov, held an address in the European Parliament to point out differences between Kosovo and the 
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the former Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. <http://www.rferl.org/a/1075387.html>. 
284 In 2008, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov commented at the Munich Security Conference that ‘[i]f it comes to a unilateral 
recognition of Kosovo, that would be a precedent’. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-kosovo-idUKL1034558020080210>. In 
March 2008, the Chairman of the Committee of the Post-Soviet Affairs Alexey Ostrovsky stated: ‘We must review our foreign policy 
in response to new challenges such as the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo’ <https://www.ft.com/content/397057f2-
f3ad-11dc-b6bc-0000779fd2ac?mhq5j=e2>. Later he added that the Western states ‘have opened a Pandora’s Box. The world 
community should understand that from now on the resolution of conflicts in the ex-Soviet area cannot be seen in any other context 
from that of Kosovo’. <https://web.archive.org/web/20080902083212/http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=131742>. 
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period of UN administration - are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. 
Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent for any other situation in the world today’.285  
On 18 February 2008, British Ambassador to the UN said that ‘[t]he unique circumstances of the 
violent break-up of former Yugoslavia had made it a sui generis case, which created no precedent, as 
all EU member states today agreed’,286 and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom commented 
that ‘[f]irstly, I want to close the chapter that has followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Kosovo has 
been and is the last unresolved status issue’.287 
The pattern is that the recognizing states were using the sui generis concept in an attempt to appease 
in advance the countries with potential separatist issues, such as Russia and China. Nevertheless, 
neither accepted the sui generis formulation. For instance, President Putin insisted on January 2008 
that ‘any resolution on Kosovo will set a precedent in international practice’.288 Moreover, all the 
explanations justify Kosovo’s independence in the context of the break-up of the SFRY. This is 
legally significant - those who recognize Kosovo are unwilling to endorse any legal right to secession 
and depend on the fact of dissolution. Yet, as affirmed by the Badinter Commission, only the SRs 
had the right to become independent from the SFRY via uti possidetis.289 Being bypassed and ignored 
in the federal dissolution does not make Kosovo unique, as there remains several former ASSRs in 
the post-Soviet space with equally legitimate demands.  
Serbia was willing to put the sui generis argumentation to the test. In October of 2008, backed by 
Russia, it managed to persuade the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution 63/3,290 which 
requested an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ. The question agreed upon was: ‘Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in 
accordance with international law?’.291 The 2010 Advisory Opinion could have given an authoritative 
answer to the question of the final sovereignty over Kosovo. However, the Court chose to pursue a 
loophole in the phrasing of the question. As noted by Richard Falk, the ICJ gave a ‘non-answer that 
                                                 
285 C. Rice, ‘U.S Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State’, U.S Department of State, 18 February 2008. <http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm>. 
286 Security Council emergency session following Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence (SC/9252), 18 February 2008.  
287 <http://kosova.org/post/England-recognizes-Kosovo-as-am-independent-state>.  
288 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7193225.stm>. Quite in contrary to the hopes by the EU and the US, Kremlin has repeatedly 
affirmed that the Kosovo precedent can now be used to solve separatist issues in the post-Soviet area.  
289 Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, January 11 1992, 31 ILM 1497.  
290 Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 
Kosovo in in Accordance with International Law, A/RES/63/3 (8 October 2008). 
291 Introductory Note from the UN Secretary-General to the International Court of Justice (8 October 2008) at 1. 
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combined legal positivism with political realism’.292 In essence, the Court avoided the controversial 
issues such as the right to secession - remedial or otherwise - and the legality of international 
recognition of such a secession. Serbia’s formulation of the question asked whether the act of 
declaration was in accordance of international law. The Court chose to answer this question, albeit 
in reverse - it analyzed whether there is anything in general international law or a lex specialis that 
would make the act of a declaration illegal. In the Court’s general conclusion: 
‘The adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general 
international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework […]. 
Consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law’.293  
Majority of scholars found the Opinion disappointing,294 and many sided with the dissenting Judge 
Keith, who argued that the Court should have used its discretion to refuse the requested Advisory 
Opinion when the problem seemed too political, rather than compromising the integrity of the ICJ’s 
legal reasoning and judicial character.295 The Opinion gave no obvious addition to the debates over 
Kosovo being either a sui generis exception or a universal precedent.296 There have even been 
attempts to qualify the 2010 Advisory Opinion as a non-precedent.297  
As a conclusion on the independence of Kosovo, I argue that this should be seen as the fourth cycle 
of the evolution of uti possidetis. It can be seen either as a belated state succession of a lower-level 
                                                 
292 R. Falk, ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent’ 105(1) The American Journal of International Law 
(2011) 50-60 at 54. 
293 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, I.C.J. Reports (2010), 
para. 122. 
294 For example, see P. Hilpold, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Perspectives of a Delicate Question’ 
(14) Austrian Review of International and European Law (2009) 259-310; M. Mammadov, ‘“Traditional Gap” in the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo’ 4(4) Caucasian Review of International Affairs (2010) 313-324; and D. Efevwerhan, Secession and the Lessons 
from Kosovo: New Dimensions in the Law of Secession (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012). 
295 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Keith, para. 1; and Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 26. The Court voted on the question of whether to exercise the 
right to discretion and chose to give the Advisory Opinion by the vote of 9 to 5. See, inter alia, Ntovas (n 198) 164; M. Milanovic, 
‘Kosovo Advisory Opinion Preview’ EJIL: Talk! 14 July 2010; D. Jacobs, ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: A Voyage by the ICJ into 
the Twilight Zone of International Law’ The Hague Justice Portal, 12 October 2010; and E. De Brabandere, ‘The Kosovo Advisory 
Proceedings and the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction as a Method of Dispute Settlement’, The Hague Justice Portal, 27 September 2010. 
296 While some claim a precedential character, the Court limited the scope of its decision. Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 290) para. 56. 
For many sides of the debate, see e.g., S. Tierney, ‘The Long Intervention in Kosovo: A Self-Determination Imperative?’ 249-278 and 
S. Trifunovska, ‘The Impact of the “Kosovo Precedent” on Self-Determination Struggles’ 375-394, both in J. Summers (Ed), Kosovo: 
A Precedent? (Brill, 2011). A view of Kosovo as a precedent in J. Ker-Lindsay, ‘Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as 
a Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo “Unique Case” Argument’ 65(5) Europe-Asia Studies (2013) 837-856.  
297 For instance, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated on 26 July 2010 during a visit to Cyprus: ‘It’s a unique decision 
in a unique situation with a unique historical background […]. It is not a decision for other countries or other regions in the world’. 
The quotation from A. Peters, ‘Has the Advisory Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to 
International Law Set an Unfortunate Precedent?’ in M. Milanovic and M. Wood (Eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion (Oxford University Press, 2015) 291-313 at 295. She adds that, for instance, Russia has been insisting that both the 
independence of Kosovo as well as the ICJ Advisory Opinion on that independence are precedents.  
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ethnofederal unit that had a de facto republican status,298 or a major uti possidetis transformation that 
now has the potential to dissolve nation-states that have created distinct autonomous territories for 
minorities. In the first case, legally speaking, Kosovo should be seen as a de facto republic that has 
become independent retroactively from the SFRY. Only in the second case, this would have happened 
from Serbia. In any event, I claim that the misapplication of uti possidetis in the third cycle was the 
catalyst that led to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 16 years later. In sum, despite 
their promises to the contrary,299 the international community had failed to endorse the legitimate 
aspirations of the Kosovars in the third cycle. After this failure, the sui generis argumentation makes 
sense. The events of 1998-1999 had made it impossible to return to the earlier autonomous status, 
which Kosovo should have been awarded already in the early 1990s.  
In accordance with uti possidetis’ evolutionary logic, the third and fourth cycles have added a set of 
requirements. In the third cycle, a recognized entity needed to have a certain status under the 
dissolving federation, and had to announce its will to constitute a state and to agree on a series of 
criteria.300 The fourth cycle introduced additional preconditions in the Proposal by the Special Envoy 
of the Secretary-General.301  
2.7 Conclusion: An Indeterminate Rule 
In the previous pages, I have introduced the evolutionary nature of uti possidetis, as well as its four 
distinct cycles of transformation. What emerges is an unpredictable yet indispensable international 
legal rule of last resort, which has been used to create approximately half of the UN member states 
of today.302 Moreover, I substantiated how the essential evolutionary process of uti possidetis was 
breached in the third cycle. This breach has already enhanced the fragmentation processes taking 
place in the post-Soviet areas and produced the highly controversial independence of Kosovo. The 
full content of this impact remains to be seen.  
                                                 
298 According to the 1974 Constitution, the Kosovo Assembly was the highest authority of the province, with the power to change the 
constitution of the SAP of Kosovo, and a veto over changes to the federal constitution or to the constitution of Serbia. Moreover, it 
controlled the executive council and other administrative bodies of the province. In many ways, from 1974 onward, Kosovo had almost 
all the prerogatives of other federal units. Pavlović (n 43). See more on subchapter 4.2.5. 
299 For instance, see The Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Joint Statement, 7 September 1991, where the EC state promised to 
‘reestablish peace for all in Yugoslavia and to achieve lasting solutions which respect all legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations’.  
300 These included, inter alia, the respect for the rule of law, democracy, and human right, and constitutional guarantees for the rights 
of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the framework of the CSCE. Guidelines (n 4) paras 2-3.  
301 The criteria were especially directed on the minority protection over the Serbian population, and the most essential part of the 
‘supervised independence’ was that the UN would be guaranteeing the minority protection for a period after the independence. 
Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271) paras. 11-14. 
302 In the first three uti possidetis cycles that I have accounted for, there have been created 12 South American states in the first cycle, 
62 African and Asian countries in the second cycle, and 23 European and Asian states in the third cycle. 
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The main reason for uti possidetis’ ambiguity is that there has been no universal codification of its 
content or target group. In most cases, it has easily been agreed upon by the parties after the fact of 
decolonization or dissolution. These newly independent states then codified the doctrine within the 
legal instruments between themselves. However, questions over territory are so essential that states 
who have not yet been affected by the doctrine do not like to commit to rule that might compromise 
their territorial sovereignty. All that being said, the combination of state practice and the ICJ case law 
has been building up the momentum for uti possidetis to be seen as a universal custom. States might 
find themselves bound by it even against their wishes, as Belgrade found out in 1991-1992.  
The combination of the lack of codification and the doctrine’s content being defined only through the 
controversial situations of its application is problematic. As the famous legal maxim goes, ‘hard cases 
make bad law’.303 Especially after the third cycle, the rule produced can only be described as 
equivocal. Its indeterminate structure has evolved over time into ambivalence over its appliance, in a 
manner of a Jack-in-the-box analogy where a legal rule might appear unexpectedly to be applicable 
to a given situation.304 This is not ideal, given the central importance of questions over territory.  
To conclude, as a general principle, uti possidetis must evolve alongside general international law. 
Otherwise, it will be either doomed to irrelevance or - even worse - lose its ability to prevent armed 
conflict over territory. As this evolution took place only partially in the third cycle, the inner logic of 
the doctrine was broken, alongside its validity to solve territorial disputes peacefully. Therewith, in 
the following Chapters, I explicate in detail what went wrong in the third cycle. In Chapter 3, I account 
for the internal legal context at the moment of the dissolution, i.e., the socialist ethnofederal model. 
In Chapter 4, I construe the external component, the international legal framework at the moment of 
the socialist federal dissolutions. Together, these two components give us access to the actual content 
of uti possidetis in the early 1990s, which I have named (uti possidetis) meritus. Chapters 5 and 6 
conclude the dissertation by analyzing how the successor states of the USSR and the SFRY chose to 
confront their national minorities, and introducing the meritus formula that can be used to settle the 
already existing territorial disputes and to preempt new ones from occurring in the cases of 
independence or state dissolution.   
                                                 
303 Original quote from the US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in 1904 with the case Northern Securities Co. v. 
United States. M. Davis and A. Stark (Eds), Conflict of Interest in the Professions (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 41-42.  
304 This analogy has been used by Thomas Wilhelmsson to describe the conflict between national legislation of an EU member state 
and the European Community Law. In Wilhelmsson’s analogy, the ambivalence is over the matter when a given rule is applied. See T. 
Wilhelmsson, ‘Jack-in-the-Box Theory of European Community Law’ in L. Krämer, H. Micklitz, and K. Tonner (Ed), Law and Diffuse 
Interests in the European Legal Order (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1997) 177-194. 
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3. The Internal Component: Socialist Ethnofederalism 
In this Part, I present to the two components that constitute my proposal for uti possidetis meritus: 
internal and international legal contexts at the moment of the dissolution. This Chapter exhibits the 
internal legal framework, which is the lex specialis of the socialist federal dissolutions - i.e., the 
socialist ethnofederal model. The following Chapter establishes the external component as the lex 
generalis - i.e., the international legal framework, especially the right to self-determination. While 
both components are equally applicable in the SFRY setting, for clarity’s sake, Chapter 3 focuses 
mainly on the USSR example, whereas Chapter 4 addresses the SFRY. 
Briefly, ethnofederalism was the official socialist national policy. It assigned the recognized peoples 
of the socialist federations a demarcated national territory and divided them into a hierarchy based on 
the progression level towards socialism. The right to self-determination was based on this status, and 
an upgrade was possible through merit. In this Chapter, I first account for the ideological origins of 
the ethnofederal system, previously unknown in the history of federalism and in contradiction with 
the original Marxist ideology. I then proceed to introduce the four levels of ethnofederal structure, 
with the focus on the two most high-ranking units: the SSRs and the ASSRs. In relation to the uti 
possidetis meritus formula, I establish the legitimate expectations (meritus) of the ethnofederal units 
in relation to the right to sovereignty and self-determination according to the applicable legal rules.  
3.1 The Ideological Foundations of Ethnofederalism: Historical Materialism and 
the ‘National Question’ 
3.1.1 The Philosophical Origins of Historical Materialism 
Karl Marx’s theory on ‘historical materialism’ is based on Georg Hegel’s concept of history occurring 
through a dialectic of opposing forces.305 Hegel’s dialectic, in turn, is based on a classical notion of 
dialectics presented by Plato in his Socratic dialogues. According to this original version, a 
philosophical argument was presented as a back-and-forth debate between individuals on opposing 
sides of a given altercation. The debaters would arrive at the truth after disclosing and overcoming 
the contradictions in the argument of their opponent. 
                                                 
305 R. Palmer and J. Colton, A History of the Modern World (6th Ed., New York, 1983) at 498-499. Originally presented in G. Hegel, 
Die Phenomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg und Würzburg, 1807). The term comes from the Greek word ‘dialego’, to discourse or 
debate.  
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Hegel’s version is also relying on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Instead of Plato’s 
opposing individuals, however, Hegel’s opposing sides were usually concepts. Additionally, his 
philosophy contains a factor of determinism. As he defined his dialectics: 
‘all change comes through the clash of antagonistic elements. All history, and indeed all reality, is a 
process of development through time, a single and meaningful unfolding of events, necessary, logical 
and deterministic; that every event happens in due sequence for good and sufficient reason, not by chance; 
and that history could not and cannot happen any differently from the way it has happened and is still 
happening today’.306 
While Plato and Hegel had different frameworks for their dialectics, in both forms the dialectical 
method produced more and more sophisticated results. The Hegelian form consisted of three 
dialectical stages of development: a thesis, an antithesis contradicting or negating the thesis, and the 
tension between the two being resolved by a synthesis.307 The word ‘negate’ can be misleading as the 
elements of the thesis and antithesis are preserved within the synthesis. 
Marx adopted the framework of Hegel’s dialectical method while criticizing it as too ideal: 
‘My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. […] the ideal is 
nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought 
[…]. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being 
the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner’.308 
Through the work of Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin, this version of dialectic became a 
school of thought known as historical materialism.309 This theory emphasizes the primacy of the 
material way of life and social praxis over all forms of social consciousness. It was portrayed as a 
scientific way to explain the events in the past, form a thorough progressive story from those events 
and, most importantly, to predict the future based on this story.310  
For the socialist theoreticians, the central contradiction to be resolved through dialectics was the class 
struggle, because of its central role in the social and political lives of societies. Another recurring 
theme is the constant progressive change of the material world. According to Engels:  
                                                 
306 Quoted in Palmer and Colton (n 305) 493. 
307 Hegel actually never coined these terms, but instead ascribed terminology to Immanuel Kant. Hegel (n 305) Preface.  
308 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy - The Process of Capitalist Production (Cosimo, 2007) at 25. Originally in K. 
Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. 1 (Hamburg, 1873), Afterword to the Second German Edition.  
309 A term ‘dialectic materialism’ has been used interchangeably, for example by a Russian Marxist theoretician Georgi Plekhanov. 
310 For more on Marx’s historical determinism, see A. Bauer and V. Eichhorn, ‘Historical Materialism and Social Prediction’ 8(3) 
Soviet Studies in Philosophy (1969) 235-251.  
65 
 
‘For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of 
everything and in everything: nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted process of becoming 
and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher’.311 
3.1.2 The Materialist Conception of History 
Once Marx had prepared his theoretical framework, he proceeded to explain the history of the world 
through the dialectic method. According to him, all societies have always been dominated by the 
economy. All the other aspects of society, such as property relations, social classes, culture, legal 
system, and the state itself, are developed in response to the economic forces and are used to prevent 
people from seeing their material conditions clearly. His central focus was on the ownership of 
‘means of production’ - things that are necessary to produce material goods, such as land, natural 
resources, technology - and the social relationships people enter into in order to acquire and use these 
means. This combination produces the mode of production, which is the determinant for any given 
historical era. Societies progress through historical stages of modes of production, which there are 
altogether five: primitive communal, slave labor, feudal, capitalist, and socialist.312 Marx concluded 
that most of Europe had progressed from feudalism to capitalism. In capitalist societies, the dominant 
mean of production is capital, the wealth required to invest in economic development. This tends to 
make everything in modern societies a commodity, whose value comes from being bought or sold. 
According to the dialectic method, the advanced states of Europe had reached this level of 
development through the predicted progression: first, there was the thesis (feudalism), which brought 
on reaction (capitalism) as an antithesis, whereas the final negation of the negation, the synthesis, 
would be the most progressive mode of production, i.e., socialism. 
Marx used the term ‘revolution’ extensively in its expanded meaning, describing a rapid change in 
crucial points of history. He considered capitalism the most progressive mode of production the world 
had seen, as it can generate tremendous growth through capitalist’s ability and incentive to reinvest 
profits into new technologies. This makes the capitalist class the most revolutionary in history.  
                                                 
311 Quoted in V. Lenin, On the Question of Dialectics: A Collection (1915), reproduced in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38 (Progress 
Publishers, 1980) 357-361. Lenin himself defined the term ‘development’ in a similar manner: ‘A development that repeats, as it were, 
stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis […] a connection that provides a uniform, 
and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws - these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development 
that is richer than the conventional one’. In 1907, he defined development as ‘the “struggle” of opposites’. V. Lenin, Collected Works, 
Vol. 13, June 1907 - April 1908 (Progress Publishers, 1978) at 301.  
312 J. Stalin, ‘Main types of Relations of Production’ in J. Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (Moscow, 1938). Leninist 
ideology would add one more subtype of the relation of production, imperialism. This was the ‘highest form of capitalism’, a natural 
result of the capital exceeding the boundaries of national states. V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19 (Progress Publishers, 1942) at 47.  
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However, means of production change more rapidly than the relations of production, and this causes 
a mismatch between base and superstructure,313 which generates social conflict. The history of means 
of production is both the substructure and the prime mover of history. Thus, political and legal 
institutions correspond to the economic interests of the ruling class in a given era.314 The role of law 
and the legal system are mere superstructures serving the material needs of the economically 
dominant class, and ‘the rule of law’ is nothing more than an ideological mechanism to justify their 
ownership of the means of production.315 Marx saw nothing intrinsically good in the existence of the 
law, which would be abolished alongside the class conflict, with the final advent of communism.316  
Marx further believed that capitalism was inevitably prone to periodic crisis. This was due to his 
uncompromising stance on the source of profits being solely the surplus value appropriated from 
labor.317 In his view, the long term tendency for the rate of profit to fall will lead to the intensification 
of exploitation and the heightening of the class conflict.318 Therefore, as the capitalists would invest 
more in new technologies and less in labor, they would cause the workers to lack capital of which to 
consume, resulting in recession or depression, where the price of labor would fall even further.  
This cycle between growth and collapse would become ever more severe. Marx concluded that the 
long-term consequence of this development would be an increasing impoverishment of the majority 
of the working people, the proletariat. He predicted that the process would inevitably lead to a 
situation where the proletariat would seize the means of production, making them, in essence, the 
next revolutionary class, those who progress history instead of being a victim of it.319 The new era 
that this would bring about would encourage social relations that benefit everyone equally, while not 
being prone to crises. However, Marx also predicted that capitalists would never accept this 
                                                 
313 As defined by Michael Lewers, ‘Marx defines the base as the social relations between men which create and produce materials that 
are eventually put up for exchange. From the base comes a superstructure in which laws, politics, religion and literature legitimize the 
power of the social classes that are formed in the base. So, for Marx, art and literature are a superstructure of society’. M. Lewers, 
‘Base and Superstructure’, Methods of Literary and Cultural Studies, 6 April 2015.  
314 K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, 1904) at Preface II. 
315 A. Zimmerman, ‘Marxism, Communism and Law: How Marxism Led to Lawlessness and Genocide in the Former Soviet Union’ 
2(1) The Western Australian Jurist (2011) 1-60 at 17. He adds that already Plato had portrayed in Republic that ‘each form of 
government enacts the laws with a view to its advantage’ and that legislation is ‘for their - the rulers - advantage’. Ibid. 
316 As phrased by Hans Kelsen, the ‘anti-normative approach to social phenomena is an essential element of the Marxian theory in 
general and of the Marxian theory of law in particular’. H. Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (London, 1955) at 36.  
317 Marx’s opponents and proponents have criticized this view. See, for example, J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Penguin Books, 
1962); and P. Pilkington, ‘Marx, Hegel, The Labour Theory of Value and Human Desire’, Fixing the Economists, 13 August 2013. 
318 A. Gamble, D. Marsh and T. Tant (Eds), Marxism and Social Science (Macmillan, 1999) at 177. 
319 Stalin was a firm believer of inevitability proclaimed by the historical materialism. ‘If development proceeds by way of the 
disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to 
overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon’. 
Stalin, ‘Contradictions Inherent in Nature’ in Stalin (n 312). 
67 
 
revolutionary step, so negotiating with them would be useless.320 Instead, a revolution like the French 
Revolution of 1789 was needed to overthrow the established mode of production. Subsequently, a 
proletarian dictatorship would have to be established to maintain this new socialist system.321 
3.1.3 Inevitability of Progress 
Unlike Hegel, who was more ambiguous on the subject,322 Marx and Lenin believed that history was 
predetermined,323 and that people can affect its flow only on a limited scale. Thesis-antithesis-
synthesis was the inescapable cyclical life of progress, and socialism was a historical inevitability 
given that the working class had every incentive to bring about the new revolutionary era.324 This was 
simple logic: their position would worsen until they would rise and bring about the change.  
According to the theory, the proletarian revolution would take place first in the most advanced 
capitalist countries, with the most impoverished working class. Following, the sparkle of a revolution 
would rapidly spread among the industrialized states until the whole world had progressed to the next 
mode of production. The October Revolution of 1917 was actually in contradiction with the theory, 
as Russia had not yet fully advanced from feudalist to capitalist mode of production. According to 
historical materialism, each revolution happens only when and where appropriate conditions are met.  
Nevertheless, while Russia was not ready for a revolution in theory, by late 1917 it certainly was 
ready in practice. The communist agitation had established a firm ground and the ruling class was 
bound to the highly unpopular figure of the Tsar. Most significantly, the Provisional Government,325 
which had taken over after the fall of the imperial regime, was closing in on a total collapse due to 
the strains of the First World War. Moreover, communists were well organized in the Bolshevik 
                                                 
320 This view was repeated throughout the writings of Marx and Engels, for instance, in ‘Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in 
Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London, 1848) and ‘10. 
The Necessity, Preconditions and Consequences of the Abolition of Private Property’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology 
(written originally in 1846, published in Moscow, 1932). 
321 Originally presented in K. Marx, ‘The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850’ (1850), republished in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected 
Works, Vol. 1 (Progress Publishers, 1969) 186-299. 
322 Hegel’s work is usually interpreted as deterministic, but his equivocalness on the matter has led many scholars to contest this view. 
See, inter alia, E. Cafagna, ‘Hegel and Determinism’ 11(3) Giornale critic della filosofia italiana (2015) 588-609.  
323 E.g., ‘each of the three great periods of world history has brought Marxism new confirmation and new triumphs. But a still greater 
triumph awaits Marxism, as the doctrine of the proletariat, in the coming period of history’. V. Lenin, ‘The Historical Destiny of the 
Doctrine of Karl Marx’ in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18 (4th Ed., Progress Publishers 1975) 582-585 at 585.  
324 ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally 
inevitable’. ‘Chapter I. Bourgeois and Proletarians’ in Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).  
325 The Russian Provisional Government was formed by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and held power in Russia 
between March and October 1917. The story of the Provisional Government is very well documented, for example, in R. Browder and 
A. Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government, 1917: Documents (Stanford, 1961).  
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Party.326 As one Bolshevik would later recall, in 1917, they had ‘found power lying in the streets and 
simply picked it up’.327 The Bolshevik decision to take power in Russia caused critique in some 
Marxist circles. For instance, Karl Kautsky, the leader of a highly influential Social Democratic Party 
of Germany, criticized the Bolsheviks for taking power too early and initiating revolutionary changes 
for which there was no economic rationale in Russia.328  
Lenin was well aware that the October Revolution was not ‘supposed’ to have happened and would 
not survive alone. Indeed, only six months previously he had proclaimed in his ‘April Thesis’ that 
their upcoming revolution would not be an isolated event, but an example that would catch on the 
war-weary states of Europe,329 Germany in particular. For example, in Political Report of the Central 
Committee in 1918, Lenin warned ‘[a]t all events, under all conceivable circumstances, if the German 
revolution does not come, we are doomed’.330 Theoretically, this view was based on the writings of 
Engels, who had proclaimed the revolution impossible in one country alone.331 
Until his death in 1924, Lenin kept on hoping in vain for a German revolution. Yet, he had to reconcile 
the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia with the fact that theory had failed to live 
up to the expectations. Therewith, the Bolsheviks started advancing an idea of ‘defending the 
revolution’ from the capitalist state’s attempts to undermine the superiority of socialism. Lenin’s 
successor, Stalin, made this policy permanent with a slogan ‘Socialism in one country’, promising 
that the USSR would build a society so advanced that the rest of the world would have no choice but 
to imitate it and to embrace socialism. In 1938, Stalin divided the question of socialism in one country 
                                                 
326 The Bolshevik faction split from the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in the 2nd Party Congress in 1903 (R. Suny, The 
Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (Oxford University Press, 1998) at 57). This was mainly due to the 
issue of party discipline, with the Bolsheviks advocating ‘virtually a military discipline’. R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: 
Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 (Harvard, 1964) at 244. The Party functioned under a series of different names. In 1918-
1925, it was called the ‘Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)’. In 1925, the Party was re-named ‘All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks)’ and finally as the ‘Communist Party of the Soviet Union’ in 1952, the title of which it would retain until it was banned 
on 29 August 1991.  
327 This quote is attributed to many sources, including Lenin and Leon Trotsky, who cite each other. Quoted in Z. Çelik, D. Favro and 
R. Ingersol (Eds), Streets: Critical Perspectives on Public Spaces (Berkeley, 1994) at 67; and <http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-
online.net/article/revolutions_russian_empire>. 
328 K. Kautsky, Social Democracy versus Communism (Rand, 1946), ‘Chapter 4. Lenin and the Russian Revolution’. 
329 V. Lenin, ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution’ (7 April 1917) in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 24 (Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1964) 19-26. 
330 Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, 7 March 1918.  
331 ‘By creating the world market, big industry has already brought all the peoples of the Earth, and especially the civilized peoples, 
into such close relation with one another that none is independent of what happens to the others. Further, it has coordinated the social 
development of the civilized countries to such an extent that, in all of them, bourgeoisie and proletariat have become the decisive 
classes and the struggle between them the great struggle of the day. It follows that the communist revolution will not merely be a 
national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries […]. It will have a powerful impact on the other 
countries of the world, and will radically alter the course of development which they have followed up to now, while greatly stepping 
up its pace. It is a universal revolution and will, accordingly, have a universal range’. Principle 19 in F. Engels, Principles of 
Communism (1847), published in F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1969) 81-97. 
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into internal relations within the USSR and the external relations with the world. In the former case, 
Stalin held that they have everything necessary to construct socialism alone. However, when asked 
about whether the victory of socialism was ‘final’, i.e. is there a possibility of capitalism being 
restored in Russia, Stalin replied that the final victory was possible only on an international scale.332 
3.1.4 Nationalism under Historical Materialism 
Nationalism was always a troublesome phenomenon for historical materialism and Marx was very 
inconsistent with the topic. While he insisted the whole concept being merely an element of class 
warfare that bourgeois use against the proletariat to make them unaware of their social conditions,333 
he was the first person to use the phrase ‘self-determination of nations’.334  
Notwithstanding, since nationalism remained a political force until the final victory of socialism was 
achieved, Marxist political parties had to try to accommodate it with their ideology. The first direct 
treatment of nationalism as an important policy issue in its own right took place in a Congress held 
by the Second International in 1896.335 An ideological schism developed, as the majority of the 
participants affirmed that all nations have a right to self-determination, yet their centralist bias336 
forced them to advocate keeping the existing multinational Empires intact.337 Eventually, the majority 
view emerged, according to which the supremacy of the proletariat would render states and 
nationalism obsolete. Therefore, in a short term, it was advisable to ensure the survival of the 
                                                 
332 J. Stalin, ‘On the Final Victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.’ in J. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. 14 (Red Star, 1978) at 315-325. 
333 Marx called nationalism ‘illusory communal interest’ that was a by-product of capitalism suffusing nations into larger ‘national’ 
units. R. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality (New York, 1973) at 123-125. Many later 
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comprehensive manner. One often-quoted critique is by Tom Nairn who argues that the theory of nationalism represents ‘Marxism’s 
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‘instant formula utopias of proletarian internationalism’. T. Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’ 94(1) New Left Review (1975) 3-29 at 29.  
334 The phrase appeared first in the International Workingmen’s Association’s ‘Proclamation of the Polish Question’ (1865). Marx had 
a major role in the Association, especially in the international issues. Walker Connor has observed the irony of the right to self-
determination being proclaimed by the history’s most famous internationalist. W. Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist 
Theory and Strategy (Princeton, 1983) at 11. More on Marx’s role in the Association, see A. Gouldner, ‘Marx’s Last Battle: Bakuni 
and the First International’ 11(6) Theory and Society (1982) 853-884. 
335 Also known as the Socialist International, was an organization of socialist and labor parties between the years 1889-1916. It was 
formed to succeed the First International (International Workingmen’s Association) that had been dissolved in 1876.  
336 According to Marx, legal relationships in a communist state would be of purely administrative nature. ‘Law’ was to be merely 
regulations or operating procedures for bureaucratizing the ideology. A unitary centralized government would be the most efficient 
with this. R. Plawker, ‘The Soviet Contradiction: Socialist Federalism and the Freedom of Secession’ 10(1) Wisconsin International 
Law Journal (1991-1992) 169-183 at 171-172. Lenin also thought that larger units were preferable. In 1920, he asserted that the Party 
should ‘create as large states as possible’ (V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, April - December 1920 (Progress Publishers, 1966) at 
167-168) and that the Bolsheviks ‘do not favor the existence of small states’ (V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, December 1920 - 
August 1921 (Progress Publishers, 1973) at 342). As another prominent Marxist ideologue Karl Kautsky put it in 1892, the socialist 
society was ‘nothing more than a single gigantic industrial concern’. K. Kautsky, The Class Struggle (New York, 1971) at 138.  
337 The opposing faction led by Rosa Luxemburg argued for the dismantling of Empires such as Austro-Hungary and Russia. R. 
Luxemburg, ‘The National Question: 1. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, Przeglad Socialdemokratyczny, 1908-1909. 
Luxemburg also held the view that under capitalism the right to self-determination cannot exists, while in socialism it is not necessary. 
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dictatorship of the proletariat in bigger units. The First Congress of the Russian Socialist Democratic 
Labor Party, held in Minsk 1898, proclaimed in a resolution ‘the right of nations to self-
determination’ in this context. The reality was that no Russian political party was willing to dismantle 
the Tsarist Empire, which was a guarantee of the Great Power status in international politics.338 In 
fact, in their inconsistent treatment of the national question, both Marx and Engels had been 
advancing the continuation of Russian imperialism as serving a progressive purpose.339 They held the 
view that Russians had progressed to a more-or-less capitalist mode of production, unlike some of 
the more backward nations of the Empire who still lived in feudalism.340  
In addition to lacking developed capitalism, Russia was a particularly troublesome target for a 
potential revolution from the national perspective since it was comprised of over 100 different 
nationalities. However, Lenin recognized this problem early on and used it to advance his cause. In 
November 1917, he became the first major political leader in the world to proclaim the right of self-
determination of peoples,341 two months before the famous Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson.342 
The issue of the national question343 in multiethnic Empires had preoccupied Lenin for quite some 
time. He had ordered Stalin to write a comprehensive article on the question, titled ‘Marxism and the 
National Question’. The article considers different ways to solve the national question, rejects the so-
called Austro-Marxists’ version of ‘cultural-national autonomy’344 and proposes regional autonomy 
in its place.345 In addition, the article provides the characteristic features of a nation: ‘A nation is a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, 
                                                 
338 R. Lukic and A. Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (2nd Ed., 
Oxford University Press, 1999) at 43. 
339 M. Molnar, Marx et Engels et la politique internationale (Paris, 1975), quoted in ibid. at 43.  
340 Marx’s championing of the right to self-determination for Poland and its secession from Russia should be seen in this context: he 
viewed the Polish nation as more progressive than Russia, which would only retard its progression until independence was achieved. 
341 N 166. In the declaration, the Bolshevik government recognized the equality and sovereignty of all peoples of Russia, granting them 
the right to free self-determination up to and including secession, freedom of religion, and the free development of national minorities 
on the territory of Russia. Lenin had committed himself already in 1914 to the right to national self-determination. V. Lenin, ‘The 
Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, Prosceshcheniye 4-6, April-June 1914.  
342 On 8 January 1918, President Wilson proposed a 14-point program for world peace that later formed the basis for peace negotiations 
after the surrender of Germany. While the points dealt with the topic, the term ‘self-determination’ was not yet used on this occasion. 
343 See n 179. 
344 Austro-Marxists were a Marxist faction in the Dual-Monarchy of Austro-Hungary. They were mostly German-speaking Austrians 
and were more preoccupied with the national question than the other Marxists since Austro-Hungary was extremely heterogenic in its 
ethnic composition. The most prominent were Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, who were the first Marxist to renounce the orthodoxy of 
nationalism as an ephemeral phenomenon. According to their policy, cultural values were neutral, devoid of class content, and could 
be preserved with the future socialist order. Their autonomy-model would not be regional but based on people, who would enjoy 
cultural rights wherever they lived. The idea of cultural autonomy appealed to the Jewish Socialist Party in Russia since they lacked a 
territorial area with a Jewish majority. M. Löwy, ‘Marxists and the National Question’ 1(96) New Left Review (1976) 81-100 at 92-94. 
345 J. Stalin, ‘Marxism and National Question’ 3-5 Prosveshcheniye 1913. This formed the base for the ethnofederal model that the 
Bolsheviks established in the 1924 Constitution of the USSR (n 390). The article made Stalin the Party’s specialist in nationality affairs, 
and he was later assigned to be the Commissar of Nationalities in the first Bolshevik government.  
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territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’.346 Finally, the 
article confirms that nationalism is a part of the social superstructure of the capitalist era of history, 
to be replaced by internationalist consciousness free of national elements under socialism.347  
Lenin saw no realistic alternative to national self-determination since nations existed objectively.348 
However, he accepted Marx’s notion that nationalism was bound to be dissolved alongside class 
struggle. It seemed pointless to construct federalism in the USSR as national differences were about 
to be eradicated. Marx had spoken explicitly against any federal arrangements, insisting that the 
interests of the proletariat could best be served through a unitary government structure.349 Therewith, 
before 1917, Lenin adamantly opposed federalism, fearing its potential for abetting nationalism.350  
Lenin’s mind changed with a surge of separatism all over the Russian Empire after the revolution. He 
thought it paramount to keep Russia intact, as the Bolsheviks would need the grandest possible unit 
to serve as a spark of revolution to more advanced Western Europe. He concluded that the only way 
to save the Empire was by proclaiming the right to self-determination up to secession, a temporary 
concession in exchange for political support for the regime. Lenin argued that if Bolsheviks were to 
give the right to secession for the nations of Russia, most of them would not use it.351 If they were to 
deny the nations this right, they would fight for it.352 He calculated that any seceding nations would 
                                                 
346 Ibid. at 2. In the SFRY the official nationalist ideologue was Edvard Kardelj, who in his 1939 book The Development of the Slovene 
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347 Stalin (n 345) 6.  
348 ‘If we were to declare that we do not recognize Finnish nation, but only the toiling masses, that would be sheer banality. We cannot 
refuse to recognize what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognize it’. V. Lenin, On the Program of the Party (1915), 
reproduced in 10(7) The New International (1944) 199-202.  
For more on the objectivity of a state recognition see Koskenniemi (n 68) at 272-282. He concludes that the question of whether or not 
an entity is a state cannot be merely a matter of the entity’s self-definition and, therefore, criteria such as the one in the Montevideo 
Convention is needed. However, this is problematic, since the recognizing states decide the application of statehood criteria always 
after a subjective assessment. Thus, Lenin cannot refuse to recognize what subjectively exists, but this does not compel others to 
recognize since nothing has been proven to exist objectively. In any case, the Bolsheviks were in a privileged position to argue for the 
objective existence of nations within their political realm, since recognition by the previous sovereign is often a guarantee of universal 
recognition for the new state.  
349 Marx also attacked the liberal notions of Montesquieu and Rousseau, both of whom though federated systems to be more democratic 
than unitary states. G. Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (1990) at 24, 129. 
350 E.g., in 1913 he insisted that ‘Marxists will never, under any circumstances, advocate either the federal principle of decentralization’ 
(V. Lenin, ‘Critical Remarks on the National Question’ 10-12 Prosveshcheniye (1913) 20-45 at 45), and ‘class loyalty is eternal, while 
ethnic loyalty is transitory’ (Quoted in J. Hazard, The Soviet Legal System: The Law in the 1980’s (New York, 1984) at 27). 
351 ‘Separation is altogether not our scheme. We do not predict separation at all’. V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18, April 1912 - 
March 1913 (Progress Publishers, 1963) at 90. 
352 Gleason (n 349) 30.  
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be drawn back to Russia by their progressive policies, economic necessity, and a need for military 
protection. He was also willing to sacrifice parts of the Empire for the sake of the socialist system.353  
3.2 The Early Years of the Bolshevik Rule 
3.2.1 The First Stage: ‘War Communism’, 1917-1921 
On 25 October 1917,354 the Bolshevik Party was able to overthrow the Russian Provisional 
Government, which had held the ultimate power in the Russian Empire since the fall of the Czar 
earlier that year. While the revolution itself was relatively peaceful, a Civil War started immediately, 
vindicating Marx’s prediction that the bourgeois class would never accept the overthrow of 
capitalism. Following Marx’s theory on the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin 
proclaimed the Bolsheviks as the ‘Vanguard of the Proletariat’, banning all other political parties.355 
Yet, as Marx’s further predictions of the worldwide revolution failed, the need to defend the 
revolution was expanded to include external threats. The Bolsheviks viewed all the other governments 
of the world as enemies of their revolution. As they had expressed as their aim to help to overthrow 
all the other governments, the reciprocal foreign hostility was to be expected. 
The Bolshevik fears appeared proven correct when several capitalist states made interventions against 
them in the Civil War.356 Notwithstanding, the Leninist national policy claimed its greatest victory as 
the Bolsheviks’ proclamation of the right to self-determination enabled them to gather considerable 
support from the non-Russians.357 This gave them legitimacy while discrediting the reactionary 
                                                 
353 J. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1957) at 84. According to Connor, Leninist policy was 
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nationalist policies of their opponents. By 1921, the Bolsheviks had won. The following period of 
War Communism introduced the most radical changes to everyday life in Russia.358  
The Bolsheviks aimed to exterminate all vestiges of the old order and to concentrate all power to the 
Party. The abolished institutions included the legal and commercial systems, as well as most of the 
governmental organizations. All industry was nationalized, the property was communalized, and 
ration cards replaced money. The economic aim was to control all national production and all 
distribution of goods to the population, thereby introducing a socialist non-profit operation to replace 
the capitalist market mechanisms. The War Communism experiment failed for several reasons. Most 
importantly, the dictatorship of the proletariat was only supposed to defend the revolution for a short 
while before the world-wide revolution. When this did not take place, the isolated national economy 
of Russia, strained further by the Civil War, started to collapse under an economic blockade.359  
Nevertheless, some Bolsheviks argued that War Communism also failed in the ideological sphere. 
Both Marx and Lenin had insisted before the revolution that the transition to communism should be 
gradual, and the ‘rush to communism’ in 1918 violated the principles they had set down.360 Speaking 
of War Communism, Lenin admitted in October 1921: 
‘brief experience convinced us that that line was wrong, that it ran counter to what we had previously 
written about the transition from capitalism to socialism, namely, that it would be impossible to bypass 
the period of socialist accounting and control in approaching even the lower stage of communism. […] 
our theoretical literature has been definitely stressing the necessity for a prolonged, complex transition 
through socialist accounting and control from capitalist society (and the less developed it is the longer 
the transition will take) to even one of the approaches to communist society’.361 
3.2.2 Reconsolidation of the Bolshevik Rule  
By the early 1920s, the Bolshevik government had won the Civil War and proceeded to reconquer 
some parts of the Empire that had unilaterally declared their independencies. To Lenin’s surprise, the 
revolutionary socialist leaders in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan took up arms against the Red 
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Army.362 He observed that these leaders did not fight against the revolutionary policies of the 
Bolsheviks, but against the continuing domination by Moscow.  
As a result, Lenin produced a major ideological contribution to the issue of self-determination.363 He 
concluded that even though nationalism was a capitalist distortion, it would remain a social fact even 
under socialism and could not be ideologically neglected. As a result, it would have to be confined 
via self-determination of peoples. Moreover, there existed two different forms of nationalism: that of 
oppressed nations (such as that of Georgians, considered good and legitimate) and that of oppressor 
nations (such as Russian chauvinism, which could not be justified under socialism).364 Without the 
latter, there would be no need for that of the former, and the world would advance towards the ultimate 
withering away of a state that Engels had predicted.365 Subsequently, the Party started contemplating 
different state structures to overcome the national distrust of the formerly oppressed nations.366 
3.2.3 The Second Stage: New Economic Policy and the Idea of a Federation 
The second attempt to establish a communist order in Russia had its origins in the realization that it 
was to remain alone in a world of hostile capitalist powers.367 In order for it to survive, there would 
need to be a competitive economy and support for the socialist order by the non-Russians. The 
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economic downfall was curtailed with the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), and the 
peripheries were won over by the socialist ethnofederal model of territorial autonomy.368  
According to the NEP, the peasants were allowed to sell the surpluses left after taxes under a market 
mechanism,369 small private enterprises were allowed, and the ration card system was abolished.370 
Lenin was contemplating even more significant changes of policy, advocating a ‘state capitalist’ 
model under which ‘the state performs the role of the capitalist employer, exploiting the workers in 
the interest of the state’.371 Under socialism, there would be no exploitation of workers, but to achieve 
this level of progress, Russia would need to enhance its industrial base and productivity through 
capitalism. Influential Bolsheviks such as Bukharin and Trotsky regarded the NEP as a dangerous 
deviation from Marxism and opposed it vehemently. However, Lenin was able to curtail the 
opposition by highlighting the temporariness of the policy and, finally, by threatening to resign.372  
3.2.4 The ‘Assimilationists’ versus the ‘Autonomists’ 
While the NEP was grudgingly accepted as a temporary policy, the subject of federalism caused a 
major ideological split within the Party in the early 1920s. The opposing sides were the 
‘assimilationists’ led by Stalin and the ‘autonomists’ led by Lenin.373 While Lenin remained the 
nominal leader of the Party, he was losing this status due to his ailing condition.374 The difference of 
opinion had to do with the future of the proclaimed Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) and the 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), and their relationship with the RSFSR.375  
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(Progress Publishers, 1972) 323-334. The USSR used the state capitalist system for most of the Soviet period, without officially 
adopting the term.  
372 W. Laqueur, Soviet Realities: Culture and Politics from Stalin to Gorbachev (Transaction Publishers, 1990) at 160. 
373 T. Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR’ Problems of Communism, May 1974, 1-22 at 1.  
374 A series of strokes in 1922-1924 took away Lenin’s ability to lead the Party, and 12 December 1922 was his last day in his office 
in the Kremlin. Y. Felshtinsky, Lenin and His Comrades: The Bolsheviks Take Over Russia 1917-1924 (New York, 2010) at 218-219. 
Moreover, Lenin never held an unchallenged dictatorial position within the Party, such as his successor Stalin would.  
375 The SSRs were proclaimed mostly after the victory of the Bolshevik side in their Civil Wars during 1918-1919, for example, in 
Lithuania (16 December 1918), in Byelorussia (1 January 1919), and in Ukraine (19 March 1918). The ASSRs were, likewise, 
proclaimed as the Red Army reconsolidated the authority of Moscow in outer peripheries of the Empire, for instance, in Turkestan (30 
April 1918), in Crimea (18 October 1921), and in Karelia (27 June 1923). After the October Revolution, the state lacked an official 
name for over three months, then was named the Soviet Russian Republic, on 25 January 1918, in the 3rd All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, and, finally, renamed Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in the Constitution promulgated on 10 July 1918.  
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The assimilationists insisted that the SSRs should be made autonomous areas of the RSFSR, and the 
elaborate system of treaties with them, created in 1918-1921, should be abolished. Stalin prepared a 
draft, called ‘Project of a Resolution Concerning the Relations between the RSFSR and the 
Independent Republics’, where he argued that the distinction between the ASSRs and the SSRs should 
be terminated, with all the SSRs being transformed into the ASSRs of the RSFSR.376 In contrast, the 
autonomists favored the Leninist model of different levels of autonomy given to nations and 
nationalities of the USSR, including the notion that the SSRs would remain sovereign in the USSR.377 
In the end, due to the personal authority of Lenin and the clear rejection of Stalin’s draft by the 
Georgian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, the autonomists were victorious. Lenin defended his 
stance with references to Engels, who was less hostile to federalism than Marx.378 In addition, he 
insisted that the continuing commitment to self-determination had to be demonstrated by a voluntary 
treaty of Union, with a constitutionally guaranteed right of secession. As described by Lenin in 1919: 
‘We want a voluntary union of nations - a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another - a union 
founded on complete confidence, on a clear recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent […]. 
We are striving towards the complete abolition of frontiers’.379 
The NEP and socialist ethnofederalism are quintessentially linked: both were major deviations from 
the original ideological tenets but were seen as necessary temporary evils. Ethnofederalism had two 
additional objectives: to demonstrate the progressiveness of socialist national policies in eradicating 
Russian chauvinism, while simultaneously keeping the USSR political unit intact.380  
                                                 
376 This draft was only partly published at the beginning of de-Stalinization in 1956. However, Richard Pipes has reconstructed the 
draft from the correspondence between Lenin and Stalin in 1922. Pipes (n 326) 270-271.  
377 Lenin consistently highlighted the transitory nature of federalism. ‘Federalism is a transitional form of government enroute to the 
unity of the laborers of all nations’. V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 41, 1896 - October 1917 (Progress Publishers, 1969) at 164.  
378 He also referred often to the American and Swiss federal experiences, which had evolved from a confederation to a federation to 
centralized unity According to Lenin, a federation was ‘the surest step to the most solid unification of the different nationalities or 
Russia into a single, democratic, centralized Soviet state’. Quoted in J. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 4 (Moscow, 1954) at 66. However, the 
American and Swiss models for a federal structure are different in many aspects. As explained by Lukic and Lynch, there are two 
possible features that well-functioning federation needs: either ‘the capacity to create a nation (the US federal model) or the capacity 
to guarantee the peaceable coexistence of the diverse ethnic and linguistic groups that are constituent parts of the federation (the Swiss 
federal model’. They conclude that the USSR was unable to create a Soviet nation or a state structure that could provide a convincing 
degree of national equality among the constituent national groups of the federation. Lukic and Lynch (n 338) 8-9.  
379 ‘Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine’, 28 December 1919, in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, September 1919 - April 
1920 (Progress Publishers, 1965) at 293. 
380 The RSFSR Constitution was drafted in 1918, but was done in haste, did not include federalist provisions and was preoccupied with 
denying political power from the regime’s enemies. Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, 10 July 1918.  
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3.3 The Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
This subchapter accounts for the entrenchment of ethnofederalism in the Union Treaty (1922) and the 
first Constitution of the USSR (1924). Throughout the Soviet era, ethnofederalism remained a 
deviation from Marxism, to which the whole concept of a ‘socialist state’ was an oxymoron. 
However, the Leninist system was successful in retaining the multinational state inherited from 
Imperial Russia in an era of nation-states without seeming to re-establish imperialism.381 
3.3.1 The Dual Structure of the Soviets and the Government  
In the Bolshevik political theory, all supreme legislative authority belonged to the Soviets (council or 
committee). Initially, Russian workers had been largely organized, but under the state-sponsored trade 
unions. In the wake of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the first Soviets were proclaimed, representing 
a break with the government’s oversight. The Soviets were autonomous movements organized all 
over the industrial centers of Russia, usually at the factory level.382  
While the government forcibly closed down the Soviets in late 1905, they were resurrected during 
the 1917 Revolutions. The Bolsheviks were able to pressure out the more moderate factions and began 
radicalizing the Soviets with the slogan ‘All power to the Soviets’.383 As the supreme constitutional 
power base, the Soviets delegated their representatives to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which 
then appointed the Central Executive Committee, acting as a kind of a parliament. The real executive 
power lay in the Council of People’s Commissars, the de facto government of the RSFSR, appointed 
by the Central Executive Committee.  
3.3.2 The 1922 Union Treaty  
In November 1918, the RSFSR government established the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Defense384 as a supreme administering body for the combined Civil War effort of the RSFSR, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine. It was the first organ with authority outside the RSFSR. In 1919, 
                                                 
381 Additionally, the Bolsheviks had been strongly affected by the simultaneous collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Tsarist 
Empires. As put by Martin, ‘Lenin and Stalin understood very well the danger of being labelled an empire in the age of nationalism’. 
Martin (n 366) 19. As nationalism was conceived as a capitalist distortion, the ethnofederal model was to be transitory and the USSR 
itself a negation of all the previous states that had existed. For the dialectic method, see subchapter 3.1.2. 
382 A. Nin, ‘The Soviets: Their Origin, Development and Function’, originally published in Cuademos de Cultura (Valencia, 1932). 
<https://libcom.org/library/soviets-their-origin-development-functions-andreu-nin>. The most important was the Petrograd Soviet. 
383 V. Lenin, ‘Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People’ in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26 (Progress Publishers, 
1972) 423-425. This was also made explicit by a declaration in January 1918: ‘Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of 
Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. All power, centrally and locally, is vested in these Soviets’. 
384 In Russian Sovet Rabochei i Krest’ianskoi Oborony, established on 30 November 1918. 
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the RSFSR governmental degree deprived the other states of the Council of much of their powers 
without consent.385 The basis for the USSR was laid on an unequal footing from the beginning.386  
The federal structure introduced in the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics387 (the Treaty) would be the framework and Grundnorm of the Union all throughout the 
Soviet era. It was included into all subsequent constitutions as an annex. The original Republics of 
the Union were the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian 
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.388 The Treaty determined the main principles of consolidation 
to be equal rights and voluntariness of the Union, the right of free withdrawal from the Union, and 
the right for new member states to join the Union.389  
3.3.3 The 1924 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
The 1924 Constitution contained a commitment to expand the USSR gradually by admitting new, 
ideologically liberated republics until the long-awaited ‘withering away’ would happen when the 
whole world had joined the USSR, which would then terminate itself as useless.  
‘access to the Union is open to all Republics already existing as well as those that may be born in the 
future. […] it will serve as a bulwark against the capitalist world and mark a new decisive step towards 
the union of workers of all countries in one world-wide Socialist Soviet Republic’.390 
The Constitution was less centralized than the subsequent ones, with Article 1 listing the exclusive 
powers given to the Union. Article 3 proceeded to affirm the sovereignty still residing with the 
member Republics.391 Article 15 listed the three original levels of the ethnofederal structure: four 
SSRs,392 the ASSRs of the RSFSR and Georgia, and the AOs in the Transcaucasia.  
The treaty also established federal governing organs. The supreme legislative organs were the 
Congress of Soviets of the Union (Congress) and the Central Executive Committee (CEC). Congress 
                                                 
385 All-Russian Central Executive Committee, ‘On the Unification of the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Belorussia for the Struggle against World Imperialism’, 1 June 1919.  
386 The domination by the RSFSR was criticized in the Soviet circles in the early stages. For instance, Christian Rakovsky, Chairman 
of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, cited several instances where the RSFSR was issuing laws and degrees 
for the other SSRs even before the Union had been ratified. Quoted in Pipes (n 326) 292.  
387 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (n 167).  
388 The Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was formed from the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in 
1922. The previously mentioned Latvia and Lithuania were not able to join the Union at this point.  
389 <http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=371>.  
390 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Part 1 Declaration, 31 January 1924. Lenin had a major influence on the 
constitutional ethnofederal model. However, the following Constitution of 1936 cancelled most of the theoretical decentralization.  
391 Ibid. Art. 3, ‘The sovereignty of the member Republics is limited only in the matters indicated in the present Constitution, as coming 
within the competence of the Union. Outside of those limits, each member Republic exerts its public powers independently’.  
392 Part II of the Constitution, inexplicably, nevertheless mentions that the Socialist Soviet Republic of Transcaucasia includes ‘the 
Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia’. 
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was meant to be the highest organ, with exclusive responsibilities including amending the 
Constitution, accepting new republics into the USSR, and electing the CEC and the Council of 
People’s Commissariats (the government of the USSR, hereinafter Sovnarkom). However, in practice 
it was a propaganda device with declining importance,393 and the 1936 Constitution disbanded it.  
The main parliamentary body was the CEC, composed of the Federal Soviet and the Soviet of 
Nationalities.394 The Federal Soviet’s 371 members were elected among the representatives of the 
SSRs in proportion to the population, and they represented the interests of all Soviet people. The 
Soviet of the Nationalities was the organ that gave a voice to the different nationalities of the Union. 
It was composed of five representatives from each SSR and one representative from each ASSR and 
AO.395 The CEC had the exclusive authority for publishing codes, decrees, and acts that were 
presented to it by its Presidium or by Sovnarkom.396 
The ultimate power belonged to the 21 members in the CEC Presidium, elected in a joint session of 
the Federal Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities. Between the sessions of the CEC, Presidium was 
‘the supreme organ of legislative, executive, and administrative power of the USSR’.397 
3.4 The Organizational Structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the CPSU) was a monolithic political organization that 
dominated all aspects of the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the USSR. Its basic units, 
the local Party organizations, were a feature in all bodies of importance, including factories, 
bureaucracies, schools, and collective farms. While the Constitution contained several decentralizing 
articles, the CPSU’s monopoly on power made a major part of this decentralization irrelevant.398 
Indeed, the Constitution and other legal documents that supposedly regulated the governing of the 
Union were, in reality, subordinate to the policies of the CPSU leadership. Moreover, even though 
                                                 
393 L. Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State; First Phase, 1917-1922 (2nd Edition, 
Harvard University Press, 1977) at 66.  
394 The 1924 Constitution of the USSR (n 390) Art. 13. 
395 Ibid. Art. 15. 
396 Ibid. Art. 17. According to Art. 37, the ministers were called People’s Commissars. 
397 Ibid. Art. 29. 
398 As Richard Pipes put it, ‘[t]he evolution of Soviet federalism, therefore, cannot be studies merely from the point of view of the 
changing relations between the central and provincial institutions of the state; it must be approached, first of all, from the point of view 
of the relations between the central and provincial institutions of the Communist Party’. Pipes (n 326) 244.  
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the Soviet government and the CPSU were separate bodies, almost all high government officials were 
members of the CPSU - not surprisingly, as it was the only allowed political party in the country.399  
The official supreme body in the CPSU was the Party Congress, where thousands of delegates met 
around once every five years. The Congress nominally elected the 300 members of the Central 
Committee, which performed the Party work in between congresses. The Central Committee elected 
the members of various party committees, with the Politburo and the Secretariat being the centers of 
ultimate power. The Politburo, with about 24 full members, was the supreme policy-making body in 
domestic and foreign policy. It was equivalent to the Presidium of the CEC in the federal structure. 
The Secretariat’s area of responsibility was the administrative work of the Party apparatus.  
In relation to the CPSU, by delegating rights to the territorial units, ethnofederalism was viewed with 
suspicion.400 In response, Lenin added two principles in order to avoid localism that might constrain 
building socialism: the CPSU would function under the organizational principle of ‘democratic 
centralism’, and would be unified throughout the Union, organized for the interest of the proletariat 
and irrespective of national background.401 
Lenin first formulated democratic centralism in his 1902 article ‘What is to be Done?’,402 and 
finalized in a 1906 article ‘Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action’.403 According to the principle, 
a CPSU body should have a debate when forming the Party line on a given subject behind the closed 
doors. Once there had been a vote and the decision had been made, there had to be a strict Party 
                                                 
399 The CPSU was not mentioned in the 1918 RSFSR or the 1924 USSR Constitutions, but Art. 1.7 of the 1918 Constitution banned 
any opposition from holding governmental office. In 1936, the CPSU was made the only allowed political Party. Constitution of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 5 December 1936, Art. 126. It retained this role in Art. 6 of the 1977 Constitution. At its height in 
the early 1980s, the CPSU had some 19 million members. G. Smith, Soviet Politics: Struggling With Change (St. Martin’s Press, 1991) 
at 125. 
400 Leninist principles on ethnofederalism included four progressive demands: the right to self-determination and free secession from 
the Union; the right for the national groups to form their own ‘independent’ governments; full legal, political, and economic equality 
of all nations; and the equality of languages within the Union. 
401 The Eight Party Conference (March 1919) adopted the following resolution: ‘At the present time, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Belorussia exist as separate Soviet Republics [...]. But this does not mean that the Russian Communist Party should in turn be organized 
as a federation of independent Communist Parties […]. It is necessary to maintain the existence of one centralized Communist Party 
with the Central Committee which directs all Party activities in all parts of the RSFSR. All the decision of the Russian Communist 
Party and of its leading institutions are unconditionally binding on all sections of the Party independently of their national compositions. 
The central committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian and Lithuanian Communist enjoy the right of the Party regional committees and are 
entirely subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party’. Quoted in W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An 
Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1959) at 397. See also Gleason (n 349) 30-31. 
402 Lenin (n 354).  
403 V. Lenin, ‘Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action’ 22 Volna 1906 in V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10 (Progress Publishers, 
1965) at 442-443. A similar organizational principle had been part of the First International Working Men’s Association’s General 
Rules of the International Working Men’s Association, October 1864. 
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discipline and unquestioning subordination to the majority view. Any Party decision would be 
obligatory for the lower bodies, enabling the Party to appear uniform.404  
In all his apparent defense of the rights of the non-Russian minorities, Lenin consistently subordinated 
the nationality issues to the class struggle, insisting that the Party had to represent only the class 
interest. An obvious contradiction manifested itself when democratic centralism clashed with the 
constitutional powers of the republics. Combined with the fact that the republican and the Party 
leaders were the same (mostly Russian) people, the ethnofederal structure lost a lot of its content.405 
Thus, the fundamental incompatibility of the division of powers in federalism and centralization 
inherent with communism weakened the otherwise decentralized federal structure.406 
In conclusion, the Soviets were the basis of any political power in the USSR. However, the supreme 
legislative and executive organs of the Union, as well as the local Soviets who elected them, were 
subjected to de facto control of the CPSU. Therewith, the ultimate political power in the USSR was 
invested in the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo. This explains the Bolshevik willingness 
to concede to federalism, otherwise in contradiction with their Marxist philosophy.  
3.5 The Soviet Ethnofederal Structure: An Asymmetrical Federation 
The USSR was a unique type of federation with three defining characteristics. First, peoples of the 
federation were proclaimed to continue to enjoy their right to self-determination, which materialized 
in an asymmetric model that gave them a different set of rights. The most privileged SSRs retained 
their sovereignty in the federation. Second, the Constitution guaranteed a set of rights for the subunits, 
with the SSRs enjoying an unconditional right to secession.407 Finally, the continuing validity of the 
Union Treaty and the voluntary basis of the Union remained essential to Soviet constitutional theory.  
The ethnofederal system was made permanent in the 1924 Constitution, which ranked all the 
recognized nations and nationalities of each region into a hierarchy of either SSR, ASSR, or AO. In 
each, the ‘titular’ nationality had the right to self-determination and a set of self-governing 
                                                 
404 Definition from the 1961 Party Rules, adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, 17-31 October 1961.  
405 Friedrich has called the USSR and the SFRY ‘façade federations’ due to democratic centralism and the domination by the unified 
Party undoing any real federal relations. C. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York, 1963).  
406 According to Richard Pipes, this ‘lent the evolution of the Soviet state a peculiar character’. Pipes (n 326) 246.  
407 In the Part 1: Declaration of the 1924 Constitution ‘the right to freely withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic’, in Art. 
17 in the 1936 Constitution (n 399) and Art. 72 of the 1977 Constitution ‘[t]o every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to 
secede from the USSR’. However, the apparent shortcoming of this generous right was the lack of any procedural means of realizing 
it. For more on the right of secession in the Soviet context, see Buchanan (n 131) 127-147. According to the Comparative Constitutions 
Project, among 184 countries, 11 specify some rights of secession, 26 preclude secession, and 147 do not directly discuss the matter. 
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institutions.408 The 1936 Constitution increased the number of autonomous units and added a fourth 
ethnofederal level, the Autonomous Okrugs (AOks).409 In 1991, the USSR was composed of fifteen 
SSRs, twenty ASSRs, eight AOs, and ten AOks.410 
The Soviet era presided over a number of intra-republican territorial transfers, the most famous being 
Crimea in 1954.411 Other notable changes include the transfers of the Taranrog and Shakhty Okrugs 
from the Ukrainian SSR to the RSFSR in 1924,412 reciprocal transfers between the RSFSR and Tuvan 
AO in 1944, and two major transfers from the Kazakhstan SSR to the Uzbekistan SSR.413 Overall, 
the SSR borders were changed over 200 times, and the lower level borders even more often.414 
The ranking of an ethnofederal unit was based on the combination of classification under scientific 
Marxism and geopolitical factors. Marxism awarded national rights only to the progressive nations - 
i.e., those that had advanced to the capitalist mode of production and could be seen as historical 
nations with national culture. A lower status meant that the nation had not advanced past feudalism 
or had not attained a sufficient level of national culture.415 In general, the progressive SSRs and 
ASSRs were classified as ‘nations’ and the lower units as ‘nationalities’.416  
The geopolitical factor was that while most of the nationalities classified as ASSRs did not have a 
history as a political unit, the original SSRs had been recognized independent by the Western states.417 
                                                 
408 For example, in 1925, the Northwest corner of the Georgian SSR was awarded to Abkhazians under the title ‘the ASSR of Abkhazia’. 
409 Curiously, when Stalin became the undisputed ruler of the USSR in the late 1920s, he expanded the ethnofederal system, which he 
had previously advocated against. 
410 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Arts. 71, 85, 87, and 88.  
411 Crimea had been an ASSR in the RSFSR from 1921-1942, after which it lost the ASSR status and autonomy. In 1954, it was 
transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. In early 1991, Crimea regained the ASSR status, title of which it possessed up until the dissolution. 
412 E. Krinko and M. Medvedev, ‘“To Elect a Parity Commission”: Documents about the Transfer of Taganrog and Shakhty Districts 
to the RSFSR in 1924-1925’ 10(4) Russkii Arkhiv (2015) 288-295. 
413 The transfers took place in 1956 and 1963, including 170 000 hectares and 959 000 hectares of land, respectively. The main motive 
of these transfers was centralizing of agricultural administration in the area. E. Allworth, Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian 
Dominance: A Historical Overview (Duke, 1995) at 296. Joshua Castellino has noted the problematic nature of applying uti possidetis 
to the borders without taking into account these transfers. J. Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of 
the Politics of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial National Identity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) at 119. 
However, the temporal scope of application of uti possidetis is the internal administrative borders at the moment of independence. For 
example, in Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal arbitration, the Tribunal did not accept the argument for returning to prior borders before colonial 
transfers, proclaiming that there is no ‘special condition of antecedence’ relating to the changing of borders prior independence. Guinea-
Bissau v. Senegal Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgement, I.C.J Reports (1991) 53. 
414 P. Goble, ‘Territorial Swap between Two Russian Oblasts Could Become Model for Redrawing Borders Elsewhere, Geographer 
Says’, Window on Eurasia, 27 January 2020.  
415 F. Hill, “Russia’s Tinderbox”: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation 
(Harvard, 1995) at 2. 
416 The Soviet constitutional theory was not altogether consistent with the ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities’ terminology. It was also common 
to refer to the first two levels as ‘states’ and the lower two levels as ‘ethnoterritorial self-administrative units’ within their host SSR. 
G. Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia: The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations (Routledge, 2016) at 96-97.  
417 For instance, Ukraine had participated in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia had maintained 
diplomatic missions abroad with both de facto and de jure recognition by the most important Western states. Pipes (n 326) 250.  
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The CSPU felt necessary to create the impression that the SSRs retained their independence, hence 
the voluntary Union Treaty. This resulted in a stark distinction in the Soviet political theory and 
constitutional law between the non-Russian areas inland and the borderlands.  
When the 1936 Constitution was being drafted, Stalin made a lengthy rebuttal on each of the proposed 
amendments.418 One proposal was to add a new article to legislate that when reaching a proper level 
of economic and cultural development, the ASSR could be promoted to the status of a SSR. Stalin 
re-affirmed the possibility for promotion but insisted on three additional criteria. First, Stalin 
confirmed the already established practice that the ASSR in question had to have a border with a 
foreign country, in order to make the right to secession theoretically possible.419 Second, the titular 
nation of the ASSR had to form a majority within that republic. Finally, to be able to protect its 
independence it had to have a population of over a million.420  
All of the ethnofederal units had representation at the federal level. The 1936 Constitution changed 
the name of CEC to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Like its predecessor, it was the highest 
legislative federal organ with two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. 
The Supreme Soviet was elected from the ethnofederal units proportionately to their population, 
representing the needs of the USSR as a whole. The Soviet of Nationalities existed to guarantee 
political participation of the nations and nationalities. Its representational structure was changed 
twice, portraying the changes in the political power of the national units. The 1936 Constitution was 
a victory for the ASSRs, and a subsequent loss for the lower units, as the representation was set to be 
25 deputies from each SSR, 11 from each ASSR, five from each AO and one from each AOks.421 The 
1977 Constitution raised the SSR deputies to 32.422 
                                                 
418 J. Stalin, ‘On the Draft Constitution of the USSR’, Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eight Congress of the Soviets of the USSR, 
25 November 1936 in J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Peking, 1979) 795-834. 
419 Not coincidentally, all the SSRs had borders with foreign countries, while the only ASSR with such a border was the Karelian 
ASSR, a former SSR. According to Ronald Helin, the downgrading of the Karelian ASSR resulted from the improvement of relations 
between the USSR and Finland. Thus, the USSR made a decision to make Finland a model of its good intensions toward neutral 
countries in 1955. R. Helin, Economic-Geographic Reorientation in Western Finnish Karelia: A Result of the Finno-Soviet Boundary 
Demarcations of 1940 and 1944 (Washington, D.C, 1961) at 101. In addition, two ASSRs were bordering Mongolia, Buryat ASSR 
and Tuvan ASSR, but Mongolia was throughout the Soviet-era a virtual puppet state of the USSR, not a foreign country per se.  
420 Stalin (n 418) 826. While the criteria was never officially codified, it became the norm, although sometimes applied arbitrarily. E.g., 
the Karelo-Finnish SSR was breaching the third criterion with a population of only half a million, while Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Karelians 
were all breaching the second criterion with less than 50% of the population being members of the titular nation. Ubiria (n 415) 96; 
and B. Nahaylo and V. Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (London, 1990) at 361.  
421 The 1936 Constitution of the USSR (n 399) Art. 35.  
422 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Art. 110.  
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3.5.1 The Soviet Socialist Republics 
The SSRs were the main units that constituted the USSR, retaining sovereignty over their territory 
and possessing the exclusive right to free secession.423 Their number varied between the original four 
and the peak of 16 in the 1950s. This status was reserved only to the most progressive nations,424 and 
it was possible to gain or lose this privileged position.425 The SSRs had their borders, governments, 
legislatures, constitutions, judiciaries, national flags, armed troops, and the right to have direct foreign 
relations.426 The governmental structure of the SSRs was a miniature of the USSR model, with their 
Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, and Supreme Court.427 The SSRs were subjected only to the 
federal center and only in areas where they had granted it exclusive jurisdiction. However, while their 
territory could not be altered without their consent, they did not have the right to ratify constitutional 
amendments, so their powers could be altered without consent.428  
3.5.2 The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
The ASSRs were subunits located within their host SSRs.429 This status was awarded to the ‘national 
states’ that were numerically smaller than the ‘sovereign states’ of the SSRs.430 Notwithstanding, the 
ASSRs possessed attributes usually attached to sovereignty. For example, a 1996 study by the 
European Commission of Democracy through Law called the ASSR status a ‘specific form of 
statehood’, adding that ‘each nation creating an autonomous republic in the Soviet federation had the 
right to self-determination on the basis of national sovereignty’.431 Just as their more progressive 
                                                 
423 In the Western scholarly circles, this right was often referred to as a simulation or ‘constitutional fiction’. For instance, see R. 
Sharlet, ‘Constitutional Law and Politics in Russia: Surviving the First Decade’ 11(1) Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization (2003) 122-128 at 123; S. Lee, Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991 (Routledge, 2006) at 36; and Walker (n 187) 6. 
424 See, inter alia, J. Larrain, ‘Classical Political Economists and Marx on Colonialism and “Backward” Nations’ in B. Jessop and R. 
Wheatley, Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Second Series 
(Routledge, 1999) 164-195 at 174-175. 
425 The later downgraded SSRs were the Karelo-Finnish SSR (1940-1956, the status changed to the ASSR), the Bukharan People’s 
Soviet Republic (1922-1925, divided between the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR), and the SSR of Abkhazia (1921-1924, the status 
changed to the ASSR). Abkhazia had a unique history within the Soviet political theory, as it was the only ‘contractual republic’ of the 
USSR, in a state union with the Georgian SSR, as well as part of the Transcaucasian SFSR in 1921-1924.  
The most privileged SSRs of Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted - under the Soviet constitutional theory rather curiously - to the 
UN as independent nations in 1945. The USSR first attempted to secure the UN membership for all the SSRs, but after a political 
compromise acquiesced for three seats. 
426 Zürcher (n 174) 25. 
427 The 1936 Constitution of the USSR (n 399) Arts. 57, 63, and 102.  
428 N. McCabe, Comparative Federalism in the Devolution Era (Lexington, 2002) at 150. Like many of the scholars studying Soviet 
constitutional law, he concludes that the constitutional provisions in the Soviet context usually did not describe nor determined political 
practice and that they included provisions that undermined any apparent concessions to federalism.  
429 Except for the Nakhichevan ASSR, which was part of the Azerbaijan SSR but located within the Armenian SSR.  
430 Zürcher (n 174) 26. 
431 S. Holovaty, ‘Territorial Autonomy in Ukraine - The Case of Crimea’ in European Commission of Democracy through Law, Local 
Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, Proceedings, Lausanne 25-27 April 1996, published in Science 
and Technique of Democracy, No. 16 (Council of Europe, 1996) 135-150 at 141-142. See also G. Lapidus, ‘Ethnonationalism and 
Political Stability in the USSR’, Final Report to National Council for Soviet and East European Research (University of California, 
1984) at 12; and Hill (n 415) 2. According to Stowe-Thurston, the ASSRs had a stronger claim to self-determination than the lower 
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counterparts, they received delineated borders, individual constitutions and national symbols, but 
without the rights to independent foreign relations or secession. Their governmental structure was 
almost an exact parallel to the SSRs, with the ASSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers.432 
However, as a significant differentiation from the SSRs, until the early 1990s, the ASSRs were 
constitutionally subjects of the host SSR, unlike the SSRs who were subjects of the USSR. Thus, the 
ASSR enters the structure of the USSR as autonomous parts of the host SSRs.433 Like the SSRs and 
unlike the lower-level units, the ASSR territory could not be altered without consent.434  
The cultural rights of the ASSRs were more restricted than the SSRs. As a rule, education was only 
available in Russian. Nonetheless, they had their political cadres, and as an informal rule, members 
of the titular nation were favored to cadre positions and university places.435  
As any ethnofederal status, the ASSR’s could be promoted or demoted within the system. Examples 
of this include Volga German (1918-1941 an ASSR of the RSFSR, autonomy abolished);436 
Chechnya (1922-1936 an AO of the RSFSR, 1936-1944 an ASSR, 1944-1957 autonomy abolished, 
1959-1991 an ASSR); Karbardino (1921-1936 an AO of the RSFSR, 1936-1991 an ASSR); North 
Ossetia (1924-1936 an AO of the RSFSR, 1936-1991 an ASSR); Kalmyk (1920-1935 an AO of the 
RSFSR, 1935-1943 an ASSR, 1943-1957 autonomy abolished, 1957-1958 a return to an AO and 
1958-1991 to an ASSR); Karakalpak (1925-1932 an AO of the RSFSR, 1932-1936 an ASSR, 1936-
1991 an ASSR of the Uzbek SSR); and Tuva (1921-1944 an ‘independent’ satellite state, 1944-1961 
an AO of the RSFSR, 1961-1991 an ASSR).437  
To summarize, the SSRs and the ASSRs possessed many similarities in their legal rights. They were 
titled ‘states’ in the Constitution, their consent was required for territorial changes, and they enjoyed 
a number of state attributes. Yet, they also had a few key differences, with the right to secession and 
                                                 
units that were typically ethnically Russian. A. Stowe-Thurston, ‘A State of the Union: Federation and Autonomy in Tatarstan’, Russian 
Studies Honors Projects, Paper (2016) at 38. 
432 The 1936 Constitution of the USSR (n 399) Arts. 89 and 93. 
433 E.g., B. Balayer, The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context (Lexington, 2013) at 116; 
and F. Feldbrugge, G. Van Den Berg and W. Simons (Eds), Encyclopedia of Soviet Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2nd Edition 
1985) at 73. 
434 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Art. 84. 
435 ‘This positive discrimination adhered to the Soviet drive for the incorporation of national elites’. Zürcher (n 174) 26.  
436 Nahaylo and Swoboda (n 420) 361. 
437 Goskomstat SSSR (1989), Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniya SSSR: Po dannym vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989. 
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the term ‘sovereign’ only awarded to the SSRs. The representational quotas in the federal organs also 
favored the SSRs. Thus, in relation to uti possidetis, these units were in a different position.438 
3.5.3 The Autonomous Oblasts and the Autonomous Okrugs 
The status of an AO was awarded to small ethnic groups in a compact area of settlement. Their 
autonomous rights did not include sovereign attributes, such as constitutions or national symbols, and 
resembled more of a limited form of autonomy. The AOs were subjects of the host SSR, and their 
territory could be changed without their consent. Again, promotion within the system was possible.439  
The last ethnofederal level was AOks. They were under their host AOs jurisdiction and had only a 
limited set of cultural rights. They did not receive promotions in the Soviet era.440 
Finally, there were around seven million people without a unit in the ethnofederal structure.441 
Usually, this discrimination was justified since these national groups had a national state outside the 
USSR, for example, Germans,442 Poles, Koreans, Bulgarians, and Greeks.443  
3.6 The Changing Tides of the Soviet National Policy: Korenizatsiia, Sblizhenie, 
and Sliyanie 
In the first years of the ethnofederal system, Soviet national policy discouraged even voluntary 
assimilation to the Russian culture and national self-consciousness was correspondingly promoted. 
All official recognized minorities were encouraged politically and financially to establish their 
national schools, producing in time indigenous national elites. The USSR assisted in creating a written 
language for those official ethnic groups that had been lacking one.444 Local languages were then 
taught at schools and universities, as well as used in local administration.445 
                                                 
438 Although this line became blurred with the Constitutional amendments of the 1990s. See subchapter 3.7.4. 
439 For example, Yakut, Chuvash, Udmurt, and Mari AOs (all established in 1920) became ASSRs in 1922, 1925, 1934, and 1936, 
respectively. For a complete list of the promotions and demotions within the Soviet ethnofederal structure, see J. Olson (Ed), An 
Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires (Greenwood, 1994) at 777-780. 
440 Outside the autonomous ethnofederal system, the 1936 Constitution also added to the Soviet administrative structure Oblasts (basic 
administrative units of the SSRs), and Krais, (territories of strategic importance) without any autonomous rights.  
441 Gleason (n 349) 12. 
442 Numbering around two million. Nahaylo and Swoboda (n 420) 361. 
443 The Yugoslavian nationality policy, likewise, used the outside national state of nationality of the SFRY as the basis for 
discriminatory representation in the governmental structure. See Chapter 4.1.3. 
444 Slezkine (n 364) 421-423.  
445 This sometimes provoked a long adaptation process of a previously Russianized population. Ibid. at 102-103.  
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The promoted national policy of korenizatsiia - ‘indigenization’ - aimed to make the Soviet rule 
appear more ‘indigenous’ to non-Russians.446 Each ethnofederal unit received an official culture and 
folklore, with the aim to ‘drain nationality of its content while legitimizing it as a form’.447 In order 
to demonstrate progression under historical materialism, socialist themes were promoted in the events 
chosen to be included in their official national histories.448 
A system of personal nationality complemented ethnofederalism. Similarly to the ethnofederal units, 
the citizens of the USSR were categorized into an exhaustive set of over a hundred national groups. 
The personal nationality had significant effects, as it was a key element of an individual’s legal status, 
registered in internal passports, transmitted by descent and recorded in most official transactions.449  
Korenizatsiia ended abruptly in the late 1930s, as Stalin began to see periphery nationalism as a threat. 
Russian nationalism, previously been condemned as oppressive, was rehabilitated, and the national 
culture in the USSR was proclaimed to be ‘national in content, socialist in form’.450 In 1938, the 
Russian language became compulsory in all schools and many institutions established during the 
korenizatsiia era were dismantled.451 
The next change of policy took place when Nikita Khrushchev had consolidated his power after the 
death of Stalin. The 20th Party Congress (1956) again recognized the existence of national differences 
in the USSR. In the 22nd Party Congress (1961) Khrushchev presented two new national concepts: 
sblizhenie (сближение, ‘coming together’) and sliyanie (слияние, ‘merging’) of nations. He was 
basing his concepts on the early Leninist national policy, where it was presupposed that the march 
towards socialism would make nations to disregard their differences and to work together 
(sblizhenie), while at the same time creating a common, internationalist culture through merging 
(sliyanie). As he summarized in his report on the Party Programme (1961):  
‘Under socialism, two interconnected, progressive tendencies operate on the national question. In the first 
place, each nation is undergoing a tempestuous all-round development and the rights of the union and 
                                                 
446 Ronald Suny has argued that the early USSR of the 1920s became the ‘incubator of new nations’. R. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: 
Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford University Press, 1993) at 87. 
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Theory and Society (1994) 47-78 at 51.  
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449 Brubaker (n 447) 53.  
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451 R. Zia-Ebrahimi, ‘Empire, Nationalities and the Collapse of the Soviet Union’, Vestnik, the Journal of Russian and Asian Studies, 
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autonomous republics are expanding. In the second place, under the banner of proletarian 
internationalism the socialist nations are drawing ever closer together’.452 
While Khrushchev retained Russian as the language of Union-wide communication, he abolished 
other Russification measures, shifted some economic-administrative competencies to the republics, 
and installed many non-Russians to important offices in central and local governments.453 Regardless, 
in 1964 many of these measures were again reversed by his successor Leonid Brezhnev. The last 
USSR Constitution was approved in 1977 amidst debate over whether Lenin had wanted the 
ethnofederal structure to be a temporary solution to the national question. On 4 October 1977, 
Brezhnev gave a report to the Supreme Soviet on the proposed amendments to the Draft Constitution. 
He concluded that proposals had been advanced to introduce a reference to a single Soviet Nation, to 
liquidate the sovereignty of the SSRs and the ASSRs, and to abolish the Soviet of Nationalities. 
Nevertheless, these proposals were resisted as premature.454 
During the tenure of his successor Yuri Andropov, the USSR finally conceded that national identity 
would outlive class identity even under socialism.455 Stressing the continuing Soviet confusion over 
the subject, in 1982, Andropov called for a ‘well thought of, scientifically substantiated nationalities 
policy’, acknowledging to a lack of one.456 The Party kept on trying, in vain, to square the vicious 
circle of advancing national cultures while assuring their conformity. 
3.7 The Disintegration of the Ethnofederal Structure 
The collapse of the USSR has produced numerous scholarly accounts on its underlying grounds.457 
While a contributing factor, nationalism should not be blamed for the dissolution. Indeed, the 
ethnofederal model had sustained centralized control from Moscow for 70 years. However, with the 
                                                 
452 Quoted in G. Hodnett, ‘The Debate over Soviet Federalism’ 18(4) Soviet Studies (1967) 458-481. 
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454 Izvestiia, 5 October 1977. The Constitution ended up curtailing the rights of the lower-level units by giving the SSRs additional 
seven representatives in the Soviet of Nationalities. However, the Constitution used the term ‘socialist federalism’ for the first time.  
455 Lapidus (n 431) III. This was highly problematic due to a simultaneous ideological crisis over the underperformance of socialism.  
456 Interview in Pravda, 22 December 1982 at 1-2. Under Andropov, the goal of creating a Soviet Nation was abandoned. The same 
year, his future successor Konstantin Chernenko admitted that there was ‘the problem of the relationship between the two leading 
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457 For different viewpoints, see, R. Strayer, ‘Decolonization, Democratization, and Communist Reform: The Soviet Collapse in 
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Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 10-38 (arguing that it was due to the non-Russian elites losing 
allegiance to the federation after economic setbacks); and D. Marples, ‘Revisiting the Collapse of the USSR’ 53(2/4) Canadian Slavonic 
Papers (2011) 461-473 (arguing that it resulted from a series of economic failures with simultaneous de-legitimization of Marxism-
Leninism).  
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ideological bankruptcy of socialism - the raison d’etre of the Union - the ethnofederal units provided 
a suitable template for the peaceful dissolving of the federation that had become obsolete.  
The USSR had always predicted the ultimate withering away of a state and saw no danger in 
equipping the ethnofederal units with prerequisites of statehood or proclaiming their sovereign status. 
In addition and equally importantly, the system had created indigenous national elites in the SSRs 
and the ASSRs. By providing them with administrative and political institutions embodied in their 
‘national homelands’, ethnofederalism had created national figures with a political history of favoring 
their ‘own’ units to the extent that the centrally planned economy allowed.458 While all this was 
harmless under the tight grip of the CPSU, the combination of the struggle over fewer resources and 
the loosening of the Party control led to the local national leaders to change their rhetoric, first to 
promoting national rights, followed by the calls for independence.  
Finally, the role of the last leader Mikhail Gorbachev cannot be underestimated. While he inherited 
a federal project undergoing a systemic crisis, his radical policies did shape at the very least the way 
and the timing of the dissolution of the USSR.459  
3.7.1 The ‘Pre-Crisis’ Situation 
The era of Soviet stagnation came to an end with the accession of Gorbachev in March 1985. Just as 
his two predecessors in 1982-1985, the new General Secretary of the CPSU was confronted with 
massive structural problems with the Soviet economy. However, unlike his predecessors, he was 
ready to acknowledge the situation and to act accordingly. In relation to the nationality issues, a 
January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU recognized the flaws in the official 
ethnic policies and initiated the groundwork for the future changes.460 In the subsequent Plenum in 
                                                 
458 Vujačić (n 457) 12.  
459 There is no scholarly consensus on whether Gorbachev caused the collapse of the USSR or whether he merely postponed the 
inevitable with his attempt to save the Union. For more on this debate see, inter alia, C. Martinez, ‘Cases of the Collapse of the U.S.S.R 
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June 1987, Gorbachev confronted the Party leadership over the economic problems, insisting that the 
USSR was in a ‘pre-crisis situation’,461 which had to be addressed: 
‘At some stage - this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies - something happened 
[…]. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began 
to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation 
and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society’.462 
Gorbachev’s approach to these issues had two inherent flaws. First, the Soviet economy was even 
worse off than he was conceding.463 Second, he thought socialism as an intrinsically non-flawed 
system that only needed an adjustment by ‘turning to Lenin’, whom he cited often.464 
Nevertheless, Gorbachev introduced a series of radical measures to Soviet politics. He made some 
astonishing successes in foreign policy, including a significant lowering of tensions of the Cold War 
rivalry and a series of arms-reduction negotiations and treaties.465 Having inherited a situation of 
encirclement by hostile powers,466 Gorbachev was able to improve relations with all the neighbors of 
the USSR.467 In the domestic front, Gorbachev had to balance carefully between the conservative 
Party hardliners and the liberal reformers. Additionally, he was the first Soviet leader since Lenin to 
acknowledge the grievances of the non-Russian peoples. The national policy had remained since 
Stalin’s formulation in its base assumptions the same: a nation in the USSR was a group of individuals 
with cohesiveness among language, culture, and ethnicity, residing in a particular area. 
Ethnofederalism then addressed the right to self-determination via more-or-less sovereign 
administrative units, named after the titular nation. However, there was one restriction: only the toilers 
of a nation, not its bourgeois, could enjoy self-determination.468 Thus, the secession right became 
obsolete, as only bourgeois would want to secede, and they did not have a right to self-
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determination.469 This all changed under Gorbachev, who wanted to reaffirm the voluntary basis of 
the Union with a new Treaty, after rejuvenating the Soviet economy and ideology. 
3.7.2 Perestroika, Glasnost, and the Effects to the Soviet National Policy 
Perestroika (перестро́йка, ‘restructuring’) was Gorbachev’s most ambitious goal, amounting to 
nothing less than reforming the entire political and economic system of the USSR. While it introduced 
a series of market-like reforms, the aim was not to end the central-planned economy but to make it 
more efficient. Perestroika did not directly address nationality issues, but it led to another, equally 
radical shift of policy via Glasnost (гла́сность, ‘openness’). It aimed to increase transparency in 
governance and accomplished first a decrease in censorship, followed by freedom of speech.470  
Glasnost had a major impact on the national policy. As Gorbachev needed a new power base for his 
reforms, he started promoting the democratization of the Soviet political culture. After gathering 
support in the 19th Party Conference of the CPSU in 1988,471 he made the Supreme Soviet approve 
constitutional amendments establishing a new legislative parliament, the Congress of People’s 
Deputies (CPD).472 Significantly, for the first time in Soviet history, the elections for CPD were multi-
candidate.473 As a result, opposition candidates gathered some 300 out of 2250 seats in the CPD and 
demanded the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution that ensured the CPSU’s political monopoly. 
Gorbachev persuaded the Supreme Soviet to repeal Article 6 just prior to the March 1990 local 
elections of the SSRs and the ASSRs. This produced another failure, as the CPSU lost the elections 
in the Baltic States, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia, and faced a powerful nationalist opposition in 
the rest of the SSRs. Significantly, due to the glasnost reforms of free speech, open discussion over 
the nationality issues was made possible. The elected national representatives started to publicize the 
grievances of their legal position in the USSR.474  
                                                 
469 Additionally, this justified the banning of all the other political parties than CPSU throughout the USSR. 
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The years 1988-1990 brought on a further deterioration of the economy and national unity. The most 
serious signs of this were the armed clashes between the Armenian and the Azerbaijan SSRs and the 
Baltic States’ intensifying demands for independence. In 1989, the Central Committee of the CPSU 
adopted a Draft Nationalities Policy of the Party under Present Conditions, admitting that:  
‘the nationalities question in the Soviet Union has become extremely acute recently. The Party recognizes 
that a solution to the problems that have arisen in this connection is of enormous importance for the fate 
of restructuring and the future of our country’.475 
The Draft blamed the contemporary problems in the USSR on ‘deformations’ in national policy after 
Lenin and described the sovereignty of the republics as ‘largely formal’.476 However, Gorbachev 
aimed to change this with a renewed Leninist federation that would limit the federal government’s 
powers to foreign and defense policies and to ‘general tasks’ in economic policy.477 In a speech a few 
months later, he concluded that ‘up to now our state existed as a centralized and unitary state and 
none of us has yet the experience of living in a federation’, that the political and economic realities 
in the USSR ‘violate the constitutional provisions of the Soviet federation both in letter and spirit’ so 
that ‘the very idea of federation has been seriously compromised’.478 
Gorbachev’s attempts to grant the subunits the powers that the Marxist-Leninist ideology had been 
promising was a precarious issue. Socialist ethnofederalism had always been a balancing act between 
granting the ethnofederal units cultural autonomy, defined territory and symbols of statehood, while 
insisting on the supremacy of the central state and Party in order to sustain the central-planned 
economy.479 While Gorbachev’s reforms tried to reconfirm a voluntary Union between sovereign 
states, his policies were eroding the supremacy of both the state and the Party. 
3.7.3 The Parade of Sovereignties  
On 12 June 1990, the process that was later termed the ‘parade of sovereignties’ started with the 
Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR.480 It proclaimed the RSFSR as a sovereign state of 
which’s laws would take priority over the USSR laws (Article 5.2), and which would significantly 
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479 As concluded by Ross, ‘paradoxically, the very policies which the communists had used to placate nationalism ended up giving it 
succour’. C. Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia (Manchester, 2002) at 17.  
480 Adopted by the First Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR, by the majority of 907-13 (nine abstentions). Some SSRs had 
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status.  
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expand the rights of its ASSRs and AOs (Article 9). The previously cautious regional elites were 
encouraged by this example, with altogether 26 ASSRs and AOs all over the USSR declaring state 
sovereignty within a year.481 They were particularly bold in the RSFSR where President Boris Yeltsin 
had encouraged the autonomous units to ‘[t]ake as much independence as you can hold on to’,482 and 
where the ASSRs had gained other additional rights. Most of the ASSRs’ and the AOs’ sovereignty 
declarations proclaimed a unilateral status upgrade to a SSR, alongside the supremacy of their laws.483 
A key difference between the sovereignty declarations of the SSRs and those of the lower-level units 
was that for the SSRs, these were a precursor of the independence declarations. In contrast, only one 
lower ethnofederal unit - Chechnya - declared independence in the Soviet era. This disparity in aims 
needs to be kept in mind. The SSRs had a different legal position not limited to their constitutional 
right to secession: they were nominally incorporated into USSR via the Union Treaty.484 Most of the 
ASSRs and all of the lower-level units had been established by unilateral administrative decisions 
and were artificial creations of Moscow.485 That being said, the titular nationalities in the ASSRs were 
not artificial creations. They had been locally governing ‘their’ republics, in their national languages, 
under their institutions established by their Constitutions. While they were not ready to declare 
independence, they felt entitled to an upgrade in their status with genuine constitutional guarantees.  
The declarations of sovereignty and supremacy of the SSRs’ and the ASSRs’ laws over the USSR 
legislation amplified the ‘war of laws’ that had been ongoing since the late 1980s. It was a symptom 
of the fundamental ambiguities in the Soviet federalism and the 1977 USSR Constitution. The Soviet 
doctrine on federal jurisdiction upheld an idea of the ‘unity of a state power’, which stipulated that a 
will of a Soviet organ should not be questioned by another organ.486 As with most of the USSR's 
problems, this constitutional ambiguity did not matter as long as the CPSU held the undisputed 
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of the Bashkortostan’s declaration, professor Venir Samigullin, was quoted saying that it ‘was not clear if Russia left the Union what 
would be the fate of the ASSRs - if Russia declared independence, then what to do?`’. Kahn (n 481) 61.  
483 Yet, unlike the SSRs’, their declarations were not usually backed up by popular approval via referendum. Eight of the fifteen SSRs 
held referendums on independence and two for state sovereignty, all of which affirmed the approval of a great majority of the voters. 
In the ASSRs, only Ingushetiya, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan held referendums, in 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively.  
484 Moreover, the SSRs possessed many rights that the ASSRs did not, such as the right to enter into relations with foreign states, to 
conclude treaties and conduct economic relations with them, and to participate in international organizations. Walker (n 187) 91. 
485 There were exceptions, such as the Abkhazian ASSR (see n 1085). 
486 The USSR also lacked a Constitutional Court. See more, M. Hartwig, ‘The Institutionalization of the Rule of Law: The 
Establishment of Constitutional Courts in the Eastern European Countries’ 7(3) American University International Law Review (1992) 
449-470 at 452-453. 
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ultimate power, but the system broke down with the erosion of the Party. The SSRs had been passing 
jurisdiction that was often abrogated by Moscow as unconstitutional. The SSRs sometimes rejected 
Moscow’s rulings and laws over the issue, claiming that it was not of all-Union importance.487 
Therewith, the same matter could be legislated by two authorities simultaneously, in unison or 
contradiction with one another. In 1990, the ASSRs started to imitate this practice. The 1990s reforms 
were responses to this unsustainable situation.  
3.7.4 The 1990 Reforms of the Federal System 
The year 1990 was a watershed moment for the ethnofederal system as a series of constitutional 
amendments and laws which, when combined with the new parliamentary power of the CPD and the 
downfall of the CPSU, finally brought elements of genuine federalism to the USSR.488  
The reforms began on 3 April 1990 with the Secession Law,489 which made fundamental changes to 
the foundations of the USSR. First, the Law defined the legal formula by which the SSRs could realize 
their right to ‘free’ secession, provided by Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution.490 Second, it 
significantly raised the ASSRs’ autonomy in many areas up to a virtual equivalence with that of the 
SSRs. Most significantly, in case their host SSR would choose to secede, the ASSRs were given a 
right to decide after a referendum whether to leave the Union with their host SSR or to remain an 
autonomous part of the USSR, with which it would then re-negotiate on its self-governing status.  
The Secession Law was accompanied by an amendment (2 April 1990) of the previous Law on ‘anti-
Soviet propaganda’ by making peaceful campaigning for the dissolution of the USSR permissible. 
Many SSRs, particularly the Baltic States, started to capitalize on this immediately.  
The privatization of the economy and deepening federalization meant competition for resources. The 
economic relations between the USSR, the SSRs and the ASSRs were reformulated with a Law on 
                                                 
487 The same situation was happening in the SFRY as well. For more on the war of laws in Yugoslavia, see R. Hayden, ‘Constitutional 
Events in Yugoslavia, 1988-90: From Federation to Confederation and Paralysis?’, Final Report to National Council for Soviet and 
East European Research (University of Pittsburgh, July 1990). However, the major difference between the two cases was the fact that 
in the USSR setting, the center could, up until 1990-1991, force its will on SSRs. In the SFRY, the country resembled more a 
confederation with a feeble central authority that was unable to force its SRs to comply.  
488 F. Feldbrugge, Russian Law: The End of the Soviet System and the Role of Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) at 126.  
As summarized by Alexander Osipov, the Party and governmental documents, legislative acts, and the statements of the high officials 
allow deconstructing the conceptual underpinnings of the renewed policy. In his view, the new conception of self-determination in the 
USSR in these years led to an asymmetrical federation where status was negotiable rather than imposed. Osipov (n 460) 65-66.  
489 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession from the USSR, 3 April 1990. 
490 The Secession Law received critique in both within the USSR (in the Baltic States) and outside since it bestowed most of the 
secession decision making power to the central government, and not to the SSR who is supposed to have a guaranteed, unqualified 
right to secede from the Union. See Treiman (n 200). 
95 
 
10 April 1990,491 followed by individual economic treaties between them. In addition, most of the 
SSRs established direct trade ties with foreign countries.492 According to the head of the Supreme 
Soviet commission that prepared the law, Nikolai Pivovarov, the recognition of the rights of the SSRs 
and ASSRs was the most important constitutional change of this law.493 
The Language Law494 retained Russian as the official language of the USSR, but gave SSRs right to 
choose their state languages.  
The Free National Development Law495 further added genuine federalism to the USSR by assigning 
most legislative and executive powers to the SSRs and the ASSRs. 
The most ambitious Law on the federal reform was a major constitutional amendment on 26 April 
1990, called ‘On the Division of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. The 
introductory decree stated that the Law was to be considered as the basis of the elaboration of the 
New Union Treaty.496 The groundbreaking change was that the terms ‘ASSR’ and ‘SSR’ disappeared, 
and they both were titled subjects of the federation, subordinated directly to the USSR government 
and thus becoming direct subjects of the USSR.497 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse have argued 
that this law radically altered the federal arrangement in a sense that prior to the law, the SSRs were 
seen technically ‘sovereign’ whereas after the law was passed, this distinction was eradicated as both 
were now subjects of the federation.498 While the ASSRs remained a part of their host SSRs, this was 
now based on free self-determination of peoples. They possessed all state power on their ASSR 
territory, apart from powers expressly transferred to the USSR or the host SSR.499 Soviet scholars 
                                                 
491 Law on the Principles of Economic Relations between the USSR, the Union and Autonomous Republics, 10 April 1990.  
492 R. Kaufman and J. Hardt (Eds), The Former Soviet Union in Transition (Sharpe, 1993) at 142. 
493 Interview in Pravda, 13 November 1989. Quoted in S. White, G. Gill and D. Slider (Eds), The Politics of Transition: Shaping a 
Post-Soviet Future (Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 247. 
494 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR, 24 April 1990.  
495 Law on the Free National Development of Citizens of the USSR Who Reside Outside Their Own National-Territorial Formations 
or Who Do Not Possess Such Formations on the Territory of the USSR, 26 April 1990.  
496 Izvestiia, 3 May 1990. 
497 Law on the Division of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Subjects of the Federation, 26 April 1990, 
Section 1(3). 
498 J. Hughes and G. Sasse, ‘Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition States’ in J. Hughes and G. Sasse 
(Eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict (Routledge, 2002) 1-35 at 19. In addition, Feldbrugge 
has noted that the law left the status of the two lower units, the AOs and the AOks, vague. Feldbrugge (n 488) 129. 
499 ‘The autonomous republics are Soviet socialist states that are members of the USSR federation. Autonomous republics and 
autonomous formations are a part of union republics on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples, and they possess all state 
power on their territory, except for the powers they have transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR and union republics’. Law On the 
Division (n 497) Section 1(3). ‘O razgranichenii polnomochii mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i sub’ektami federatsii’ in Vedemosti s’ezda 
narodnykh deputatov SSSR I Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 19, 9 May 1990 at 430. Translated by John Dunlop in J. Dunlop, Russia 
Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 91. Zverev has highlighted that the equality 
of the ASSRs with the SSRs was stressed, barring those rights they had voluntarily assigned to the latter. A. Zverev, ‘The Value of the 
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were puzzled by this development. For instance, professor Zheleznyov, a key drafter of the Tatarstan 
ASSR’s sovereignty declaration, commented that this was ‘juridical nonsense because one republic, 
one state, cannot at the same time be subject of two federations’.500 However, they were ignoring 
events in the USSR half a century earlier: the SSRs of Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
had held the same status in 1922-1936, as constitutive parts of both the USSR and the Transcaucasian 
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.501 The asymmetrical socialist understanding of different levels 
of sovereignty, inherent with the ethnofederal model, was making this development possible.  
The 26 April Law equalized the rights of the SSRs and the ASSRs by introducing a concept that the 
relations between them are determined by the treaties and conventions they conclude within the 
Soviet legal framework.502 As Sakwa has noted, after the Law, the ASSRs could negotiate on equal 
terms with their host SSRs.503 Indeed, the higher status of the ASSRs in comparison to the lower units 
was pointed out in several articles.504 Finally, the Law offered a new distribution of jurisdiction 
between the USSR and the SSRs, superseding Chapters 8-11 of the 1977 Constitution. The exclusive 
powers of the USSR were restricted, and jurisdiction in several areas was passed to the SSRs.  
Meanwhile, Gorbachev had pushed through a series of amendments enlarging the powers of the 
President of the USSR - position created for him in March 1990 - over the reforms taking place. The 
Presidents of the ASSRs were now also included in the Council of the Federation. This institution 
was established in 1990 and included the President of the USSR and the leaders of the fifteen SSRs.505 
The most important task of the Council was drafting the New Union Treaty, with the turmoil all over 
the USSR adding a sense of urgency.506 
3.7.5 New Union Treaty and the Referendum on the Future of the USSR (1991) 
Gorbachev proposed his New Union Treaty project to the Party in the 28th Congress of the CPSU in 
July 1990. This historical Congress approved the project, supported his other reforms so far, and re-
                                                 
Tatarstan Experience for Georgia and Abkhazia’ in B. Coppieters, D. Darchiashvili and N. Akaba (Eds), Federal Practice: Exploring 
Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia (Bruessels, 2000) 91-110 at 96. 
500 Quoted in Kahn (n 481) 77. Hough has questioned this Soviet contradiction that partially deprived the SSRs of their sovereignty 
while giving it to the ASSRs. J. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Brookings, 1997) at 386.  
501 See, for instance, G. Law, Administrative Subdivisions of Countries: A Comprehensive World Reference, 1900 through 1998 
(Library of Congress, 1999) at 313. In addition, in the SFRY context, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo had held the same 
dual status as a constitutive unit of both the SFRY and Serbia, since the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. 
502 Law On the Division (n 497), Section 1(4).  
503 R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (Routledge, 1993) at 215.  
504 Feldbrugge (n 488) 130.  
505 The President of Lithuania boycotted all the sessions. In March 1990, a constitutional amendment gave the ASSRs’ Presidents and 
the leaders of the AOs and AOks equal rights in the Council than those of the SSRs. G. Hahn, Russian Revolution from Above 1985-
2000. Reform, Transaction and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (Transaction Publishers, 2002) at 277-278.  
506 By late 1990, at least the Baltic Republics were already considered lost, and the Caucasus was in disarray. Ibid. at 131.  
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elected him as the General Secretary. These were the last major decisions made by the CPSU, as this 
was the last Party Congress before the dissolution of the Party a year later.  
The negotiations over the New Union Treaty, known as the Novo-Ogarevo Process, took place mostly 
between the SSRs and the ASSRs in the Council of the Federation. The first draft was made public 
in November 1990. It contained drastic changes, such as renaming the country the Union of Soviet 
Sovereign Republics, abolishing the CPD, and awarding most powers to the Council of the 
Federation. The aim was to turn the USSR into a confederation. Finally, the draft put the ASSRs on 
a par with SSRs, describing both as republics and as sovereign states.507  
Based on the feedback, a drafting committee started reworking the Treaty on 1 January 1991. 
However, just as many had feared, six SSRs (the Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia) 
refused to participate in the drafting, started to boycott all federal institutions, and were preparing for 
independence. Gorbachev continued to push for a ‘9+1 agreement’ with the remaining SSRs and the 
USSR. A third draft was approved by the Soviet of the Union on 6 March 1991 but was rejected in 
the individual Supreme Soviets of the SSRs.  
Adamantly, Gorbachev sought an alternative source of political support. On 17 March, a hastily 
organized popular referendum was held in nine of the SSRs,508 producing a 76% support for the 
continuation of the USSR, including a majority in all of them.509 This success enabled Gorbachev to 
persuade nine of the SSR Presidents to continue to work for a mutually acceptable Treaty.510 Finally, 
the New Union Treaty was completed and was to be signed on 20 August 1991.511 It proclaimed to 
be based on the right of nations to self-determination and that all the SSRs and ASSRs possess and 
retain their sovereignty in the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics.512 
                                                 
507 Quoted in Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Russian Federation, 
November 2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce18c.html>. 
508 Referendum on the Preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The posed question was: ‘Do you consider necessary 
the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights 
and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?’. 
509 The results varied between 70,2% in the Ukrainian SSR to 97,9% in the Turkmen SSR. Only one ASSR, Abkhazia, organized 
referendum (Georgian SSR was among the boycotting republics), with 52,3% in favor. <http://i.imgur.com/xXS4jN0.jpg>. 
510 Novo-Ogaryovo Agreement, signed on 23 April 1991. 
511 Even the order of the signatures had been agreed. More on the Novo-Ogarevo process, see S. Cohen, Soviet Fates and Lost 
Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War (Colombia, 2011) at 85-111.  
512 Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, 15 August 1991, Part 1. Basic Principles. 
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However, the Party hardliners, always suspicious of Gorbachev, saw the Treaty as the end of the 
USSR.513 After a crisis meeting, a delegation of representatives from the Party, the Red Army, 
industry, and the government met Gorbachev at his vacation residence in Crimea.514 When they failed 
to persuade the President not to sign the Union Treaty, they put him under house arrest and attempted 
a coup d’état under a collective name of the State Committee on the State of Emergency on 19 August 
1991.515 The Committee’s Resolution No. 1 proclaimed that, for the purpose of protecting the 
independence and territorial integrity of the country, the USSR law ‘On the Legal Conditions 
Applying in a State of Emergency’ becomes immediately binding all over the Union (Article 1); all 
the structures of power and administration in defiance of the USSR laws and Constitution are to be 
immediately disbanded and all their laws and decisions considered invalid (Articles 2 and 3); and that 
all activities of political parties and public organizations are suspended (Article 4).516 As a response, 
a massive protest against the coup began at the streets of Moscow led by the RSFSR President Yeltsin. 
When the Army refused to get involved, the coup unraveled. Among its victims were the CPSU, 
which Yeltsin banned in the RSFSR by a presidential decree; and Gorbachev, who had no more 
legitimacy to pursue the Union Treaty or to lead the country.  
3.8 The Dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
After the coup attempt, the USSR remained in a state of paralysis, with the RSFSR refusing to 
participate in any federal organs. On 2 September 1991, the governmental system of the USSR was 
suspended.517 Still attempting to save the Union, on 25 November 1991, Gorbachev presented a final 
draft of the New Union Treaty to the SSRs. It portrayed a loose confederation, the Union of Sovereign 
States, and gained some support. However, Yeltsin concluded that any Treaty without Ukraine was 
useless and wanted to wait until Ukraine had held its referendum of independence. The Ukrainian 
                                                 
513 When Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov received the text of the Treaty on 15 August, he was alarmed and told the cabinet that there 
would be a power vacuum if it was signed. C. Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus (Brill, 2010) at 208. 
514 There are two different narratives of this meeting: Gorbachev claims that the delegation demanded that he resign, while the 
delegation members claim that the demand was for the President to return to Moscow, to refuse to sign the treaty, and to declare a state 
of emergency. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/soviet_stand_01.shtml>. 
515 The Committee (Государственный комитет по чрезвычайному положению) consisted of eight high-ranking Soviet officials, 
including Vice President Yanayev, Prime Minister Pavlov, Interior Minister Pugo, Defense Minister Yazov and Chairman of the KGB 
Kryuchkov. The coup is well documented, for example, in Congressional Research Service, Soviet Coup Attempt: Background and 
Implications (Library of Congress, 1991); and M. Sixsmith, Moscow Coup: The Death of the Soviet System (Simon & Schuster, 1991).  
516 Quoted in R. Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union: 1917-1991 (Routledge, 1999) at 462. According to Sakwa, the 
‘putschists’ hoped to neutralize the opposition by a raft of populist measures, but in vain. Sakwa concludes that the Committee did not 
understand the profoundness of transformation of the Soviet society under perestroika. Ibid. at 462.  
517 Joint Declaration of the President of the USSR and of the Leading Officials of the Union Republics, Izvestiia, 2 September 1991. 
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vote on 1 December 1991 was overwhelmingly for the independence,518 and the Treaty became 
infeasible.  
On 8 December 1991, the heads of state of the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Belarus met in Minsk and signed 
an ‘Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS). This document stated 
that, since the Novo-Ogarevo Process had become deadlocked and several republics had de facto 
withdrawn from the USSR, ‘the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no 
longer exists’.519 On 21 December 1991, eight more heads of state joined the CIS,520 declaring that 
‘with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the USSR ceased to exist’.521  
Gorbachev’s signature is missing from the CIS establishment documents that terminated the socialist 
federal experiment. The center had become so discredited and obsolete that the SSRs did not feel this 
necessary. Therewith, being the General Secretary of a banned Party and the President of a federation 
that had lost all its subunits, he announced his resignation on 26 December 1991: 
‘Dear compatriots, fellow citizens, as a result of the newly formed situation, creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, I cease my activities in the post of the USSR president […]. I 
have firmly stood for independence, self-rule of nations, for the sovereignty of the republics, but at the 
same time for preservation of the union state, the unity of the country’.522 
3.9 Conclusion: Dissolution and Uti Possidetis Meritus 
In the auspices of the CIS, the successor states of the USSR agreed that Russia would continue the 
legal existence of the USSR,523 and declared that all their border adjustments would be settled by uti 
possidetis, if not agreed otherwise by the parties in question.524 Similarly to the 1960s decolonization, 
the utilization of uti possidetis was agreed upon in a mutual agreement by the states emerging from 
the former Empire. Therewith, the SSRs became sovereign states and their internal borders 
international borders, as they were recognized independent by the international community and 
became member states of the UN. As the dissolution was seen to be taking place in a peaceful and 
                                                 
518 D. Nohlen and P. Stöver (Eds), Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook (Nomos, 2010) at 1985. The Ukrainian parliament had 
already declared independence on 24 August following the coup d’etat. In the referendum, the question posed was: ‘Do you support 
the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?’. 92,3% voted affirmative. 
519 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (n 216). 
520 The Baltic States did not participate, for they had been recognized independent by the USSR already on 6 September 1991, while 
Georgia was under severe internal unrest culminating in the civil war. 
521 Alma-Ata Declaration (n 230). 
522 Resignation speech, quoted in C. Chatterjee, L. Kirschenbaum and D. Field, Russia’s Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, 
Contested Perspectives (Routledge, 2016) at 230. On the same day, the Supreme Soviet formally dissolved itself and the USSR. 
523 N 229. 
524 N 230.  
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consensual manner, the SSRs were only asked to fulfil the requirements listed in the Guidelines and 
to adhere shortly to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.525 
This peaceful dissolution process hid the fact that 20 former ASSRs had lost the constitutional 
guarantees for their autonomies, and that some of them refused to accept the new rule of the now-
independent SSRs as legitimate, eroding the internal cohesion of the successor states. Under the 
ethnofederalist system, these recognized nationalities had been given a meaningful self-governance 
within a demarcated territory assigned to their titular nationality. Moreover, the 1990-1991 
amendments had taught the ASSRs to emphasize the constitutive forms of their autonomic 
institutions. In the Soviet era, they could always ask Moscow to mediate if there was a conflict with 
their host SSR. When the SSRs were recognized territorially fully sovereign, many of them felt no 
need to respect the former autonomy agreements. While they confronted their ASSRs in different 
ways,526 many of them chose a revocation (e.g., Georgia with Abkhazia) or a substantial diminishing 
of their autonomies.527 This often led to protracted conflicts.  
Therefore, I wish to challenge the narrative of the peaceful dissolution of the USSR. I argue that uti 
possidetis was misapplied in 1991, both on the grounds of Soviet Law and of public international law. 
First, national law and international law work in general work in different spheres,528 and the internal 
legislation of a country will typically not have international legal ramifications.529 That being said, 
one major exception of this rule is the uti possidetis doctrine, which selects the units of its application 
based on the constitutional order of the dissolving international legal entity. In effect, it freezes the 
constitutional (juris) situation at the moment of independence. Thus, I claim that the application of 
uti possidetis in the dissolution has to be based on the legal framework of the USSR in December 
1991: the 1977 USSR Constitution with its amendments and the individual SSR constitutions. As the 
international community recognized the former SSRs based on these legal instruments, it is puzzling 
                                                 
525 N 225. The Russian Federation was not required this, as the successor states of the USSR had jointly decided that it would legally 
continue the State existence of the USSR. Thus, Russia was a unique case that did not seek or receive any international recognition.  
526 See subchapter 5.2-5.4. 
527 For instance, one of the first legislative initiatives of the newly independent Republic of Georgia was to abolish the autonomies of 
the former ASSR of Abkhazia and the AO of South Ossetia. In the SFRY context, the same took place in Serbia in relation to Kosovo. 
528 As phrased by Oppenheim, ‘[i]n consequence of its internal independence and territorial supremacy, a state can adopt any 
constitution it likes, arrange its administration in any way it thinks fit, enact such laws as it pleases, organise its forces on land and sea, 
build and pull down fortresses, adopt any commercial policy it likes and so on’. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise. Vol. 1. 
Peace (London, 1905) at 255-256.  
529 A good example of this is the Soviet attempt to gain seats for all its SSRs in the UN (n 425). However, the international legal position 
of these states could not be altered just by Soviet legislation, and they remained, in the eyes of the rest of the world, dependent subunits 
of the USSR. The United Kingdom was amenable to this Soviet request because it wanted the then-dominion of India to be admitted 
as well. J. Nichol, Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics (Praeger, 1995) at 13.  
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that they ignored the rights and even the existence of the lower level ethnofederal units as stipulated 
in the very same instruments. 
Second, by a virtue of being a general principle of international law,530 uti possidetis has to evolve 
alongside the shifting paradigm of the international legal order. As I accounted for in Chapter 2, in 
the first two cycles uti possidetis was applied in accordance with other international legal principles. 
There were indisputable attempts, primarily by the EC, to again update uti possidetis in the 
contemporary international legal framework in place in the early 1990s. State recognition remains a 
powerful weapon in international relations, and the EC used this bargaining position when forming 
its collective recognition policy. It informed the former SSRs that they would be recognized ‘subject 
to the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case’ within their 
former borders if fulfilling the following criteria: 
‘Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in 
the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights 
Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the 
commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE 
Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement 
Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as 
well as to security and regional stability 
Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions 
concerning State succession and regional disputes’. 531 
This was a major break from the standard Montevideo Convention state recognition criteria.532 Yet, 
the EC’s application failed to take into account two crucial factors. In relation to the internal law of 
the USSR - internationalized by uti possidetis - the EC did not understand ethnofederalism and the 
status of the ASSRs in it. This was especially problematic, since the constitutional amendments of 
                                                 
530 For the authoritative statements of qualifying uti possidetis as a general principle of international law, see ICJ’s Frontier Dispute (n 
2) para. 20; Qatar v. Bahrain (n 2) paras. 10, 148; Indo-Pakistan Western (n 39) 527; Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration (n 39) 579; 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (n 39) para. 386L; Opinion No. 3 (n 39) para. 2. For additional supporting scholarly views, 
see, among others, Naldi (n 39) 39; Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 503; and Scott (n 39) 428-429. There are also dissenting opinions. On the 
African context, see Ahmed (n 39) 32–35; and, in general, see Torres Bernández in Ginther (n 39) 435. 
531 Guidelines (n 4). 
532 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed in Montevideo, 26 December 1933. Entered into force on 26 
December 1934. Art. 1 defines a state as a person of international law possessing the following qualifications: ‘a permanent population; 
a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with other states’.  
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1990-1991 had considerably enhanced the ASSR’s legal position.533 Moreover, the decision to deny 
the ASSR’s rights is illogical concerning the EC Declaration’s paragraphs 2 and 3, which stipulate 
the need to guarantee the rights of national groups and the respect of inviolability of borders.534  
To summarize, at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR, the ASSRs’ representational rights had 
been upgraded to be in most part equal to the SSRs;535 they were direct subjects of the USSR as well 
as their host SSR;536 their territory could not be altered without their consent;537 and while they lacked 
the right to secede, they did possess the right to decide whether they wanted to remain a part of the 
USSR or the host SSR that was seceding.538 In other words, their legal status was, in many ways, 
comparable to that of the SSRs.539 
All that being said, I need to highlight two crucial legal distinctions between the first and second-
level subunits. First, as recognized by the EC in both the USSR and the SFRY, only the highest 
ethnofederal level possessed the right to secede from the federation. However, this right was never 
exercised. The USSR had a legal formula for secession, but there was no time to utilize it before the 
USSR ceased to exist. The SFRY guaranteed the right to secede, but no formula for it, and the 1974 
                                                 
533 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession from the USSR (n 489); Law on the 
Principles of Economic Relations between the USSR, the Union and Autonomous Republics, 10 April 1990; Law on the Free National 
Development of Citizens of the USSR Who Reside Outside Their Own National-Territorial Formations or Who Do Not Possess Such 
Formations on the Territory of the USSR, 26 April 1990; and, finally, Law on the Division of Powers (n 497).  
534 In Chapter 4, I analyze the rights of the national groups in more detail, especially under the framework of the CSCE. Concerning 
the inviolability of borders, this Chapter aims to elucidate the legal status that the ASSRs possessed at the moment of the dissolution. 
This helps to explain the following distortions and conflicts that have taken place since the dissolutions. See subchapter 5.1. 
535 See subchapter 3.7.4. 
536 Law on the Free National Development of Citizens of the USSR Who Reside Outside Their Own National-Territorial Formations 
or Who Do Not Possess Such Formations on the Territory of the USSR, 26 April 1990, Art. 1. Hughes has argued that the combination 
of the Secession Law (3 April 1990), Law on Economic Principles (10 April 1990), and Law on the Division of Powers (n 497) together 
eradicated the core features of the constitutional distinction between the SSRs and the ASSRs. J. Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism 
to Jihad (University of Pennsylvania, 2007) at 16. Tishkov has argued that the Law of 26 April 1990 gave SSRs and ASSRs an equal 
status as subjects of the federation. V. Tishkov, ‘Dynamics of a Society at War: Ethnographical Aspects’ in R. Sakwa (Ed), Chechnya: 
From Past to Future (Anthem, 2005) 157-180 at 271. Bowring concurs, noting that the 1990 laws raised the ASSRs to a significant 
extent to the level of subjects of the USSR, equal to the SSRs in their interconnections with the USSR. B. Bowring, ‘The Russian 
Constitutional System: Complexity and Asymmetry’ in M. Weller and K. Nobbs (Eds), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of 
Ethnic Conflicts (Pennsylvania, 2010) 48-74 at 54.  
537 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Art. 84. 
538 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession from the USSR (n 489) Art. 3. ‘In 
accordance with universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international obligations of USSR the seceding 
republic is to guarantee all civil, political, social, economic, cultural and other rights and freedoms of citizens of the USSR which 
remain on its territory without any acts of discrimination based on race, skin color, sex, language, religion, political or other beliefs, 
ethnic or social origin, welfare, place or time of birth’. Ibid. Art. 16. 
539 In a remarkably comparable situation in the context of the SFRY, an independent Arbitration Committee tried to establish a clear 
distinction between the Socialist Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Provinces in the application of uti possidetis. The Committee 
concluded that ‘[t]he principle applies all the more readily to the Republics since the second and fourth paragraph of Art. 5 of the 
Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that the Republics’ territories and boundaries could not be altered without their consent’. Opinion 
No. 3 (n 39) para. 2. Since the Commission based many of its Opinions on the above-quoted Guidelines (n 4), I argue that the successor-
states of the USSR should have been obliged to have gone through the same process to gain recognition. The later distortions could 
have been avoided by recognizing the rights of the ASSRs, whose territory, likewise, could not be altered without their consent. For 
more on the SFRY case, see subchapter 4.3. 
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constitution was inconsistent on the matter.540 Thus, in the end, no state seceded from the USSR or 
the SFRY. Instead, there were federal-state dissolutions, an application uti possidetis, and subsequent 
state successions. Now, since the successor states were formed on the basis of uti possidetis, the right 
to the secession of the SSRs has no legal relevance, and it becomes even harder to argue that the 
ASSRs had no rights in the state dissolution.  
Second, there did exist a highly important legal difference between the SSRs and the ASSRs outside 
the secession framework that is essential to the application of uti possidetis: the ASSRs were direct 
subjects of both the federation, as well as their host SSR. Thus, I argue that in contrast to the SSRs, 
the ASSRs did not have a right to independence in the early 1990s. Notwithstanding, they had a 
special legal status that should have been recognized.541  
In conclusion, the international recognition decisions in the early 1990s resulted in a distortion of the 
contemporary uti possidetis doctrine. In the previous Chapter, I explained why its application has to 
take into account the last constitutional order of the target state, as well as any changes in the general 
international law principles. While this Chapter focused on ethnofederalism as the last constitutional 
order, the following Chapter establishes the general international law principles applicable to a state 
dissolution. The combination of these factors can then be used to upgrade uti possidetis into the 
contemporary international legal setting and to ensure peaceful changes of sovereignty over territory 
in the future. If the international community continues with the obsolete version used in the socialist 
federal dissolutions, it is likely heading towards another regrettable failure.   
                                                 
540 This enabled the Serbian SR to deny this right from the other SRs, leading eventually into the ‘process of dissolution’, as recognized 
by the Badinter Commission. Opinion No. 1 (n 210). 
541 For my proposal for an adapted version of uti possidetis juris that takes into account the lower level internal borders, see Chapter 6. 
According to this version, the legitimate expectations (meritus) of the ASSRs under both internal and international law are taken into 
account. Consequently, the recognition of the SSRs would have been conditioned upon respecting these expectations.  
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4. The External Component: The Evolution of the Right 
to Self-Determination 
The previous Chapter introduced the first component of (uti possidetis) meritus, the internal legal 
framework at the moment of state dissolution. The internal component is lex specialis and changes 
with the target state, as uti possidetis takes the borders of reference from the last applicable internal 
legal order of the state in question. As I am using the dissolutions of the USSR and the SFRY as 
examples for meritus, the previous chapter introduced their internal legal framework, namely the 
socialist ethnofederal model.  
Consequently, next I progress to the second - external - component of meritus: the international legal 
framework at the moment of the dissolutions of the USSR and the SFRY in 1991. The external 
component is lex generalis and thus is applicable in the same manner in all cases where uti possidetis 
is utilized. Additionally, it is in constant flux, evolving alongside other developments of international 
law. The focus in this chapter is on the evolution of international legal principles, most importantly 
of the right to self-determination and its division into internal and external self-determination variants.  
By using the SFRY as an example, I establish the background of the legitimate expectation (meritus) 
of a former autonomous unit to self-rule in the form of a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. This 
expectation was due to both internal (the last applicable legal order) and external (the right to self-
determination as interpreted by the intervening parties) legal frameworks as they stood at the moment 
of the SFRY’s dissolution. I first go through the evolution of the right to self-determination in the UN 
era, followed by a brief history of self-determination in the Yugoslav context. Finally, I move to the 
synthesis of these two aspects - the content of the right to self-determination and the constitutional 
position of Kosovo - as they were at the time of the external intervention in the summer of 1991. 
4.1 Self-Determination in the United Nations Era 
4.1.1 Self-Determination as a Principle, 1945-1966 
Following a ‘false start’ after the First World War,542 the principle of self-determination gained real 
significance after the establishment of the UN. Unlike the League of Nations,543 the UN codified self-
                                                 
542 See subchapter 2.4.  
543 The Commission of Rapporteurs analyzed self-determination in the early 1920s thus: ‘The principle is not, properly speaking, a rule 
of international law and the League of Nations has not entered it in its Covenant […]. It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed 
by a vague and general formula which has given rise to most varied interpretations and differences of opinion’. Report of the 
Commission of Rapporteurs (n 122) 22-23. 
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determination into its Charter, according to which one of its purposes is to ‘develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.544 
However, self-determination remained a vague principle without clear legal ramifications.  
This ambiguity changed when decolonization began to have political momentum in the UN. As the 
USSR had an exceptional attitude towards self-determination due to its history,545 it became the 
leading proponent of decolonization. As the USSR had ‘solved’ its national question with 
ethnofederal model, it felt it was entitled to promote self-determination as a legal right that was only 
applicable to other states.546 Indeed, the USSR was consistently involved in drafting international 
treaties and conventions referring to self-determination,547 and it was enshrined in Article 1(2) of the 
Charter by a supplement proposed by the Soviet delegation.548 
Another major status-upgrade came with the 1960 UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that equated the right to self-
determination to complete independence in the colonial context.549 Although not legally binding, it 
went much further in its legal implications than a normal General Assembly Declaration, establishing 
a Special Committee devoted exclusively on decolonization and monitoring the implementation of 
the 1960 Declaration. The Soviet role was again decisive, as its delegation submitted the original 
draft of the Declaration.550 The USSR continued its quest for codifying the right to self-determination 
into a binding international agreement and found natural allies for this cause from the newly-
independent African and South-Asian states.  
                                                 
544 Charter of the United Nations (n 123), Chapter 1, Art. 1(2).  
545 See subchapters 3.1.4, 3.3, and 3.5.  
546 Additionally, the USSR’s reasoning was due to the fact that unlike the Western bloc, the socialist bloc did not have colonies - at 
least in the salt-water sense - and could thus weaken the West by promoting decolonization. More on the salt-water thesis on colonialism 
(with particular focus on indigenous peoples in Australia and Irish in Northern Ireland), in A. Maguire, ‘Contemporary Anti-Colonial 
Self-Determination Claims and the Decolonization of International Law’ 22(1) Griffith Law Review (2013) 238-268. Moreover, self-
determination was seen as a useful instrument to consolidate Russian territorial acquisitions. Numerous examples of these are 
summarized in M. Beissinger, ‘Self-Determination as a Technology of Imperialism: The Soviet and Russian Experiences’ 14(5) 
Ethnopolitics (2015) 479-487 at 481-482.  
547 According to a highly distinguished Soviet scholar Grigory Tunkin: ‘Having placed the right of nations to self-determination at the 
base of its policy on the nationality question, the Soviet government pressed for the recognition of the principle of self-determination 
of nations as a principle of international law’. G. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Translated by W. Butler, London, 1974) at 61. 
548 Ibid. at 62.  
549 N 86 Arts. 2, 4, and 6.  
550 This is well documented by Bowring, who calls this instance a ‘truly climatic moment in the development of contemporary 
international law’. B. Bowring, ‘Positivism versus Self-Determination: the Contradictions of Soviet International Law’ in S. Marks 
(Ed), International Law on the Left: Revisiting Marxist Legacies (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 133-168 at 160. 
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4.1.2 Self-Determination as a Right, 1966-1991 
The momentum continued, as self-determination was made a qualified legal right beyond 
decolonization context by the 1966 Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, both containing identical Article 1(1): ‘All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development’.551 Article 1(3) gives a more specific depiction by 
stating that the signatories ‘shall promote the realization of the right to self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’. The 
preparatory work was guided by the UN General Assembly, which called on the UN Commission on 
Human Rights to ‘study ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its next 
session’.552 In addition, the resolution recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination as a ‘fundamental human right’,553 and portrayed it as being ‘the first human right 
without which other political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights would be meaningless’.554  
The Covenants have been seen as prominent developments of international law on self-determination 
in several aspects.555 For one, they make self-determination a treaty based right and a general 
entitlement not limited to decolonization, which is its specific emanation.556 Many believe the 
Covenants to be signaling a notion that national unity is not an automatic fait accompli, but has to be 
earned by the government of a state.557 Additionally, a territorial element in the construction of self-
determination can be derived from the state practice.558 According to Higgins, self-determination 
                                                 
551 N 10. Art. 1(1) was identical to Art. 2 of the 1960 Declaration. The SFRY ratified both Covenants on 2 June 1971 and the USSR in 
1973. <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#1>. 
552 Hannum (n 129) 19, citing the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work of 
the Commission on Human Rights, GA Res. 421D A/1775, 1 December 1950. See also n 89.  
553 Ibid. at 20. 
554 J. Castellino and J. Gilbert, ‘Self-Determination, Indigenous Peoples and Minorities’ 3 Macquarie Law Journal (2003) 155-178 at 
161. Furthermore, according to Karakostanouglou, the preparatory work seemed to provide a right to secede under two conditions: ‘if 
a) multiethnic state that is comprised of ethnic groups similar in size, but not in case of groups forming the populations majority and 
another the populations minority (case of ethnic minorities) b) when ethnic group has been recognized as a political entity in the 
constitution’. Quoted in V. Karakostanoglou, ‘The Right to Self-Determination and the Case of Yugoslavia’ 32 Balkan Studies (1991) 
335-362 at 345, citing A. Μπρεδήμα, “Αυτοδιάθεση λαών και απόσχιση κράτους στα πλαίσια των Ηνωμένων Εθνών” (Self-
Determination of Peoples and Secession of States within the Framework of the U.N.), in Διεθνές Δίκαιο και Διεθνής Πολιτική (12 
International Law and International Politics (1987)) 105-147 at 121. 
555 For instance, Shaw has called the Covenants as ‘an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter’s Human Rights provisions’. M. 
Shaw, International Law (6th Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 308-311.  
556 Oeter (n 11) 322. According to Hannum, the ‘relative straightforward language’ of Art. 1, in addition to its reference to ‘all’ peoples 
and the fact that ‘is found on a human rights treaties intended to have universal applicability suggest a scope beyond that of 
decolonization’. Hannum (n 129) 19. 
557 D. Wippman (Ed), International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell, 1998) at 121. Ratner reaches the same conclusion (n 12) 611. 
558 S. Oeter, ‘The Kosovo Case - An Unfortunate Precedent’ 75(1) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
(2015) 51-74 at 60; and U. Saxer, Die Internationale Steuerung der Selbstbestimmund und der Staatsentstehung (Heidelberg, 2010) at 
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refers to the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power.559 
Franck has supplemented this by claiming that self-determination is linked with historically pre-
constituted political entities with a specific territory. Therefore, ‘people’ is not merely a group of 
persons, but the historically constituted people of a particular territorial entity.560 The linkage between 
territory and people is essential in order not to invite a series of never-ending minority secessions. 
This affiliation became fundamental in the socialist federal context in the early 1990s. Finally, the 
1966 Covenants also made a clear distinction between peoples, to whom Article 1 is applicable, and 
persons belonging to minorities, whose legal rights are guaranteed under Article 27.561 
In 1970, a UN Friendly Relations Declaration clarified the content of self-determination by stating 
that ‘[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 
every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter’.562 It 
also made a principled presumption in favor of territorial integrity: 
‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’.563  
                                                 
324-326. Some states have claimed that territorial autonomy (such as the Soviet ethnofederal model) assures that self-determination is 
accomplished in a single-party state. USSR 1984 CCPR/C/SR/565, para. 2. 
559 R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London, 1963) at 104. 
560 T. Franck, ‘Clan and Superclan: Loyality, Identity and the Community in Law and Practice’ 90(3) American Journal of International 
Law (1996) 359-383. He has also defined self-determination as a ‘right of a people organized in an established territory to determine 
its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is, therefore, at the core of the democratic entitlement’. T. Franck, ‘The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ 86(1) American Journal of International Law (1992) 46-91 at 52. 
561 According to Art. 27, ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language’. Since the mid-1990s, the rights of the minorities are also guaranteed by the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM), adopted on 10 November 1994 by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. The next breakthrough in minority affairs took place at the CSCE Copenhagen Summit of June 1990. The summit 
formulated seven key principles that later became the fundamentals of the European minority regimes embedded in further OSCE, as 
well as Council of Europe instruments including the legally binding FCPNM and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages. Osipov (n 460) 69. 
562 Friendly Relations Declaration (n 88) Art. 1. The SFRY supported the declaration. 
563 Ibid. Malcolm Shaw has pointed out that the very instruments of the United Nations that proclaim the foundations of the principle 
of self-determination, the UN Charter, the 1960 Declaration, and the 1970 Declaration also clearly prohibit partial or total disruption 
of national unity and territorial integrity of states. He also adds general reaffirming of territorial integrity of states in the UN Security 
Council resolutions S/5002 (1961), 716 (1991), 822 (1993), 852 (1993), 876 (1993), 884 (1993) and 896 (1994). Shaw (n 17, ‘Heritage’) 
482. Notwithstanding, the 1970 Declaration can alternatively be read the other way around, and there are views that territorial integrity 
is only protected if the government of a state presents the whole of its people without discrimination. See, inter alia, F. Kirgis, ‘The 
Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era’ 88(2) American Journal of International Law (1994) 304-310 at 306; and 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo, Written Statement of Switzerland (2009), paras. 62-63. 
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The 1970 Declaration is believed by many legal commentators to reflect customary international law 
and ‘remains the most authoritative statement on the meaning of self-determination’.564 It affirms that 
territorial integrity protects federations just as it does unitary states. Indeed, there is a legal assumption 
that in federations, self-determination is bound-up in the constructs of the federation or autonomy.565 
Any other interpretation would make states reluctant to bestow an autonomous status to a subunit 
since such administrative subdivisions could potentially be ‘upgraded’ to the status of international 
boundaries.566 Equally, states with federal arrangements could be destabilized by their internal 
boundaries, which would provide potential secessionists a clear blueprint to fracture a state.567  
In 1974, self-determination was included in the ‘Definition of Aggression’ resolution by the UN 
General Assembly, which stated that it was the ‘duty of states not to use armed force to deprive 
peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial 
integrity’ and that ‘[n]othing in this definition […] could in any way prejudice the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter’.568 
In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act identified most fully the content of self-determination at a regional 
level,569 by extending its normative content to all nations and peoples.570 In this declaration, the 
participating states promised to ‘respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-
determination’ in conformity with the UN Charter and relevant norms of international law and 
affirmed that ‘all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, 
their internal and external political status’.571 Although the Helsinki Final Act was not legally a treaty, 
it was a political agreement with lasting consequences.572 
                                                 
564 H. Hannum, ‘Legal Aspects of Self-Determination’, Encyclopedia Princetoniensis: The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-
Determination. <https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/254>. 
565 Oeter (n 11) 327.  
566 M. Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ 86(3) American Journal 
of International Law (1992) 569-607 at 606. 
567 Bartos (n 19) 86. 
568 Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, preamble and Art. 7.  
569 As described by Kuznetsov, ‘[a]fter the decline of colonial empires, the issue of self-determination of peoples in the sense of the 
formation of autonomous States was basically resolved […]. Now the provisions of this principle are basically applicable to the peoples 
of existing sovereign States’. V.I Kuznetsov and G.V. Ivanenko, ‘Principles of International Law’ in V.I Kuznetsov and B.R. 
Tuzmukhamedov, International Law - A Russian Introduction (Trans. and Ed. by W. Butler, Eleven Publishing, 2009) 129-162 at 149.  
570 The Act proclaims: ‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, 
in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to 
pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development’. Final Act (n 13) 1. (a) VIII. 
571 Ibid. chapter VIII. The SFRY was among the signatories.  
572 Particularly utilized by human rights groups of the Eastern Bloc. <http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/helsinki/>. 
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In 1984, the Human Rights Committee’s ‘General Comment’ on Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights reaffirmed the right to self-determination - without clarifying who are the people 
entitled to this right. Moreover, it affirmed that the state parties have a specific obligation not only in 
relation to their peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples who have been deprived of this right.573 Finally, the 
CSCE summit in 1990 produced a Charter of Paris, in which the participatory states re-affirmed 
people’s right to self-determination in a similar wording than in the Helsinki Final Act.574  
The right to self-determination has been reaffirmed several times since the socialist federal 
dissolutions. For example, in 1993 the UN World Conference on Human Rights issued a ‘Vienna 
Declaration and Programme for Action’, with paragraph 2 repeating the 1966 Covenants definition 
of self-determination and adding that the ‘World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial 
of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights’.575 In the same year, a UN 
Declaration recognized ‘the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter 
of United Nations to realize their inalienable right to self-determination’.576 Notwithstanding, it added 
that this right ‘shall not be construed by disrupting territorial integrity of sovereign states’, in the 
same formulation as in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.  
To conclude, by the time of the socialist federal dissolutions in late 1991, the right to self-
determination had gained an undisputable position under international law with the ICJ referring to it 
as an operative legal right on several occasions.577 However, it remains a problematic legal norm for 
its vagueness.578 The actual content of self-determination, as well as its relationship with territorial 
integrity, remains somewhat unclear. For example, outside decolonization, the 1970 Declaration 
seems to equate self-determination to self-government rather than independent statehood.579  
                                                 
573 CCPR General Comment No. 12 (n 89). Regrettably, the Human Rights Committee has not clarified the content further since 1984.  
574 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (n 13) 5. The SFRY was among the signatories.  
575 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, adopted by the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. The Declaration had originally 171 state parties out of the 179 UN 
member states of that time, including all the EU countries. The FRY signed the declaration later, as it was not represented at the UN 
in 1993. In addition, referring to the 1966 International Covenants, the Badinter Commission has affirmed that the right to self-
determination serves to safeguard human rights. Opinion No. 2 (n 289) para. 3. 
576 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/50/6, 40th plenary meeting, 24 
October 1995 at para. 1.  
577 See, e.g., Western Sahara (n 128) 120-121; and South West Africa (n 128) 73-75. 
578 See Cassese (n 9) 159-162; H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 
(Pennsylvania, 1990) at 27; and Hannum (n 129) 2. 
579 Nikouei and Zamani (n 130) 49. 
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4.1.3 Internal and External Self-Determination 
In addition to affirming it as a legal right, when the 1966 Covenants recognized self-determination 
outside decolonization, they seem to unequivocally demonstrate that it can be applied both internally 
and externally. Decolonization - and the cases where peoples were seen to be under another form of 
foreign domination - was a clear example of the external form of self-determination. While all peoples 
have the right to self-determination, the right to the territorial integrity of the existing states usually 
restrains it. However, in the decolonization context the territorial integrity did not prohibit the 
independence of the African states since the 1960 Declaration had made colonization illegal and had 
thus left no room for any counterarguments for the territorial integrity of the colonizing states.580  
Yet, self-determination continues to have a pivotal role outside decolonization. In these cases, the 
contradiction with territorial integrity remains. Therewith, in order not to deprive peoples of their 
right to self-determination, many scholars assert that the Covenants provide a right to internal self-
determination, which conveniently does not have to mean the dismemberment of state’s territory. For 
example, Rosas concludes that both the wording of self-determination in the Covenants and 
subsequent state practice seems to be pointing in favor of the right to internal self-determination and 
the travaux preparatoires do not refute such a claim.581 According to Hannum, the right to popular 
participation, as expressed in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and 
Article 25 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, should be interpreted as 
internal aspects of self-determination.582 Thornberry argues that the internal aspect of self-
determination is represented in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and by its indeterminate 
connection with human rights.583 Thürer claims that the modern view of self-determination recognizes 
a ‘federalist option’ of allowing a certain level of cultural or political autonomy as a means of 
satisfying this right.584 Finally, Borgen defines the mainstream view of the right to internal self-
determination as meaning a right to choose a political system and pursuit of economic, social, and 
cultural development in the auspices of an existing state.585 In sum, the general view on the content 
                                                 
580 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (n 86).  
581 A. Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ in Tomuschat (n 45) 246. 
582 Hannum (n 577) 113. 
583 P. Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with some Remarks on Federalism’ in Tomuschat (n 45) 
120. 
584 D. Thürer, ‘Self-Determination, 1998 Addendum’ in R. Bernhardt (Ed), 4 Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-
Holland, 2000) 364-373 at 373. 
585 C. Borgen, ‘Public International Law and the Conflict over Transnistria’ in M. Akgün (Ed), Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons 
from Moldova and Cyprus (Istanbul, 2013) 83-108 at 89.  
For other proponents of the right to internal self-determination, see Shaw (n 555) 289-293; L. Medina, ‘An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-
Determination: Resolving Puerto Rico’s Status’ 33(3) Fordham International Law Journal (2009) 1048-1100 at 1061-1062; C. 
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of the right to internal self-determination appears to amount to a right to territorial self-governance 
with clear legal limits in the host state’s constitutional order, and usually not including a right to 
external self-determination in the form of secession.  
The African Commission of Human and People’s Rights reaffirmed in 1995 the view that while the 
right to self-determination could be exercised in various forms, it has to be in compliance with other 
fundamental principles of international law, such as the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The Commission saw no sufficient legal ground in favor of external self-determination for 
the people of Katanga, but affirmed that the province of Katanga ‘was obliged to exercise a variant 
of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire’.586 In 
other words, with the right to self-determination being restricted by territorial integrity, the 
Commission held that the Katangese people had a right to internal self-determination within Zaire.  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) that gives expert interpretations 
of human rights provisions in international treaties587 has stated that Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants 
needs to be subdivided into the internal and the external aspects of the right.588 According to the 
CERD, the right to internal self-determination means that the ‘governments are to represent the whole 
population, without distinction as to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. The external 
aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have the right to determine freely their political 
status and their place in the international community’.589 
                                                 
Chinkin, ‘Expert Opinion by Christine Chinkin Accompanying the Ad-Hoc Committee of Canadian Women on the Constitution’s 
Reply Factum’ in A. Bayefsy (Ed), Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (Brill, 2000) 231-240 at 
236; A. Eide, ‘In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession’ in Tomuschat (n 45) 139-176; J. Crawford, ‘Democracy and 
International Law’ 64(1) British Yearbook of International Law (1993) 113-133 at 115-117; M. Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination 
under International Law: ‘Selfistans’, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers (Routledge, 2013) at 18-22; M. Seymour, ‘Secession 
as a Remedial Right’ 50(4) Inquiry (2007) 395-423 at 398; Cassese (n 9) 48-52 and 59-62; Barelli (n 12) 414; Rosas in Rosas and 
Helgesen (n 12) 30-34; and Ratner (n 12) 611. 
586 Katangese People’s Congress v. Zaire, Merits, Communication No 75/92, Eight Activity Report 1994-1995 (ACHPR 1995), quoted 
in M. Evans and R. Murray (Ed), Documents of the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights: The System of Practice, 1986-
2000 (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 232. 
587 Including the UN General Assembly’s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 89) 
195.  
588 UN Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Forty-eight Session, 1996), Arts. 2-4. In addition, CERD drew extra attention to the General 
Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which has an 
extensive list of the rights that the states need to award to minorities. It also contains the ‘basic saving clause’ in Art. 8, stating that 
‘[n]othing in the present declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states’. Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, GA Res. 47/135, 18 December 1992. 
589 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 21: The Right to self-determination, Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Forty-eight session, 23 August 1996. 
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The International Conference of Experts has defined internal self-determination to mean 
‘[p]articipatory democracy: the right to decide the form of government and the identity of rulers by 
the whole population of a state and the right of a population group within the state to participate in 
decision making at the state level. Internal self-determination can also mean the right to exercise 
cultural, linguistic, religious or (territorial) political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing 
state’.590 Under another definition, self-determination ‘is not a general right of secession. It is the 
right of a people to decide on their culture, language, and government. It has evolved into the concepts 
of “internal self-determination”, the protection of minority rights within a state, and “external self-
determination”, secession from a state. While self-determination is an internationally recognized 
principle, secession is considered a domestic issue that each state must assess itself’.591 Finally, as 
summarized by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 
‘outside the colonial context, self-determination is basically limited to internal self-determination. A 
right to self-determination in form of secession is not accepted in state practice’.592 
4.1.4 The Coincidental Evolution of Uti Possidetis and the Right to Self-Determination  
For uti possidetis, there were two relevant developments in international in 1966-1991: the principle 
of self-determination had been codified as a legal right in the 1966 Covenants with a more clarified 
content, and a completely new human rights paradigm had emerged.593 I claim that while the 
international community did successfully incorporate the latter,594 the former was partially bypassed 
with lasting negative consequences for both the affected successor states and uti possidetis.  
In the second cycle in the early 1960s, uti possidetis had to accommodate only a principle of self-
determination. As the 1960 declaration had made colonialism illegal, the former colonial powers’ 
                                                 
590 Report of the International Conference of Experts, organized by the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), 21-27 November 1998, Barcelona.  
591 Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar (n 12) 383-384. The Committee also concluded that international 
law could provide a means to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions and, perhaps, to provide a framework for 
fruitful settlement discussions that realpolitik has been unable to deliver.  
592 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report Volume II (September 2009) at 141. 
593 A clear account on the emergence of the first human rights systems, first in Europe, and then in the auspices of the UN since the 
1960s, see D. Shelton, ‘An Introduction to the History of International Human Rights Law’, GW Law Faculty Publications & Other 
Works, Paper 1052 (2007), 1-30 at 13-24. Additionally, the UN Chronicle has divided the international human rights law into three 
generations (the first generation is ‘liberty’, civil and political rights, the second generation is ‘equality’, socio-economic rights and the 
third generation is ‘solidarity’, collective rights such as right to self-determination), and highlights the importance of the ratification of 
the 1966 Covenants in this process. <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/international-human-rights-law-short-history>. 
594 For instance, the EC Guidelines (n 4) demanded that the emerging successor states fulfill a set of criteria based on the human rights 
paradigm. In order to get a recognition from the EC, new states had to, inter alia, respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (n 13), especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights; and guarantee the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed 
to in the framework of CSCE.  
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territorial integrity was not respected, and they had to renounce these territories in favor of self-
determination.595 The ICJ has argued that uti possidetis is, in fact, an extension of the right of self-
determination, for example in the Frontier Dispute case (1986): ‘[t]he essential requirement of 
stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, 
has induced African states judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take 
account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples’.596 
The changes in the content and scope of the right to self-determination since the second cycle are 
apparent. International Covenants, the UN General Assembly resolutions, state practice,597 and 
scholarly writings all confirm that there exists a legal right to self-determination, which has external 
and internal aspects. Yet, while numerous scholars corroborate the existence of the right to internal 
self-determination, they have significant issues trying to establish and agree on what such a right 
entails - a problem not uncommon with self-determination in general.598 As summarized by Michla 
Pomerance, the UN declarations are a conflicting package of principles, ‘presented without any 
indication of how a desirable balance might be struck between them’.599 
Thus, having established the evolution of self-determination from a principle to a qualified legal right 
with the division to internal and external self-determination aspects, in order to accommodate this 
division to the Yugoslav context, I account for the history of self-determination in the SFRY. 
                                                 
595 The decision on which borders to ‘internationalize’ was eventually left to the new African leaders. They, in turn, decided that self-
determination of the African peoples would be best guaranteed by applying uti possidetis to all the former colonial borders, despite 
their arbitrariness. As self-determination was merely a vague principle, this was seen sufficient to guarantee self-determination in 
Africa, and there have been very few changes in the decolonization borders since. Only major changes have been the independence of 
Eritrea (1991) and of South Sudan (2011). Still, uti possidetis borders in Africa have been criticized heavily. Davidson goes even 
further in his book, making an intriguing comparison between the crisis of a nation-state in Africa and the socialist federal dissolutions 
in Europe. According to him, in both cases, the main issue is about the imposed political institutions and the predatory leadership that 
governs them. See more in Davidson (n 104). 
596 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 25.  
597 For State practice, see, inter alia, Oral statement by the Federal Republic of Germany, the International Court of Justice Verbatim 
Record, 2 December 2009 at para. 39. 
598 Castellino and Gilbert have argued that, indeed, international law should concentrate its attention in the right to self-determination 
to its internal variant since it can be considered a compromise between minorities and sovereign states (n 554) 175. In addition, the 
internal variant is in accordance with the current emphasis on the territorial integrity of states. Therewith, internal self-determination 
requires an increase in scholarly attention, if not only for its numerous alternatives, in stark contrast with the more axiomatic route of 
decolonization or secession. However, this ‘compromise’ has its complexities, as, according to Castellino and Gilbert, minorities tend 
to view the right to internal self-determination in the same light as the UN mandate or trusteeship system, i.e., as a provisional measure 
towards achieving full political independence and statehood (Ibid. at 175).  
599 M. Pomerance, Law of Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations (Springer, 1982) at 46. 
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4.2 Self-Determination and the National Question in the Yugoslav Context 
4.2.1 The Origins of the National Question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia was one of the several manifestations of the ‘first-round’ of self-determination, which 
was only applicable to the vanquished Central Powers of the First World War.600 The state was 
proclaimed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918. It united the former 
Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with previous Austro-Hungarian holdings of Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a presentation of ‘Yugoslavism’, a shared South Slav identity. Despite 
proclamations of unity, the Kingdom was administrative chaos: in 1918, it had ‘six custom’s areas, 
six legal jurisdictions, five currencies, five railway networks, and three different banking systems’.601 
This first Yugoslav project was from the outset dominated by Serbia.602 For example, the Kingdom 
was ruled by the Serbian royal House of Karađorđević and its capital was the Serbian capital of 
Belgrade. Thus, despite proclamations of being a manifestations of self-determination, the Kingdom 
was constantly weakened by the lack of unity between its peoples. The debates over centralization 
and the ethnic relations dominated the political discourse.603 In sum, the Croats favored a federal 
structure that would ensure the respect of their culture, while the Serbs favored a centralized state.604  
In 1921, Yugoslavia’s first Constitution was promulgated. It created a unitary state, abolishing all the 
pre-Yugoslavian regions and introducing 33 districts (oblast) as the primary administrative units of 
the country.605 Croat discontent rose throughout the 1920s and culminated with the leading Croatian 
opposition party declaring on 1 August 1928 that ‘[w]e do not want to destroy the state, we are not 
going outside of the state’s borders, but within the borders of this state the Croat must be the only 
master on Croatian territory’.606 King Alexander responded on 3 October 1929 by disbanding the 
                                                 
600 Other manifestations included the formation of Czechoslovakia out of the Austro-Hungarian lands of Bohemia, Moravia, Czech 
Silesia, Slovakia, and Sub Carpathian Ruthenia; the formation of dependent Mandate Territories out of the former Ottoman lands; the 
independences of several previously Russian territories including Finland and the Baltic States; and the formation of the USSR with 
(theoretically) high levels of territorial autonomy granted to the peoples of Russia based on the right to self-determination.  
601 L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) at 51. 
602 Mostly due to the having fought on the victorious allied side in the First World War and having suffered horrendous casualties.  
603 Especially between the Serbs and the Croats. The difference between the language of the Serbs and the Croats is a contentious issue 
that has been politicized by both sides. For example, their languages have been described as ‘closely related and mutually intelligible 
as British English and American English’. R. Hayden, ‘Serbian and Croatian Nationalism and the Wars in Yugoslavia’ 19(2) Cultural 
Survival Quarterly Magazine, June 1995. <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/serbian-and-
croatian-nationalism-and-wars-yugoslavia>. More pronounced differences arise from the fact that most of the Croats are Roman 
Catholics while the Serbs are Orthodox Christians, and that the Croats use Latin alphabet while the Serbs use Cyrillic alphabet.  
604 Radan (n 213) 138. ‘Serb politicians rejected federalism on largely practical grounds. Because the Serbs were the most territorially 
dispersed of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations, it would have been impossible to create a Serb federal unit’. Ibid. at 139.  
605 Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, promulgated on 28 June 1921. Art. 95 established the unit of oblast 
and a ministerial degree on 28 April 1922 then divided the country into 33 oblasts.  
606 M. Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928 (Toronto, 2000) at 241.  
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parliament, introducing a dictatorship, and changing the administrative structure from 33 oblasts to 
nine provinces (banovinas) that were named after rivers and were drafted to deliberately cut across 
traditional regions.607 The aim was to suppress nationalism while building national unity, and the state 
was symbolically renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.608 After all of the nationalist parties were 
banned,609 a part of the Croat opposition was radicalized. The former Croatian Deputy Ante Pavelić 
left for exile to start a revolutionary Ustaša organization aiming to bring down the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia and achieving independence for Croatia.  
The Croats continued to oppose the dictatorship and to call for a solution to the ‘Croatian question’ 
by ending the Serb hegemony. In 1934, an assassin working in cooperation with Ustaša assassinated 
King Alexander. The Prince Regent Paul saw the Serb-Croat conflict as the main threat to Yugoslavia 
and was pressured from abroad to resolve these internal problems.610 After several years of 
negotiations, the Serbs and the Croats finally reached an agreement - Sporazum - on 26 August 1939. 
According to Jović, Sporazum was the first step towards the federalization of Yugoslavia, which 
could solve the national question.611 It created an autonomous Banovina of Croatia, encompassing 
the areas of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina and parts of Bosnia. Croatia gained substantial 
autonomy, as only foreign policy, transportation, and other ‘Pan-Kingdom areas of administration’ 
were left for Yugoslavia.612 This angered both the Serb minority in the new Banovina and Ustaša, 
who wanted full independence for an even larger area. In addition, ethnic relations between remained 
tense, as other nationalities envied the preferential treatment of the Croats.613 
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was de facto put to an end in April 1941, when the Axis Powers 
conquered the country. However, Yugoslavia had already been failing as a unitary state. It had been 
unable to find an answer to the national question of how to keep Yugoslavia united without Serb 
hegemony and how to persuade the Croats as the second largest ethnic group to remain in the state. 
While Sporazum had offered a type of a solution, it had not satisfied all the Croats and had alienated 
                                                 
607 R. Donia and J. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (Colombia, 1994) at 129. 
608 Serbo-Croatian word Jugoslavija means the ‘Land of the Southern Slavs’. According to Art. 3 of the 1921 Constitution, the Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes were three tribes of one unified Yugoslav nation, with the official language being ‘Serbo-Croato-Slovenian’. 
609 Radan (n 213) 141.  
610 Especially by the United Kingdom and France, who wanted Yugoslavia to resolve its internal problems in order for it to be able to 
stand up to Nazi Germany. Ibid. at 141. 
611 D. Jović, ‘(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism’ in D. Djokić (ed), Yugoslavism: Histories of a 
Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (London, 2003) 136-156 at 155.  
612 Banovina of Croatia encompassed 30 percent of the area of the whole Kingdom. A. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National 
Identity: A Centuries-Old Dream? (Manchester, 2003) at 50-51. 
613 Accounted for in S. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legimitation, 1918-2005 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2006) at 108.  
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other nationalities, including the Serbs living in the Banovina of Croatia. However, the underground 
Communist Party was determined to solve the question with the Soviet ethnofederal model. 
4.2.2 The Socialist Solution: Ethnofederalism and ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ 
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the Party) was founded in 1919 but was soon banned by the 
authorities. The Party’s national policy was based on the Marxist-Leninist version of the right to self-
determination, which perceived nationalism as something that can divert the masses from economics 
and class struggle.614 By ‘solving’ the national question, the Party could lead the masses back to their 
economic interests. In the conferences of 1924 and 1926, the Party proclaimed that the right to self-
determination including secession belongs to all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, and that the 
Yugoslav state should be dissolved as an ‘imperialist creation’.615 Nevertheless, in the mid-1930s, the 
Party started advocating for the preservation of Yugoslavia in a federal form.616  
After the Axis invasion, the Party announced the ‘People’s Liberation War’ against the occupiers. 
Out of the two liberation movements,617 the communists proclaimed to have the solution to the 
national question and could thus unite the Yugoslav peoples in a common struggle.618 Under an 
organization called Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko 
Veće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ), the Party gathered together several armed 
groupings to conduct a unified armed resistance campaign against the occupying forces and to work 
as a kind of revolutionary parliament to re-organize the state in a federal form.619 On 26 November 
1942 in Bihać, AVNOJ’s first session adopted a principle of a federal state to solve the national 
conflicts that had plagued Yugoslavia. On 29-30 November 1943 in Jajce, AVNOJ’s second session 
proclaimed itself the ‘supreme legislative and executive body of Yugoslavia’, promoted Macedonians 
among the recognized peoples and pledged that the state was to be re-established ‘on a democratic 
federative principle as a state of equal peoples’.620 This was the first instance where a principle called 
                                                 
614 See subchapter 3.1.4. 
615 E. Redžić, Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Second World War (London, 2005) at 209-210. 
616 This was due to the Comintern having started to advocate the preservation of larger political units to counterbalance fascism. G. 
Ognjenović and J. Jozelic (Eds), Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory: Volume Two, Tito’s Yugoslavia, Stories 
Untold (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) at 77. 
617 The other resistance movement was the monarchist, mostly Serb Chetniks organization that fought the Axis forces and Titoist 
Partisans in 1941-1945. The Chetnik movement remained loyal to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s government in exile but was 
abandoned by the Allies when the Partisans’ victory started to seem inevitable in the late stages of the Second World War in Europe. 
More on Chetniks see, for example, Ramet (n 613) 113-162.  
618 There is a parallel here to the Russian Civil War, where the Bolsheviks were able to gain support among the various peoples of 
Russia by proclaiming their right to self-determination. See subchapter 3.2.1. 
619 This first AVNOJ was an assembly of 54 representatives from different sections of the country and was dominated by the Party. G. 
Harmon, War in the Former Yugoslavia: Ethnic Conflict or Power Politics?, A Senior Honors Thesis, Boston College 2007 at 107. 
620 Quoted in Radan (n 213) 145.  
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‘brotherhood and unity’ (bratstvo i jedinstvo) was announced to solve the national question in 
Yugoslavia.621 The aim was to make the Yugoslav peoples recognize that their disunity was insane 
and had led to genocides during the Second World War.622 Therefore, the national question could be 
solved with a federation of equal Yugoslav peoples. After the victory of the communist forces, the 
third AVNOJ was held on 7-9 August 1945 in Belgrade. It convened a Constituent Assembly to 
prepare a new Constitution for the renamed state, the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The first federal Constitution of Yugoslavia was promulgated on 31 January 1946. It was largely 
based on the 1936 Soviet Constitution, most importantly on the principles of ethnofederal divisions 
and democratic centralism.623 The new state held the same area as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,624 but 
now followed the Soviet example of fulfilling the right to self-determination of its various peoples 
through territorial autonomies. Thus, Yugoslavia was divided between six nominally equal Republics 
of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Serbia having 
two provinces with special autonomous status, Kosovo and Vojvodina.625 The Republic’s borders had 
been determined at the AVNOJ meeting on 24 February 1945, and they coincided mostly with the 
nationalist claims of each of the peoples of Yugoslavia.626 They became sacrosanct with Article 12 
of the Constitution, stating they could be altered only with the consent of the Republic in question. 
Just as with their counterparts in the USSR, ethnofederalism was a way for the Yugoslav leaders to 
reconcile nationalist aspirations with an extremely centralized state structure needed for a functioning 
central-planned economy. Especially the nationalist aspirations of the Serbs remained an issue. While 
the other peoples had more-or-less compact areas of settlement, the most numerous Serbs were 
scattered all around Yugoslavia. Eventually, the Serbs accepted their Republic being smaller than it 
was due, but only as long as they remained in one centralized state. While the Party thought that 
ethnofederalism had solved the national question, repeated re-drafting of the Constitution 
                                                 
621 Brotherhood and Unity resembled the official national ideology in the USSR, termed ‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov). 
622 V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford University Press, 2002) at 100. The reference is to 
the notorious massacres of the Serbs by the Croat Ustaša organization in 1941-1945. More on this dark episode of Yugoslavian history 
see, for example, A. Korb, ‘Genocide in Times of Civil War: Popular Attitudes Towards Ustaša Mass Violence, Croatia 1941-1945’ 
in F. Bajohr and A. Löw (Eds), The Holocaust and European Societies: Social Processes and Social Dynamics (Palgrave, 2016) 127-
145.  
623 See subchapter 3.4.  
624 With small additions acquired from Italy in Istria and Dalmatia. 
625 Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (n 241), Art. 2: ‘The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is 
composed of the People’s Republic of Serbia, the People’s Republic of Croatia, the People’s Republic of Slovenia, the People’s 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People’s Republic of Macedonia and the People’s Republic of Montenegro. The People’s 
Republic of Serbia includes the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous Kosovo-Metohijan region’. In effect, Serbia 
had a similar position than the RSFSR had in the USSR, being both the core state of federation and a ‘federation within a federation’.  
626 Radan (n 213) 149-150.  
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demonstrates that it had only changed the question’s content.627 The Yugoslavian national question 
was a political struggle between the Serb aims to centralize the state with only administrative 
divisions and the other people’s attempts to maximize their autonomy in a confederal state. The Party 
leadership tried to balance these differences, with President Tito stating in May 1945 that: 
‘If Bosnia and Herzegovina is equal, if everyone has their federal unit, then we did not divide Serbia, but 
have created happy Serbs in Bosnia, and just the same with Croats and Moslems. It is just an 
administrative division. I do not want in Yugoslavia borders that will separate, I have said it already a 
hundred times that I want borders which will connect our peoples’.628  
Following the Soviet model,629 the eight major national groups in Yugoslavia were put into a 
hierarchy, allegedly based on their progression level towards socialism, and were assigned a rank and 
a territory. The USSR model had four levels of rank, with the highest two being the Soviet Socialist 
Republics (SSRs), and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs). Yugoslavia, with a 
significantly smaller number of inhabitants and peoples, transplanted only the highest two into its 
Constitution: the six Yugoslav ‘nations’ (narodi) were called Socialist Republics (SRs) and were 
legally equivalent to the SSRs, whereas the two ‘nationalities’ (narodnosti) were called Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces (SAPs) and were legally equivalent to ASSRs.630 The Constitution reserved 
                                                 
627 The alleged solution to the national question only postponed the demands of the various peoples to self-determination. Moreover, 
as the Party’s solution to the national question was copied from the USSR, it is not surprising that the socialist federations would face 
the same fragmentation at the same time in the early 1990s. 
628 J. Tito, a speech at the founding congress of the Communist Party of Serbia, 8 May 1945. This reflected the Soviet formulation of 
the subject. For instance, in 1920, the then Commissar of Nationalities Joseph Stalin stated that ‘[a]utonomy means not separation but 
union between the self-governing [...] peoples and the peoples of Russia’. J. Stalin, speech at the Congress of the Peoples of the Terek 
Region, 17 November 1920. 
629 Which, in turn, was based on the socialist nationality theories of Friedrich Engels. F. Engels, ‘To the Editor of the Commonwealth 
(The Commonwealth No. 160, 1866)’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 20 (Moscow, 1985) 155-158 at 157. It seemed, 
although the original theoreticians did not spell it out clearly, that the progressive level of society would be the most important 
determining factor with the nations-nationalities distinction. This view was apparent with the Soviet distinction.  
630 The USSR and the SFRY designation of which peoples were awarded the highest status were decided on a different basis. In the 
USSR, this was done by a combination of the peoples’ ‘progressive level’ towards socialism and geopolitical location. See Chapter 3. 
I am using the term ‘Socialist Autonomous Province’ that was used in the last 1974 Constitution of the SFRY throughout this Chapter 
when referring to the two autonomous provinces, but their titles changed several times during the SFRY era. Kosovo was titled 
‘Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija’ from 1945 to 1963, ‘Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija’ from 1963 to 
1968 and ‘Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo’ from 1968 onwards. Vojvodina was titled ‘Autonomous Province of Vojvodina’ 
from 1945 to 1963 and ‘Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina’ from 1963 onwards.  
While the SAP of Vojvodina had the same status as Kosovo at the time of the dissolution of the SFRY, this dissertation does not focus 
on this unit, since it has a Serb majority, has been satisfied with its role as a part of Serbia and has not demonstrated any separatist 
claims since the dissolution took place. Moreover, Vojvodina’s autonomy in Serbia was restored in 2002. 
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the right to secession to the SRs,631 but without giving any legal formula on how to accomplish this.632 
In addition, many articles in the Constitution seemed to contradict the existence of such a right.633 
The terms ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities’ had special connotations in the socialist national policy, as the 
theory saw nationalism as a passing and mostly negative phenomenon. The issue was even more 
delicate in Yugoslavia due to the experiences of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thus, it was essential 
that no national group felt like a minority under Serb hegemony. The issue with the six nations of 
Yugoslavia was solved by making them ‘in principle equal, so that the Serbs, constituting between 
35 and 40 percent of the country’s population, were considered formally equal with the Montenegrins, 
at less than 3 percent’.634 The discrimination and less autonomous rights awarded to the two other 
ethnic groups, ‘nationalities’, was justified by reference that SAPs had ‘homelands’ outside the 
borders of Yugoslavia.635 Therewith, the Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Albanians in Kosovo were 
not given an SR status, because of the existence of Hungary and Albania, respectively.636  
4.2.3 The 1950s: ‘Yugoslavism’ and the Integration of the World 
While President Tito had proclaimed in 1948 that ethnofederal model had resolved the problem of 
nationalities in Yugoslavia,637 the need to adjust the constitutional arrangement resurfaced about once 
a decade. Moreover, the subsequent constitutional changes were not minor adjustments but reflected 
fundamental internal structural changes.638 Soon after the 1946 Constitution was promulgated, there 
occurred a severe Soviet-Yugoslav split in relations, which had significant ramifications to the 
Yugoslavian politics in general and to the nationality policies in particular.  
                                                 
631 ‘The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people’s state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in 
rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together 
in a federative state’. The 1946 Constitution (n 241), Art. 1(1). 
632 A prominent member of the Party and later the President of the Federal Assembly Moša Pijade commented in 1950 that ‘our 
Constitution contains no clauses which would give the republics the right of secession in the same sense as expressed by Art. 17 of the 
Constitution of the USSR […]. Inasfar as the Constitution has mentioned the right to secession, it is only in connection with the origin 
of the F.N.R.J and not in order to ensure that our republics still have today the right of separation’. Quoted in B. Bagwell, ‘Yugoslavian 
Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of Member Republics’ 21 Georgian Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (1991) 489-523 at 509. 
633 For example, Art. 3(12) of the 1946 Constitution, which stated that the ‘People’s Assembly of the Federative People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia determines the boundaries between the people’s republics’. N 241. 
634 Stokes (n 5) 83. 
635 See subchapter 4.2.2. 
636 Yet, even according to this ideological logic, there is no reason why the Albanians in Macedonia did not receive autonomy. The 
status of the SAPs changed in due time with their alleged ‘progression’ towards socialism. This was apparent by the 1974 Constitution 
giving Kosovo, along with almost all the right vested to the Republics, a new title of ‘Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo’. 
637 J. Tito, ‘Concerning the National Question and Social Patriotism’, speech at Slovene Academy of Arts and Sciences, 26 November 
1948. 
638 Pavković and Radan (n 233) 135-136.  
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As the Party639 was no longer bound by the Soviet dogma, it was able to assert its contribution to the 
socialist national theory. The 1950s was a period of promoting the idea of ‘Yugoslavism’, according 
to which the national differences would rapidly vanish and give away to a more internationalist 
viewpoint. This was reflected in a set of extensive constitutional amendments called Fundamental 
Constitutional Law, on 13 January 1953. The changes included introducing a new revolutionary 
socialist model termed ‘workers self-management’ that gave workers control over some large key-
sector enterprises.640 In relation to the nationalities, the Party started to implement its equally 
revolutionary policy of actively withering away of the state by decentralization. The state power was 
steadily devolved from the federal level to the republic level and from the municipalities to the 
workers’ enterprises. The increase in the status of the SRs and the SAPs was evident in the 
establishment of a Federal People’s Assembly with two houses: a Federal Chamber representing the 
regions and Chamber of Producers representing the workers’ self-management units.641 However, 
despite the changes, Yugoslavia remained a very centralized state, as the calls for Yugoslavism 
countered any claims for enhancing the SRs rights further. As an important writer and later President 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Ćosić, wrote in 1961:  
‘We pronounce ourselves for Yugoslavism […] as a free process by which nations and people grow 
together and unify socialistically, Yugoslavism - as a part of a historically inevitable process of the 
integration of the world and the appearance of socialist civilization on this planet’.642 
4.2.4 The 1960s: De-Centralization 
In 1963, a new Constitution was introduced. It renamed the country the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,643 made ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ one of the guiding principles of the federation,644 
furthered decentralization by delegating more powers to the SRs and the SAPs,645 and strengthened 
the workers’ self-management.646 In the national policy sphere, the 1963 Constitution described 
Yugoslavia as a ‘community of nations’, rejecting the ‘Yugoslavism’ of the previous decade. Since 
                                                 
639 Renamed in 1952 as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije). 
640 The Constitutional Law on the Basics of the Political and Social Organization of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
and of Federal Organs of Authority, promulgated on 13 January 1953, Art. IV, Section 15. 
641 Idib., Art. 2.1.2.1.  
642 Quoted in N. Miller, The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944-1991 (Central 
European University Press, 2007), ‘Chapter 3 Ćosić: Engagement and Disillusionment’ 83-118. Original in D. Ćosić, ‘O savremenom 
nesavremenom nacionalizmu’, Sabrana Dela Vol 8 (1961), 17-46. A similar idea of all the countries uniting into one super-state was 
illustrated in the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (n 399), which stated in its declaratory first part that it was the first step towards ‘the 
union of workers of all countries in one world-wide Socialist Soviet Republic’. For more, see subchapter 3.3.3. 
643 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, promulgated on 7 April 1963, Art. 1. 
644 Ibid. Introductory Part, Basic Principles I and VI. 
645 Ibid. Arts. 190, 191, and 192.  
646 Ibid. Introductory Part, Basic Principle II, and Art. 9. 
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1946, the official theory maintained that by uniting into a Federation, the peoples of Yugoslavia had 
‘used’ their right to self-determination, thereby consummating the right to secession.647 The 1963 
Constitution changed this view drastically, making the possibility of secession conceivable. 
Nevertheless, the 1963 Constitution failed to solve national grievances within the federation. In 1964, 
the Eight Party Congress started a fundamental overhaul of the nationality policies of the SFRY by 
re-opening the national issue, including economic inequalities.648 The Party decided to push for more 
economic decentralization as the process of the central state ‘withering away’ had to be continued.649 
In addition and ideologically significantly, Lenin’s theory that nations would disappear with the 
disappearance of the class society was officially rejected.650 This meant that the national question 
would not go away and that the state would have to address it.  
In 1966, Tito admitted that the national question had been solved only in principle and that ‘material 
and political content needed to be added’.651 According to the Archives of Yugoslavia, the 1964 
Congress started ‘the process of alteration relations between the federal state and republics, resulting 
in a fundamental transformation of the federation. Yugoslavia was built as a “federation of balance” 
[…]. Republican elites started thinking about Yugoslavia as a “transitional” creation. Administrative 
boundaries among republics (formerly described as “veins in marble”) became the boundaries of 
autonomous states’.652  
When combined with the increasing regional imbalances with wealth, the ‘community of nations’ 
approach led to the SR and SAP elites being increasingly orientated towards ‘their’ national unit. As 
Tomić put it, ‘[w]hat apparently seemed a good compromise in dealing with the different national 
interests in Yugoslavia set the legal or formal basis for the later dissolution of the state. The increasing 
                                                 
647 Bagwell (n 632) 509-510. 
648 The SFRY was throughout its history unable to significantly change the socio-economic situation of the country’s geography: those 
SRs that had been under the Austro-Hungary - Slovenia and Croatia - were profoundly more industrialized, both in 1918 and in 1991, 
than the rest. In contrast, Kosovo kept on falling more behind the SRs throughout the existence of the SFRY. See, for example, K. 
Kawczynska, ‘Disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ 2 Przegląd Zachodni (2013) 169-189 at 169-173. 
649 V. Poposvki, ‘Yugoslavia: Politics, Federation, Nation’ in G. Smith (Ed), Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (Routledge, 1995) 
180-207 at 189.  
650 V. Pešić, ‘The War for Ethnic States’ in N. Popov (Ed), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (English ed., CEU Press, 
2000) 9-49 at 20. 
651 Quoted in N. Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Springer, 1996) at 25. 
652 Archives of Yugoslavia, ‘Amendments to the 1963 SFRY Constitution’. 
<http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/amandmani_na_us
tav_iz_1963.html>. 
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federalization of the country strengthened the republics (and autonomous provinces) and, to a certain 
degree, influenced the population’s exclusive orientation to its “own” republic’.653 
At the end of the 1960s, after decades of regular constitutional changes, the Party started to implement 
the decisions of the 1964 Party Congress to solve the national question conclusively. On 18 April 
1967, the first series of amendments decentralized the federation by delegating more power to the 
Council of Nationalities. In August 1967, the SFRY ratified the 1966 Covenants that internationally 
codified self-determination as a legal right. On 26 December 1969, the status of SAPs was expanded 
as they could now implement their ‘sovereign rights’ in their territories, and they were made 
‘essentially equal’ to Serbia.654 Finally, on 30 June 1971, there was the last major set of amendments, 
mostly concerning the self-management system. These amendments contained some significant steps 
towards decentralizing the SFRY and paved the way for the last 1974 Constitution. 
4.2.5 The 1974 Constitution: An Asymmetrical Federation or a Confederation? 
The 1974 Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Commission comprised of both constitutional 
experts and politicians and with a close-to-equal representation of the SRs and the SAPs than in the 
previous constitutional drafting processes.655 In his report of the upcoming Constitution to the 
Chamber of Nationalities on 22 January 1974, the President of the Federal Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Commission Mijalko Todorović linked the success of the socialist self-management 
system to the state of relations among different nationalities in the SFRY.656 This echoed Tito’s 
proclamation that political content needed to be added to the national relations, and the 1974 
Constitution was meant to achieve just that. The basic concept remained the same: the state and its 
laws were withering away, and the Constitution would only legislate a transitionary period.657 
Notwithstanding, nations were not withering away, so there was a need to continue to legislate their 
reciprocal relations and power-sharing. Moreover, the SFRY was now part of several international 
                                                 
653 D. Tomić, ‘From “Yugoslavism” to (Post-) Yugoslav Nationalisms: Understanding Yugoslav Identities’ in R. Vogt, W. Cristaudo 
and A. Leutzsch (Eds), European National Identities: Elements, Transitions, Conflicts (Routledge, 2014) 271-292 at 276. 
654 Archives of Yugoslavia, ‘Amendments to the 1963 SFRY Constitution’. 
655 M. Accetto, ‘On Law and Politics in the Federal Balance: Lessons from Yugoslavia’ 32(2) Review of Central and East European 
Law (2007) 191-231 at 202. 
656 ‘The close dialectical interconnection of the solution of the relations and status of the working class in associated labor and in the 
system of political relations and of the self-management solution of relation among the nationalities has been confirmed’. M. Todorović, 
Report on the Final Draft of the SFRY Constitution, President of the Federal Assembly and Chairman of the Joint Constitutional 
Commission of all the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, made at the session of the Chamber of Nationalities on 22 January 1974. 
657 Bagwell (n 632) 498. 
123 
 
instruments that were calling for actual measures to support the right to self-determination. The 1974 
Constitution was a great leap forward in this regard. Indeed, Basic Principle I stated that: 
‘The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including 
the right to secession […] have together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal 
republic of free and equal nations and nationalities […]. The working people and the nations and 
nationalities shall exercise their sovereign rights in the Socialist Republics, and in the Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces in conformity with their constitutional rights’. 658 
The process of delegating power from the federal government to the member-republics (and, to a 
lesser extent, from the republic governments to the people themselves) was brought to an entirely 
new level. Indeed, the SFRY after 1974 could be described either as a weak asymmetrical federation 
or as a strong asymmetrical confederation. One traditional description of the difference between a 
federation and a confederation is that in a federation, the governing body can enact binding laws to 
all its members.659 The SFRY could indeed enact binding legislation, but the Constitution added a 
confederal element by introducing the principle of ‘consensus in decision-making’, which amounted 
to giving the SRs and even the SAPs a virtual veto right to all federal legislation.660 Rycerska has 
argued that this resulted in the federal authorities not being sovereign in respect to its constitutive 
parts and citizens, making it impossible to call the state a federation.661  
The changes relating to self-determination since 1963 included the SFRY signing the 1966 Covenants 
and voting in favor of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, both of which affected the self-
determination provisions of the 1974 Constitution.662 According to the 1974 Constitution’s Basic 
Principles VII, in order for the SFRY to fulfill the principles of the UN Charter it will strive ‘for the 
right of nations to self-determination and national independence’, ‘for respect for the rights of national 
                                                 
658 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Basic Principles I. 
659 G. Ahrne and N. Brunsson, Meta-Organizations (Edward Elgar, 2008) at 13. 
660 Archives of Yugoslavia, ‘The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, February 21, 1974’. 
The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Art. 294 states that ‘[i]f a bill, draft regulation or draft enactment or any other issue concerning 
the general interests of a Republic or Autonomous Province, or the equality of the nations and nationalities is on the agenda of the 
Federal Chamber, and if so requested by the majority of delegates from one Republic or Autonomous Province, resort shall be made 
to a special procedure to consider and adopt such a bill, draft enactment or issue’. The special procedure would then require that all 
SRs and SAPs reach a common position, or the bill would be rejected.  
661 Quoted in Kawczynska (n 648) 172, original in I. Rycerska, Rozpad Jugosławii. Przyczyny i przebieg (Kielce, 2003) at 14. 
662 The SFRY signed international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 8 August 1967 and ratified it on 2 June 1971. 
Art. 1(3) of the Covenant states that the state parties ‘shall promote the realization of the right to self-determination, and shall respect 
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’. 
Friendly Relations Declaration (n 88) states that ‘[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence’ and ‘[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. 
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter’. 
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minorities’ and ‘for international support for peoples waging a just struggle for their national 
independence and liberation from imperialism, colonialism and all other forms of national oppression 
and subjugation’. As the SFRY had promised to advance the cause of self-determination abroad, it 
was intrinsically guaranteed for all the peoples of Yugoslavia on several clauses of the Constitution.  
The 1974 Constitution made the SAPs constituent units of the SFRY, with their legal position no 
longer exclusively a matter of the Serbian Constitution. The SAPs could forge direct links with federal 
authorities bypassing the Serbian authorities, which gave them a ‘de facto republican status’.663 They 
gained a right to have their Constitution, assemblies, and executive councils, with ‘no vertical 
superiority or subordination’ between their organs and those of the SR Serbia.664 For example, the 
Kosovo Assembly was the highest authority in the Kosovo SAP, with the power to change the SAP 
Constitution and veto changes to the Constitutions of the SFRY or Serbia that would have affected 
its legal position. In addition, the Kosovo Assembly had the power to issue laws and budgets and to 
appoint and recall presidents, judges, and high officials in the province. Finally, the SAPs gained the 
same right to territory as the SRs, which could no longer be altered without their consent.665  
To summarize, while the Constitution retained some asymmetry between the SRs and SAPs, the line 
was blurred considerably with references to the SAPs ‘sovereign rights’666 and equal ability to 
introduce bills for all-Union laws.667 Their representative ratio also improved in the main legislative 
body, with the Federal Chamber having 30 representatives from each SR and 20 from each SAP.668 
The Constitutional Court of the SFRY had two judges from each SR and one from each SAP. Finally, 
in the highest authority - the SFRY Presidium - the SRs and the SAPs both had one representative.  
                                                 
663 According to Pavlović in M. Pavlović, ‘Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974-1990’ in C. Ingrao and T. Emmert, Confronting the Yugoslav 
Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (Purdue, 2013) 48-80 at 16. 
664 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Governments of Kosovo (Request for an Advisory Opinion), Written Comments of the Republic of Slovenia on Other Written 
Statements, 17 July 2009 at 30. 
665 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Art. 5. As summarized in the Written Comments of Slovenia, ‘[a]t the federal level, 
autonomous provinces were equal to republics also with regard to decision making powers on the following main issues: Republics 
and autonomous provinces took decisions on amendments to the SFRY Constitution on an equal footing (Arts. 398-402 of the SFRY 
Constitution), meaning the consent of autonomous provinces was required for the adoption of an amendment to the SFRY Constitution; 
Federal bodies decided on laws and other issues stipulated by the Constitution (Arts. 398-402 of the SFRY Constitution and amendment 
No. 40) on the basis of the agreement of republic and provincial assemblies; The Federation concluded certain treaties in agreement 
with the competent republic or provincial bodies (Art. 271 of the SFRY Constitution); Republics and autonomous provinces cooperated 
with foreign bodies, organisations and international organisations (amendment No. 36 to the SFRY Constitution); Republics and 
autonomous provinces could request a special decision-making procedure in the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly (Art. 294 of 
the SFRY Constitution)’. Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 10. 
666 Ibid. Art. 4. 
667 Ibid. Art. 293. 
668 The secondary body (Chamber of Republics and Provinces) had 12 from each SR and eight from each SAP. Ibid. Arts. 291 and 292. 
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Many scholars have pointed out that many articles of the 1974 Constitution treat the SAPs in practice 
as equal to the SRs.669 Confusingly, the SRs were described as ‘states based on the sovereignty of the 
people’ whereas the SAPs were described as ‘autonomous socialist self-managing communities based 
on the power of and self-management by the working class’.670 Thus, seemingly the powers that the 
Constitution invested upon them had a different basis: for the SRs, it was the ‘sovereignty of the 
people’,671 which was not mentioned in Article 4 that concerns the ‘autonomous socialist self-
managing communities’ of the SAPs.672 That being said, Article 4 continued to state that the nations 
and nationalities of Kosovo realize their ‘sovereign rights’ in the province. A leading Yugoslav 
constitutional lawyer Dr. Jovan Mirić argued that the Constitution contained confederal elements and 
that ‘under Article 4 of the SFRY Constitution, the socialist autonomous province is not only 
autonomous, but even sovereign: it is the locus of the exercise of the sovereign rights of the working 
people and citizens and of the nationalities and ethnic minorities’.673 
The 1974 Constitution of Serbian SR reaffirmed the equality of the nations and nationalities in Serbia: 
‘In the Socialist Republic of Serbia the nations and nationalities shall be equal. Every nationality shall be 
guaranteed the freedom to use its language and alphabet, develop its culture and establish organizations, 
and enjoy other constitutional rights in the exercise of its right to express its nationality and culture’.674 
The 1974 Constitution of the SAP of Kosovo stated that: 
‘The Socialist Autonomous province of Kosovo […] proceeding from the freely expressed will of the 
population - the nations and nationalities of Kosovo and the freely expressed will of the people of Serbia, 
has associated itself with the Socialist Republic of Serbia within the framework of the SFRY’.675 
The conditionality of the association of Kosovo with Serbia only within the federal framework was 
an early indication of the troubles ahead if the existence of the SFRY was called into question.  
                                                 
669 For instance, Arts. 1 and 3. See, for example, Pavlović (n 663) 65; and S. Woehrel, ‘Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current 
Conflict’, CRS Report for Congress, 3 June 1999, at 4. 
670 Ibid. Arts. 3 and 4. 
671 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Art. 3. 
672 Ibid. Art. 4. 
673 Quoted in East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 20 December 
1984 at 97. 
674 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, promulgated on 25 February 1974, Art. 145.  
675 Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (1974), Art. 1, Official Gazette of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, 
No. 4/1974, italics mine. In addition, the Constitution of the SAP Kosovo does refer to the ‘sovereign rights’ of the nations and 
nationalities of Kosovo, in Basic Principles I(3) and Art. 2. 
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4.2.6 The 1974 Constitution and Uti Possidetis Juris 
Being the last federal Constitution, the 1974 Constitution was paramount in establishing the rights of 
the ethnofederal units at the moment of the dissolution of the SFRY.676 There is a general view among 
states that the constitutional arrangements ‘reflect the wishes of the people and thus satisfy self-
determination’.677 This is due to the fundamental principle of sovereignty of states - the freedom to 
choose their political, social, economic, and cultural system.678 Consequently, I start with the premise 
that the 1974 Constitution was the legal basis for any arguments on national rights since it reflected 
both the self-determination of peoples in the SFRY, as well as the international obligations of the 
SFRY. While international law and internal law work on different levels, when uti possidetis is being 
applied, international law has to rely on the constitution of the previous sovereign to establish borders. 
When the SFRY dissolved, the successor states were recognized according to their former 
administrative borders designated to them by this Constitution. Therewith, it is essential to understand 
what the last applicable Constitution had awarded for Kosovo.  
According to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the distinction between nations and nationalities is a 
result from their differing level of progression. Significantly, the 1974 SFRY Constitution gave 
Kosovo a clear promotion by simultaneously increasing its autonomous rights and awarding it the 
prefix ‘socialist’, making the province officially the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. This 
was an explicit recognition of Kosovo’s progression towards socialism under the SFRY.  
While the SFRY distinction between nations and nationalities seems artificial and subjective, the 
utilization of uti possidetis has to be based on the legislative acts of the previous sovereign, and its 
constitutional matters are within the internal competence of the state. Thus, uti possidetis grants 
international legal effects to the state’s internal legislation without questioning its content. This 
content provided a legal distinction between the nations (SRs) and the nationalities (SAPs). However, 
the factual content of this distinction was vague and mostly limited to the SRs having slightly elevated 
                                                 
676 There were no major changes to this Constitution, but two rounds of amendments occurred. First took place on 3 July 1981, which 
regulated the self-management system and the term-limits to the SFRY presidency (as the President-for-life Tito had died a year 
previously). The second round took place on 25 November 1988, where some free-market reforms took place, and the federation gained 
a few additional legislative rights, but the veto right was preserved. Archives of Yugoslavia, ‘The Constitution of the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, February 21, 1974’. 
<http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/amandmani_na_us
tav_iz_1974.html>. 
677 J. Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 187. 
678 T. Franck, R. Higgins, A. Pellet, M. Shaw and C. Tomuschat, The Territorial Integrity of Quebec in the Event of the Attainment of 
Sovereignty (Québec's Ministère des relations internationales, 1992) at 2.3. 
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representation in the federal bodies and a theoretical right to secession.679 Otherwise, in most cases, 
the SAPs were both treated and designated as being equal with the SRs.  
The ethnofederal system used in the USSR and the SFRY had produced a unique understanding of 
sovereignty and self-determination based on merit and possibilities of upgrading or downgrading 
one’s status. Throughout the years, Kosovo had fought a long campaign to obtain the SR status. The 
SAP’s hoped were partially fulfilled with the 1974 Constitution. Nevertheless, the system needed the 
guarantees of the federal center and proved to be only as everlasting as the central government. The 
ethnofederal model collapsed conjointly with the governing institutions of the SFRY. 
The 1974 Constitution, in essence, froze the constitutional situation in place until the dissolution of 
the SFRY in 1991-1992. As all the SRs and the SAPs had the right to veto any constitutional changes, 
Serbia was unable to make constitutional alterations to the SAPs’ autonomy in the SFRY 
Constitution. While it made changes to its SR Constitution and abolished the autonomies of the two 
SAPs, these were unconstitutional acts without legal relevance to the application of uti possidetis 
juris.680 Thus, in late 1991 Kosovo’s legal position was still regulated by the 1974 SFRY Constitution, 
which confirmed its substantial internal self-rule and equality with the ‘nations’ of Yugoslavia.681 
4.2.7 The Endgame of Yugoslavia: Disintegration of the Federal and Party Structures, 1987-
1990 
While the 1974 Constitution eased the tensions between the nations and nationalities, the 
confederating tendencies had an unintended consequence of pushing the national elites of the SRs 
and the SAPs to defend the rights of ‘their’ units against the other constituent elements and the federal 
center. The economic differences between the units were becoming more and more pronounced.682 
In 1978, the aging President-for-life Tito lamented the lack of national unity in the SFRY and in the 
Party: ‘There is no Yugoslavia… There is no party any more’.683 After his death in 1980, the SFRY 
                                                 
679 This was due to the SAPs already having ‘homelands’ outside the SFRY. See subchapter 4.2.2. 
680 This is due to uti possidetis freezing the legal boundaries at the moment of the dissolution. As Serbia’s constitutional changes were 
not in accordance with the SFRY constitutional system, they were not legal acts and do not produce legal ramifications for the 
application of uti possidetis. See subchapter 4.4.  
681 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Preamble I, and Arts. 1 and 4.  
682 Slovenia, Croatia, and the SAP of Vojvodina were growing strongly and converging towards the Western European levels, whereas 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo performed poorly. L. Kukić, ‘Regional Development Under Socialism: Evidence From Yugoslavia’, 
267 Economic History Working Papers (London School of Economics, 2017) at 7. 
683 J. Ridley, Tito, A Biography (London, 1994) at 409.  
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Presidium started a system of a rotating one-year term presidency among the eight SR and SAP 
representatives. Without a strong leader, real power in the SFRY shifted to the ethnofederal level.684 
In March 1981, massive demonstrations demanding a SR status and economic equality took place in 
Kosovo. The SFRY leadership decided to blame the regional leaders for not being strict enough 
against nationalism.685 However, they were in denial about the real problems facing Kosovo, namely 
rising poverty, unemployment, and worsening relations between the Albanians and the Serbs.686 
Simultaneously, the economic situation was deteriorating across the federation, with personal 
incomes declining and governmental debt from International Monetary Fund rising drastically.687 
Anna Orford has described in her work how the international financial institutions, in effect, 
restructured Yugoslavia by imposing cuts in wages and services in exchange for loans.688 This put 
the national relations under severe strain as the wealthier Slovenia and Croatia were becoming 
increasingly unwilling to pay donations for the less developed parts of the federation.689 Pressures for 
democratization grew, and some politicians were gathering public support with nationalist rhetoric.690 
In the late 1980s, nationalist parties had been formed in all the SRs and the SAPs.  
The final breakup of the SFRY began in Serbia. First, in late 1987 a strife developed within the 
Serbian Communist Party between those who advocated Yugoslavia’s restructuring under Serb 
dominance and those who clung to the Titoist concept of a multinational SFRY.691 The former policy 
line, championed by the Serbian Party leader Slobodan Milošević, won the vote, and the advocates 
of the latter line were forced to resign.692 Following, in the summer of 1988, Milošević launched an 
‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’, a wave of popular mobilization that rallied the Serbs around him as 
a national leader. The aim was to take over the SFRY by replacing important federal officials - 
                                                 
684 A. Wachtel and C. Bennett, ‘The Dissolution of Yugoslavia’ in C. Ingrao and T. Emmert, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: 
A Scholars’ Initiative (Purdue, 2013) 13-47 at 28. 
685 Pavlović (n 663) 60. 
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129 
 
‘bureaucrats’ - with Milošević’ supporters. The main targets were the leaders of the SR of 
Montenegro and the SAPs of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The SFRY federal government proved to be 
unable to respond to such an intense assault on its authority, and the Party decided to sacrifice the 
SAPs.693 In the absence of support from the federal authorities, after a series of mass demonstrations, 
a great number of high SFRY officials left office.694 The government of Vojvodina resigned in 
October 1988, followed by the governments of Kosovo (November 1988) and of Montenegro 
(January 1989). This gave Milošević control over four out of eight votes in the SFRY Presidium and 
an opportunity to start pushing for the recentralization of the SFRY. 
In November 1988, the last major federal legal act of the SFRY took place as a set of constitutional 
amendments were promulgated. In the lack of any consensus on the future relationship between the 
federal units, the amendments dealt mostly with limited free-market reforms. While virtually all 
representatives agreed that a new constitution would be needed,695 they had quite contrary positions 
over the content of the new constitutional arrangement. The rhetoric against ‘Serb domination’ was 
hardening among the Slovenian and Croatian leaderships who advocated a very loose confederation 
and who had started even to contemplate secession from the SFRY.696 Milošević, by now an 
unchallenged leader of Serbia, stated that such secessions would be impossible until border changes 
were negotiated so that the Serb-populated areas could remain within the SFRY.697  
In this atmosphere of distrust, all the SRs and the SAPs were supposed to make amendments to their 
Constitutions to reflect the 1988 SFRY constitutional amendments. Some SRs chose to use this 
opportunity to push through their agendas. Slovenian and Croatian amendments added articles on 
their ‘self-determination’, ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘right to secession’.698 Slovenia was justifying these 
additions due to the right to self-determination as provided in the 1966 Covenants which the SFRY 
had signed and Article 210 of the 1974 Constitution which states that ‘international treaties which 
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have been promulgated shall be directly applied by courts of law’, thus becoming legally binding 
internally without a need to have a separate federal law on the matter.699 Serbian amendments started 
the process of abolishing the autonomies of the SAPs in the SR level, for example, by taking away 
their veto right over changes in the Serbian SR Constitution and giving the Serbian Constitutional 
Court vertical superiority over the Kosovo Constitutional Court.700 The Kosovo Assembly was forced 
to give its consent to the changes during a proclaimed state of emergency, and due to a boycott without 
legally required two-thirds of a majority. When the Kosovo Assembly further protested the 
amendments, Serbia dissolved it all together and assumed its functions.701 The process for dismantling 
the autonomous structures of Kosovo was continued with series of measures and laws in the summer 
of 1990: Albanian language broadcasting on TV and radio was suspended,702 and teaching in 
Albanian was banned.703 Finally, the process reached a conclusion on 28 September 1990 with a new 
Serbian SR Constitution which, in effect, terminated what remained of the autonomy of the SAPs.704  
The unconstitutional nature of the Serb actions cannot be overstated, as this is a critical element in 
the application of uti possidetis. The abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy was contrary to the 1974 
SFRY Constitution,705 violated several individual federal laws,706 and the principle of vacatio legis.707 
The assumption of the Kosovo Assembly’s functions had no basis in the 1974 SFRY Constitution as 
the Kosovo Assembly was not in any kind of a subordinate position to the Serbian Assembly. Thus, 
the abolishment process of Kosovo’s autonomy should be seen as illegal and invalid in its entirety, 
                                                 
699 Hayden (n 487) 15-16. 
700 There were four critical amendments. Amendment 29 made certain provisions of the SAPs’ Constitutions not applicable if the 
assembly of the SAP did not harmonize such provisions within one year. Amendment 33 considerably weakened the status of the SAPs 
in relation to passing laws relating to legislation applicable thought out the SR Serbia. Amendment 44 stipulated that the Serbian 
Constitutional Court could begin to decide on certain matters without the Kosovo Constitutional Court having yet concluded its 
proceedings on the matter. Amendment 47 abolished Art. 427 of the Constitution of Serbia, which stated that Serbia decided on its 
constitutional amendments based on an agreement with the SAP assemblies, which now could only give ‘opinions’. However, the 
SAPs retained a right to give their consent to amendments of the SFRY Constitution, which the Serbian amendments were breaking. 
701 D. Janjic, A. Lalaj and B. Pula, ‘Kosovo under the Milošević Regime’ in C. Ingrao and T. Emmert, Confronting the Yugoslav 
Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (Purdue, 2013) 273-301 at 279. 
702 A. March and R. Sil, ‘The “Republic of Kosova” (1989-1998) and the Resolution of Ethno-Separatist Conflict: Rethinking 
“Sovereignty” in the Post-Cold War Era’, CIAO Working Papers (Pennsylvania, 1999) at 5. 
703 M. Sommers and P. Buckland, Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo (International Institute for Educational 
Planning, 2004) at 41. 
704 March and Sil (n 702) 5. 
705 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Arts 2 and 5. 
706 For example, Law on the Foundations of State Administration and Federal Executive Council, Law on General Administrative 
Procedure, and Law on Administrative Disputes. Summarized in Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 20. 
707 The principle of vacatio legis requires that a certain time limit must elapse from the date of the promulgation of the law until its 
entry into force. For example, three legal acts by Serbia were adopted, published, and entered into force on 26 June 1990. Ibid. at 23. 
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and will not affect the utilization of uti possidetis, which is based on the last legal order at the moment 
of the dissolution.708  
The escalation continued, with the members of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly issuing a Declaration 
of Independence on 2 July 1990. Technically, the declaration was not of independence from the SFRY 
but from Serbia, and it demanded that Kosovo be recognized as one of the SRs of the restructured 
SFRY.709 The politicians in Kosovo were split between ‘legalists’ and ‘anti-legalists’. Both groups 
advocated for independence and self-determination for Kosovo. However, the former sought this on 
the basis of autonomy as portrayed in the 1974 Constitution. In contrast, the latter claimed this 
approach would only result in Kosovo remaining under a new Yugoslavia or Serbia and, thus, 
advocated for unilateral radical action.710  
As the federal center remained passive, the Constitutional Court tried to intervene against obvious 
distortions of the 1974 Constitution.711 It concluded that all the SRs except Montenegro had violated 
the Constitution with their 1988-1989 amendments.712 While the Court could only give its ‘opinion’ 
on the matter, it activated the SFRY Federal Assembly. On 27 March 1990, the Assembly passed a 
resolution that unequivocally demanded that the SRs change their Constitutions accordingly within 
three months.713 None of them did, as the SFRY was becoming increasingly paralyzed. 
The 14th Party Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade from 20 
to 22 January 1990. It convened under a growing crisis that was putting the very survival of the 
federation at stake. On the third day and before the Congress had reached any substantial decisions, 
the Slovenian delegation called for democratic reforms, including multi-party elections, appealed for 
a peaceful resolution of the unrest in Kosovo, and proposed reforming the Party as an association of 
                                                 
708 I.e., the last legal order of the dissolved federal entity, not the legal order of the subordinate SR of Serbia.  
709 Tierney (n 296) 269. 
710 S. Maliqi, ‘Why the Peaceful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed’ in R. Hudson and G. Bowman (Eds), After Yugoslavia: 
Identities and Politics within the Successor States (Palgrave, 2012) 43-76 at 55-56. 
In 1993, a somewhat similar situation developed in the former SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An area in the North-West of the country 
led by Fikret Abdić proclaimed the establishment of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia on 27 September 1993. It did not 
seek secession, but recognition as a separate administrative unit within Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, on 26 July 1995 the leaders of 
the Autonomous Province transformed the autonomy movements into a push for secession by proclaiming independence. The 
Autonomous Province was put to an end after a successful military operation by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 August 1995.  
711 Unlike in the Soviet system, in the SFRY, the decisions of the SRs could be challenged by the Constitutional Court. 
712 With other SRs, the violations were mainly technical, but with Slovenia, the Court held that the references to the unilateral right to 
secession were unconstitutional. Interestingly, while the Court did criticize Serbia on many grounds, it did not hold the abolishment of 
the SAPs autonomies to be unconstitutional.  
713 Trbovich (n 282) 177. 
132 
 
fully autonomous political parties.714 Milošević and his allies blocked all these proposals. The 
Slovenian delegation walked out, followed by the Croatian delegation. The Chair of the meeting 
called for an adjournment for the following day, but the Congress was never recalled. With this 
failure, all illusions about the Party’s unity or ability to overcome the crisis were dispelled.715 All the 
subsequent initiatives to create a new, all-Yugoslav political Party failed and the League of 
Communists disintegrated into eight factions, renamed as social democrat or socialist parties.  
While the disintegration of the Party precluded federal elections, the first free elections of the SFRY 
era were held on the ethnofederal level. In the atmosphere of ethnic tensions, nationalist parties or 
coalitions won in each SR and SAP, enhancing the SFRY fragmentation.716 On 23 December 1990, 
Slovenia held a referendum with overwhelming support for independence.717 Soon afterwards, Serbia, 
Slovenia, and Croatia promulgated new SR Constitutions, with Slovenia and Croatia giving 
themselves a unilateral right to secede if the SFRY could not be restructured on a confederal basis.718  
The only common nominator remaining for the SRs and SAPs was the collective presidency. On 21 
December 1990, the SFRY Presidium conceded that nations in the SFRY are sovereign and have a 
right to self-determination and secession.719 Nevertheless, it held the view that secession could not be 
a unilateral act as that ignores other nations’ interests and that Slovenia and Croatia should negotiate 
with the other SRs on the future of the SFRY.720 However, in May 1991, Serbia blocked the 
installation of the Croatian candidate for the rotating presidency, which led to the dissolution of 
Presidium.721 With Serbia now in de facto control of all the remaining federal organs, Slovenia and 
                                                 
714 L. Centrih, ‘The Road to Collapse: The Demise of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’, Research Paper Series of Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe No 2 (2014) at 4. 
715 Accounted for in detail in Pauković (n 192) 21-33. 
716 According to Hayden, these elections ‘set the stage for the civil war that broke out in summer and fall 1991’. R. Hayden, 
‘Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics’ 51(4) Slavic Review (1992) 654-673 at 654.  
717 With 93,2% turnout, independence was supported by 88,2% of the voters. D. Jović, ‘The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal: 
A Tactical Move or an Ultimate Solution?’ in L. Cohen and J. Dragović-Soso (Eds), State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New 
Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Purdue, 2008) 249-280 at 274. 
718 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, adopted on 24 December 1990, Art. 135; Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, adopted 
on 23 December 1990, Amendment 99. 
719 R. Iglar, ‘The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia’s and Croatia’s Right 
to Secede’ 15(1) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (1992) 213-239 at 219. 
720 To this end, the SFRY Presidium had presented the SFRY Federal Assembly a document entitled ‘Concept for the Constitutional 
Structure of Yugoslavia on Federal Basis’, to be used as a draft for future constitutional reform. The document did concede the right 
to secession in accordance with procedures to be set out in the federal Constitution. I. Primoratz and A. Pavković (Eds), Identity, Self-
Determination and Secession (Ashgate, 2006) at 159. 
721 Busky (n 193) 36.  
Already in March 1991, Milošević had declared that ‘Yugoslavia does not exist anymore’. Carter et al. (n 231) 246. 
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Croatia decided to stop interacting with the SFRY institutions and pursue their independencies 
unilaterally, despite Milošević’ threats of use of force. 
4.3 External Intervention: The EC Declarations, The Hague Peace Conference, 
and the Badinter Commission Opinions 
4.3.1 The Right to Self-Determination as Portrayed by the EC in 1991 
In the summer of 1991, Prime Minister of the SFRY Ante Marković admitted that the SFRY would 
be unable to solve its internal conflicts alone and pleaded for proposals for a peaceful solution from 
the EC and other international organizations.722 After receiving support from the US and the USSR, 
the EC took a leading role in the mediation efforts.723 However, the EC member states had difficulties 
in formulating a comprehensive stance towards the SRs’ right to self-determination and the SFRY’s 
right to territorial integrity. Already on 19 December 1990, the EC foreign ministers had taken notice 
on the situation in the SFRY and had demanded respect for human rights, democratic principles, 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and the interests of the republics.724 On 13 March 1991, the 
European Parliament declared in a resolution that ‘the constituent republics and autonomous 
provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own future in a peaceful and 
democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal borders’.725 Yet, on their 
9 April 1991 meeting, the EC was demanding the preservation of territorial integrity of the SFRY.726 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) likewise promoted the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia at a ministerial meeting on 19-20 June.727 
The EC’s wariness towards recognizing unilateral secessions is understandable.728 Secession remains 
a very disorganized and disputed area of international law because it entails two contradictory but 
fundamental principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. Currently, 
international law does not grant sub-state entities a general right to secede, but neither does it prohibit 
secession.729 Some scholars argue that the ‘right’ to territorial integrity, in fact, only protects 
                                                 
722 Bagwell (n 632) 494. 
723 See subchapter 2.5.2. 
724 Ministerial Meeting Between the European Community, Its Member States and the Courtiers of the European Free Trade 
Association, Brussels, 19 December 1990.  
725 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Yugoslavia’, 13 March 1991.  
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international (external) borders of the state, and the matter of secession is purely an internal affair.730 
A growing number argues for a ‘remedial right’ to secession in the cases where there are extreme 
persecutions of a minority in a state,731 but the state practice does not support the right to remedial 
secession and states are wary of endorsing such a general legal right.732 Additionally, although the 
1974 Constitution did contain a constitutionally guaranteed right to secession for the SRs,733 the EC 
did not feel competent to interpret the SFRY Constitution.734 Notwithstanding, by the summer of 
1991, there was an urgent need for a reaction as violence seemed imminent.  
After supporting referendums, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence unilaterally on 25 June 
1991.735 At first, the EC and the OSCE chose to deny recognition because of the fear of a Yugoslav 
civil war.736 Instead, the foreign ministers of the EC troika were sent to act as mediators. This 
produced Brioni Agreement on 7 July 1991, which called for a three-month moratorium on the 
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independencies.737 Despite these efforts, the civil war broke out soon after.738 Next, at the meeting 
held in Brussels on 27 August 1991, the EC decided to convene a peace conference in The Hague.739  
4.3.2 The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 
The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (also known as International Conference for Peace in 
Yugoslavia, hereinafter the Conference) was convening from 7 September to 5 November 1991 and 
gathered the representatives of all the SRs and the head of the SFRY Presidium Stipe Mesić.740 In the 
Conference, Mesić affirmed that all Yugoslav regions had the right to self-determination, including 
the right to secession.741 However, Chairman Lord Carrington insisted that the international 
community should not recognize any state independent until a mutually acceptable solution had been 
found. In addition, the USSR President Gorbachev showed his political support to the Conference by 
inviting Serbian President Milošević and Croatian President Tuđman to Moscow, where he tried to 
reason with them to renounce the use of force. Moreover, Gorbachev said that he believed that the 
war between Serbia and Croatia ‘mirrored the horrors’ that were possible in the USSR.742 Milošević 
and Tuđman then promised to work with the Conference to end the fighting. 
In the opening ceremony, the participants of the Conference issued a joint statement declaring as their 
mission ‘to reestablish peace for all in Yugoslavia and to achieve lasting solutions which respect all 
legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations’.743 On 6 October, the EC issued a declaration stating 
that ‘[t]he right to self-determination of all peoples of Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation 
from the interests and rights of ethnic minorities within the individual Republics’.744 On 18 October 
1991, the Conference produced a Draft Convention that proposed independence for all the SRs 
wishing for it within their internal borders, with comprehensive guarantees for safeguarding human 
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rights of ethnic and national groups that would become minorities.745 Thus, the SFRY would 
recognize the independencies of the SRs wanting to secede in exchange for minority right guarantees. 
The Draft was signed by all the SRs but Serbia.746  
After the failure of the Draft Convention, the Conference shifted its focus on establishing conditions 
for recognizing unilateral independencies from the SFRY. These conditions mostly concerned about 
human rights and the rights of national and ethnic groups.747 The next two Drafts tried to re-establish 
the SAPs autonomy by demanding that the ‘republics shall apply fully and in good faith the provisions 
existing prior to 1990 for autonomous provinces’.748 The Conference also established a ‘Special 
Group’ focusing on Kosovo, but which reached no tangible results.749 
On 28 October, the EC issued a Declaration where they noted the uncompromising attitude of Serbia 
and affirmed that the SFRY situation can only be solved through the principles in the Draft 
Conventions and that the principles of no unilateral change of borders and protection of human and 
minority rights are ‘universal, objective standards, which leave no room for compromise’. Finally, 
they stated that if Serbia would continue its non-cooperative stance, the EC ‘will proceed with the 
cooperative republics to obtain a political solution, in the perspective of recognition of the 
independence of those republics wishing it’.750 
On 4 November 1991, the last Draft Convention was published. It reaffirmed the applicability of the 
1966 Covenants, the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris (1990), and the minority rights 
as enshrined in, inter alia, the Convention of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the CSCE 
meeting of experts in Geneva.751 Moreover, it guaranteed for any group ‘forming a substantial 
percentage of the population in the Republic’ a ‘general right of participation in public affairs, 
including participation in the government of the Republics concerning their affairs’.752 Finally, it 
demanded a special status of autonomy for special minority areas - such as Kosovo - under which 
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they were to have their national emblems, legislative bodies, regional police forces, and judiciaries, 
accompanied with a demilitarized status.753 Moreover, the provisions for autonomy would be 
subjected to international monitoring.754 After Serbia rejected the Draft, the Conference was brought 
to an end in its last plenary session on 5 November 1991.755  
In the end, as the Conference was unable to reach a compromise solution and the EC member states 
were divided over the recognition policy, they decided to delegate the issue to the independent 
arbitration commission, and an arbitration procedure was established to accomplish legal settlement 
for the SFRY crisis.756 This procedure gained a form of an Arbitration Commission of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission) to act as a legal advisor for the EC.757  
4.3.3 The Badinter Commission Opinions 
As the Badinter Commission was meant to offer a federal solution to the impasse, the arbitrators 
appointed by the EC were not international but constitutional lawyers.758 However, after the political 
situation further deteriorated, the Badinter Commission became under significant pressure to establish 
rules according to which unilateral independencies could be legitimately recognized.759 As the SFRY 
was increasingly seen as a dissolving entity, the main question was who had the right to self-
determination in Yugoslavia. The SRs of Slovenia and Croatia were advocating for this ‘unqualified’ 
right belonging to all the SRs. Serbia and Montenegro - claiming to speak on behalf of the SFRY - 
claimed that the right belonged to the six ‘nations’ of Yugoslavia and that the internal administrative 
borders did not correspond with the location of peoples. Kosovo argued that the 1974 Constitution 
guaranteed the right to self-determination for the SRs and the SAPs alike.  
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This confusion was due to the fact that while the 1974 SFRY Constitution had decentralized the 
federation by bestowing significant rights to the SRs and the SAPs, it had justified this with references 
to ‘national’ rights and equality.760 Unlike the USSR Constitution that was very explicit on the SSRs 
having a right to secession, the SFRY Constitution stated that ‘the nations’ (ethnic designation) had 
a right to self-determination and secession, not the SRs.761 According to the Yugoslavian 
Constitutional Court, the rights of self-determination and secession belonged to ‘the peoples of 
Yugoslavia and their socialist republics’.762 Radan has argued that this notion cannot be justified, as 
the 1974 Constitution can only be read as to mean that the SRs were the result of the peoples’ exercise 
of the right to self-determination and that ‘[a]s such the republics could not have the rights of self-
determination or secession, that right being vested exclusively in Yugoslavia’s peoples’.763 The 
Yugoslavian Constitutional Court had confirmed this on 19 February 1991 with the Kosovo 
Declaration Case, stating that ‘only peoples of Yugoslavia’ had the right of self-determination.764 
In late November 1991, the Badinter Commission gave its Opinion No. 1. After considering the 
traditional statehood conditions,765 the Commission made a summary of the situation of the SFRY at 
the end of 1991. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia had had referendums with overwhelming support 
for independence and declared their independence accordingly, while the parliament of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had adopted a sovereignty resolution. The main federal organs were no longer meeting 
the criteria of participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state.766 Finally, the federal 
authorities were powerless to enforce the ceasefire agreements in the armed conflicts between the 
SRs.767 Based on these findings, the Commission opined that the SFRY was in a ‘process of 
dissolution’, rather than in a secessionist conflict.768  
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As the EC was confirmed that the SFRY was not going to survive as a state, it issued two declarations 
on 16 December 1991: ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ and the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ (the Guidelines). These are the most important 
documents that delineate the subsequent EC recognition practice, later to be adopted universally.769 
While the Guidelines were similarly applicable to the USSR, the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the 
Draft Conventions of The Hague Peace Conference were applicable only to the SFRY.770  
The Guidelines continue the evolution of the uti possidetis doctrine by reforming it to take into 
account the developments that had taken place in international law since the 1960s. Under the 
Guidelines, the EC required any SR or SSR asking for recognition to respect the provisions of the 
UN Charter, the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris; to guarantee the rights of ethnic and 
national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework 
of the CSCE; to respect the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means 
and by common agreement; to accept all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and 
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; and to settle by agreement or 
arbitration any questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.771  
According to the Declaration on Yugoslavia, which was only applicable to the SRs: 
‘The Community and its Member States agree to recognize the independence of all the Yugoslav 
Republics fulfilling all the conditions set out below. The implementation of this decision will take place 
on 15 January 1992. 
They are therefore inviting all Yugoslav Republics to state by 23 December whether: 
– they wish to be recognized as independent States 
– they accept the commitments contained in the above-mentioned Guidelines 
                                                 
Aspects of Federalism (London, 1973) at 26). Radan has argued that the closer look to the Opinions No. 3 and No. 11 imply secession, 
not dissolution, taking place. Radan (n 20) 51.  
769 Timeline of the recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia was as follows: The Badinter Commission Opinion No 1, declaring the SFRY 
being ‘in the process of dissolution’, was published on 29 November 1991; Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 
1991; the EC recognized the countries on 15 January 1992, although this had been decided already on a meeting on 17 December 1991; 
in the days following the official EC recognition Canada, Australia and Argentina recognized the countries; finally, within a few months 
the countries were recognized by the US, Russia, China, Japan and India, and were admitted to the UN on 23 May 1992. See more on 
the politics of these decisions on Crawford (n 47) 482-521. She is very critical towards the German policy and only slightly less critical 
towards the EC policy in general. For much more favoring view of the EC goals (but not of the implementation of these goals) see 
Eckert (n 252) 19-39. Finally, for a good overview of the events from the international relations perspective, especially focusing on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, as well as the UNSC debates, see Lucarelli (n 204).  
770 The EC issued an official statement on 31 December 1991 which, in turn, was applicable only to the USSR (n 225).  
771 Guidelines (n 4).  
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– they accept the provisions laid down in the draft Convention - especially those in Chapter II on human 
rights and rights of national or ethnic groups - under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia 
– they continue to support the efforts of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United 
Nations, and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia’.772 
While Serbia refused to sign the last Draft Convention on 4 November, the ‘process of dissolution’ 
derived from Opinion No. 1 began to produce legal ramifications, transforming the SFRY internal 
borders and internal legislation to a matter of international law. On 11 January 1992, the Badinter 
Commission gave its Opinions No. 2-7. Opinions No. 2 and No. 3 stipulated that uti possidetis was 
applicable in the context of the breakup of the SFRY. The Commission based this view in the Frontier 
Dispute case, where the ICJ defined uti possidetis as a ‘principle of general scope, which is logically 
connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs’.773 The 
application of uti possidetis removed the possibility of independence for the Serbian areas in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina since the Serb minorities there were not constituent units of the SFRY. 
Opinion No. 3 stated that ‘[e]xcept where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers 
protected by international law’ and that uti possidetis ‘applies all the more readily to the Republics 
since the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that 
the Republics’ territories and boundaries could not be altered without their consent’.774 
With the Badinter Commission having affirmed the applicability of uti possidetis, Opinions No. 4-7 
then addressed the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina,775 Croatia,776 Macedonia,777 and Slovenia,778 
based on their fulfilment of the conditions of the Guidelines and the Declaration on Yugoslavia. 
Opinion No. 2 referred expressly to the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention: 
                                                 
772 N 224. According to Cassese, Declaration on Yugoslavia is profoundly innovative for making recognition contingent on ‘democratic 
rule, that is, internal self-determination’. Thus, the ‘close link existing between external and internal self-determination’ was affirmed 
by the EC. Cassese (n 9) 268. 
773 ‘Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general 
principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali […]. Nevertheless the principle is 
not a special rule which pertains to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with 
the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability 
of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles’. Opinion No. 3 (n 39) 1500.  
774 Ibid. This sentence is somewhat puzzling given that the SAPs had the very same right than the SRs to veto any changes to their 
boundaries. On the contrary, to paraphrase Opinion No. 3, I argue that the right to internal self-determination works all the more readily 
for the former SAPs because of the applicable lex specialis - ethnofederalism - as portrayed in the SFRY Constitution. 
775 Opinion No. 4 (n 226). The Commission decided against recognition at this point, since the will to constitute an independent state 
had not been affirmed via referendum. 
776 Opinion No. 5 (n 226). The Commission decided against the recognition at this point because the new Croatian Constitution did not 
provide for the minority guarantees demanded by the EC. 
777 Opinion No. 6 (n 226). The Commission decided in favor of the recognition. 
778 Opinion No. 7 (n 226). The Commission decided in favor of the recognition. 
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‘Where there are one or more groups within a State constituting one or more ethnic, religious or language 
communities, they have the right to recognition of their identity under international law. As the 
Commission emphasized in its Opinion No 1 […] the - now peremptory - norms of international law 
require a States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities. This requirement applies to all the Republics 
vis-à-vis the minorities on their territory. The Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
must therefore be afforded every right accorded to minorities under international conventions as well as 
national and international guarantees consistent with the principles of international law and the provisions 
of Chapter II of the draft Convention of 4 November 1991’.779 
This Opinion has a great significance in relation to the SAPs since it contained a certain, undisputable 
set of rights to those nationalities that lacked the SR status. The Badinter Commission is calling 
minority rights ‘peremptory norms of international law’ that apply to all the SRs.780 This annuls any 
arguments for Serbia being a ‘persistent objector’781 of the Badinter Commission Opinions. Even 
more significantly, Opinion No. 2 is referring to the provisions of Chapter II of the Draft Convention 
of 4 November 1991, which demanded a special status of autonomy for Kosovo. Moreover, Opinions 
No. 4-7 demanded that the SRs fulfill the commitments of the 4 November Draft Convention. Thus, 
I conclude that this is where the misapplication of uti possidetis takes place. Under both the internal 
and external legal frameworks - the 1974 SFRY Constitution and public international law of the early 
1990s - the Badinter Commission made the right choice of insisting the guarantees for the rights of 
minorities and the continuation of Kosovo’s autonomy. However, the EC and the international 
community failed to execute this decision in regard to the SR of Serbia, even though they did succeed 
to do this in relation to all the other SRs. In retrospect, this made the Kosovo uprising almost 
inevitable. I claim that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the ‘sui generis’ 
argumentation782 are derived from this collective mistake of the early 1990s. 
All the relevant international instruments that the Badinter Commission was referring to - the Helsinki 
Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the EC Guidelines - demanded the inviolability of all frontiers. 
The Conference put forward several Draft Conventions, all aiming to uphold Kosovo’s autonomy and 
                                                 
779 Opinion No. 2 (n 289) Art. 1. 
780 Despite the extensive usage of the term, international law does not have any authoritative definition of a minority. One of the more 
famous definitions has been made by the UN Special Rapporteur Capotorti, according to which minority is a ‘group numerically inferior 
to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, religion or language’. F. Capotorti, ‘Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977).  
781 As summarized by James Green, ‘if a state persistently and consistently objects to a newly emerging norm of customary international 
law during the period of the “formation” of that norm (i.e. prior to its crystallization as a binding rule of customary international law), 
then the objecting state is exempt from the customary norm in question once it has crystallized and for so long as the objection is 
maintained’. J. Green, Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 1. However, peremptory norms 
of international law are exempt from the persistent objector rule, as they bind states even without their prior consent.  
782 See subchapter 2.6. 
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its internal frontiers. Their opening ceremony spoke of respecting all legitimate concerns and 
legitimate aspirations. So why was Kosovo’s status bypassed in the end? 
The most crucial Opinion in relation to the status of Kosovo was Opinion No. 5, in which the Badinter 
Commission considered whether Croatia had fulfilled the conditions in the Guidelines and whether it 
had fulfilled all the provisions of the Draft Convention on 4 November 1991.783 The Badinter 
Commission concluded that Croatia had incorporated some of the provisions of the Draft Convention 
insufficiently to its new constitution, and had failed especially concerning Chapter II, Article 2.C, 
which demands a special status of autonomy in the Croatian case for the Serb minority. I conclude 
that if Serbia had applied the Badinter Commission for recognition, this would have been conditioned, 
incontrovertibly, on the re-establishment of Kosovo’s autonomy. It would have been imperative for 
the EC to stand firm on this policy.  
Serbia was indeed in a dire need for recognition. The rump-SFRY consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, 
and the SAPs of Kosovo and Vojvodina was renamed in a new 1992 Constitution as the ‘Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The Constitution finalized Milošević’ campaign of abolishing the 
internal provinces of Serbia.784 Afterwards, the FRY refused resolutely to apply for recognition from 
the Badinter Commission. As Opinion No. 8 had ruled that ‘the process of dissolution of the SFRY, 
referred to in Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991, is now complete and that the SFRY no longer 
exists’,785 the question arose which state, if any, would legally continue the existence of the SFRY as 
Russia had done in the USSR. On 27 June 1992, the EC had declared that it would not recognize FRY 
as the successor state of the SFRY until ‘qualified international institutions’ would do so.786 A week 
later, the Badinter Commission Opinion No. 9 stated that no successor state could continue the 
membership of the SFRY in international organizations, including in the UN.787 Finally, Opinion No. 
10 stated that the FRY ‘is a new state which cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY; its 
recognition by the Member States of the European Community would be subject to its compliance 
                                                 
783 Opinion No. 5 (n 226). 
784 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 April 1992. The constitution had no mention of the previous autonomous 
provinces, creating a unitary state apart from the dividing internal border of Serbia and Montenegro. 
785 Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 8, 4 July 1992, 31 ILM 1521. 
786 The European Community Declaration on Former Yugoslavia, 27 June 1992. 
787 Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 9, 4 July 1992, 31 ILM 1523. 
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with the conditions laid down by general international law for such an act and the joint statement 
and Guidelines of 16 December 1991’.788 
Yet, Kosovo’s legitimate aspirations were dealt a series of blows during the next four years. Serbia 
continued to live in a legal fantasy as a continuation of the SFRY, although the UN Security Council 
resolutions 757 and 777 had explicitly reaffirmed the international rejection of the continuation of the 
SFRY.789 On 21 November 1995, the Yugoslav Wars were seemingly put to an end with the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (also known as and hereinafter, the Dayton Accords)790 that ended the Bosnian War 
between the Bosniaks and the Croats on one side and a self-proclaimed Serb-entity called ‘Republika 
Srpska’, supported militarily by Serbia, on the other.791 While the end of the war was certainly a 
warmly welcomed event, the Dayton Accords contained two inherent distortions. First, throughout 
the Badinter Commission Opinions, there had been very few legal constants, but one had been the 
retention of the former SR borders via uti possidetis. This had to be devised by the ad hoc territorial 
modifications in the Dayton Accords that brought upon a de facto re-partition of the state.792 
Therewith, the international community breached their recent application of uti possidetis by forcing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to accept a major reconfiguration of the state’s internal borders, in order to 
satisfy the self-determination demands of the Serb minority.793  
Second and even more seriously, while the Dayton Accords did breach the earlier application of uti 
possidetis, it still neglected to address the status of Kosovo in any manner. According to Peter Russell, 
while there were several reasons to exclude Kosovo from the Dayton Accords, the ‘lack of knowledge 
                                                 
788 Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 10, 4 July 1992, 31 ILM 1525. Italics mine.  
According to Trifunovska, the failure of The Hague Peace Conference and the subsequent Peace Conference in Brussels failed because 
of the Serb dissatisfaction caused especially by the Badinter Commission Opinions No. 1 (‘process of dissolution’), as well as 9 and 
10 (refusing to accept the FRY as the continuation of the SFRY). S. Trifunovska (Ed), Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its 
Creation to Its Dissolution (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) at 378. 
789 SC Res. 757, 30 May 1992, noted that ‘the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally 
accepted. SC Res. 777, 16 September 1992 added that the ‘Security Council considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United 
Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) should apply of membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly’. 
The FRY was finally admitted to the UN as a new member on 1 November 2000 by the General Assembly, following the 
recommendation by the Security Council (SC Res. 1326, 31 October 2000).  
790 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, formally signed on 14 December 1995. While the wars 
between former SRs were put to an end with this agreement, it led to the armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1996-1998. 
791 For an overview with special attention to the internal and international politics, see S. Burg and P. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (M.E. Sharpe, 1999). For the Republika Srpska, see subchapter 5.5.3. 
792 Bartos (n 19) 77.  
793 General Framework Agreement (n 790) Art. 3. The Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina had no territorial autonomy in the SFRY.  
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or concern about the state of affairs in Kosovo’ were not among them.794 The Dayton Accords would 
have been an excellent opportunity to pressure the Serb leadership to reinstall the autonomy of 
Kosovo, as should have been the case considering the EC Guidelines, The Hague Peace Conference 
Draft Conventions and the Badinter Commission Opinions. However, as the Dayton Accords 
disregarded the issue, the last remaining leverage that the international community had over the FRY 
leadership was the issue of recognition. 
In the FRY era, the status of Kosovo was unquestionably not in conformity with the criteria spelled 
out by the Badinter Commission and the EC. Accordingly, the EC member states and the rest of the 
international community held out their recognition of the FRY, and the EC gave several statements 
declaring their unwavering support for Kosovo’s legitimate right to self-governance. On 15 June 
1992, the EC declared that ‘frontiers can only be changed by peaceful means and (the EC states) 
remind the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the 
framework of the Peace Conference’.795 In February 1994, the European Union796 (EU) endorsed a 
proposal for the re-establishment of Kosovo’s autonomy in its European Action Program for 
Yugoslavia.797 All that being said, on 9 April 1996 the EU member states collectively recognized the 
FRY,798 thereby effectively giving up the demands for the status of Kosovo in the process.799 It should 
be noted that the recognition decision was made a month after the CERD’s ‘General Recommendation 
21’, which reaffirmed the division of the right to self-determination to internal and external aspect.800  
                                                 
794 P. Russell, ‘The Exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton Negotiations’ 11(4) Journal of Genocide Research (2009) 487-511 at 487. 
According to Russell, the exclusion ‘was the result of a deliberate decision on the part of Richard Holbrooke and his team that the 
severity of the Bosnian war justified focusing on it to the point, if necessary, of excluding any other issue’. Thus Kosovo was bypassed, 
‘despite both longstanding fears that the violence in Bosnia might spread and knowledge about the conditions in Kosovo. The one man 
whose cooperation was deemed to be absolutely essential, Slobodan Milosevic, was adamantly opposed to any discussion of Kosovo 
at Dayton’. He concludes that ‘the decision was not cost-free, and the level of violence in Kosovo increased radically in the post-
Dayton period in consequence. Rugova’s policy of peaceful resistance was completely undermined, replaced by the violent struggle of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army and the corresponding increase in brutality and violence from the Serbian military’. Ibid. at 504-505.  
795 The EC Press Statement, Luxembourg, 15 June 1992, italics mine. Quoted in Tierney (n 296) 266. Tierney continues that ‘[a]s a 
consequence, Kosovo had a right only of internal self-determination’, and the Peace Conference did not consider its right to external 
self-determination. Ibid. 
796 The European Community was renamed by the ‘Treaty on European Union’, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992.  
797 ‘A broad autonomy in Kosovo also has to be re-established within the framework of the current borders […] an international 
presence (for example, ECMM) appears necessary in order to monitor the respect for the rights of ethnic groups and minorities’. Action 
Plan of the European Union for the Former Yugoslavia November 1993-February 1994, C1 London II. According to the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, leading politicians, including David Owen, continued to insist on the integrity of Yugoslavia. 
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 58.  
798 European Union Bulletin, No. 4 (1996) at 1.4.7.  
799 Ibid. While the EC recognized the FRY unconditionally, the Presidency did state that ‘[h]ereinafter the development of good 
relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of its position within the international community will depend on a constructive 
approach by the FRY to […] the full respect for […] minority rights’. Document 4b/78, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of 
the European Union on Recognition by EU Member States of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Brussels 9 April 1996. 
800 The Committee inspects the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 89), of 
which all the EU member states were state parties to. 
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In addition, the EU recognition stance was inconsistent with its earlier position, according to which 
both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been demanded to grant internal self-determination for 
their minorities that had not been former constitutional units of the SFRY. Indeed, in the Bosnian 
case, the previously unknown entity of Republika Srpska had achieved a status of a constitutional 
unit with a veto right in the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation by invoking the use of force. The 
disappointment caused by the exclusion drove a group of Kosovars to pursue self-determination in 
similar extra-legal means, in a form of armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army,801 not unlike 
the separatists in several of the former ASSRs of the USSR since 1991.802 
4.4 Conclusion: Dissolution and the Badinter Commission Opinions 
Examining the previous application cycles of uti possidetis, the Badinter Commission chose to use 
the doctrine to establish the borders of the successor states of the SFRY and to give them 
legitimacy.803 Moreover, it chose to contribute to the evolution of uti possidetis by adding new criteria 
to be fulfilled in order for a state to be awarded recognition.804 These included a mostly overlapping 
combination of new trends in international law and the criteria provided by the EC in the Guidelines, 
the Declaration on Yugoslavia, and The Hague Peace Conference’s 4 November 1991 Draft 
Convention. This contribution was in complete conformity with the earlier evolutionary logic of uti 
possidetis. The doctrine needs to be updated in order for it to function. Thus, when compared to the 
earlier cycles of uti possidetis, the evolutionary process seems to continue and carry the doctrine into 
the 1990s setting. In my opinion, the decisions to apply uti possidetis and to upgrade it on the basis 
of the changes since the second cycle - including, in addition to the above mentioned EC instruments, 
the 1966 Covenants, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris - were legitimate. 
Notwithstanding, I argue that the EC - and, by extension, the international community that imitated 
the EC in the recognitions - did not follow through with the Badinter Commission Opinions and with 
their own logic in two ways. First, the EC did not advance uti possidetis to take into account the 
second-level internal borders and thus addressed internal self-determination in an inconsistent 
                                                 
801 Accounted for, inter alia, in K. Hudson, Justice, Intervention, and International Relations: Re-Assessing Just War Theory in 21st 
Century (Routledge, 2009) at 136; and in A. Hehir (Ed), Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and 
the Transition to Independence (Routledge, 2010) at 6. 
802 See n 249. 
803 The Badinter Commissions influence cannot be overstated. As noted by Vidmar, although its opinions were ‘not legally binding, 
they were generally followed by the entire international community’. Vidmar (n 198) 46. 
804 Shaw argues that the authoritativeness of the Badinter Opinions (in particular the decision to apply uti possidetis outside 
decolonization framework) is proven by the subsequent international practice, which has been fully in conformity with the Opinions 
and the EC Guidelines criteria. In contrast, any contradictory claims have met with international opposition. Shaw (n 17) 503-504.  
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manner.805 The systematic ignorance of the rights of the SAPs was in contradiction with several 
Badinter Commission Opinions. Opinion No. 2 stated that ‘[w]here there are one or more groups 
within a state constituting one or more ethnic, religious or language communities, they have the right 
to recognition of their identity under international law […]. This requirement applies to all the 
Republics vis-à-vis the minorities on their territory’.806 Opinions No. 4-7 subsequently demanded that 
all the SRs fulfill the requirement of Opinion No. 2, with direct references to the autonomous 
arrangements in the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention. Finally, Opinion No. 10 conditioned the 
recognition of the FRY with the fulfilment of the demands of the Declaration on Yugoslavia, the 4 
November Draft Convention, and the Guidelines.  
In effect, the EC recognized internal self-determination to be the right for ethnic groups but 
incoherently did not provide this for the established, constituent self-determination units.807 The 
second-level ethnofederal units became victims of this failure.808 Moreover, the EC reasonably 
attempted to have as little fragmentation of the SFRY as possible, and the SRs seemed like a logical 
instrument to draw the line on minority secessions. I agree with this decision to the extent of limiting 
secessions. However, the subsequent relentless categorization and all rights-no rights dichotomy 
between the SRs and the SAPs inevitably jeopardizes the promotion of internal self-determination, 
as provided in several international conventions and instruments that the EC and the Badinter 
Commission were systematically referring to.809 Another reaffirmation came in autumn 1992, when 
the International Human Rights Committee that monitors the implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requested urgent special reports on specific issues 
under the ICCPR from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY. The Committee noted that ‘all the 
                                                 
805 For more on the different forms of internal self-determination and why the right to self-determination should not be equated with a 
right to independent statehood, see J. Anaya, ‘The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims’ 
75(4) Iowa Law Review (1990) 837-844 at 842-843. For more on how internal self-determination is principally designed to forestall a 
more aggressive assertion of the right (on the road to its ultimate culmination in secession) see J. Oloka-Onyango, ‘Heretical Reflections 
on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium’ 15(1) American 
University International Law Review (1999) 151-208 at 168. Finally, for a good overview of the right to self-determination according 
to the demands based on international human rights law, see McCorquodale (n 149) 857-885. He concludes that while the right to self-
determination is a human right, it is not an absolute human right and should be handled with this restriction kept in mind.  
806 Opinion No. 2 (n 289) Art. 1. 
807 According to the Dutch government (holding then the EC Presidency): ‘It considers it especially important that selective application 
of principles be avoided. The principle of self-determination e.g., cannot exclusively apply to the existing republics while being deemed 
inapplicable to national minorities within those republics’. Quoted in D. Owen (Ed), Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Vance/Owen Peace 
Plan (Liverpool, 2013) at 28. The Dutch government also asserted that it was difficult to imagine that the SFRY could peacefully 
dissolve into its six independent republics with their borders intact and suggested a redrawing of the borders.  
808 While this Chapter focuses on the SFRY, the Guidelines were also applicable to the successor states of the USSR. See Chapter 3. 
809 For instance, the previously mentioned Helsinki Final Act (n 13) Chapter VIII; the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (n 13); and 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections (n 13), preamble. According to Allen and Castellino, 
one of the main problems with uti possidetis as a legal rule is that it seems to critically alter the right to self-determination as it stands 
in modern international law (Allen and Castellino (n 49) 22).  
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peoples within the territory of the former Yugoslavia are entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant’. 
The states in question then acquiesced in being bound by Yugoslavia’s obligations under the 
ICCPR.810 Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the end, all the SRs received recognition of their 
independent statehood by fulfilling the Guidelines criteria (and in the case of the FRY, eventually 
without fulfilling it), whereas the SAPs could not get any status recognition under any criteria.  
While I do not agree with the form of internal self-determination that the EC chose to use - bypassing 
the rights of the second-level units and the interpretations of the Badinter Commission on this regard 
- I want to point out that even disregarding this fact, the logic does not hold. If the EC insists that 
Kosovars are not in a special position, they at least should have been awarded the same constitutional 
guarantees than their Serb counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, to a lesser extent, in Croatia. 
Previously a constituent autonomous unit of the SFRY did not even receive the same rights as other 
ethnic groups without any prior status.811 For example, in the Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords (the 
current Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina), the Bosnian Serbs received a status that is comparable 
to the Kosovo’s autonomy in the 1974 SFRY Constitution, especially on their ability to participate 
within the political organs of the federation and to use a veto right in constitutional matters.812 Yet, 
the fact remains that this status upgrade was accomplished by the use of force and was built upon no 
previous legal basis, whereas the international community chose to ignore Kosovo’s peaceful 
demands until their armed uprising in 1998.  
Uti possidetis needs to protect minority rights consistently and thus should take into account internal 
self-determination instruments already in place. Otherwise, the peace project nature of uti possidetis 
fails, and it ends up producing more territorial instability and ethnic violence as the Yugoslav Wars 
illustrate. The tragedy of the EC’s practice towards the constituent units of the former SFRY is that 
it consistently demanded the protection and even autonomy for minorities in every other case except 
in Kosovo, which was one of the two recognized minorities with autonomy in one of the SRs. 
I claim that as a constituent unit of the SFRY, Kosovo possessed a right to internal self-determination 
independently from the host SR of Serbia. While there is no authoritative definition on the content of 
                                                 
810 Müllerson (n 145) 492. 
811 Indeed, if anything, the Serb minority seemed to be somehow sui generis after the dissolution. See subchapter 2.6 on the issue of 
the sui generis formulation with regards to Kosovo independence. 
812 For example, Republika Srpska was guaranteed one-third of the seats in both the upper and lower chambers of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, in the House of Peoples (Art. IV.9), and the House of Representatives (Art. IV.10). The veto right was affirmed in Art. V.7. 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 790), Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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the right to internal self-determination in practical terms - apart from it being separate from the 
external self-determination, i.e., secession - in the cases of the SAPs, this is easier to establish. The 
SRs, as the constituent nations of the SFRY, possessed a general, external right to self-determination 
that they continued to enjoy as a part of the federation. After the dissolution, this amounted to the 
right to have an independent state or to join another state.813 The constituent autonomous units as 
nationalities of the SFRY did not have a right to external self-determination as their peoples had 
already established nation-states outside the SFRY. That being said, under the last legal order of the 
dissolving SFRY, the nationalities possessed a right to internal self-determination, an autonomous 
status to self-govern their given territory, and to participate politically in the organs of both the host 
SR and the federation.  
As accounted previously, uti possidetis turns the former administrative borders to international 
borders at the moment of the dissolution or independence. However, in the third cycle, there was also 
the recognized right to internal self-determination. The application of uti possidetis in the early 1990s 
should have recognized both variants of the right. The SRs borders were internationalized 
accordingly, but their internal administrative borders - delineating the autonomous areas of the SAPs 
- should have been recognized as well. According to the last legal order as enshrined in the 1974 
Constitution, the SAPs were not in a subordinate position vis-à-vis Serbia. Therefore, Serbia never 
fully possessed these units in the federal times, and ignoring this is a factual distortion of the uti 
possidetis doctrine. If a former SR wanted to retain the entire territorial extent it had during the federal 
times - and only obtained during the federal times814 - this should have been made contingent upon 
respecting the inherited autonomous statuses of the SAPs. On the contrary, the version of uti 
possidetis used made the previously guaranteed constitutional statuses dependent on the goodwill of 
the successor state - indeed an implausible scenario in Serbia led by Slobodan Milošević.815 
                                                 
813 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia chose the first option, whereas Serbia and Montenegro decided to integrate 
into a new joint state, the FRY. According to the Friendly Relations Declaration: ‘The establishment of a sovereign and independent 
State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people’. Friendly Relations Declaration (n 88). 
814 Before the SFRY, Kosovo only became a part of Serbia in 1912. Noel Malcolm has argued that the incorporation of Kosovo at this 
point was done outside the operating 1903 Constitution of Serbia, which states in Art. 4 that no changes to the frontiers of Serbia can 
be valid unless the Grand National Assembly has agreed on it. N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York, 1999) at 264. After 
1912, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia only for six years, out of which Serbia was occupied most of the time by the Central Powers 
in the First World War. When the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was proclaimed in 1918, Kosovo became a part of Yugoslavia, not Serbia. 
Only in 1945 the Federal Yugoslavia degreed Kosovo to be a part of Serbia, but with autonomous status. At the same time, Serbia and 
Montenegro gained substantial area as they divided the Sandžak region between themselves. Finally, in 1974, Kosovo was made a part 
of Yugoslavia while remaining a part of - but not subordinated to - the SR of Serbia. 
815 Serbia argued that Kosovo had more arguments for independence in 1999 when human rights violations were taking place, but had 
no right to independence in 2008, as Serbia had been a functioning democracy since the fall of Milošević in 2000. Thus, the safeguards 
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Kosovo’s right to internal self-determination in the early 1990s was independent of Serbia since its 
autonomy under the 1974 Constitution was not given by Serbia but by the SFRY. Moreover, it was 
seen as an integral component, even a condition of Kosovo being a part of Serbia. Self-determination 
insists on a link with pre-determined political entities, and the SAP of Kosovo was a constituent - and 
arguably sovereign816 - socio-political unit with a clearly defined territory. Therewith, I conclude that 
the people of Kosovo817 had a legal entitlement to self-rule, in their constitutionally designated area, 
when the dissolution took place. Germany supported this view in its Oral Statement in the ICJ’s 
Kosovo hearings in 2009, which called this the democratic right to internal self-determination that 
was taken away by the unilateral abolishment by Serbia from 1989 onwards.818 According to many 
Yugoslav lawyers, under the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was a SR in all but name.819 It had all the 
functions of a republic and held a veto right at the federal level. It had a Constitution, a parliament 
that was the highest authority in the province, as well as judicial and educational systems.820 Finally, 
Kosovo was in effective control over its area through its police force.821  
While Serbia had unconstitutionally abolished Kosovo’s autonomy on its Constitution - i.e., on the 
SR level822 - the act has no legal relevance as we look at the state succession from the SFRY. Uti 
possidetis juris concentrates on the applicable legal (juris) situation at the moment of independence, 
                                                 
for the Kosovo autonomy could have been restored (Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Written Statement of the Republic of Serbia, 15 April 2009 at 237). 
However, at that point, many facts on the ground had changed, making the process in my opinion irreversible: Kosovo had been 
excluded from the Dayton Accords, the Kosovo War, and external intervention had taken place, and the interim administration by the 
UN had been governing Kosovo since 1999. See subchapter 2.6. 
816 N 675. 
817 ‘The people of Kosovo’ has been recognized several times, for instance by the Security Council resolution (SC Res. 1244, 10 June 
1999, art. 10); the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (n 797) 286-287; UN Secretary-General (UNIS/SG/2763, 15 
January 2001); and the last SFRY Constitution (n 189), Art. 4.  
818 Oral statement by the Federal Republic of Germany (n 597) para. 39.  
819 For example, according to Vojin Dimitrijević, there was a general Yugoslavian view that the provinces were republics in all but 
name, and the only reason they were not awarded this was the alleged political unreliability of the Albanian population, that the 
Yugoslav authorities did not want to invest even a theoretical right to secession. V. Dimitrijević, ‘The 1974 Constitution and 
Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia’ in P. Akhavan and R. Howse (Ed), Yugoslavia, the Former and 
Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Brookings, 1995) 45-74 at 59. Timothy Waters sees this minor distinction became 
the lynchpin with the recognition decisions. Based on the constitution, Badinter could have chosen either nations, nationalities or the 
provinces and made a disputable decision to choose only nations. T. Waters, ‘Indeterminate Claims: New Challenges to Self-
Determination Doctrine in Yugoslavia’ 20(2) The SAIS Review of International Affairs (2000) 111-144 at 124-125. Finally, the leading 
Yugoslav constitutional lawyer of the time Mirić held the opinion that after the 1974 Constitution, ‘the socialist autonomous province 
is not only autonomous, but even sovereign’. Quoted in East Europe Report (n 673) 97. 
820 Pavlović (n 663) 57. 
821 The Prosecutor v. S. Milošević, M. Milutinović, N. Sainović, D. Ojdanic & V. Stojiljković, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Case No IT-99-37 (1999), Art. 3; D. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S Intervention 
(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012) at 7; P. Williams, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict 
of Kosovo’s Final Status’ 31(3) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2003) 387-426 at 395. 
822 Accounted for, inter alia, in Krieger (n 740) 522.  
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and the unconstitutional abolition is thus null and void.823 The abolishment of the SAP autonomy was 
a territorial modification of the SFRY territory, which was not left for the discretion of the SRs but 
needed the federal government’s constitutional ratification. While internal changes do not require 
outside recognition, uti possidetis can only work through the applicable legal framework of the target 
state. Otherwise, Serbia could have proclaimed in its SR Constitution that the Serb areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina belonged to the SR of Serbia as well. As stated by the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute case, 
‘[t]he principle of uti possidetis juris accords pre-eminence to legal title over effective possession as 
a basis of sovereignty’.824 Already in the first cycle, the states in question had agreed that their new 
borders should be based on uti possidetis juris, not uti possidetis de facto. By abolishing Kosovo's 
autonomy illegally, Serbia was, in essence, arguing uti possidetis de facto as fait accompli. However, 
de facto variant has never been internationally accepted, and it is equally inapplicable in this case.825 
In addition to it not being in accordance with the SFRY legislation and constitutional order, the denial 
of the continuation of Kosovo’s autonomy was a breach of the understanding and the scope of the 
contemporary doctrine of self-determination. This flaw disrupted the evolution of uti possidetis, 
undermining its legitimacy in the process. While contemporary international law does not provide for 
a legal right to autonomy, it does provide for guarantees for a group that has enjoyed such a right - 
taking back the autonomous status unilaterally is a clear breach of self-determination.826 As the 
                                                 
823 Alan Pellet has argued that the 1990s dissolutions precedents have demonstrated that uti possidetis would be applicable in the case 
of Quebec and that the Canadian Constitution (Canadian Constitution Act, 1982) would protect the current borders of Quebec until the 
moment of (possible) independence. Franck et al. (n 678) 2.1 and 2.5-2.7. 
The other side of this is that any lawful changing of borders just prior to the moment of independence will provide a legal effect when 
applying uti possidetis. For instance, in the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal arbitration, Guinea-Bissau argued that uti possidetis should only 
apply to treaties ‘concluded a long way back’, so that any treaties concluded by the colonial power ‘once the process of liberation had 
begun’ would be null and void if they breached the essential elements of the right of peoples to self-determination. However, the 
Tribunal did not accept this, proclaiming that there is no ‘special condition of antecedence’ relating to the changing of borders prior 
independence. Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal Arbitral Award (n 412) 53. In addition, the same view was confirmed by the Badinter 
Commission (n 207) and by Franck et al. (n 678) 2.3. 
824 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 23. 
825 As affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Honduras Borders Case (n 79) 1322; and by the ICJ in the Frontier 
Dispute (n 2) para. 23. 
826 See, inter alia, A. Buchanan, ‘A Principled International Legal Response to Demands for Self-Determination’ in Primoratz and 
Pavković (n 720) 141. He argues that the international legal order should support a right to intrastate autonomy for groups that have 
been granted such an autonomy previously, and that violation of such an autonomy needs to be regarded as a violation of international 
law. I would add that Buchanan is only addressing the question according to general public international law - in the case of Kosovo, 
there were special issues such as the international obligations of the SFRY. Babbit has concluded that if a group is denied language 
rights, non-discrimination, political inclusion, or economic opportunities, the risk of an armed confrontation is already high. If the 
group had, in earlier stages, an autonomy that has not been honored, the confrontation becomes all the more likely (E. Babbitt, 
‘Negotiating Self-Determination: Is It a Viable Alternative to Violence?’ in H. Hannum and E. Babbitt, Negotiating Self-Determination 
(Lexington, 2006) 159-166 at 159-160. In the context of the autonomous arrangements in China, Friberg has concluded that the 
autonomous entities need to give their consent to the changes in the autonomous status. E. Friberg, ‘“Masters of Their Homelands”: 
Revisiting the Regional Ethnic Autonomy System in China in Light of Local Institutional Developments’ in M. Weller and S. Wolff, 
Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided Societies (Routledge, 
2005) 205-229 at 220. Kaikobad has argued that when establishing the gravity of a breach of self-determination with the revoking of 
autonomy one needs to separate between a negotiated autonomous status, where there might be some international institutional 
151 
 
Commission of Jurists affirmed in their 1920 report, self-determination does not give a positive right 
to secession, which is an internal matter of a state. However, in some cases, such as the post-First 
World War transformations, self-determination was no longer just an internal matter, and the right to 
self-determination for the new states in Europe could not be questioned.827 The same applies to the 
situation in the 1990s, where the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy was not just an internal matter of 
Serbia but was fundamentally linked to the preservation of international peace.  
On the other hand, it is my opinion that Kosovo did not have a right to external self-determination in 
the early 1990s as the SRs did. The difference is somewhat small but decisive. Outside decolonization 
context, the right to self-determination does not have state practice or opinio juris on amounting to a 
legal right to secession, because it is always connected to, and restrained by, the principle of territorial 
integrity.828 This rule did not bind the SRs of the SFRY, because the SFRY dissolved and - similarly 
to decolonization - there is no more state whose territorial integrity to uphold. Notwithstanding, it 
does bind Kosovo since Serbia continues to exist as one of the SFRY successor states with its 
inherited uti possidetis borders.829 In a conflicting situation, without exceptional circumstances, 
territorial integrity seems to prevail over the external right to self-determination.830 This is the view 
                                                 
involvement (such as Eritrea and Hong Kong), and situations where autonomy is a concession or a gift. K. Kaikobad, ‘Autonomy, 
Kashmir and International Law’ in R. Hofmann and U. Caruso (Ed), Minority Rights in South Asia (Peter Lang, 2011) 114-145 at 144. 
Finally, Oeter has argued that ‘[i]f the state completely blocks any “internal self-determination”, erodes existing arrangements of 
autonomy and subsequently takes recourse to brutal forms of violent oppression, ending in gross and consistent patterns of crimes 
against humanity, forms of “ethnic cleansing”, perhaps even genocide, a “right to secession” as an emergency tool seems to be 
arguable’. Oeter (n 558) 62. See also GA Res. 47/135 (n 588), Arts. 1 and 2; and the CSCE Copenhagen Document on the Human 
Dimension, 29 June 1990, Arts. 4, 5(2), 5(3), 5(7), 5(20), 6, 30, 31, 33 and, especially, 35, which states that ‘[t]he participating States 
will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in 
the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities. The participating States note the efforts undertaken 
to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of certain national minorities 
by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to 
the specific historical and territorial circumstances minorities’.  
827 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an 
Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Åland Islands Question, 3 October 1920 at 4.  
828 In fact, in the UN era and prior to the socialist federal dissolutions of the 1990s, there was only one successful secession in the case 
of Bangladesh. According to Heraclides, Bangladesh secession fits very well with the very essence of the principle of the right to self-
determination. It is a right of majorities, and the people of Bangladesh, while oppressed, were the majority of the state of Pakistan. A. 
Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (Routledge, 1991) at 24. 
829 This is why Kosovo’s independence in February 2008 is indeed unique, as there was Serbia whose territorial integrity to uphold.  
830 On the exceptional circumstances, see Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 2 SCR 217. The Canadian Supreme Court took its 
stance on the ‘exceptional circumstances’ from the ‘saving clause’ of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration (n 88). For instance, 
Marc Weller and Marko Milanović have been supporters for this reading of the ‘saving clause’ (see M. Weller, ‘The Sound of Silence: 
Making Sense of the Supposed Gas in the Kosovo Opinion’ in M. Milanović and M. Wood, The Law and Politics of the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press, 2015) 187-218 at 201-203. Apart from these exceptional circumstances, the Supreme 
Court of Canada maintained that international law expects the right to self-determination to be exercised within the framework of 
existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of territorial integrity of those states. James Crawford argues that the 
right to self-determination could be allowed in cases of extreme misgovernance, in situations of ‘carance de souverainete’. Crawford 
(n 214) 126-127. Lauri Hannikainen argues that the right to secession is only applicable for colonial peoples and peoples under alien 
domination. For others, autonomy can be a lawful choice for self-determination. L. Hannikainen, ‘Self-Determination and Autonomy 
in International Law’ in M. Suksi, Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) 79-96 at 84.  
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of the majority of scholars in relation to the so-called ‘saving clause’ of the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration.831 Yet, within the confinements of territorial integrity, there is still the ‘default rule’ of 
internal self-determination,832 which can be accomplished in several ways.833  
As international law acknowledges state sovereignty, if a state has not assumed any specific 
international obligations to consent to autonomous arrangements, it is up to that state to decide on its 
internal affairs, including whether or not to grant autonomy.834 That being said, in the early 1990s, 
there existed external factors that did legally bound Serbia to uphold Kosovo’s autonomy. First, 
Serbia was given its SR borders by the SFRY at the same time when Kosovo was given autonomy 
within those borders. The conceptual logic of uti possidetis is that a change of sovereignty by itself 
does not change the status of a boundary.835 Serbia cannot have it both ways. Since it wanted to 
maintain its SR area, including the SAP of Kosovo, it should have then inherited the autonomous 
status that the SFRY had instilled upon Kosovo, in accordance with its international legal 
obligations.836 Second, the SFRY was bound to several international treaties that provided the right 
to self-determination and that were legally binding in the federation according to Article 210 of the 
1974 SFRY Constitution.837 Third, in the autumn of 1992, Serbia had officially acquiesced in being 
bound by the 1966 Covenants and had affirmed that ‘all peoples in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia are entitled to the guarantees of the Covenants’.838 Finally, Serbia was bound to respect 
the right to self-determination and self-government of Kosovo according to the EC Guidelines, the 
                                                 
831 ‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing 
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color’. GA Res. 2625 (n 88), ‘The principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples’.  
832 Reference re Secession of Quebec (n 830) Art. 126; C. Borgen, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration: Analyzing the Legal Issues of Secession and 
Recognition’, Opinio Juris, 20 February 2008; Borgen (n 40) 483; and D. Saad, ‘Crimea Secession: A Legal Standpoint’, The Cord, 
19 March 2014. 
833 Klabbers and Lefeber have argued that people would not be entitled to external self-determination by means of secession if it can 
enforce its right to internal self-determination. However, while a part of internal self-determination can be achieved through individual 
human rights instruments without collective rights, the authors demonstrate that the ‘surplus value’ of these collective rights is a 
people’s freedom to determine its internal political status. For the very least, all peoples should be entitled to participate in the decision-
making process of the state, in particular with the constitution. This right could be implemented in various ways, for instance, through 
federalism, special constitutional rights, or democratic governance. Klabbers and Lefeber in Brölmann (n 49) 43-44, 49. Kosovo used 
to enjoy constitutionally guaranteed rights, including a veto right over the Serbian constitution, numerical participation rights in the 
SFRY and the Serbian SR parliaments, and a membership in the rotating presidency of the SFRY. By removing all these rights in 1989, 
the Serbian actions can only be classified as a grave denial of the right to internal self-determination of the Kosovo people. 
834 Hannikainen (n 830) 87. 
835 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), I.C.J. Reports (1962) 6, quoted in McCorquodale and Pangalangan (n 1) 874.  
836 The obligations deriving from, inter alia, the 1966 Covenants (n 10), the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration (n 88), the Helsinki 
Final Act (n 13), the 1990 Paris Charter for New Europe (n 13), the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension (n 
826); and the GA Res. 47/135 (n 588). 
837 N 189. 
838 Quoted in Müllerson (n 145) 492. 
153 
 
Declaration on Yugoslavia, the Badinter Commission Opinions No. 2, 5, and 8-10, as well as the 4 
November 1991 Draft Convention. Therefore, I conclude that according to the evolutionary logic of 
uti possidetis, the border between Kosovo and Serbia should have been ‘internationalized’ in the form 
of internationally guaranteed autonomy based on the above-mentioned instruments.  
If applied in 1991, meritus would have awarded Kosovo the continuation of its substantial autonomy 
via the leverage over the recognition of the FRY. The Hague Peace Conference did attempt to do this 
on several occasions with the Draft Conventions, and the Badinter Commission subsequently 
conditioned the recognition of the former SRs to accepting the last Draft Convention of 4 November 
1991. However, unlike the meritus formula, they did not portray this as a legal right of Kosovars 
derived from uti possidetis juris, but rather as a political compromise Serbia should agree upon.839 As 
merely a political compromise, it was forgotten in 1996 when the EC and the international community 
recognized the FRY. At this instance, if the EC had maintained a strict line towards the FRY, the 
evolution of uti possidetis would have been completed. While the Badinter Commission Opinions by 
themselves do not and cannot create international law, I claim that since the rest of the international 
community waited for the EC recognition decisions and then followed suit with these decisions, this 
uniform display of state practice arguably began a process of creating customary law - or, rather, a 
customary update of an old international law rule.  
After the ‘process of dissolution’ had started in late 1991, consistent and clearly legally justified 
demands would have produced the continuation of Kosovo’s autonomy with international guarantees, 
like those portrayed in the Draft Convention of 4 November 1991.840 Furthermore, if clearly justified 
on the basis of uti possidetis and made applicable to all the SAPs and the ASSRs, the concurring 
successor states would likely have avoided territorial conflicts with their subunits.841 Finally, I want 
to emphasize that this interpretation would have been more in accordance with international law. 
                                                 
839 Often in ethnic conflicts, the intervening parties suggest territorial autonomy or its enhancement as the solution to the conflict. This 
is usually not seen to be based on any prior legal right to autonomy but to political compromise to stop the conflict. For example, the 
conflict between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement was settled by granting the Aceh region substantial autonomy in 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005.  
840 Would the peaceful coexistence have lasted under the Milošević regime is debatable and beyond the scope of this dissertation. The 
key in such arrangements is to have as extensive monitoring system as possible, preferably with UN participation. 
841 The former ASSRs that have declared independence since 1991 include Crimea, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Tatarstan, and Chechnya. 
In addition, former lower-level units of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have declared independence. 
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5. The Right to Self-Determination in a State Dissolution 
Context 
This is the third and final Part of the dissertation. In the first Part, I have analyzed the essence and the 
evolution of the uti possidetis doctrine. In the second Part, I introduced the two components that make 
up my proposal for uti possidetis meritus - internal and external legal framework at the moment of 
state dissolution. In addition, I provided an overview of the ethnofederal history of my two main 
dissolution cases, the USSR and the SFRY. 
In this Part, I finish the dissertation by providing the way forward from the impasse that the 
misapplication of uti possidetis in the early 1990s has led to.842 First, I demonstrate through case 
studies how the right to self-determination was implemented in the late 20th Century state dissolution 
context and account for the numerous legal symptoms that have emerged in the successor states of 
the USSR and the SFRY. The results are rather striking and substantiate my original argument - that 
the insufficient understanding of ethnofederalism distorted the application of uti possidetis. Indeed, 
out of the eight successor states of the USSR and the SFRY federalized in the socialist era, seven 
have experienced separatism of their former ethnofederal units.843 Moreover, out of these cases, those 
three states that more or less followed the same guidelines as my uti possidetis meritus - which I 
present in detail in the following Chapter - are doing manifestly better in their national relations than 
those states that followed the official uti possidetis application model.844  
In sum, those states that accepted that their sovereignty over the ethnofederal units was qualified and 
that the autonomous arrangements needed to be continued were able to solve the challenges to their 
territorial integrity peacefully. Those states that took the recognition of their independence as a clean 
slate and abolished the autonomies they regarded as externally imposed during the federal era have 
faced a series of unilateral independence declarations, armed clashes, and ‘frozen conflicts’.845  
I begin this analysis by examining the cases of those successor states that retained aspects of the 
ethnofederal system - the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Following, I 
proceed to the cases of those states that chose to consider their recognition of independence as a 
                                                 
842 For more on the misapplication of uti possidetis, see subchapter 4.4. 
843 In contrast, none of the non-federalized successor states have experienced separatism.  
844 See subchapter 5.3.  
845 A frozen conflict is a legal situation in international relations where there exists only a ceasefire, not any formal peace treaty or a 
power-sharing agreement between the parties. In the post-Soviet context, the conflict has often resulted from an armed uprising of a 
former autonomous unit that had lost this status after the dissolution. While the separatists were able to secure the retreat of the host 
state’s army from their territory, they have remained unrecognized and unable to reach an agreement on autonomy.  
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chance to abolish their internal autonomies and reassert full authority over their subunits, which then 
led to tragic consequences - Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia. Finally, I disentangle the two 
cases outside the ethnofederal framework - Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.  
The main point to realize is that the international community failed to sufficiently guarantee the right 
to self-determination to all the stakeholders of the dissolving socialist federations. According to the 
version of uti possidetis used by the recognizing states in the early 1990s, the successor states had 
only limited obligations towards their autonomous subunits, whose right to self-determination was 
eventually based solely on the goodwill of the host state. Subsequently, the actual implementation of 
this right was manifested in very different fashions. This, in turn, has complicated the international 
mediation efforts, which I go through in the last section of this Chapter.  
5.1 Introduction: Three Versions of Self-Determination in the Post-Dissolution 
Framework 
Due to the recognition policies chosen by the EC and the wider international community that linked 
the recognition of the USSR and the SFRY successor states to the internal administrative borders, 
two legal issues emerged in the early 1990s: the interpretation over the ethnofederal systems in place 
in these federations, and the subsequent interpretation of the applicable legal rule, uti possidetis.  
As previously accounted, ethnofederalism was a set of ethnicity-based territorial autonomies, derived 
from the proclaimed progressiveness of national policies under socialism.846 In this particular political 
federation the state consisted of a certain number of first-level ethnic subunits, which were in turn 
further subdivided - ethnofederalized - to better reflect ethnic groups’ territorial distribution. For 
ideological reasons, the different ethnicities were put into a hierarchical order based on an alleged 
‘progressive level’ of their development toward socialism.847 The two highest units of the USSR were 
the SSRs, followed by the ASSRs.848 In the SFRY, these units were called the Socialist Republics 
(SRs) and the Socialist Autonomous Provinces (SAPs), respectively. During the socialist era, the 
USSR ethnofederalized seven of its 15 SSRs,849 and the SFRY one of its six SRs, Serbia.850  
                                                 
846 See, inter alia Zürcher (n 174) 23-32; and Beissinger (n 174) 334. 
847 See subchapter 3.5. 
848 For example, the SSR of Georgia was ethnofederalized in 1921 to contain two ASSRs of Abkhazia and Ajara and an AO of South 
Ossetia. See subchapter 5.4.3. 
849 Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.  
850 Moreover, the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina was made a homeland to three different ethnicities - Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. This 
had fragmenting consequences when the SFRY dissolved in 1991-1992.  
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As explicated earlier, uti possidetis is an international law principle according to which the former 
administrative borders of a unit become international borders at the moment of independence.851 
Before the socialist federal dissolutions, it had been utilized only in a decolonization context in the 
early 1800s and in the 1950s-1960s.852 While uti possidetis has received judicial recognition as a 
general principle of international law, it is essential to note that it does not merely freeze the borders 
in place. As noted by Ian Brownlie, according to uti possidetis ‘the change of sovereignty does not 
as such change the status of a boundary, and thus pre-existing disputes will subsist as an aspect of the 
principle of continuity’.853 Thus, in the next Chapter, I advance the uti possidetis meritus argument 
to take into account not only the highest level, but the lower-level administrative borders as well. 
While the successor states have differed politically since their independencies, the challenge of 
nationalism and the national question - who has the right to self-determination and how it is 
implemented within a state - continues to affect their national development. Yet, despite these 
similarities, the state succession was interpreted differently in legal terms in the USSR and the SFRY 
contexts. Indeed, when addressing the legal legacies of the dissolutions of the USSR and the SFRY, 
one observes three separate trajectories in the international recognition policy: the Russian 
Federation, other former SSRs, and the former SRs of the SFRY. This is due to there being a couple 
of significant differences between the two federal dissolutions. First, the USSR dissolution was 
consensual at the highest ethnofederal level - all the SSRs endorsed the view that Russia would 
continue the legal existence of the USSR,854 and formally declared that their borders would be settled 
by uti possidetis if not agreed otherwise by the parties in question.855 Second, there was a great fear 
that the dissolution of the USSR would not be peaceful. As the US Secretary of State James Baker 
put it in December 1991, if the dissolution was not organized peacefully, the USSR could become a 
‘Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons thrown in’.856 Added to the fact that this dissolution was 
consensual, outside states demanded a lot less from the SSRs to be recognized independent.857 Third, 
                                                 
851 For a good overview of uti possidetis, see Shaw (n 17, ‘Peoples’) 75-154.  
852 In both cases, the successor states of the colonial empires agreed to apply uti possidetis and to honour the former administrative 
borders. Most Latin American States agreed to apply uti possidetis in the Treaty of Confederation (n 76), the African states in the 1963 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (n 96), art III.3, and reaffirmed in Resolution on Border Disputes (n 97). For more on uti 
possidetis, see subchapter 2.1. 
853 Brownlie (n 225) 58. Italics in the original. 
854 Decision by the Council of Heads of State (n 229), para. 1.  
855 In the auspices of the CIS, the inviolability of their former internal borders has been affirmed in several treaties: Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (n 216) Art. 5; Alma-Ata Declaration (n 230). Preamble and Art. 1; Charter 
Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (n 230) Art. 3; and Declaration on Respect of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity 
and Inviolability of Boundaries (n 230) 9-10.  
856 ‘Soviet Union As We've Known It Is Gone, Baker Says’, Washington Post, 9 December 1991. 
857 See subchapter 3.8. 
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as Russia continued the legal existence of the USSR, its recognition was not contingent on any 
criteria. Therefore, the application of uti possidetis in 1991-1992 takes place in three different legal 
frameworks: the continuation state, the SSRs, and the SRs.858  
For the continuation state,859 things were rather straightforward as all the other SSRs supported 
Russia’s claim to continue the existence of the USSR. On 12 December 1991, Russian President 
Yeltsin addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General stating that Russia would continue the 
membership of the USSR in the UN.860 In exchange, Russia affirmed the USSR’s treaty obligations 
and accepted responsibility for most of its foreign debt. While the EC’s Statement on the USSR 
mentioned the Soviet Union, nothing was demanded of Russia for its legal continuation state status. 
Thus, Russia did not seek and did not receive recognition for its independence by the international 
community.861 
The recognition of the SSRs within their uti possidetis borders was contingent upon fulfilling the 
requirements of the EC Guidelines.862 These included the respect for provisions of the UN Charter, 
the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris (1990),863 especially with regard to the rule of 
law, democracy, and human rights; guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; 
inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; 
                                                 
858 This interpretation is dubious in the uti possidetis framework. I claim that while it is plausible to treat Russia differently due to the 
continuation state status, according to uti possidetis’ evolutionary logic, there are no legal grounds to separate the SSRs and the SRs, 
apart from the ‘political realities’ mentioned in the Guidelines (n 4).  
859 As pointed out by Müllerson, the ‘state succession is a very special part of international law’ that can govern succession only as a 
set of generally recognized norms of customary international law. The conventions on state succession would not be obligatory for new 
states. In the case of Russia continuing the legal existence of the USSR, he comments ‘even deep social changes are irrelevant in 
determining whether or not a State continues to exist’. He concludes that due to Russian retaining most of the USSR territory - which, 
in turn, had inherited the legal personality of the Russian Empire in 1917 in state practice - and all the other former Soviet Republics 
agreeing with the continuation, Russia should be seen as the legal continuation state of the USSR. Müllerson (n 145) 474 and 476. I 
would add that all the constituent Republics - SSRs - representing the late USSR that commented on the issue supported Russia’s 
continuation state status, which was subsequently widely recognized in state practice. Therewith, I concur with Müllerson.  
For a critical take on the ‘continuation state’ proposal, see O. Zadorozhnii, International Law in the Relations of Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation (Kyiv, 2016) at 112-113.  
860 Letter of the President of the Russian Federation to the UN Secretary-General (n 229). Similarly, in the late 1940s, after considerable 
debate, the UN concluded that India could continue British India’s legal personality, including its UN membership. Pakistan on the 
other hand was required to apply for membership as a new state. 
According to Michael Scharf, the international community has considered six factors when determining whether a potential successor 
has inherited the legal personality of the dissolving entity. The successor has to have a substantial majority of the former state’s territory, 
population, resources, and armed forces, as well as the control over most central government institutions and has to have entered into 
an agreement on the continuation of legal personality with the other components of the former State. M. Scharf, ‘Musical Chairs: The 
Dissolution of States and Membership in the United Nations’ 28(1) Cornell International Law Journal (1995) 29-69 at 67. 
861 Although many countries did re-establish diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation, such as the US (on 31 December 1991) 
and the People’s Republic of China (on 27 December 1991).  
862 Guidelines (n 4). For more, see subchapter 4.3. 
863 The Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (n 13) form the legal basis for inter-state relations in Europe, 
reaffirming the legal principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes and inviolability of borders.  
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commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all 
questions concerning state succession and regional disputes;864 and commitment to adhere to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.865  
The most comprehensive and relevant of these commitments to the application of uti possidetis were 
the inviolability of borders and the CSCE framework for the rights of national groups and minorities. 
This framework was updated in the early 1990s, with the most important documents being the 
Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in June 1990,866 and the Report of the 
CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in July 1991.867 While there is no precise, binding 
definition, within the CSCE framework, the term ‘national minority’ usually means a population that 
is a numerical minority within a state but might share the same ethnicity as the population constituting 
a majority in another state.868 The rights enshrined in the CSCE instruments include the right to 
effective participation in public affairs,869 and to maintain and develop their culture in every aspect 
without any attempts to assimilation.870 They obliged the successor states to take the necessary 
measures to protect the separate identity of national minorities, taking into account their historical 
and territorial circumstances.871 Finally, the CSCE’s 1991 Report noted that ‘[i]ssues concerning 
national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments 
concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern 
and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State’.872 
Finally, the SRs of the SFRY were given the strictest criteria. In addition to the above-listed 
conditions of the EC Guidelines, their recognition was further contingent by the EC Declaration of 
Yugoslavia.873 It demanded that the SRs wishing to be recognized had to apply by a deadline to a 
special Arbitration Commission and accept the provisions laid down in the Draft Convention - 
                                                 
864 Guidelines (n 4). 
865 N 225. This condition was due to the USSR’s nuclear weapons being located in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.  
866 Document on the Human Dimension (n 826). According to Chandra, the 1990 Document ‘is still regarded as the basic OSCE 
standard-setting instrument concerning minority rights’. R. Chandra (Ed), Minority: Social and Political Conflict, Volume-1: Racial 
and Ethnic Minorities (Isha Books, 2004) at 278. 
867 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva, 19 July 1991. While the CSCE instruments are only 
politically binding, the successor states were also bound by similar provisions adopted by the UN and the Council of Europe. Moreover, 
while the CSCE instruments do not contain complaint mechanisms (Chandra (n 866) 178) the commitments were made legally binding 
by the EC Guidelines.  
868 Chandra (n 866) 282. 
869 This included the right to participate ‘in decision-making or consultative bodies’ that ‘constitutes an important element of effective 
participation in public affairs’. Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (n 867) Chapter III. 
870 Ibid. 
871 Ibid. Chapter IV.  
872 Ibid. Chapter II. Italics mine.  
873 N 224. 
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especially those related to human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups - under consideration 
by the Conference on Yugoslavia.874 Furthermore, they had to support the continuation of the 
Conference and the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council. 
Eventually, all the SSRs and the SRs were recognized independent after fulfilling the criteria 
applicable to their case. Concurrently, the dissolutions completely disregarded the lower-level units. 
In both the USSR and the SFRY, the ruling Party had thought it had solved the national question via 
ethnofederalism. However, this solution only worked in a multinational federation with a one-party 
authoritarian system. Thus, the legal legacy that the socialist federations bequeathed to their successor 
states was the ethnofederalization of national question. In 1991-1992, those SSRs and SRs that had 
been ethnofederalized during the socialist era inherited both the uti possidetis borders and the socialist 
solution, which was hard to reconcile with their newly founded and unqualified independence.  
Therewith, the ethnic disputes in the successor states of the USSR and the SFRY were affected by 
both external and internal policies. The external policy was imposed upon them by the international 
community, which coordinated its recognition policy based on a set of criteria. The internal policy 
was the way in which the successor states decided to reconcile their ethnofederal history to the 
external policy, and it determined the outcome of a given ethnic conflict. Next, I locate the 
ethnofederalized SSRs and SRs into a chart with three possibilities for them to adopt for their internal 
policy: retention, rejection, or distortion of their ethnofederal legacy. The main conclusion is that all 
but one of the ethnofederalized successor states that chose to retain meaningful parts of the 
ethnofederal arrangement were spared of armed separatism. In contrast, none of those that chose to 
reject their ethnofederal legacy could avoid ethnic conflicts with their former subunits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
874 The Hague Peace Conference convened from 7 September to 5 November 1991 and gathered the representatives of all the SRs and 
the EC member states. See more on subchapter 4.3.2. 
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Table 1: The External and Internal Policies of the Successor States of the Socialist Federations 
 
My claim is that uti possidetis was applied in an inadequate manner by the outside states in relation 
to the ethnofederalized SSRs and SR. None of them were seen to have any legal obligations towards 
their subunits per se, although they were seen to have obligations in relation to their minorities in 
general. The problem was that the former ethnofederal subunits were left in the no-man’s land 
between peoplehood and minority status. This is a crucial distinction: for example, the UN Human 
Rights Committee has determined that there is no right to self-determination for minorities, only for 
peoples, and that the ICCPR Article 1 is applicable to peoples and Article 27 for minorities.875 As 
minorities lack any explicit right to autonomy, some scholars have advanced that this right could be 
deduced from the right to effective participation in public life, which is manifested in several minority 
                                                 
875 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 23’ Art. 27 (Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994. However, 
confusingly the Badinter Commission stated in Opinion No. 2 that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have rights under Art. 1. 
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documents before and after the socialist federal dissolutions.876 Nevertheless, there was no explicit 
right to autonomy for a minority in 1991. 
The socialist ethnofederal system used unusual terminology, e.g., terming the ASSRs and the SAPs 
‘nationalities’. The status of a ‘nationality’ was less than peoplehood - which amounted to the right 
to external self-determination when the federations dissolved in the early 1990s - but more than just 
a status of a minority or and ethnic group, who did not receive any self-governing territorial rights. 
For example, in the SFRY setting, Albanians in Kosovo received the ‘nationality’ status, whereas the 
Albanians in Macedonia did not receive the same ‘constituent’ element of the state, territorial rights, 
or indeed any collective rights as a group.877 Moreover, the subunits thought of national rights 
according to the ethnofederal logic, and many of them attempted to unilaterally promote themselves 
to the higher level of self-determination just prior to the dissolutions of the socialist federations.878 
Thus, the international recognition policy produced various different solutions on how to address their 
former autonomous units and minorities, producing equally various results. Eventually, the 
international community did successfully ensure the rights of minorities but failed to do this in 
relation to the internal self-determination rights of the lower-level territorial autonomies. 
Paradoxically, the rights of minorities were, in some cases, strengthened by the dissolution, while the 
rights of the recognized national groups with territorial autonomy were curtailed or outright ignored.  
To conclude, the response of the newly-independent state authorities to their ethnofederal legacy and 
the automatic challenge that this posed to their central authority would chart their future course as 
nations for years to come. Eventually, all the ethnofederalized former SSRs and the SR experienced 
calls for the continuation of autonomy or outright separatist movements of varying intensity. The 
ones that chose to negotiate and to continue the autonomous status of the subunits were able to secure 
a peaceful balance between the right to internal self-determination and territorial integrity. The ones 
who chose to revoke previous autonomies were succumbed to separatist violence and lost the ensuing 
                                                 
876 Such as the 1990 Copenhagen Document (n 826), Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (n 867), 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UNGA 47/135 (n 588), 
and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (n 561). In 2010, the Independent Expert on minority issues 
stated in her report to the Human Rights Council that public participation ‘entails participation in governmental bodies, the judiciary 
and other agencies of the criminal justice system, decentralized and local forms of government, consultation mechanisms, as well as 
through cultural or territorial autonomy arrangements’ (A/HRC/13/23, para. 32). In the ethnofederal context, ‘effective participation’ 
manifested differently, as the lover level subunits were used to substantial representational quotas, often complimented with veto right.  
877 M. Koinova, ‘Why Do Ethnonational Conflicts Reach Different Degrees of Violence? Insights from Kosovo, Macedonia, and 
Bulgaria during the 1990s’ 15(1) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (2009) 84-108 at 92-93. 
878 For example, Kosovo declared itself as an SR on 2 July 1990 and Transnistria as a SSR on 2 September 1990.  
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conflicts because of foreign intervention.879 However, these cases did not end favourably for the 
separatists either, as they have been stuck with their unrecognized status and remain heavily 
dependent on the patron state. Thus, in relation to the right to self-determination, the version of uti 
possidetis that was applied in the socialist federal dissolutions ended up achieving the worst of all 
possible scenarios, with negative effects on most of the successor states affected by ethnofederalism 
and on most of the minorities alike.880  
This Chapter progresses in the following manner: I first account for how the ethnofederalized 
successor states responded to the grievances of their subunits in all the three relevant trajectories - the 
continuation state, the SSRs, and the SRs - creating in the process three versions of self-determination 
in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav spaces. I then analyze how they legally performed in relation to 
the version of self-determination that was required of them and how the former subunits viewed this 
relationship. Finally, I present my conclusions on the right to self-determination and the application 
of uti possidetis in the socialist federal dissolutions.  
5.2 The Continuation State: The Russian Federation 
5.2.1 Russia and the First Version of the Right to Self-Determination 
When listing the legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions, the Russian Federation is a natural 
place to start as it was the most ethnofederalized unit at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR. 
However, it is also a strange case for the application of uti possidetis, as it was only applicable to 
Russia to a more limited extent - while uti possidetis determined the other SSRs’ borders with Russia, 
it was not otherwise applicable to Russia as it did not need outside recognitions. Therefore, the 
Russian decision to retain the Soviet ethnofederal system, as well as its subsequent dissolving in the 
2000s, do not stem from a clear international legal obligation.881 This makes the Russian version of 
self-determination manifestly different from the other ethnofederalized SSRs. 
That being said, the Russian conception of the right to self-determination remains highly relevant for 
several reasons. First, as I accounted for in subchapter 4.1, the USSR and Russia have significantly 
contributed to the evolution of the right to self-determination since the concept’s very inception in 
                                                 
879 By Russia in the cases of Georgia and Moldova, and by Armenia in Azerbaijan. 
880 A case could be made that an established territorial autonomy should be guaranteed under international law. However, my argument 
is that in the case of federal state dissolution and the application of uti possidetis, the right to internal self-determination is already 
guaranteed under international law (see Chapter 6).  
881 The Russian Federation was, naturally, bound by the treaty obligations of the USSR in relation to minority protection, but it did not 
have an obligation to continue its territorial autonomies as I claim the other federalized SSRs had.  
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1917, and Russian interpretations have thus an enhanced weight in the international community. 
Second, Russian views on self-determination resonate directly beyond its borders, and it has, on 
several occasions promoted its federal structure as a model for internal self-determination in the post-
Soviet space.882 Third, as a constitutionally multinational federal state, it is especially important for 
Russia to find a consistent balance between the right to self-determination and the territorial integrity 
of states. Fourth, as the official continuation state of the USSR, Russia has a unique attitude to its 
Soviet past that the other former SSRs do not share. This has greatly affected Russian stance towards 
ethnofederalism, and its international law doctrine on self-determination remains heavily influenced 
by its Soviet legacy. Finally, Russia has a negotiation history with ethnofederal relations,883 which 
surely affected its decision to pursue this path again in the 1990s. 
5.2.2 Russian National Question  
Russia was ethnofederalized in the early 1920s when the lands formerly under Russian imperial rule 
gained autonomy as SSRs and received demarcated borders that became their internationally 
recognized borders in 1991. The ethnofederalization process continued, and eventually, the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) consisted of 20 ASSRs and one Autonomous Oblast 
(AO) at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR.884 Just like all the other ethnofederalized SSRs, 
these internal divisions were imposed upon Russia by the federal center. However, unlike the others, 
Russia accepted the ethnofederal model as a legitimate way to handle the national question. Whereas 
most of the former SSRs with ASSRs and AOs discredited the Soviet past, Russia embraced and 
retained the Soviet ethnofederal system.885 This decision may have well saved the country from 
disintegration during the chaotic 1990s,886 and has dramatically affected the Russian understanding 
of the notions of internal and external self-determination. The restoration of ethnofederalism was 
                                                 
882 Apparent for instance in the Russian federalization suggestion for Moldova in the form of the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ in 2003 (n 
1267), the Russian Written Statement in the Kosovo hearings at the International Court of Justice in 2009 (Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of lndependence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request 
for advisory opinion), Written Statement by the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009), and in the federalization plans for Ukraine in the 
form of the Minsk Agreements in 2014-2015 (n 1297-1298).  
883 First, in 1922 the USSR was established by a Union Treaty of allegedly equal negotiation partners of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (Treaty of the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, n 167). In 1991, President Gorbachev 
tried to re-legitimize and save the USSR by a renewed Union Treaty, which proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination and 
that all the SSRs and the ASSRs possess and retain their sovereignty in the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. Treaty on the Union 
of Sovereign States (n 512) Part 1. Basic Principles. 
884 All the ASSRs apart from the Bashkir ASSR (founded by agreement between the RSFSR and local elites) were creations of Moscow. 
P. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton, 2007) at 57. 
885 This is understandable, as the last Soviet census of 1989 identified 101 ethnic groups within Russia, with 39 groups numbering 
more than 100 000.  
886 See more in H. Hale, ‘The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell’ 3(1) 
Perspectives on Politics (2005) 55-70. 
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done in phases: in 1990-1992 by making amendments to the 1978 RSFSR Constitution, in March 
1992 by the signing of the Federal Treaty, followed by the new Russian Constitution in December 
1993, and by a long process of drafting individual power-sharing treaties with the federal units in 
1992-1998. 
5.2.3 The Final Ethnofederal Developments of the Soviet Era, 1990-1991 
From spring 1990 onwards, the USSR President Gorbachev pushed through a series of constitutional 
changes for a complete overhaul of the federal system in preparation for his grand project, New Union 
Treaty.887 These ground-breaking changes promoted the ASSRs close-to-equals with the SSRs in the 
Soviet constitutional system.888 At this point, the RSFSR President Yeltsin decided to use the ASSRs 
as a political weapon against the federal center and Gorbachev. By allowing the subunits to demand 
even more autonomy within the RSFSR, Yeltsin initiated a process known as the ‘parade of 
sovereignties’ where all the SSRs and many of the ASSRs declared themselves to be sovereign.889 
An important distinction to make here is that in Russia all the ASSRs apart from Chechnya and 
Tatarstan proclaimed sovereignty within the framework of the RSFSR. In contrast, most of the SSRs 
were aiming for independence from the USSR.  
After a Union-wide referendum had affirmed the will of the Soviet people to preserve the USSR,890 
Gorbachev proceeded to negotiate the New Union Treaty with the SSRs and the ASSRs. However, 
Yeltsin was making preparations for Russian independence via changes to the 1978 RSFSR 
Constitution. In May 1991, a constitutional amendment upgraded the ASSRs into the ‘Republics’ of 
the RSFSR.891 In July 1991, four of the five titular ethnic AOs of RSFSR - Adygea, Altai, Khakassia, 
and Karachay-Cherkessia - were upgraded into Republics as well, while the lowest level ethnic units 
were upgraded to an equal status with ethnic Russian regional units.892 
In August 1991, the New Union Treaty process collapsed after a coup attempt by the Communist 
Party hardliners, which resulted in Yeltsin becoming a de facto ruler of the USSR. After meeting with 
                                                 
887 See subchapter 3.7.5. 
888 Four momentous laws were passed in April 1990 (n 533). 
889 In August 1991, Yeltsin encouraged the Russian ASSRs to ‘take as much independence as you can hold on to’ (n 482). Consequently, 
16 of the RSFSR’s 20 ASSRs and some of the AOs of the USSR to proclaim their sovereignty in a short time. 
890 Referendum on the Preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, held on 17 March 1991. ‘Yes’ vote won by 77,85%, 
with over 80% turnout.  
891 On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 24 May 1991. 
892 On Amendments and Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in Connection 
with the Transformation of Autonomous Regions into Soviet Socialist Republics within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 
3 July 1991. See more on J. Hughes, ‘Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation’ in J. Hughes and G. Sasse (Eds), 
Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict (Routledge, 2014) 36-68 at 47. 
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the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991, Yeltsin proclaimed that the USSR ‘no longer 
exists’.893 Gorbachev resigned on 25 December, and the next day, the Supreme Soviet formally 
dissolved itself and the USSR. Although all the constituent 15 SSRs achieved external self-
determination via internationally-recognized independence, for the ethnofederalized ones, the 
negotiations over the right to self-determination were just beginning.  
Before and after the dissolution, the RSFSR parliament produced draft constitutions to settle the 
national question of independent Russia - whether to retain the federal system and in what form. The 
first draft prepared by the Rumiantsev Constitutional Commission proposed to abolish the 
ethnofederal framework by erasing the distinction between Republics (former ASSRs and AOs) and 
the lower ethnic Russian administrative units and creating about 50 new zemli (lands) with equal 
status and without ethnic labels.894 The proposal echoed the Soviet schism over the subject in the 
early 1920s.895 Notwithstanding, this was perhaps an unrealistic suggestion given the constitutional 
changes made in 1990-1991. After the Republics vigorously protested the draft, Yeltsin, parliament, 
and the governments of the Republics and the lower units started to negotiate on the continuation of 
the asymmetric ethnofederal structure.  
5.2.4 The 1992 Federal Treaty 
The 1992 Federal Treaty896 was signed between the Russian government and 18 of the 20 Republics 
of the RSFSR,897 with the main objective to prevent the disintegration of the newly independent 
Russian Federation. In effect, the Treaty cemented the federal asymmetry and secured the loyalty of 
the Republics by providing them with extensive autonomy. It used the Soviet terminology when 
proclaiming the Republics to be ‘sovereign republics within the Russian Federation’. The Republics 
had the right to their own constitutions, wide autonomy over their internal budgets and foreign trade, 
and the right to use their natural resources and land.898 
A month after the signing of the Federal Treaty, a constitutional amendment made the Treaty a part 
of the applicable 1978 RSFSR Constitution and declared federalism as one of the ‘unshakable 
                                                 
893 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (n 216). On 21 December, eight more heads of state 
joined the CIS (Alma-Ata Declaration (n 230)). 
894 Hughes (n 892) at 46. 
895 See subchapter 3.2.4. 
896 Treaty of Federation, signed in Moscow on 31 March 1992.  
897 The two Republics not signing were Tatarstan and Chechnya. The Treaty consisted of three separate treaties, one with Republics, 
one with ethnic Russian administrative units, and one with the lower-level ethnic AOs and AOks. Hughes (n 892) 47. 
898 As summarized by Hughes, the ‘republics were now treated as empowered autonomous units within the federation, while the regions 
were effectively dealt with as administrative units under the vertical power of a unitary state’. Ibid. 
167 
 
foundations of the constitutional system’.899 However, national tensions continued, and law on 3 July 
1992 froze the existing internal borders of the RSFSR and demanded that any outstanding territorial 
disputes within the Federation had to be solved by 1 July 1995.900 
5.2.5 The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation 
After Yeltsin’s draft Constitution for the Russian Federation was approved in a national referendum, 
it became effective in December 1993.901 The Constitution took back some of the powers of the 
Republics from the Federal Treaty by endorsing partially the Rumiantsev draft’s suggestions on the 
equalization of the status of the subunits. The Federal Treaty’s provisions were contained in Article 
11, but only up to the extent that they conform to the other parts of the Constitution. The references 
to the Republic’s ‘sovereignty’ were omitted, and all subunits were given equal status as ‘subjects of 
the federation’.902 Finally, Article 3 stated that the Russian Federation rests on the sovereignty of the 
whole people of Russia (rossiiane), not on the sovereignty of separate Russian (russkii) peoples.903 
The Constitution reproduced the Soviet asymmetrical federal system. There were three ethnofederal 
units - 20 Republics (former ASSRs and AOs), one remaining AO, and 10 AOks904 - and three 
predominantly Russian administrative units - krais (territories), oblasts (areas), and federal cities.905 
Yet, the new Constitution failed to solve the inherent inconsistency with the equality of the federal 
units. Every federal subject was given a right to have its head, parliament and the constitutional court, 
and all the subjects had equal rights in relations with federal government bodies and two delegates 
each in the Federation Council, the upper house of the Federal Assembly. However, the actual 
asymmetry between the Republics and the rest of the subjects was visible in several articles. For 
example, the Republics have a right to have their state language (Article 68) and their constitution, 
while the other subjects may have only a charter (Article 5).  
                                                 
899 On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 21 April 1992, 
Art. 1. 
900 Feldbrugge (n 488) 188. 
901 Referendum on the Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993. The draft was approved by 58,43% of the 
vote, with 54,4% turnout. Seven Republics returned majority votes against the Constitution, and Tatarstan boycotted the referendum. 
902 Ibid. Arts. 5 and 65. The same levelling to ‘subjects of the federation’ took place in the late USSR between the SSRs and the ASSRs 
according to Law on the Division of Powers (n 497) Section 1(3). 
903 ‘The multinational people of the Russian Federation shall be the vehicle of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian 
Federation’. Ibid. Art. 3. 
904 Six of these have been abolished since 2005. The four remaining AOks are Chukotka, Khanty-Mansi, Nenets, and Yamalo-Nenets.  
905 1993 Constitution, Art. 65(1). In sum, Republics, AOs, and AOks are determined and named primarily on the basis of the minority 
populations concentrated in the region. In contrast, oblasts and krais are generic administrative divisions and have no particular basis 
for their formation. Krais usually contain an autonomous oblast or okrug. 
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Some of Yeltsin’s aides were jubilant about the 1993 Constitution having solved the national 
question. For instance, soon after the Constitution’s adoption, Yeltsin's nationalities adviser Emil 
Paen proclaimed that ‘[f]ederalism [is] no longer an issue’ in Russia.906 Nevertheless, Yeltsin was 
aware that the balance between the Republic’s ‘sovereignty’ and the Federation’s territorial integrity 
had not been found. While Article 72 broadly delimited powers in favour of the federal government, 
Article 11 stated that the division of powers between the center and the subjects may be regulated by 
‘treaties’, without giving mechanism for this treaty-making. The Republics were most keen federal 
subjects to signing these treaties. As commented by the Bashkorstan President Rakhimov in 1994: 
‘I feel that if we actually want to have a truly federative state, Russia must sign bilateral treaties with all 
the republics forming the Federation […]. There are those among us who want to make the republics, 
oblasts and krais completely equal political. That cannot be allowed […]. In Sverdlovsk oblast, for 
example, the nationality question does not arise’.907 
5.2.6 The Power-Sharing Treaties 
To summarize, after having given the Republics extensive autonomous rights during the late Soviet 
era and in the 1992 Federal Treaty, and then scaling these rights back somewhat in the 1993 
Constitution, Russia planned to balance the situation with individual treaties with the subunits, taking 
into account the unique circumstances of each case. Thus, from 1994 to 1998, Russia proceeded to 
write a series of more detailed and individually designed power-sharing treaties with the Republics 
and the lower-level units. The historical parallels to this were the negotiations over the Union Treaty 
(1922) and the New Union Treaty (1991) between the federal center and the subunits. 
In general, the power-sharing treaties reproduced the 1993 Constitution’s Article 72 formulation that 
limited the Republics’ autonomy. However, some Republics were given better treaties than others. 
Tatarstan was conceded the most extensive autonomy, with its power-sharing treaty establishing a 
co-sovereignty with Russia.908 The first sections declared Tatarstan a ‘State’ that is ‘united with the 
Russian Federation’, on the basis of the Russian and Tatarstan Constitutions and the Treaty. The 
Constitution of Tatarstan (November 1992) declared its laws to be ‘supreme’ (Article 59), proclaimed 
it to be ‘a sovereign state, a subject of international law associated to the Russian Federation’ (Article 
                                                 
906 Quoted in R. Ahdied, Russia’s Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996 (Penn, 
2010) at 133. 
907 Quoted in S. Solnick, ‘Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation’ in B. Rubin and J. Snyder (Eds), Post-
Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (Routledge, 2005) 54-74 at 66. 
908 Tatarstan is one of the most populous Republics in Russia and has a long and complicated history of national relations with Moscow, 
including several secessionist attempts and uprising, as well as at times preferential treatment. For example, during the Soviet-era, 
Tatars were one of the chosen few nationalities that could continue their studies in their language after primary school.  
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61), and reserved the right to conduct independent foreign relations, to hold exclusive ownership of 
natural resources and to restrict military service of its citizens to its territorial jurisdiction.909 
These constitutional provisions were in flagrant disagreement with the 1993 Constitution and 
challenging to reconcile with the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over its whole territory. After 
Tatarstan, treaties became less generous, although the economic leverage of Bashkortostan and 
Yakutia meant they could also extract considerable powers.910  
A presidential decree on 12 March 1996 established a standardized format and a specific vocabulary 
for the future power-sharing treaties. Interestingly, it was only in April 1997 that the Russian Duma 
legitimized the process of signing the power-sharing treaties.911  
5.2.7 The Chechnya Debacle 
While the power-sharing treaties were successful in keeping Russia intact, a major mistake was made 
in relation to the former Chechen-Ingush ASSR.912 Chechnya was the only ASSR that had declared 
outright independence from Russia (on 2 November 1991) and refused to sign the 1992 Federal 
Treaty. The Ingush minority feared Chechnyan secession and declared independence within the 
RSFSR as the Republic of Ingushetia on 4 June 1991. This was codified into the RSFSR Constitution 
in December 1992.913 
Yeltsin’s refusal to recognize a former ASSR independent is understandable. Russia had another 19 
of these units, and it could have ignited a chain reaction leading to the fragmentation of the Federation. 
However, his failure to negotiate with Chechen leadership led to the First Chechen War (December 
1994 to August 1996), after which Russia had to sign a ceasefire.914 The unilaterally declared and 
unrecognized ‘Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’915 suffered from economic chaos, instability, and 
                                                 
909 Quoted in Hughes (n 892) 52.  
910 The Bashkortostan treaty describes it as ‘a sovereign state within the Russian Federation’ (Art. 1) and accords its Constitution an 
‘equal status’ with the Russian Constitution in the regulation of joint relations (Art. 2). Furthermore, Bashkorstan was the only Republic 
in addition to Tatarstan to gain a right to establish a national bank. The Yakutia treaty describes it as a state ‘conforming to the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) within the Russian Federation’. Ibid. 
911 Federal Law on the Principle and Order of the Delimitation of Jurisdiction and Powers between the Organs of State power of the 
Russian Federation and the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, 25 April 1997. 
912 Two ASSRs in the RSFSR that had two nations (Chechen-Inhush and Kabardino-Balkar) and the Dagestan ASSR had nine nations. 
913 On Amendments to Article 71 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation, 10 December 1992. 
914 It is telling of the scope of the Chechen ‘independence’ aspirations that the Chechen separatists under Johar Dudaev continued to 
insist right up to his death in 1995 that Chechnya would be happy to remain a member of the redesigned USSR but not of Russia. R. 
Sakwa and A. Pavković, ‘Secession as a Way of Dissolving Federations: The USSR and Yugoslavia’ in P. Radan and A. Pavković 
(Eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession (2016) 147-170 at 151. 
915 Throughout its existence, it was recognized only by the Taliban rogue government of Afghanistan, which the Chechen President 
Maskhadov rejected as he considered Taliban illegitimate. A. Kullberg, ‘The Background of Chechen Independence Movement III: 
The Secular Independence Movement’, The Eurasian Politician, 1 October 2003. 
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Islamist extremism throughout the 1990s. Finally, in August 1999, an Islamist insurgency movement 
from Chechnya infiltrated on the Russian side of the border in the Republic of Dagestan, igniting the 
Second Chechen War. After the capital Grozny was captured in February 2000, the Chechen regime 
fell apart, although a low-level insurgency movement continued. In 2003, a referendum approved a 
new Constitution that reintegrated Chechnya to the Russian Federation with limited autonomy.916 As 
attested in the encompassing amount of cases against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights, 
Chechnya remains in a way a frozen conflict.917 
5.2.8 Dismantling Russian Federalism 
By the summer of 1998, 46 of the 89 subjects of the federation had concluded power-sharing treaties. 
However, only the treaties with key Republics - Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia - actually 
provided for a significant devolution of powers. The future president Vladimir Putin got his first 
experiences dealing with the Republics in July 1996, as he was recruited by the Head of the 
Presidential Administration Anatoly Chubais to run the Control Division that handled relations with 
the regions and the Republics. From the center’s perspective, the most important issue settled by the 
power-sharing treaties was the supremacy of federal law over regional law.918 The main task of the 
Control Division was to ensure compliance with the vertical command line from the Presidential 
Administration. In 1997, it was reported that many regional laws conflicted with federal laws and the 
Constitution, a phenomenon that Chubais termed ‘legal separatism’.919 In January 1999, Prime 
Minister Primakov called for the reforming of the federal system and the bilateral treaties.920 
As summarized by Lynch, the Russian Federation that Putin took over as a President in 1999 
‘resembled at best a confederation rather than a unitary state or even a federation’.921 However, this 
began to change from the summer of 1999 onwards. In June, Duma passed a law stipulating that all 
                                                 
916 Constitution of the Chechen Republic, adopted on 27 March 2003. 
917 After Russia ratified the European Convention of Human Rights in 1998, it has been heavily involved in numerous cases, many of 
which are related to the situation in Chechnya. For example, in 2019, the Court dealt with 9238 applications concerning Russia, of 
which 8793 were declared inadmissible or struck out. It delivered 198 judgments (concerning 445 applications), 186 of which found 
at least one violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Quoted in European Court of Human Rights, Press Country 
Profile - Russia, updated February 2020.  
918 According to Art. 76 of the Constitution, ‘1. On issues under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws 
and federal laws shall be adopted. These shall have direct force on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. 2. On issues under the 
joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, in addition to federal laws, laws, and 
other normative legal acts of constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be issued, which are adopted in accordance with those 
federal laws. 3. Federal laws may not conflict with federal constitutional laws’. 
919 T. Frommeyer, ‘Power Sharing Treaties in Russia’s Federal System’ 21(1) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
Law Review (1999) 1-53 at 48. 
920 M. Chuman, ‘The Rise and Fall of Power-Sharing Treaties Between Center and Regions in Post-Soviet Russia’ 19(2) 
Demokratizatsiye (2011) 133-150 at 134. 
921 A. Lynch, ‘What Russia Will Be?’ Eurasian Futures, The American Interest, 25 October 2018. 
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the power-sharing treaties must be revised to comply with the Constitution by 2002. In May 2000, a 
territorial-administrative reconfiguration divided the subjects into seven new federal districts, each 
headed by a presidential plenipotentiary representative. In June 2000, a landmark case on the status 
of the power-sharing treaties in the Russian Constitutional Court struck down Bashkortostan’s 
electoral law, establishing an important de jure precedent that the Republic Constitutions must 
comply with the federal Constitution.922  
In the summer of 2001, a commission headed by Dmitri Kozak began to formulate a basic framework 
for relationships between federal, regional, and municipal governments, to centralize control. After 
the commission’s report on 20 May 2002, Putin adopted its findings as the basic policy for the division 
of power between the center and the regions.923 With the pressure from the Duma’s legislation, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision and President’s new policy line, the power-sharing treaties began to 
unravel one by one.924 From July 2001 to May 2003, 34 regions abolished their treaties. Some regions 
tried to resist,925 but the federal government kept the pressure on. In July 2003, a new federal law 
came into effect, stipulating that bilateral treaties should be revised under a new procedure or be 
abolished.926 Only Tatarstan and Bashkortostan continued renewal negotiations. By July 2005, all 
bilateral treaties became invalid, but Tatarstan was able to set forth a new treaty in 2007.927 Moreover, 
in relation to the lower-level units, since 2005, six out of the ten AOks have been abolished.928 
5.2.9 Conclusions 
Due to the continuation state status, under uti possidetis Russia had no special obligations towards its 
numerous ethnofederal subunits. Nevertheless, it chose continuity in its approach to the national 
question and transplanted the Soviet ethnofederal model into the 1993 Constitution. The Russian 
leaders felt that the national question had again been solved with the federal right to internal self-
determination. From the outset, however, this right was restricted. While the 1992 Federal Treaty 
                                                 
922 Decision 92-O, Russian Constitutional Court, 27 June 2000. 
923 Chuman (n 920) 144-145. 
924 The dismantling of the Russian federal system did not take place at the constitutional level - the power-sharing system was treaty-
based and largely outside the constitutional framework, so it could be reversed by simply abolishing the treaties. 
925 The Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia, the Oblasts of Chubash, Sverdlovsk, and Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai and 
Moscow City objected. 
926 On Amendments and Supplements to the Federal Law about General Principles for the Organization of Legislative and Executive 
Power Organs, 4 July 2003. The law was based on the basic concept of the Kozak commission. 
927 The Treaty had to be renewed every five years. It was in 2012, but not in 2017. This will reduce Tatarstan’s administrative autonomy 
to the same level as the other Republics. For example, Tatarstan will lose its Presidential institution by 2020. See more in 
<https://www.europeanforum.net/headlines/russia-revoking-tatarstan-s-autonomy>. 
928 These were Agin-Buryat, Evenk, Komi-Permyak, Koryak, Taymyr, and Ust-Orda Buryat AOks. They were demoted either as 
Okrugs or Districts without autonomic rights. 
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cemented the ethnofederal model, provided the subunits with encompassing autonomy, and 
proclaimed the ASSRs ‘sovereign republics’, the 1993 Constitution reversed these gains by curtailing 
the autonomies and replacing the term ‘sovereign’ by ‘subjects of the federation’.929 Moreover, unlike 
in the Soviet constitutional theory, the Constitution’s declaration of the right to self-determination to 
all peoples of Russia did not entail a right to secession. In the 1990s, the Russian Constitutional Court 
re-affirmed the interpretation that territorial integrity overrules a right to secession in the Russian 
Federation in Tatarstan (1992) and Chechnya (1995) cases.930 The Court reasoned that according to 
the Russian Constitution and international law doctrine, the whole people of a state alone had the full 
right to self-determination. A minority inhabiting a province was not seen as a ‘people’ with the right 
to have a state of their own but, at most, a right to internal self-determination within the Russian 
Federation. Finally, the developments in the last 20 years have both curtailed the number of the 
autonomous units, and the rights vested upon these units.  
Thus, I conclude that Russian autonomous subjects did experience a reduction of their rights after the 
dissolution. Unlike the USSR, which was a treaty federation with a constitutional right to secession, 
Russia is a constitutional federation where the constituent parts are considered to be part of a pre-
existing political entity and have no constitutional right to secede.931 Yet, according to uti possidetis, 
the requirements for the recognition of Russia’s bid to continue the existence of the USSR were very 
limited - to honor the borders of the other SSRs and to uphold the USSR’s legal obligations including 
minority protection.932 The Russian Federation has upheld these obligations and remains one of the 
more successful former SSRs in relation to its answer to the inherited national question - apart from 
the violent conflict with Chechnya that casts a shadow over Russian federalism.  
Next, I analyze the lower-level subunits’ right to self-determination in the context of the other 
ethnofederalized former SSRs and the SRs. The comparison between the SSRs is especially fruitful 
as their state structures were, in most cases, identical from 1924 to early 1990. However, after the 
                                                 
929 The same categorization concerning the ASSRs, took place in the 1990s when they became the ‘subjects’ of the USSR as well as 
part of their host SSR. See subchapter 3.7.4. 
930 J. Summers, ‘Russia and Competing Spheres of Influence: The Case of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ in M. Happold (Ed), 
International Law in a Multipolar World (Routledge, 2011) 91-113 at 109. 
931 Sakwa and Pavković (n 914) 154.  
932 In addition, in 1992, the Russian Federation joined the UN Declaration 47/135 (n 588), where it reaffirmed the rights of its ethnical 
minorities to cultural autonomy. In 1998, it signed a mostly analogous Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (n 561). According to the Convention, the signatories pledge to respect the rights of national minorities, to 
undertake to combat discrimination, to promote equality, to preserve and develop the culture and identity of national minorities, to 
guarantee certain freedoms in relation to access to the media, minority languages and education and to encourage the participation of 
national minorities in public life. Art. 25 of the Convention binds the member states to submit a report to the Council containing ‘full 
information on the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to the principles set out in this framework Convention’. 
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momentous decisions by the Soviet leadership to allow free national elections in the SSRs in 1990 
and to expand their internal autonomy considerably, the local elites began to redesign these 
institutions, including the relations between their ASSR or AO subunits. I begin with the former SSRs 
that retained the ethnofederal system, followed by those that outright rejected it.  
5.3 Ethnofederalism Retained: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine 
In addition to the special case of the Russian Federation, three former ethnofederalized SSRs chose a 
de facto retention of many aspects of the ethnofederal agreement, which in turn made their national 
relations a lot less confrontational than in the other SSRs with inherited subunits. As former SSRs, 
the second version of the right to self-determination in the post-dissolution framework is applicable. 
Apart from Russia, the recognition of the SSRs was contingent upon fulfilling the criteria of the EC 
Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR. The criteria included respecting the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights as stipulated in the UN Charter and the CSCE framework, guaranteeing 
the rights of national groups and minorities under the CSCE commitments, inviolability of the uti 
possidetis borders apart from common agreement, and commitment to arbitrate any regional or state 
succession disputes and to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.933 Therewith, the decisions 
of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine to retain the rights of their ethnofederal units need to be 
analyzed according to these criteria. 
5.3.1 Uzbekistan and Karakalpakstan 
Uzbekistan inherited one ASSR, Karakalpakstan. The area had a complex ethnofederal history: it was 
first created in 1925 as an AO within the Kazakh ASSR and transferred to the RSFSR in 1930. In 
1932, it was promoted to an ASSR. In 1936, it was transferred in this capacity to the SSR of 
Uzbekistan. During the rest of the Soviet era, Karakalpakstan enjoyed a constitutionally guaranteed 
meaningful autonomy as an ASSR within Uzbekistan.934 In April 1990, the autonomy of the ASSRs 
was promoted to a virtual equivalence with the SSRs in many areas. For example, they gained the 
right to secede with its host SSR or to remain an autonomous part of the USSR, with which it would 
then re-negotiate on its self-governing status.935 In addition, the term ASSR was abolished, and these 
units became direct subjects of the USSR. They remained a part of their host SSRs, but now based 
on free self-determination of peoples. Moreover, the ASSRs were now said to possess all state power 
                                                 
933 N 4 and n 225. 
934 Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on 19 April 1978, Part VI. 
935 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession (n 489).  
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on their territory apart from powers expressly transferred to the USSR or to the host SSR.936 Finally, 
the law introduced a concept of contractual relations between the SSRs and the ASSRs, stating that 
the relations between them are to be determined by the treaties and conventions they conclude within 
the Soviet legal framework.937 This was the legal position of Karakalpakstan at the moment of the 
dissolution of the USSR and the application of uti possidetis in December 1991.938  
After functioning at the interim period under its SSR Constitution, Uzbekistan promulgated a new 
Constitution on 8 December 1992. It reproduced the ethnofederal status of Karakalpakstan with a 
comparable level of self-governance. The former ASSR was called sovereign and titled the ‘Republic 
of Karakalpakstan’.939 It received a right to have a Constitution,940 its territory could not be altered 
without its consent, and the Republic ‘shall be independent in determining its administrative and 
territorial structure’.941 Karakalpakstan has extensive autonomy in creating its local institutions,942 
and its relations with Uzbekistan ‘shall be regulated by treaties and agreements’ concluded between 
the two and any disputes ‘shall be settled by the way of reconciliation’.943 Finally, reminiscent from 
the Soviet federal theory, Karakalpakstan has the right to secede on the basis of the referendum, 
although Uzbekistan’s veto right substantially qualifies this.944 All that being said, the reality of an 
authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan can, at times, have unexpected consequences for the functioning 
of the constitutional order in the country. Unlike in the Soviet-era, Karakalpakstan can no longer 
appeal to the federal authorities for the actions of Uzbekistan.  
To conclude, just like in the late Soviet era, Karakalpakstan retaines the right to be called sovereign 
Republic, although the 1992 Constitution does not mention the right to self-determination. 
Karakalpakstan continues to have its Constitution, and any decisions concerning territorial alterations 
or Karakalpakstan’s rights are made via concurrent decision making, giving both Uzbekistan and 
Karakalpakstan mutual right to veto over changes. Finally, Karakalpakstan’s relations with 
                                                 
936 Law on the Division of Powers (n 497), Section 1(3). It left the status of AOs and the AOks vague. See Feldbrugge (n 488) 129. 
937 Ibid. Section 1(4). As Sakwa has noted, the ASSRs could now negotiate on equal terms with their host SSRs. Sakwa (n 503) 215. 
938 While Uzbekistan had already declared independence in August 1991, it was recognized independent only after the dissolution of 
the USSR. The EC recognized it on 16 January 1992. While the US recognized the country already on 25 December 1991, Washington 
stipulated that the establishment of diplomatic ties would depend on meeting its conditions on human rights and democracy, which was 
finally achieved on 15 March 1992. Uzbekistan became a UN member state on 2 March 1992. 
939 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on 8 December 1992, Art. 70. 
940 Ibid. Art. 71. 
941 Ibid. Art. 73. 
942 Ibid. Arts. 93, 107, and 109. However, this can be somewhat limited with Art. 71 stating that the ‘Constitution of the Republic of 
Karakalpakstan must be in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan’.  
943 Ibid. Art. 75. 
944 Ibid. Arts. 74 and 78. 
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Uzbekistan are regulated by treaties between the two. I conclude that Uzbekistan passed the second-
level requirements that the international community insisted upon for the SSRs, namely those listed 
in the EC Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR. Therewith, in terms of uti possidetis, the 
international recognition of Uzbekistan in 1992 was not premature.  
5.3.2 Tajikistan and Gorno-Badakhshan 
Tajikistan inherited one AO, Gorno-Badakhshan. The AO was first created in 1925 and in 1929 it 
was transferred to the newly-formed SSR of Tajikistan. Gorno-Badakhshan remained an AO 
throughout the Soviet era and even received additional territory in 1955.945 After the failed Soviet 
coup, Tajikistan declared independence in September 1991. However, a Civil War broke out between 
different clans almost instantly.946 Until 1994, Tajikistan operated under its 1978 SSR Constitution, 
which guaranteed the AO limited autonomy without any sovereign attributes.947 While the ASSRs 
were titled ‘states’ and direct subjects to the USSR, the AOs were ‘a part of union republics on the 
basis of the free self-determination of peoples’. Nevertheless, just like the ASSRs, they ‘possess the 
entirety of state power on their territory, except for the powers that they transfer to the jurisdiction of 
the USSR and union republics’.948 Moreover, the relations between the ASSRs and the AOs ‘are 
defined by treaties and agreements that are concluded within the framework of the USSR constitution, 
the constitutions of the union republics and autonomous republics, and this law’.949 This was the legal 
status of Gorno-Badakhshan at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR (December 1991).950  
Gorno-Badakhshan declared its independence at the start of the Tajik Civil War in May 1992, but 
later backed down and chose to negotiate with the central authorities. After the fighting had ceased, 
Tajikistan adopted a new Constitution on 6 November 1994, which has been amended twice since.951 
Under Chapter 7 of the Constitution, Gorno-Badakhshan retains the AO title. It is described as integral 
part of Tajikistan and while notably not sovereign, its territory cannot be changed without its 
consent.952 The AO has its parliament which has a right of ‘legislative initiative’.953 However, as 
                                                 
945 The Gharm Oblast was dissolved and divided between the AO and Tajikistan by a Soviet government decision. 
946 For more on this catastrophic war and the power-sharing agreements on the eventual peace treaty (1997) see D. Lynch, ‘The Tajik 
Civil War and Peace Process’ 4(4) Civil Wars (2001) 49-72. 
947 See subchapter 3.5.3. 
948 Ibid. quoted in Walker (n 187) 91. 
949 Ibid. 
950 Tajikistan had declared independence in September 1991. It was recognized independent by the EC on 16 January 1992 and by the 
US already on 25 December 1991. It became a UN member state on 2 March 1992.  
951 Constitution of Tajikistan, adopted on 6 November 1994, amended after referendums on 26 September 1999 and on 22 June 2003.  
952 Ibid. Art. 81. The AOs possessed the same veto right over their territory in the USSR Constitution.  
953 Ibid. Arts. 60 and 82. 
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pointed out by Roeder, this right can be rescinded by a constitutional amendment over which the AO 
has no veto.954 Moreover, according to the Constitution, the local AO authorities are directly 
accountable to the President of Tajikistan,955 and Gorno-Badakhshan has no right to secession from 
Tajikistan. However, one needs to keep in mind that even during the Soviet times, Gorno-Badakhshan 
was the lower-level AO, and it is within the ethnofederal logic that its rights are more limited to its 
ASSR counterparts, such as Karakalpakstan. In addition, Tajikistan is - together with Russia - the 
only former SSR that has maintained a second legislative chamber for regional representation,956 
reminiscent of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR.  
Tajikistan chose to retain many of the more meaningful parts of the Soviet ethnofederal arrangement 
in its relations with its inherited national question and Gorno-Badakhshan continues to enjoy many 
autonomous rights, including its parliament and regional representation in Tajikistan’s parliament.957 
Thus, I conclude that Tajikistan likewise passes the second-level requirements as portrayed in the EC 
Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR, and its international recognition in January 1992 was not 
premature. The relationship between the AO and the central government has remained sometimes 
confrontational since the 1994 Constitution, yet so far the subsequent constitutional amendments have 
enhanced the AO’s rights.958  
5.3.3 Ukraine and Crimea 
Ukraine inherited one ASSR, Crimea. It was a different from the other ASSRs in many aspects, 
contributing to Crimea’s complicated relationship with Ukraine throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
First, Crimea was made an ASSR only in February 1991, and this decision was not imposed by the 
USSR but initiated by Ukraine. Second, just like Karakalpakstan, Crimea had previously been a part 
of other SSR than Ukraine.959 Third, Crimea had a predominantly Russian population, making the 
Russian Federation a stakeholder in the former ASSR’s quest for self-determination.960 
                                                 
954 Roeder (n 884) 65. 
955 Constitution of Tajikistan (n 951) Arts. 78 and 80. 
956 The Parliament of Tajikistan was made bicameral after a constitutional amendment on 26 September 1999.  
957 In addition, according to Art. 53, one of the assistants to the Chair of Parliament must be a people’s deputy from Gorno-Badakhshan. 
958 N 951. 
959 While rare, there are other examples of this under the ethnofederal system. For instance, Gorno-Badakhshan was at first part of 
Turkestan ASSR, until transferred to the SSR of Tajikistan in 1929. Moldavian ASSR existed from 1924 to 1940 within the SSR of 
Ukraine, until it was disbanded and divided between Ukraine and Moldova in August 1940. Abkhazian SSR and Karelo-Finnish SSR 
were demoted from the ‘independent’ SSR status to becoming parts of Georgia and RSFSR as ASSRs in 1931 and 1956, respectively.  
960 The same kind of dynamic happened between Armenia and Azerbaijan in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh. See subchapter 5.4.1. 
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Crimea was originally created as a national unit in April 1919 when the Bolshevik government 
declared it as a SSR.961 The peninsula was occupied during the Russian Civil War by the White Army. 
On 18 October 1921, the Crimean territorial unit was re-established as the ‘Crimean ASSR of the 
RSFSR’,962 which was downgraded to an administrative Region without autonomy on 30 June 
1945.963 In this capacity, it was transferred from the RSFSR to the SSR of Ukraine on 19 February 
1954. The reasoning given to this transfer was the ‘integral character of the economy, the territorial 
proximity and the close economic ties between Crimea Province and the Ukraine Republic’, as well 
as the favouring stances of the RSFSR’s and Ukraine’s Presidiums.964 Moreover, the transfer was 
conditioned on Ukraine rebuilding the Region from its SSR budget, creating infrastructure including 
water and energy supply, and setting up recreational areas on the Western coast of the peninsula.965  
On 20 January 1991, a referendum was held in Crimea, with a posed question of ‘Are you in favor of 
the restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty?’. 
The motion was backed by 93,26% of the electorate, with over 80% participation.966 The ASSR status 
for Crimea was re-established on 12 February 1991. Notably, this decision was made not by Moscow 
but by Ukraine - it had declared its sovereignty and its laws’ precedence over the laws of the USSR 
already on 16 July 1990.967 Subsequently, at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR, Crimea had 
acquired all the rights of an ASSR.968  
As the host SSR, Ukraine inherited the ASSR of Crimea according to uti possidetis. However, from 
the very outset, Crimea displayed tendencies for more enhanced autonomy or even outright 
independence. On 26 February 1992, the Crimean parliament renamed the ASSR as the ‘Republic of 
Crimea’, and in March, the ‘Republican Movement of Crimea’ collected over 200 000 signatures in 
support for an independence referendum.969 There was a great pressure on the Ukrainian parliament 
                                                 
961 For more about Crimean history prior to 1945 (in Finnish), see T. Lundstedt and L. Hannikainen, ‘Ajavatko Venäjän perustelut 
Krimin valtaukselle sen kansainvälisoikeudellisen doktriinin umpikujaan?’ 45(4) Oikeus (2016) 445-465 at 445-446; and for the 
Russian claims of its ‘historical rights’ over the province see T. Lundstedt, ‘“Peaceful and “Remedial” Annexations of Crimea’, Russian 
Perspectives on International Law Symposium, Voelkerrechtsblog, 19 January 2018. <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/peaceful-and-
remedial-annexations-of-crimea/>. 
962 Renamed simply Crimean ASSR in the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (n 399) Art. 22. 
963 D. Heaney (ed), The Territories of the Russian Federation 2016 (Routledge, 2016) at 313. 
964 Quoted in K. Calamur, ‘Crimea: A Gift to Ukraine Becomes A Policial Flash Point’, National Public Radio, Parallels, 27 February 
2014, original in Pravda, 27 February 1954. 
965 A. Tatarenko, ‘The Legal Status and Modern History of Crimean Autonomy’, Verfassungsblog, 2 April 2014.  
966 ‘Chronology for Crimean Russians in Ukraine’, Minorities at Risk Project (2004).  
967 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, passed by the parliament of the Ukrainian SSR, 16 July 1990.  
968 The international community ignored Ukraine's original independence declaration in August 1991. However, the recognition by the 
RSFSR on 2 December was followed by the US on 25 December and by the EC member states by 31 December 1991.  
969 D. Litvinenko, ‘The Legal Aspects of Crimea’s Independence Referendum of 2014 With the Subsequent Annexation of the 
Peninsula by Russia’, Master’s Thesis, Harvard Extension School 2016 at 17. 
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to give concessions to Crimeans, as many of the former ethnofederal units had started armed uprisings 
in Azerbaijan,970 Georgia,971 and Moldova.972 Thus, in April, a Ukrainian law reinstated generous 
autonomy for Crimea,973 although this still amounted to less self-governance than the province had 
hoped for. Subsequently, on 5 May 1992, the Crimean parliament approved a new Constitution that 
declared Crimea independent, pending on its approval by an independence referendum to be held on 
2 August 1992. This referendum was never held, as the next day, the Crimean parliament backed off 
and passed a constitutional amendment that stated that Crimea was a ‘constituent part’ of Ukraine.974  
Nevertheless, the 1992 Constitution of Crimea gave it a very substantial self-governing status. For 
example, the local parliament and the council of ministers were stated to possess the highest 
legislative and governmental power, Russian was declared the state language and the Republic 
retained the right to have its state symbols.975 Additionally, just like in the late Soviet era, the 
Constitution proclaimed that while Crimea was a part of the state of Ukraine, it ‘defines its relation 
with it on the basis of a treaty and agreements’.976  
On 19 May, Crimea annulled its proclamation of independence, and after a set of prolonged 
negotiations, in July 1992 Ukraine and Crimea agreed on a compromise: Crimea would remain under 
Ukrainian jurisdiction, but with significant cultural and economic autonomy. Following, a new 
Ukrainian law on the status of the ‘Autonomous Republic of Crimea’ was adopted.977 It gave Crimea 
right to pass its laws as long as they did not contradict Ukraine’s laws, to adopt a budget and impose 
its tax system, to have its policies in environmental regulation, social protection, and culture, and to 
conduct local referendums on questions under the Autonomous Republic’s jurisdiction.978  
In 1993, the Crimean parliament took the initiative to introduce legislation that strengthened the 
autonomy, first by creating an office for the President of Crimea.979 The presidential elections on 16 
                                                 
970 See subchapter 5.4.1. 
971 See subchapter 5.4.3. 
972 See subchapter 5.4.2. 
973 Law On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 21 April 1992. 
974 P. Kolstø and A. Edemsky, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (Hurst & Company, 1995) at 194. 
975 Tatarenko (n 965). 
976 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, 5 May 1992, Art. 9.  
977 Reflecting the ongoing war of laws, Ukrainian law called Crimea ‘Autonomous Republic’, although the Crimean Constitution used 
the term ‘Republic’. This was finally settled in the 1998 Constitution of Crimea. J. Hylton, ‘Understanding the Constitutional Situation 
in Crimea’, Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog, 16 March 2014.  
978 ‘Autonomous Republic of Crimea’, Global Security (2018). <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/arc.htm>. 
979 In addition, Crimean Tatars received a quota of 14 seats in the parliament, and Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, and Greeks 
received one seat each, but this was a measure for one term only. N. Belitser, ‘The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement’, International Committee for Crimea, 20 February 2000. 
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January 1994 were won by Yuri Meshkov, who had campaigned for Crimean secession and union 
with the Russian Federation and who decreed for a new independence referendum right after taking 
office. Although the Ukrainian President vetoed several Crimean laws, relations remained peaceful, 
and negotiations continued over the extent of Crimean self-government. In May 1994, the Crimean 
parliament adopted a law ‘On Renewal of the Constitutional Basis of the Statehood of the Republic 
of Crimea’. It indicated a desire for more autonomy or even outright independence as it aimed to 
change the legal status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine and thus violated the Ukrainian Constitution 
and the April 1992 law on the status of Crimea.980 International involvement followed on 24 
November 1994, when the OSCE established ‘Mission to Ukraine’ with the task of supporting the 
work of experts on constitutional and economic matters and reporting on the Crimean situation.981  
After further failed negotiations with the Crimean authorities, in March 1995, the Ukrainian 
parliament passed a law on the status of Crimea.982 It repealed the 1992 Crimean Constitution, 
abrogated all Crimean laws and decrees contradicting Ukrainian legislation, and removed the post of 
President of Crimea as well as the incumbent Meshkov. The province’s name was changed from the 
‘Republic’ to the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea. 
Ukraine adopted a new Constitution in 1996. It proclaimed Ukraine a unitary state with sovereignty 
over all its territory and that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an integral part of the 
administrative and territorial structure of Ukraine.983 Under the Constitution, Crimea was still 
awarded many characteristics of a state: its representative organ entitled to adopt the Constitution for 
the Autonomous Republic and other legal acts; local government; emblem, hymn, flag, and state 
language (Russian).984 Yet, these rights were substantially limited - the Crimean Constitution had to 
be approved by the Ukrainian parliament, and all Crimean legislation had to be in conformity with 
the Ukrainian Constitution and legislation.985 Notably, the Constitution explicitly prohibits Crimean 
secession or any other territorial modification of the territory of Ukraine.986 
                                                 
980 A. Bloed (Ed), The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Basic Documents, 1993-1995 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997) at 788. 
981 The Mission was closed in 1999, and it had an essential contribution to the stabilization of the national relations between Ukraine 
and Crimea. <https://www.osce.org/mission-ukraine-1999-closed>. 
982 On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Act No. 0095, 17 March 1995.  
983 Constitution of Ukraine, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996, Arts. 2 and 133. 
984 Ibid. Title X, Art. 134-139. 
985 Ibid. Art. 135.  
986 Ibid. Arts. 92(13), 92(18), and 157. 
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Finally, Crimea adopted its new Constitution on 21 October 1998, concurring with the 1996 
Constitution of Ukraine. It was approved by Ukraine and became effective on 23 December 1998. 
According to the Constitution, Crimea exercises normative regulation over numerous areas.987 
Although the Crimean parliament selects the head of the Crimean government, this is subjected to a 
veto by the Ukrainian President.988 In sum, since 1998, Crimea has enjoyed a more limited but not 
insignificant territorial autonomy within Ukraine. 
With the Crimean population being predominantly Russian,989 the dispute between Ukraine and 
Crimea always had a third stakeholder just across the border. The separatist elements in Crimea found 
support from the Russian Duma, which in 1992 had declared the 1954 transfer of the ASSR from the 
RSFSR to Ukraine to have been illegal and in 1993 that Crimea was a part of Russia. Nevertheless, 
President Yeltsin did not press the issue, and the question over the sovereignty over Crimea was 
cemented with the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and 
Ukraine,990 where Russia unambiguously recognized Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty over Crimea 
in exchange for rights to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol Naval Base until 2017.991 After these 
issues had been settled, the advocating of a union between Russia and Crimea was significantly 
curtailed in Crimea and in Russia, although a few warning signs were visible before 2014.992  
To conclude, the interaction between Ukraine and Crimea displays a complex ethnofederal bargaining 
process. The resulting compromise provided the former ASSR with a meaningful autonomy, but was 
less than expected and thus contributed to separatist tendencies. Without Ukraine having upgraded 
                                                 
987 These areas are agriculture and forestry; land reclamation and mining; public works, crafts and trades; charity; city construction and 
housing management; tourism, hotel business, fairs; museums, libraries, theatres, other cultural establishments, historical and cultural 
preserves; public transportation, roadways, water supply; hunting and fishing; and sanitary and hospital services. Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, adopted on 21 October 1998, Art. 18(2). 
988 Ibid. Art. 36(1).  
989 According to the All-Ukrainian population census of 2001, Russians made up 58,3% of the population of Crimea. 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20111217151026/http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/>. 
990 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, signed in Kiev on 31 May 1997, 
entered into force on 1 April 1999. 
991 Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, signed on 28 May 1997 and entered into force on 12 July 
1999. The Treaty consisted of three separate treaties: Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Parameters of 
the Division of the Black Sea Fleet; Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the 
Presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine; and Agreement between the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of Ukraine on Payments Associated with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and Its Presence on the 
territory of Ukraine. A fourth treaty, Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was signed on 21 April 
and ratified on 27 April 2010. It extended the Russian lease over Sevastopol until 2042.  
992 In September 2008, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko accused Russia of giving out Russian passports to the 
population in Crimea and described it as a ‘real problem’ given Russia's declared policy of military intervention abroad to protect its 
citizens. <https://www.smh.com.au/world/cheney-urges-divided-ukraine-to-unite-against-russia-threat-20080906-4auh.html>. After 
the Russian recognition of independencies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008, the former Chairman of the Crimean 
parliament said then that he hoped that Russia would treat Crimea the same way as it had treated South Ossetia and Abkhazia. C. Levy, 
‘Russia and Ukraine in Intensifying Standoff’, The New York Times, 27 August 2009.  
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Crimean status to an ASSR in February 1991, the inhabitants would have been a simple territorially 
concentrated ethnic minority. However, as they held an ASSR status at the moment of the dissolution, 
they expected at least the same rights as their counterparts. The process of negotiating power-sharing 
treaties with the former ASSRs and AOs in the Russian Federation was a natural reference point.  
The 1992 Crimean Constitution stated that although a part of Ukraine, Crimea exercises its sovereign 
rights over its territory, which cannot be altered without its consent, and that the bearers of this 
sovereignty are the people of Crimea.993 This was a typical example of thinking along with the Soviet 
asymmetrical federation framework - for the former ASSRs it was not uncommon to view their legal 
position as a territory not entitled to independence but to ‘territorial sovereignty’, i.e., very significant 
autonomy in their territory with strong constitutional guarantees including a veto right over any 
changes. Thus, while being a part of Ukraine, Crimea functioned under its Constitution based on the 
sovereignty of its people, and its relations with Ukraine were regulated by treaties and agreements.994 
This constitutional order was almost a direct copy of the Soviet era. It continued the asymmetric 
ethnofederal model and co-opted it with the new realities, such as the loss of the arbitrating federal 
center, a multi-party democratic system, and a more rule of law state. However, it was not to last. 
The still valid 1998 Constitution995 curtails Crimean autonomy on many grounds. First, while Crimea 
retains the right to have its parliament, government, Constitution, state language, emblem and flag,996 
this has notable limits: the Crimean Constitution has to be approved by the Ukrainian parliament, 
which underlined its subordinate position, and all Crimean legislation has to be in conformity with 
the Ukrainian Constitution and laws.997 Second, the Ukrainian President has a veto right over the 
selection of the Prime Minister of Crimea.998 Finally and most importantly, unlike the 1992 
Constitution that had stated that Crimea is sovereign, functioning under its Constitution and basing 
its relations with Ukraine on treaties between the two, the 1998 Constitution states unambiguously 
that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea exercises ‘any and all powers as may be delegated to it by 
                                                 
993 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea (n 976) Arts. 1, 2, and 7(1). 
994 Ibid. Art. 9. 
995 Crimean parliament passed a new Constitution on 11 April 2014, but this was done under foreign occupation and has not been 
recognized by the Ukrainian parliament. As the international community does not recognize Russian annexation of Crimea, according 
to ex injuria jus non oritur the 2014 Constitution is null and void.  
996 Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (n 987) Arts. 134-139. 
997 Ibid. Art. 135.  
998 Ibid. Art. 36(1).  
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Ukrainian laws pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine’.999 Thus, the asymmetric ‘co-sovereignty’ 
with Ukraine was transformed into a more conventional limited territorial autonomy.  
All that being said, despite all the limitations introduced by the 1998 Constitution, Crimea did 
continue to exercise normative regulation right over many important policy areas, such as agriculture, 
land reclamation, public works, city construction, public transportation, tourism, and culture.1000 
Moreover, the Crimean territory was affirmed to be the 1991 uti possidetis territory - i.e., the same as 
that possessed by the ASSR Crimea - and Crimea held a ‘double veto’ over any changes to this 
territory as it was only changeable after a local referendum and by a resolution by the Crimean 
parliament. Therefore, I conclude that Ukraine passed the second-level requirements listed in the EC 
Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR, and its international recognition in December 1991 was 
not premature. After 1998, Crimean autonomy has been notably weaker than in the late-Soviet and 
early Ukrainian independence periods but has nevertheless remained meaningful and compares 
favourably with the other ethnofederalized SSRs.  
5.3.4 Conclusions 
The constitutional statuses that Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine chose to provide for their former 
ASSRs and AOs are similar in many ways. Moreover, they all chose to maintain their inherited 
administrative borders without changes, complemented with constitutionally guaranteed veto right to 
the subunits for any adjustments of these borders.1001 This should not come as a surprise, given the 
shared ethnofederal history of the former SSRs. In turn, Karakalpakstan and Gorno-Badakhshan were 
content with their autonomy and decided not to pursue armed or even peaceful separatism after the 
new Constitutions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had been adopted. Ukraine and Crimea had a more 
confrontational relationship manifested in Crimean attempts for separation or union with Russia and 
the subsequent pushback by Ukraine limiting province’s autonomy. To summarize, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan provided their subunits with constitutional positions that were very similar to the ones 
under the Soviet constitutional system.1002 Crimea enjoyed even more extensive autonomy until 1998 
when its internal self-determination was significantly curtailed. Regardless, it still enjoyed 
meaningful autonomy, and there were no major confrontations with Ukraine prior to 2014. 
                                                 
999 Ibid. Art. 1(1). 
1000 Ibid. Art. 18(2). Tourism was particularly important, with around six million tourists visiting Crimea annually before 2014. 
1001 This is the baseline scenario for uti possidetis meritus. See Chapter 6. 
1002 The lesser rights invested upon Gorno-Badakhshan is in conformity with its lower AO status.  
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Next, I proceed to analyze those former SSRs that decided after 1991 to outright reject their 
ethnofederal legacy and the rights of their subunits, and how the subunits responded to such policies. 
5.4 Ethnofederalism Rejected: Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia 
The cases of competing claims of sovereignty over territory analyzed in this subchapter - Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, and Georgia - are notably different from the previous examples. The first difference is that 
in these cases, there was a clear and articulated decision by the central authorities to reject the 
ethnofederal legacy and to abolish the self-governing rights of the subunits.1003 The other major 
difference is that - not accidentally - in all these cases, the central government faced such a pushback 
from the subunits that they lost control over them during the 1990s. Since then, the former ASSRs 
and AOs have existed in a legal limbo without any clear path forward. They have de facto control 
over their territory and seek in vain recognition for their independencies. The international 
community has pressured them to negotiate with the central authorities on a possible return of their 
autonomy. Nevertheless, the lack of goodwill between the parties and the considerable passage of 
time has made these attempts futile so far.1004 
5.4.1 Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh 
Azerbaijan inherited two ethnofederal units, a predominantly Azeri ASSR of Nakhchivan and a 
predominantly Armenian AO of Nagorno-Karabakh. As an ASSR, Nakhchivan had a substantial 
autonomy based on the April 1990 USSR constitutional amendments. It had been recognized holding 
the right to self-determination and possessing all state power on its territory apart from powers 
expressly transferred to the USSR or the host SSR. Moreover, relations between Nakhchivan and 
Azerbaijan were determined by the treaties and conventions they conclude within the Soviet legal 
framework.1005 In contrast, as an AO, Nagorno-Karabakh had limited autonomy without any 
sovereign attributes.1006 This was the legal landscape in Azerbaijan at the dissolution of the USSR 
and the application of uti possidetis in December 1991.1007  
What took place in Azerbaijan after 1991 is a part of a pattern in the post-Soviet context of a former 
SSR confronting its subunits. With less of an ethnic element and no third party involvement, 
                                                 
1003 However, there were exceptions in these states - Azerbaijan, and Georgia retained most of the autonomy for their former ASSRs 
of Nakhichevan and Ajara, while Moldova gave a substantive autonomy to a minority previously lacking one in Gagauzia.  
1004 The apparent aberration was the timing of this pressure - if the EC had indeed consistently demanded the fulfilment of the second-
level of self-determination before the recognition decision, it would have had the needed leeway. See subchapter 4.4. 
1005 See subchapter 3.7.4.  
1006 See subchapter 3.5.3. 
1007 Azerbaijan was recognized by the US and the EC states between late December 1991 and January 1992, and by Russia on 4 April 
1992. It became a UN member state on 2 March 1992. 
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Azerbaijan’s relations with Nakhchivan have been smooth since its independence, whereas the 
dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has led to a lasting frozen conflict. 
The ethnofederalization of Azerbaijan took place in the early 1920s. After the 1917 October 
Revolution and subsequent turmoil, Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their independencies from 
Russia and fought each other for the ownership over Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh. A 
subsequent invasion by the Red Army in July 1920 abolished their short-lived independencies, and 
they were declared as SSRs of the USSR. In November 1920, Bolsheviks promised to transfer 
Nakhchivan to Armenia, but an early 1921 referendum demonstrated a 90% support for staying within 
Azerbaijan. The ASSR of Nakhchivan was created on 16 March 1921. Its autonomy was 
internationally guaranteed in 1921 by the Treaty of Kars with Turkey, which stated that Nakhchivan 
‘constitutes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan’.1008 Finally, the ASSR was 
formally incorporated into Azerbaijan on 9 February 1924.  
Nakhchivan remained peaceful until the late 1980s, when the relations between the SSRs of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan soured. Azerbaijan had declared its sovereignty already on 23 September 1989 and 
was acting with relative independence from the USSR. However, a Soviet intervention in January 
19901009 led the Supreme Soviet1010 of the Nakhchivan ASSR to threat to secede from the USSR in 
protest.1011 On 17 November 1990, Azerbaijan renamed Nakhchivan as an ‘Autonomous Republic’, 
and in August 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence from the USSR.1012 
Azerbaijan adopted its new Constitution in 1995, under which the Autonomous Republic retained 
most of its Soviet-era autonomy. It was termed an ‘autonomous state within the Azerbaijan 
Republic’,1013 with its legislative assembly and Cabinet of Ministers.1014 Nakhchivan’s Constitution 
and laws cannot be in contradiction with the Azerbaijani ones, its Constitution must be approved by 
the Azerbaijani government, and all the key appointments - the prime minister and local executives - 
                                                 
1008 Treaty of Friendship between Turkey, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic and the 
Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, 23 October 1921, Art. 5. Preamble of Nakchivan’s 1998 Constitution refers to this treaty.  
1009 Worried by the escalating tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on 15 January the USSR declared a state of emergency in the 
province and the nearby areas and on 19-20 January dispatched 11 000 troops to quell protests in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, causing 
widespread chaos and casualties. The incident - known in Azerbaijan as ‘Black January’ - led to Azerbaijan’s Communist Party losing 
its legitimacy and popular support. M. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Prager, 1998) at 37-38. 
1010 Highest legislative organ in the SSRs and the ASSRs. 
1011 Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession (n 489). Under this legislation, an 
AO could decide after a referendum whether it would like to secede with the host SSR or to remain within the USSR. 
1012 In fact, it declared the restoration of its independence that had been illegally deprived by the 1921 Soviet invasion. Declaration of 
the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan about a Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 30 August 1991. 
1013 Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted on 12 November 1995, Art. 134(I).  
1014 Ibid. Arts. 135 and 140. 
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are made only by the recommendation of the President of Azerbaijan.1015 Nakhchivan’s Constitution 
was approved in late 1998 within the parameters set by the Constitution of Azerbaijan. Its territory 
was stated as ‘inviolable and indivisible’, but it retained no national symbols.1016 Nakhchivan 
exercises only the powers that are delegated to it, cannot unilaterally reallocate rights, and does not 
have a right to secession. It continues to have a Constitution and a Constitutional Court, but it is not 
termed sovereign, and its relations with the parent-state are not regulated by treaties but solely by the 
Azerbaijani Constitution that Nakhchivan cannot affect.1017 While it is, in the end, a reduced version 
of the Soviet-era autonomy, the lack of ethnic component or any kind of oppression from Azerbaijan 
has kept the population content with their position. Therefore, I conclude that in relation to its former 
ASSR, Azerbaijan passed the second-level requirements that the international community insisted 
upon for the SSRs, namely those listed in the EC Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR.  
The negotiated autonomy of Nakhchivan is in stark contrast with Azerbaijan’s relations with the 
predominantly Armenian AO of Nagorno-Karabakh.1018 Despite its ethnic composition, the AO was 
established on 7 July 1923 within the SSR of Azerbaijan. Just like many other Soviet subunits, it 
started to display secessionist tendencies in the late 1980s and was encouraged by the neighbouring 
SSR of Armenia that aimed to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh. In February 1988, the Soviet of 
Nagorno-Karabakh appealed to the USSR Supreme Soviet to transfer the AO from Azerbaijan to 
Armenia, followed by a similar appeal by the Armenian Supreme Soviet.1019 After Moscow stood 
firm against any changes in borders between the SSRs,1020 the situation escalated further, and the 
European Parliament issued a Resolution where they regarded the inclusion of 80% Armenian AO 
into Azerbaijan as ‘arbitrary’ and called for the USSR to study the compromise proposals made by 
Armenia to temporarily either govern the AO from Moscow or to unite it with the RSFSR.1021  
Notwithstanding, Azerbaijan was taking its distance from the federal center and declared its 
independence in August 1991. In September, the AO followed suit by proclaiming its independence 
                                                 
1015 Ibid. Arts. 134(V-VI), 140(II), and 141. 
1016 Constitution of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, adopted on 29 December 1998, Arts. 6 and 10. 
1017 Ibid. Arts. 1, 24, 25, and 44. 
1018 According to the population census of 12 January 1989, the population of the AO was around 189 000 persons, with 139 000 
(73,5%) Armenians and around 48 000 (25,3%) Azerbaijanis. Numbers quoted in ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the 
Azerbaijan SSR’, Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
1019 This was accompanied by first-ever mass demonstrations in the USSR with hundreds of thousands of Armenians protesting at the 
streets of Yerevan. ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Timeline of the Long Road to Peace’, Radio Free Europe, 10 February 2006.  
1020 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Art. 78 prohibited changing the SSR territory without its consent.  
1021 European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Soviet Armenia, Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 94/117, 
July 1988. 
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as the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’,1022 which was reaffirmed in December via referendum 
boycotted by the Azeri population.1023 Azerbaijan countered this by abolishing the Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in November 1991.1024 However, Azerbaijan did not have a right to 
make this change unilaterally - according to the USSR Constitution, the abolition of an AO status 
could only be possible after upon submission by the Council of the People’s Deputies of the AO 
concerned.1025 Moreover, Azerbaijan violated its Law on Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of 
16 June 1981, which prohibited changing the AO’s borders without its consent.1026 Finally, the USSR 
Constitutional Oversight Committee Resolution founded Azerbaijan’s abolishment of the AO’s 
autonomy unconstitutional and called for the restoration of its previous status.1027 Therefore, legally 
Nagorno-Karabakh continued to enjoy an AO status according to the applicable Soviet legislation 
until the dissolution of the USSR on 26 December 1991, and at the moment of the recognition of its 
independence, Azerbaijan had within its uti possidetis borders one AO and one ASSR.  
When Azerbaijan tried to establish a direct rule over the AO after 1991, a full-scale war ensued with 
Armenia intervening on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh. A ceasefire was reached through Russian 
mediation on 12 May 1994. The ensuing frozen conflict has lasted to this day with periodical bursts 
of violence, the latest in the summer of 2016. The 1995 Constitution of Azerbaijan does not mention 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been left without any rights whatsoever under Azerbaijani legislation.  
To summarize, in relation to its AO, Azerbaijan decided to break the Soviet ethnofederal arrangement 
in its entirety. According to the Soviet-era AO status, Nagorno-Karabakh had its parliament and a 
right to veto any changes to its territory, as well as regional representation of 12 deputies in the 
Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Azerbaijan. It had a relatively wide range of self-governing powers on 
local issues, and its language rights were guaranteed.1028 However, the Azerbaijani law abolishing the 
AO’s autonomy changed the equation and demonstrated a grave breach on the right to internal self-
determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the applicable Soviet laws. The 
abolition of the autonomy was even more tragic since Nagorno-Karabakh is located entirely inside 
Azerbaijan’s borders. Hence, any separatist attempt would most likely involve the kin state Armenia, 
                                                 
1022 Declaration on Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, adopted on a joint session of the Nagorno-Karabakh AO and 
Shahumian regional councils of people’s deputies on 2 September 1991. Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself as a SSR of the USSR. 
1023 Zürcher (n 174) 168. 
1024 Law on Abolition of Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Region, 26 November 1991. The Law was based on Arts. 68 and 104 of the 
Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted on 21 April 1978. 
1025 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200) Art. 86.  
1026 S. Avakian, Nagorno Karabagh: Legal Aspects (Tigran Mets, 2013) at 17. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 See subchapter 3.5.3. 
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which would have to occupy large swathes of Azerbaijani land to maintain a land corridor to the 
separatist province. In addition, the landlocked Nagorno-Karabakh is even less viable for independent 
statehood than the other Soviet subunits, and it would have been essential to achieve the continuation 
of its autonomy and to negate the separatist tendencies.  
I conclude that, in relation to its AO, Azerbaijan did not pass the second-level requirements as 
portrayed in the EC Guidelines and the Statement on the USSR. Azerbaijan transgressed the 
Guidelines criteria concerning the right to self-determination,1029 the guarantees for the rights of 
ethnic and national groups in accordance with the CSCE framework,1030 the inviolability of all 
frontiers that can only be changed by common agreement,1031 and the commitment to settle any state 
succession and regional disputes by agreement or by arbitration.1032 Therefore, the international 
recognition of Azerbaijan in December 1991-January 1992 was premature. 
Azerbaijan’s breaches of the Nagorno-Karabakh’s rights have destroyed any legitimacy of its rule 
over the province from the Karabakh point of view. The timely Armenian military involvement has 
created a lasting frozen conflict with neither side willing to make substantial concessions to solve the 
                                                 
1029 Guidelines (n 4) para. 3. According to the Helsinki Final Act (n 13) Chapter VIII: ‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and 
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they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. A unilateral and 
unconstitutional abolition of the former autonomous status is in obvious contradiction to this commitment. According to Arts. 32-33, 
the ‘persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 
religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will’, and 
‘[t]he participating States will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and 
create conditions for the promotion of that identity’. Under Art. 35 ‘[t]he participating States will respect the right of persons belonging 
to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and 
promotion of the identity of such minorities. The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for 
the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the 
possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and 
territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned’. Finally, according to Art. 38 
‘[t]he participating States, in their efforts to protect and promote the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, will fully respect 
their undertakings under existing human rights conventions and other relevant international instruments’. Azerbaijani actions obviously 
tried to assimilate the people of Nagorno-Karabakh against their will by abolishing their autonomy and breached their right to 
participate in public affairs. Via the USSR’s commitments, Azerbaijan was bound by this CSCE framework, and its actions can only 
be seen as in violation of it. 
1031 Ibid. para. 5. As I have accounted for in more detail in subchapter 3.5, the Soviet ethnofederal structure realized the right to self-
determination via ethnoterritorial autonomy. The lower-level subunits (ASSRs and AOs) territory was just as indivisible as the SSRs, 
and they had a constitutionally guaranteed veto over any changes to it. Thus, the Guidelines criterion on the inviolability of all frontiers 
must be read in conjunction with the Soviet ethnofederal system, i.e., guaranteeing the lower-level frontiers as well.  
1032 Ibid. para. 6. The borders of the AO of Nagorno-Karabakh were drawn and guaranteed by the federal center, thus making this 
essentially a question of state succession - the USSR gave Nagorno-Karabakh to the SSR of Azerbaijan under the condition that it had 
a meaningful autonomy. Azerbaijan should have been conditioned to settle its dispute with Nagorno-Karabakh via mutual agreement 
or international arbitration. The latter is currently taking place in the format of the OSCE Minsk, but without the recognition leeway. 
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dispute. By making its recognition contingent on the fulfilment of the conditions of the second-level 
of self-determination, the international community tried to ensure the right to (internal) self-
determination of the subunits. However, the decision to recognize Azerbaijan despite the abolishment 
of the AO’s autonomy inadvertently caused the consolidation of the conflict.  
5.4.2 Moldova: Gagauzia and Transnistria 
Moldova became independent with one former ASSR of Transnistria and with a relatively large but 
dispersed Turkic minority of Gagauzians. Both cases stand out in contrast to other post-Soviet 
territorial disputes as neither was an existing ethnofederal unit at the moment of the dissolution of the 
USSR - Transnistria had lost its ASSR status in 1940, whereas Gagauzia had never held any status.1033 
Nevertheless, both minorities thought in the ethnofederal terms and posed real challenges to the unity 
of the Moldovan state. Eventually, Moldova was able to negotiate a very substantial autonomy for 
the Gagauzians, but the dispute with Transnistria and a third party involvement there produced 
another lasting frozen conflict. 
The complex ethnofederal history of Moldova began on 7 March 1924, when the USSR created an 
AO of Moldavia within the SSR of Ukraine. On 8 October 1924, the AO was upgraded to an ASSR 
and expanded to include adjacent Ukrainian areas. On 2 August 1940, after the USSR had issued an 
ultimatum to Romania and annexed its territory known as Bessarabia, a new unit of Moldavian SSR 
was created. It included Bessarabia and the area corresponding to today’s Transnistria, with the rest 
of the Moldavian ASSR being incorporated back to Ukraine without autonomy.1034 During 1941-
1944, Moldavia was occupied by Romanians who reorganized the area administratively, creating a 
‘Governate of Transnistria’.1035 However, after the USSR reoccupied the area, the Moldavian SSR 
was restored as a unitary SSR, and it was not ethnofederalized during the rest of the Soviet era. 
Just like in many other ethnofederal units, the glasnost era1036 brought about a revival of nationalism 
in Moldavia. When political parties and movements were allowed to be established, a ‘Popular Front 
of Moldova’1037 started advocating for secession from the USSR from 1988 onwards. In 1989, it 
organized mass demonstrations under the title ‘Grand National Assembly’. In this capacity, the 
                                                 
1033 Apart from two weeks of self-proclaimed independence in January 1906. Accounted for in J. Minahan, One Europe, Many Nations: 
A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups (Greenwood, 2000) at 274. 
1034 Moreover, Bessarabia’s Black Sea and Danube frontage were transferred to Ukraine at this point. 
1035 The name is derived from the Russian geographical moniker Pridnestrovye.  
1036 See subchapter 3.7.2. 
1037 Rejecting the Soviet term ‘Moldavia’. 
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‘Assembly’ pressured the SSR parliament to adopt a language law that switched the official script 
from Cyrillic to Latin.1038 The Popular Front won the first democratic elections in Moldavia in 
February and March 1990, and on 23 June 1990, it declared sovereignty as the ‘SSR of Moldova’. 
At this point, the national tensions within the SSR started to escalate in the two minority areas, 
Transnistria in the East and Gagauzia in the South. According to the 1989 Soviet census, while the 
population of Moldova as a whole was 64,5% Moldovan, with 13,8% Ukrainians and 13% Russians, 
in Transnistria, the numbers were 39,9% Moldovan, 28,3% Ukrainian and 25,5% Russian.1039 
Moreover, while the Gagauz made up only 4% of the population of Moldova, they made up an 
overwhelming majority in many areas in the South of the country.1040 Therewith, as the Popular Front 
government started calling for independence and possible unification with Romania, as well as 
removal of Russian as the official language of the Republic, minorities started to assert themselves.  
First, Gagauzia declared itself as an ASSR within the USSR on 12 November 1989, which was 
rejected by the Supreme Soviet of Moldova. After the Moldovan elections, Gagauzia renewed its 
declaration on the ASSR status on 22 June 1990, again to be rejected by the Moldovan authorities. 
Finally, on 19 August 1990, Gagauzia aggravated the situation by declaring itself the ‘Gagauz SSR’ 
of the USSR.1041 In response, Moldova organized armed volunteer units to stop the planned elections 
in Gagauzia in October. Only an intervention by the Soviet troops saved the situation from escalating 
into armed conflict between Moldovans and Gagauzians. After Gagauzia rejected Moldova’s first 
proposal for limited autonomy in 1991, the relations remained frozen as Moldova’s focus shifted on 
its even more assertive minority area in the east.  
Following a very similar trajectory, after the Moldovan sovereignty declaration, Transnistria 
announced its independence within the USSR as ‘Pridnestrovian Moldavian SSR’ on 2 September 
1990.1042 The breakaway unit sought historical legitimacy from the pre-1940 Moldavian ASSR and 
from the fact that - in case of a possible Moldovan unification with Romania - the Transnistrian area 
                                                 
1038 Law on the Status of the State Language, 31 August 1989. 
1039 The 1989 All-Union Census of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, conducted on 12-19 January 1989. 
1040 The only available statistics from the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia are from 2014, when the Gagauz made up 83,8% 
of the population, with Moldovans making up 4,7%. The 2014 Republic of Moldova Census, conducted on 12-25 May 2014. 
1041 P. Järve, ‘Gagauzia and Moldova: Experiences in Power Sharing’ in M. Weller and B. Metzger (Eds), Settling Self-Determination 
Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 307-344 at 314. 
1042 The proclamation was made by the ‘Second Congress of the Peoples’ Representatives of Transnistria’, acting as an ad hoc Assembly 
but without any institutional legitimacy.  
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had never been part of Romania. However, in December 1990, President Gorbachev declared the 
Transnistrian proclamation to be lacking any legal basis and annulled it by a presidential decree.1043  
It is noteworthy that both Gagauzia and Transnistria thought about self-determination on exclusively 
Soviet terms - despite their ‘independence’ declarations, by declaring themselves as an ASSR or a 
SSR they sought merely an autonomy within the USSR and to legitimate their actions under the Soviet 
legal framework.1044 Regardless, lacking any formal ethnofederal status under the USSR Constitution, 
their unilateral calls for autonomy were deemed unconstitutional by Moldovan and Soviet officials. 
Therewith, while Gagauzians and Transnistrians could argue for a right to (internal) self-
determination in general, they could not base their claims on the existing ethnofederal system.  
Moldova declared its independence in August 1991,1045 and was recognized independent by the end 
of the year.1046 After there was no longer a federal center that could mediate between the parties and 
armed clashes occurred between Moldovan and Transnistrian forces. The conflict intensified in 
March 1992, when the Soviet 14th Army stationed in the area joined the separatists,1047 drove out 
Moldovan forces, and captured the City of Bender on the Moldovan side of the proclaimed ‘border’. 
This, in turn, led to the fleeing of up to 100 000 ethnic Moldovans from the area. A ceasefire in July 
1992 provided for the establishment of a Russian-Moldovan-Transnistrian peacekeeping force, 
stationed in a buffer zone between the parties and overseen by the ‘Joint Control Commission’.1048 
After the ceasefire calmed the situation, the newly-independent Moldova faced difficult choices in 
terms of negotiating a lasting solution to its newly found national question. First, it started to negotiate 
with Gagauzia, where the involvement of President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel helped to pave the 
way for a constitutionally recognized self-government for the province. This process began with 
Moldova replacing its 1978 SSR Constitution by a new Constitution in August 1994,1049 which 
opened up the possibility to create autonomous areas in Transnistria and Gagauzia with a separate 
                                                 
1043 A. Vaseashta and S. Enaki, ‘The Transnistria Equation: Transnistria’ in A. Vaseashta, E. Braman and P. Susmann (Eds), 
Technological Innovations in Sensing and Detection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Threats and Ecological Terrorism 
(Springer, 2010) 141-148 at 143. 
1044 Many ASSRs that tried to stay within the USSR or gain independence invoked the Soviet secession law for legitimization.  
1045 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, adopted on 27 August 1991 by the Moldovan Parliament.  
1046 Moldova was recognized independent by the US on 26 December 1991, by the EC states on 31 December 1991, and was admitted 
to the UN as a member state on 2 March 1992. Moldova had already changed its name to the ‘Republic of Moldova’ on 23 May 1991. 
1047 The 14th Soviet Army was supposed to give up its military equipment to Moldova and return to Russia, but its commander Lebed 
was acting without authorization from Moscow.  
1048 Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova, 
signed on 21 July 1992.  
1049 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted on 12 August 1994. The Constitution has since been amended eight times.  
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law. Five months later, the Moldovan parliament passed a law on Special Status of Gagauzia.1050 
According to the Law, ‘Gagauzia is an autonomous territorial entity with a special status that as a 
form of self-determination of Gagauzians, is an integrant part of the Republic of Moldova’.1051 All its 
laws have to comply with Moldovan laws and Constitution,1052 it has its symbols of statehood 
(anthem, emblem, and a flag),1053 and, most importantly, a right to secede in case of a change in the 
legal status of Moldova - such as unification with Romania.1054  
The People’s Assembly of Gagauzia has a right to pass laws on many areas of local importance, 
including local budget, taxation and social welfare,1055 to decide on the names and territorial 
organization of localities, borders of districts, towns and villages, and to hold a local referendum and 
to take part in the realization of the domestic and foreign policy of Moldova on matters concerning 
Gagauzia.1056 Moreover, Gagauzia has its governing organ, the Executive Committee, which is 
approved by the Gagauzian parliament on the proposal of the Governor of Gagauzia.1057 Following, 
based on the Law, a referendum was held on 5 March 1995, which determined the communities that 
would join the new autonomous Gagauz entity. Finally, after being pressured by the Council of 
Europe,1058 Moldova amended its Constitution on 25 July 2003 and recognized Gagauzia as an 
‘autonomous territorial unit’.1059 According to the Venice Commission, ‘the extent of the powers 
conferred on the Gagauzian autonomous institutions is very striking. The range of matters on which 
the People’s Assembly can legislate is almost comprehensive. It is difficult to see any important area 
which is excluded from their competence apart from than defence and foreign policy’.1060 
It might seem surprising that Moldova provided Gagauzians - a population without any prior 
ethnofederal status - with a very extensive and constitutionally guaranteed self-governance and 
qualified the participating areas after a local referendum. The guarantees go as far as give Gagauzia 
                                                 
1050 Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, Nr.344-XIII, adopted on 23 December 1994. 
1051 Ibid. Art. 1(1).  
1052 Ibid. Art. 2. 
1053 Ibid. Art. 4. 
1054 Ibid. Art. 1(4) 
1055 Science, culture, education, housing and utilities, urban development, health, physical culture and sports, local financial, budgetary, 
and tax activities, economy and environment, labour relations and social welfare. Ibid. Art. 12(2).  
1056 Ibid. Art. 12(3). 
1057 Ibid. Art. 16. However, under Art. 14 the Governor of Gagauzia has to be approved by President of Moldova.  
1058 Ibid. at 51. 
1059 Amended Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted on 25 July 2003, Art. 111. While the amendments inserted many 
provisions from the Law on the Special Status of Gagauzia into the Constitution, they omitted the provision for secession and described 
Gagauzia as ‘a constitutive and inalienable part of the Republic of Moldova’. 
1060 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Law on Modification and Addition to the Constitution 
of the Republic of Moldova, N° 191 / 2002, Comments by: Mr James HAMILTON (Member, Ireland) at para. 21. 
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a Soviet-style secession right. In contrast, the conflict with the former ASSR of Transnistria has been 
challenging to settle. There are several interconnected issues: what should be the relationship between 
Transnistria and Moldova, what would be the boundaries of the Transnistrian entity,1061 what to do 
with the Russian troops present in Transnistria (by the continuing invitation of the Transnistrian de 
facto authorities),1062 and should Moldova be federalized if it has a second autonomous entity within 
its territory.1063 While these complexities are relevant, I argue that the key difference between 
Transnistria and Gagauzia is that due to the former’s high expectations, it was less prone to 
compromise, and the subsequent war destroyed the remaining basis for a negotiated settlement. 
However, despite the numerous challenges, there are grounds for optimism. There has been no 
fighting between the parties since the ceasefire and, notwithstanding its multinational composition, 
Transnistria itself has not had any inter-ethnic tensions. Indeed, it has developed what the CSCE 
Mission to Moldova has called as a ‘distinct Transdniestrian feeling of identity’ which is based on 
Russian language, geography, and history.1064 In May 1997, Moldova and Transnistria signed a 
Memorandum on normalizing their relations,1065 which gave Transnistria a right to participate in the 
conduct of Moldovan foreign policy on ‘questions touching its interests’, and to maintain independent 
international contacts in economic, scientific, and cultural spheres.1066 
Under Article 111 of the 1994 Constitution, Moldova adopted a law on Transnistrian autonomy in 
2005.1067 It defined Transnistria as an ‘autonomous territorial entity’ and an ‘integral part of 
Moldova’, and established a mechanism to define the areas to be included in the entity in the same 
manner as in Gagauzia.1068 It gave Transnistria the right to have its state symbols to be used along 
                                                 
1061 The biggest issue is the city of Bender, which is included in what the de facto Transnistrian state claims, but is excluded from the 
Moldovan Law on Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of the Dniester. Subsequently, some territories claimed by 
Transnistria are excluded from the Autonomous territorial unit with special legal status Transnistria. 
1062 According to Art. 4 of the 1992 ceasefire agreement (n 1048). 
1063 According to Wolff, the future territorial construction of Moldova will require considering the representation of territorial entities 
within the state at the center. S. Wolff, ‘The Prospects of a Sustainable Conflict Settlement for Transnistria’, 14 September 2014 at 7. 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265001842_The_Prospects_of_a_Sustainable_Conflict_Settlement_for_Transnistria>. 
1064 CSCE Mission to Moldova, Report No. 13, 13 November 1993, Chapter II. 
1065 Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria, signed on 8 May 
1997. According to the memorandum Preamble and Art. 1, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to principles on the UN, OSCE, 
and generally recognized norms of international law; to the agreements reached previously between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transdniestria; Recognizing the responsibility for securing civil peace, international concord, the strengthening of stability and security 
in this area of Europe; not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force in their mutual relations, but by solving any differences 
through negotiations and consultations with the assistance and mediation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine - as guarantor States 
of the agreement - and of the OSCE, with the assistance of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
1066 Ibid. Art. 3.  
1067 Law on the Main Notes about Special Legal Status of Settlements of Left Bank of Dniestr (Transnistria), No 173, adopted on 22 
July 2005.  
1068 Ibid. Art. 3. 
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with Moldovan ones. The official languages would be Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Russian.1069 
Transnistria could resolve independently all the issues of legal, economic and social development that 
are referred to its jurisdiction by the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Moldova and - in 
similar wording than in the 1997 memorandum - could establish external contacts independently in 
the economic, scientific and humanitarian fields.1070 However, the details of the power-sharing 
between Moldova and Transnistria would be clarified in a later organic law that would be adopted by 
the two parties together after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria.1071 Finally and most 
importantly, according to Article 12 the adoption of the Law on Transnistria ‘will be accompanied 
by the adoption of a system of international guarantees’.1072 
Despite the compromises made by Moldova in its 2005 Law on Transnistria, the population of the 
breakaway entity remained independence-orientated. In 2006, a referendum gave 90 percent support 
for Transnistrian independence and a subsequent voluntary joining to the Russian Federation.1073 
Since its declaration of independence in September 1990, Transnistria has been recognized only by 
three other mostly non-recognized former Soviet subunits of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-
Karabakh. The proclaimed de facto state1074 has its government, parliament, postal system, currency, 
and state symbols, but persisting non-recognition continues to hinder its development. 
To summarize, the Moldovan case stands out of the other post-Soviet territorial disputes in many 
aspects. For one, according to the application of uti possidetis, Moldova did not inherit any 
ethnoterritorial units and thus did not break any ethnofederal arrangements.1075 Notwithstanding, it 
had one clearly demarcated unit with a claim to a national identity separate from the central Moldovan 
state (Transnistria) and a clearly separate cultural and lingual group without a demarcated area 
                                                 
1069 Ibid. Art. 6. Moldovan would be based on Latin script. The rest of Moldova had already switched to Latin script in 1989 (n 1038), 
but Transnistria had retained Cyrillic and has kept it in place since then. During the Soviet-era, Romanian was written in Cyrillic 
alphabet in Transnistria from 1924 to 1932, and from 1940 until 1989. 
1070 Ibid. Arts. 8 and 9.  
1071 Ibid. Art. 1(2).  
1072 However, as pointed out by Oleh Protsyk, the law does not create international guarantees but only ‘envisages the creation of a 
system of internal guarantees of such a status’. O. Protsyk, ‘Democratization as a Means of Conflict Resolution in Moldova’ 4(1) 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2004/2005 (Brill, 2006) 723-737 at 728. 
1073 J. Loughlin, V. Kolossov and G. Toal, ‘Inside the Post-Soviet De Facto States: A Comparison of Attitude is Abkhazia, Nagorny 
Karabakh, South Ossetian, and Transnistria’ 55(5) Eurasian Geography and Economics (2014) 423-456 at 437. The reasoning on 
joining Russia can be explained by both the shared Soviet nostalgia by all three major ethnic groups in Transnistria whose main 
common language is Russian, as well as by the fact that, on top of Moldovan citizenship, most Transnistrians also have Russian and 
Ukrainian citizenship. In 2016, the Transnistrian government declared that it was time to enact the results of the 2006 referendum. 
1074 According to Toal and O’Loughlin, a de facto state is a political entity that has proclaimed itself sovereign over a specified territory 
and controls all or part of that territory for at least two years. G. Toal and J. O’Loughlin, ‘Frozen Fragments, Simmering Spaces: The 
Post-Soviet De Facto States’ in E. Holland and M. Derrick (Eds), Questioning Post-Soviet (The Wilson Center, 2016) 103-126 at 107. 
1075 In a somewhat puzzling development, Moldova has given a better autonomy to Gagauzia than Transnistria, a former ASSR. 
Notwithstanding, neither was an autonomous unit at the moment of the dissolution, and thus no ethnofederal agreements were breached. 
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(Gagauzians). Moldova was able to solve its dispute with Gagauzia by giving it ethnoterritorial status 
with a wide-ranging, meaningful autonomy up to a right to secession,1076 whereas the periodic 
negotiations with Transnistria have not amounted to an agreement acceptable to both sides. In relation 
to the second-level requirements, Moldova has belatedly moved into observance. However, at the 
moment of the international recognition of Moldova’s independence, it did not abide by the rights of 
ethnic and national groups in accordance with the CSCE framework,1077 although its breaches were 
certainly not as grave as Azerbaijan’s. Thus, the international recognition of Moldova was premature.  
The Moldovan case has two especially noteworthy aspects. First, it was able to settle its dispute with 
Gagauzia based on territorial autonomy. In my opinion, this is the most workable solution to the post-
Soviet territorial disputes. It is in accordance with the ethnofederal system that the minorities are 
familiar with and the territorial integrity of the successor states that the international community 
insists upon. Second, Moldovan attempts to reach an agreement on autonomy with Transnistria have 
always included international guarantees,1078 which is another important post-Soviet trait. During the 
Soviet era, the center often needed to act as an outside guarantor and mediator. The continuation of 
this baseline solution is a way to re-establish the trust between the parties that is needed to agree upon 
a deal on self-governance.1079  
5.4.3 Georgia: Ajara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia 
Georgia was the most ethnofederalized SSR after the RSFSR and became independent with three 
ethnofederal units: the ASSRs of Ajara and Abkhazia, and the AO of South Ossetia. While Ajarans 
were a subgroup of Muslim Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians had been recognized as separate 
peoples by the USSR in the ethnofederal system. As ASSRs, Ajara and Abkhazia had a substantial 
autonomy based on the April 1990 USSR constitutional amendments.1080 They had gained a 
recognition that they held the right to self-determination and possessed all state power on their 
territory apart from powers expressly transferred to the USSR or the host SSR, and relations between 
them and Georgia were determined by the treaties and conventions they conclude within the Soviet 
                                                 
1076 Roeder concludes that Moldova has given such an extensive autonomy to Gagauzia that it is the only post-Soviet state alongside 
Uzbekistan that has maintained the Soviet-era doctrine of ‘pooled sovereignty’, i.e. competing and overlapping sovereignty over a 
territory. Roeder (n 884) 67.  
1077 Guidelines (n 4) para. 4; and Arts. 32-33 and 35 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting (n 815). When Moldova was admitted 
to the UN as a member state on 2 March 1992, the Transnistria War had just entered its most violent phase.  
1078 Russia and Ukraine are specified as the guarantors of the 1997 Memorandum on Transnistrian autonomy, and the 2005 Law on the 
Main Notes about Special Legal Status of Settlements of Left Bank of Dniestr (n 1067) Art. 12 also calls for international guarantees. 
1079 I utilize these findings with uti possidetis meritus in the next Chapter.  
1080 See subchapter 3.7.4. 
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legal framework.1081 South Ossetia, as an AO, had a limited autonomy without any sovereign 
attributes.1082 This was the legal landscape in Georgia at the dissolution of the USSR and the 
application of uti possidetis in December 1991.1083 
The ethnofederalization of Georgia began in March 1921, when the ASSR of Ajara was created by 
the Treaty of Kars.1084 In December, Abkhazia was made a SSR but with a particular ‘Treaty 
Republic’ status,1085 under which it transferred parts of its powers, including foreign policy and trade, 
to Georgia. Finally, the AO of South Ossetia was created in Northern Georgia in April 1922.  
Following a very similar pattern than that of Moldova, in the late 1980s, Georgians started to demand 
a more independent position in the USSR. They mobilized around nationalism and radicalized 
considerably after the Soviet troops crushed a demonstration in the capital Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. 
The nationalist movement proclaimed Georgian the only official language in August 1989, followed 
by the nationalist parties winning an election in October 1990 and their leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
becoming the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia1086 in November 1990. In March 1991, 
the SSR government annulled all Soviet legislation on Georgia and organized a referendum with 
overwhelming support for independence.1087 Subsequently, the independence of Georgia was 
proclaimed on 9 April 1991 - the second anniversary of the 1989 Soviet crackdown - under the 
leadership Gamsakhurdia, who was elected President in the following month.  
Gamsakhurdia’s ultra-nationalism managed to alienate all three Georgian subunits simultaneously by 
proclaiming not only ‘Georgia for Georgians’ but also limiting this to Christian Georgians.1088 As 
they were rejecting the Soviet history altogether, the Georgian nationalists regarded the ethnofederal 
subunits as Soviet ‘imperial encumbrances on the Georgian body politic’.1089 
Unsurprisingly, the three subunits began to rebel against the Georgian authorities. In Ajara, the 
Chairman of the local Supreme Council Aslan Abashidze began to build an independent power base 
                                                 
1081 See subchapter 5.4.3.  
1082 See subchapter 3.5.3. 
1083 Georgia was recognized independent by the US on 25 December 1991 and by the EC in the first half of the 1992 and became a UN 
member state on 31 July 1992. 
1084 N 1008. 
1085 In Russian договорная республика. There were no other examples of Treaty Republics in the Soviet ethnofederal system.  
1086 Equivalent to the post of the head of local government, the highest position in a SSR or an ASSR.  
1087 G. Hewitt, ‘Abkhazia, from Conflict to Statehood’, Open Democracy, 13 July 2012. 
1088 M. Toft, ‘Multinationality, Regions and State-Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia’ in Hughes and Sasse (n 892) 123-142 at 
133. 
1089 Toal and O’Loughlin (n 1073) 106. 
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and an army of his own, opposing openly Georgian rule over Ajara. In contrast, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia tried to upgrade their ethnofederal statuses. Abkhazia aimed to re-establish the ‘Treaty 
Republic’ status it had lost when it was demoted to an ASSR status within Georgia in 1931. South 
Ossetia proclaimed itself as a SSR in September 1990. Georgia replied to this on 11 December 1990 
by dissolving the AO of South Ossetia and terminating its autonomy.1090 According to the new 
Georgian legislation, the AO’s actions had contradicted the Constitutions of Georgia and the USSR, 
as well as basic principles of international law. Moreover, Georgia was pointing out that Ossetians 
already have a homeland (the ASSR of North Ossetia in the RSFSR).1091  
After the Georgian independence declaration, there was an impasse. Georgia explicitly rejected all of 
the Soviet legacy, including the ethnofederal arrangements. Abkhazia wanted either independence or 
a very loose confederation with Georgia, whereas South Ossetia wished to stay in the USSR or to join 
the Russian Federation.1092 Ajara just wanted to be left alone.  
Tragically, Georgia gained international recognition within its uti possidetis borders while already 
fighting a war against South Ossetia to bring it under its sovereignty. Moreover, shortly after receiving 
a UN membership, Georgia attacked Abkhazia to reclaim that territory as well.1093 After fierce 
fighting, an intervention by Russian troops achieved a victory for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which 
caused forced displacement of approximately 200 000 Georgian refugees from Abkhazia alone.1094  
Under the Russian mediation but nominally under the CIS auspices, a ceasefire was signed with South 
Ossetia in Sochi on 24 June 1992 and with Abkhazia in Moscow on 14 May 1994.1095 South Ossetian 
agreement established a joint control commission and three separate peacekeeping contingents 
(Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian).1096 The Abkhazian agreement stipulated that the peacekeeping 
forces were to be provided by the CIS, but in reality, they were mostly Russian. 1097 An unarmed UN 
                                                 
1090 Law of the Republic of Georgia on Abolition of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, adopted on 11 December 1990.  
1091 Notably, Georgia never abolished the Abkhazian autonomy, which did not have an ethnic homeland outside Georgia.  
1092 B. Coppieters, ‘The Roots of the Conflict’ in C. Jonathan (Ed), A Question of Sovereignty. The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, 
Conciliation Resources, Accord issue 7, October 1999.  
1093 The war started in earnest on 14 August 1992 when Georgian militias crossed the border river Ingur. Hewitt (n 1087).  
1094 ‘Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict’ 7(7) Reports, Human Rights Watch, March 
1995. This tilted the population balance, and in the 2011 census, there were 122 069 Abkhazians, 43 166 Georgians, 41 864 Armenians, 
and 22 077 Russians. According to these figures, Abkhazians represented an absolute majority (50,71%) of the population.  
1095 The South Ossetian ceasefire was brokered by Russia, the Abkhazian ceasefire by Russia, the US, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. 
1096 The peacekeeping forces were created under the 1996 Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust 
between Sides in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict. The composition of the peacekeeping formations followed the same pattern as 
in Moldova (n 1048).  
1097 Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994.  
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Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was charged with monitoring observance of the ceasefire. 
As the two agreements did nothing to solve the status questions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
remained legally under Georgian rule but de facto acting independently. Both declared independence 
(South Ossetia in 1992, Abkhazia in 1999) but remained internationally unrecognized. 
These frozen conflicts produced strange constitutional situations, especially in regard to Abkhazia. 
Georgia was insisting that it was merely restoring the pre-1921 independence that had been illegally 
taken away from it by the Soviet invasion and subsequent annexation in the early 1920s.1098 This, in 
turn, would revoke all the ethnofederal changes since then, making Georgia a unitary Republic. 
Abkhazia responded that the reversion to the Georgian pre-1921 independence would cut all formal 
Abkhazian ties to Georgia. Therewith, they were arguing that the international community’s 
recognition of Georgia within uti possidetis borders that included Abkhazia was a mistake.1099 
As Georgia did not legislate on Abkhazia’s and Ajara’s legal statuses before 1995, under international 
law, the former ASSRs whose statuses had not been changed continued to enjoy a comfortable level 
of autonomy. The 1995 Georgian Constitution recognized Ajara (a ‘territorial unit’) and Abkhazia 
(an ‘Autonomous Republic’) but termed South Ossetia as a ‘Former Autonomous Region of South 
Ossetia’.1100 The Constitution did not determine the division of powers between Georgia and the 
subunits but demanded a separate law on this topic.1101 Referring to the ceasefire agreements, Article 
2 stated that the ‘territorial state structure of Georgia shall be determined by a Constitutional Law on 
the basis of the principle of circumscription of authorization after the complete restoration of the 
jurisdiction of Georgia over the whole territory of the country’, and explicitly prohibited secession of 
the autonomous units.1102 Moreover, as a considerable incentive, Article 4 promised to create an upper 
chamber to be added to the Parliament of Georgia, with representational quotas from the subunits.1103  
Abkhazia refused to accept the offered provisions, and as all the further status between the parties 
failed, it declared independence in 1999. The act was condemned by Georgia and ignored by the 
                                                 
1098 The Baltic States had utilized the same line of legal argumentation previously. F. Clines, ‘Secession Decreed by Soviet Georgia’, 
The New York Times, 10 April 1991. Importantly, however, in the international recognition practice, the Baltic States’ claim was 
recognized whereas Georgia’s was not. Therewith, Georgia became independent from the USSR via state dissolution and succession.  
1099 While both Georgia and Abkhazia could certainly make these claims, the fact remains that only the Baltic States and the Russian 
Federation were seen to be re-establishing their old independent statuses, whereas all the other SSRs were recognized independent as 
new states. Subsequently, when Georgia was recognized independent in 1992, it did contain three ethnofederal units within its borders. 
1100 Constitution of Georgia, adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia on 24 August 1995, Art. 2. 
1101 Ibid. Art. 7(2); and amended Constitution of Georgia (20 April 2000) Art. 3(3). 
1102 The ‘alienation of the territory of Georgia is prohibited’. Ibid. 
1103 Ibid. Arts. 4, 55, and 57. 
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international community. Meanwhile, negotiations continued with Ajara. In April 2000, a 
constitutional amendment granted Ajara the status of an Autonomous Republic but still did not define 
the division of powers.1104 After Mikhail Saakashvili became President of Georgia in 2003, the 
tensions began to build up between the center and the subunits. In April 2004, Saakashvili made an 
ultimatum to the Ajaran ‘President’ Abashidze, demanding the dismantlement of his militias and the 
acceptance of the central government authority.1105 On 5 May 2004, Abashidze gave in, and the 
Autonomous Republic returned under Georgian control.  
On 1 July 2004, Georgia enacted a ‘Constitutional Law of Georgia on the Status of the Autonomous 
Republic of Ajara’, which defined Ajara as ‘a territorial unit which constitutes an inseparable part of 
Georgia’.1106 Its territory was affirmed to be the same as the ASSR of Ajara’s. Its borders could be 
changed with an initiative of two-thirds of the local Parliament and by a subsequent decision by the 
Parliament of Georgia.1107 Ajara was given individual state symbols and the right to a Constitution. 
Its powers were said to be based on the ‘Constitution of Georgia, this Law and the Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajara’.1108 Ajaran Parliament was given a right to legislate over its 
Government and Parliament, and over, e.g., education, science, culture, tourism, agriculture, and 
infrastructure.1109 Moreover, it had a right to approve the local budget, the composition of the local 
Government, including its Chairperson, and to dismiss the Government by a vote of two-thirds.1110  
The President of Georgia was given the right to dismiss the Ajaran Parliament or Government with 
the consent of Georgian Parliament if they were seen to ‘pose a danger to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the country’ or to the exercise of central government’s rule.1111 The Georgian 
Constitutional Court can abrogate Ajaran legal acts if found to be in contradiction with the 
Constitution or laws of Georgia.1112 Ajara was stated to ‘enjoy financial autonomy’ by administrating 
                                                 
1104 Constitution of Georgia (2000) (n 1101). 
1105 On 2 May 2004, Saakashvili said that ‘[w]e will give him 10 days to return to Georgia’s constitutional framework, stop violations 
of law and human rights, and start to disarm’. ‘Georgia Gives Ultimatum to Ajara’, BBC News, 2 May 2004. 
1106 Constitutional Law of Georgia on the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, adopted on 1 July 2004, Art. 2. 
1107 Ibid. Art. 4. 
1108 Ibid. Arts. 5 and 6. 
1109 Ibid. Art. 7.  
1110 Ibid. Art. 14.  
1111 Ibid. Arts. 12 and 16.  
1112 Ibid. Art. 13. 
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the revenues from local taxes.1113 In 2017, Ajara received added rights to appoint head officials and 
to create new agencies and ministries without the approval of the central government.1114  
In contrast, the negotiations over the statuses of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are at an impasse. After 
a renewed attempt of Georgia to take over South Ossetia via military force and a renewed Russian 
intervention in August 2008, the two unilaterally proclaimed de facto states have not received many 
recognitions internationally1115 and continue to exist in a legal limbo where the international 
community still regards them as a part of Georgia. On the other side of the dispute, Georgia continues 
to pass legal acts concerning the territories but is unable to enforce them in any meaningful way.1116  
To summarize, Georgia is a fairly typical case of the results of rejecting its ethnofederal legacy. When 
deconstructing the phenomenon, we can detect three different trajectories. Ajara was the only former 
subunit whose status was clarified with a separate law. On the basis of this law, it is clear that the 
continuation of the Ajaran autonomy resembles the Nakhichevan case from Azerbaijan - the lack of 
ethnic component and third party involvement built up the trust needed to achieve a peaceful 
transition and meaningful autonomy for the former ASSR. In contrast, the abolition of the South 
Ossetian autonomy resembles the case of Nagorno-Karabakh - likewise a former AO - in Azerbaijan. 
The outright rejection of the ethnofederal legacy, and the fact that this was ignored and passively 
approved by the international community, led to a counteraction of a unilateral declaration of 
independence and armed uprising against the central government. Finally, the Abkhazian case differs 
from the two other Georgian subunits in many aspects. As a former SSR, Abkhazia never abandoned 
its goal for a more independent posture vis-à-vis Georgia and the declaration of the restoration of pre-
1921 independence in Georgia only deepened the distrust between the parties.1117 However, Abkhazia 
is a challenging case for external self-determination, as the Abkhaz constituted less than 18% of the 
population of the ASSR before the forced expulsions of Georgians after the war of 1992-1994.1118 
In relation to the second-level requirements as portrayed in the EC Guidelines and the Statement on 
the USSR, at the moment of Georgia’s recognition in March 1992, the picture is rather clear. Georgia 
                                                 
1113 Ibid. Art. 22. 
1114 ‘What is Changed in the Constitutional Law of Georgia on Ajara?’, Ajara TV, 22 June 2017.  
1115 As of 5 June 2020, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have received recognitions by five UN member states. In addition, two UN member 
states had previously recognized them but have withdrawn their recognition.  
1116 These include a State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation, 27 January 2010, and Law On Occupied 
Territories, Law No 2676, 26 February 2010. 
1117 Although Georgia did display in the 1995 Constitution a more conciliatory attitude towards Abkhazia than to South Ossetia. 
1118 According to the 1989 census, quoted in <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/abkhaz/>. In 2011, the Abkhaz made up a slightly 
over 50% of the population (n 1091).  
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had continued Ajaran autonomy, and the 1995 Constitution did abide by the rights of ethnic and 
national groups in accordance with the CSCE framework.1119 Yet, Georgia was breaching the rights 
of its two other subunits that it had inherited within its uti possidetis borders. The outright attack 
against Abkhazia and the abolishment of South Ossetian constitutionally guaranteed autonomy are in 
stark violation of the Guidelines’ criteria on the ‘inviolability of all frontiers which can only be 
changed by peaceful means and by common agreement’ and the ‘commitment to settle by agreement, 
including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and 
regional disputes’.1120 Thus, Georgia did not fulfil the requirements in relation to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and its international recognition was premature. As the aim was to promote peaceful state 
succession, it would have been of utmost importance for the international community to insist upon 
the continuation of the ethnofederal autonomies at this point when they had the leeway to do so. The 
failure has led to the consequences that should be familiar to us already at this point - ethnic violence, 
unilateral declarations of independence, outside intervention, de facto independencies, fragmentation 
of the successor state, and lasting frozen conflict with no negotiated end in sight.  
In the end, the international community did not accept Georgian claim for the restoration of its pre-
1921 independence but instead recognized it within its uti possidetis borders due to the dissolution of 
the USSR in the late 1991. Therewith, they demanded the second-level requirements listed in the 
Guidelines for their recognition - guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities 
in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the CSCE framework; inviolability of all 
frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; commitment to 
settle by agreement all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes - but failed to 
follow through with this demand. I conclude that this breached the evolutionary logic of uti possidetis 
and failed to produce a peaceful settlement of state succession.  
5.4.4 Conclusions 
While the cases of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia contain unique elements, there are common 
patterns. In all the cases where the autonomy of a former ethnofederal unit was abolished or curtailed 
- Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria - there was a territorial conflict, 
which the host state was unable to win as external stakeholder took part in the fighting.1121 In contrast, 
                                                 
1119 Guidelines (n 4) para. 4; and Arts. 32-33 and 35 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting (n 815). 
1120 Guidelines (n 4). 
1121 Transnistria was not an ethnofederal unit at the moment of the dissolution, but it did have a history as an ASSR.  
201 
 
in Nakhichevan and Ajara, where there was the continuation of their former autonomous statuses, 
there was no conflict.1122 Moreover, the successor states viewed the statuses of their ASSRs and AOs 
on different terms: when the federal control loosened in the late 1980s, the host states tried to abolish 
their AOs instantly, whereas there were at least attempts to negotiate with the ASSRs.1123 
The tragedy of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space is that after the host state had suffered a 
military defeat and had withdrawn its forces, it has offered the subunits similar autonomies than those 
of which’s abolition had led to the conflict in the first place.1124 The post-conflict autonomy offers by 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia have been seen as too little and too late by the de facto independent 
breakaway states. The successor states had missed their opportunity to maintain their territorial 
integrity in the early 1990s when there was still enough goodwill to achieve multinational unity. 
5.5 Ethnofederalism Distorted: Yugoslavia and the Third Level of Self-
Determination 
In this subchapter, I go through the last trajectory of the socialist federal dissolutions, the successor 
states of the SFRY. These cases are comparable to the Soviet successor states as the SFRY had copied 
the Soviet ethnofederal model into their constitutional system,1125 and the recognition of the SFRY 
successor states was regulated under the same EC Guidelines criteria. However, the cases of the 
SFRY have an added complexity as their recognition was further contingent by the EC Declaration 
of Yugoslavia.1126 The additional criteria included making an application by a deadline to a special 
Arbitration Commission and to accept the provisions laid down in the draft Convention of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia. These conditions were a lot stricter than in the Soviet cases, especially in 
regard to the rights of national and ethnic groups.  
The more encompassing criteria for the SFRY successor states resulted in a distortion of the 
ethnofederal legacy. Indeed, the SFRY disintegration began when the only ethnofederalized SR, 
                                                 
1122 The standoff between Ajara and Georgia did not contain an ethnic element and was resolved peacefully. 
1123 This is yet another example of thinking in the inherited Soviet terms, which I have utilized in my uti possidetis meritus proposal. 
As defined by the ICJ, uti possidetis ‘applies to the State as it is, i.e. to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing. The 
principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back the hands’ (Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 
30). However, I claim that it is impossible to deny that the modern understanding of the ‘territorial title’ that the ICJ was referring to 
has developed into a more complex set of manifestations.  
1124 For example, Azerbaijani offers of the highest level of autonomy available in international practice for Nagorno-Karabakh has not 
been accepted. This offer has never been officially revoked. R. Rahimov, ‘Kurdish Referendum: Implications for the Karabakh 
Conflict’ 14(121) Eurasia Daily Monitor (2017).  
1125 See subchapter 4.2.2. In one of the few departures from the Soviet model, the Yugoslav SRs gained a slightly greater fiscal power 
than their SSRs counterparts in the USSR. D. Rusinow, ‘Reopening of the “National Question” in the 1960s’ in L. Cohen, J. Dragović-
Soso (Eds), State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration (Purdue, 2007) 131-148 at 131. 
1126 N 224. 
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Serbia, decided to keep its subunits in name while unilaterally and unconstitutionally de facto 
abolishing all their relevant rights, causing alarm among the other SRs.1127 Especially the rejection of 
the rights of the Kosovars - a third largest national group in the SFRY according to the last 1991 
census - led to Kosovo’s subsequent rejection of a common future in Serbia and an armed uprising 
against it. Moreover, the case of Kosovo activated other minorities without prior ethnofederal status 
to question their links to their host state and to demand territorial autonomies in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia, respectively. Finally, Kosovo has become a highly influential example for the post-
Soviet ethnofederal conflicts, making the negotiated solutions there even less likely.1128 
5.5.1 Introduction: The Long Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
As accounted for previously, the SFRY became the second ethnofederal socialist state with the 
proclamation of the right to self-determination to all Yugoslav peoples. In 1945, the previously 
unitary Yugoslavia was ethnofederalized and subdivided into six SRs (equivalent to the SSRs). In 
1974, the SFRY adopted its last Constitution, according to which the SR of Serbia had two Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces (SAPs, equivalent to ASSRs),1129 which were simultaneously constituent 
components of both Serbia and the SFRY. The SAPs were given a remarkably high level of 
autonomy, even surpassing the status given to the Soviet ASSRs in 1990.1130 
Briefly, in the late 1980s, the SFRY was ruled by a collective presidency called Presidium, with a 
rotating one-year chairmanship for each federal unit.1131 In 1989, Serbia tried to take over Presidium, 
which alarmed the other SRs and led to the dissolutions of the ruling Party1132 and Presidium in early 
1990.1133 With Slovenia and Croatia announcing plans to secede from the dysfunctional SFRY, Serbia 
took over the remaining federal organs and warned that such moves would be countered by force. In 
this volatile moment, Prime Minister of the SFRY pleaded for mediation from the EC and other 
                                                 
1127 For more the destruction of the SFRY state, see subchapter 4.2.7. 
1128 The recognition of Kosovo independence in 2008 has made the former ASSRs even more determined to pursue outright 
independence from their host state and has allowed them to accuse the West of ‘double standards’ in self-determination disputes. Siding 
with the post-Soviet separatists, Russia has also used the double standard accusation, for instance, by the UN Ambassador Churkin in 
April 2007. ‘Russian, U.S Diplomats Clash At UN Over Abkhazia’, RadioFreeEurope, 11 April 2007.  
1129 The two SAPs were Vojvodina (with a significant Hungarian minority) and Kosovo (predominantly Albanian). They were not 
given a SR status, because they were seen to be having ‘homelands’ abroad in Hungary and Albania, respectively.  
1130 According to Art. 294 of the 1974 SFRY Constitution, the SAPs had a veto right over Serbian legal acts concerning their affairs. 
‘[i]f a bill, draft regulation or draft enactment or any other issue concerning the general interests of a Republic or Autonomous Province, 
or the equality of the nations and nationalities is on the agenda of the Federal Chamber, and if so requested by the majority of delegates 
from one Republic or Autonomous Province, resort shall be made to a special procedure to consider and adopt such a bill, draft 
enactment or issue’. The special procedure required that all SRs and SAPs reach a common position, or the bill would be rejected.  
1131 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189) Art. 313.  
1132 Accounted for in detail in Pauković (n 192) 21-33. The League of Communists was the only allowed political party according to 
the Preamble VIII of the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY. 
1133 Busky (n 193) 36.  
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international actors.1134 The EC attempted to reconcile the competing claims in the SFRY by 
organizing a Peace Conference in late 1991. 
According to the Conference’s Draft Settlement proposal, the SRs would be recognized within their 
uti possidetis borders if they guarantee for their ethnic and national minorities all the rights envisaged 
in the 1966 Covenants, the CSCE Documents and the Council of Europe protocols, as well as the 
right to participation to the governance of the SR concerning their affairs.1135 Most importantly, the 
Draft demanded that ‘areas in which persons belonging to a national or ethnic group form a majority, 
will enjoy a special status (autonomy)’, which included the right to have national emblems, a 
legislative body, an administrative structure including a regional police force and a judiciary 
responsible for matters concerning the area, as well as provisions for appropriate international 
monitoring of the fulfilment of these rights.1136  
In December 1991, the EC issued the Declaration on Yugoslavia that promised to recognize any SR 
requesting for it if it accepts the conditions of the Guidelines and the conditions laid down in the Draft 
Convention, especially considering human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups.1137 This 
was seen as essential, as the national tensions were high in the collapsing SFRY. Especially the 
question over the rights of Serbs and Albanians were hard to resolve - the application of uti possidetis 
would leave a remarkable number of ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,1138 and Kosovo 
Albanians in Serbia. Eventually, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina send their 
recognition applications to the EC, whereas Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed that they continue 
the existence of the SFRY under the name of FRY.1139  
In March 1992, the EC and the US issued a joint declaration pledging their support for the principles 
of the Conference on Yugoslavia - respect for the uti possidetis borders and the rights of all national 
and ethnic groups - and promised to coordinate their recognition processes.1140 Especially important 
in this regard was that they pledged to ‘coordinate their approach to Serbia and Montenegro, which 
have expressed the wish to form a common state, and lay particular emphasis on their demonstrable 
                                                 
1134 Bagwell (n 632) 494. 
1135 Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, ‘Arrangements for a General Settlement’, 4 November 1991, Chapter I Art. 1(f) and Chapter II 
Arts. 2a(1) and 2b. 
1136 Ibid. Art. 2c. 
1137 N 224. 
1138 N 232.  
1139 The Constitution of the FRY maintained that it was a legal continuation state of the SFRY, but excluded any territorial claims on 
the four seceding republics. UN Doc A/46/915 (n 225). However, the continuation of the SFRY was not accepted in state practice.  
1140 US/EC Declaration on the Recognition of the Yugoslav Republics, Brussels, 10 March 1992. 
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respect for the territorial integrity of other republics and for the rights of minorities on their territory 
as well as their willingness to negotiate Yugoslav state succession issues at the EC Conference’. 
In sum, at the moment of the dissolution of its dissolution in 1991-1992, the SFRY consisted of six 
SRs and two SAPs. When the EC was given a lead to form a recognition policy towards the SRs, it 
concluded that just like in the Soviet dissolution only the first tier ethnofederal units would have the 
right to independent statehood. As the SAPs had held an even higher status than the Soviet ASSRs, 
they were given more rights in the application of uti possidetis as the EC’s Draft Convention 
demanded the continuation of their autonomies. Moreover, some rights provided for in the Draft 
Convention were not limited to the SAPs but concerned other non-titular ethnic groups as well. 
Nevertheless, a similar pattern than in the Soviet cases developed: despite the strict conditions, the 
international community prematurely recognized the SRs without sufficient guarantees for autonomy. 
Violence ensued, after which there was be negotiations on autonomy but from a significantly weaker 
negotiating position and without the leeway of international recognition.  
I begin by the cases of the two SAPs in the SR of Serbia, followed by the two cases where an 
internationally guaranteed autonomy would be given to two groups that did not enjoy any 
ethnofederal status and territorial autonomy in the SFRY era, Republika Srpska and Ilirida.1141  
5.5.2 Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo 
Serbia was ethnofederalized with the creation of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the first 1946 SFRY 
Constitution.1142 Vojvodina had a notable Hungarian minority, but throughout its existence, a Serb 
plurality,1143 whereas Kosovo was almost 80% Albanian in the last SFRY census.1144 Thus, while 
sharing the same autonomous rights and the curtailment of those rights in the late 1980s, the two 
cases were rather different in terms of the right to self-determination. Vojvodina resembles more like 
the cases of the ASSRs of Nakhichevan and Ajara, as the ethnic component did not play such a role.  
                                                 
1141 Even though there would be other ethnoterritorial conflicts to cover in the SFRY - the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Croatian 
Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia - but these cases did not involve former ethnofederal subunits or facilitated the creation of new territorial 
subunits, so I exclude them from my analysis. The same applies to the two self-proclaimed ‘People’s Republics’ in Ukraine’s Donbas.  
1142 The 1946 Constitution (n 241), Art. 2: ‘The People’s Republic of Serbia includes the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the 
autonomous Kosovo-Metohijan region’.  
1143 According to the last SFRY census in 1991, the population was 57,2% Serbs and 16,9% Hungarians.  
1144 According to the 1981 census, the Province had an Albanian majority of 77,42%, with 13,2% Serb minority. Albanians boycotted 
the last official SFRY census of 1991.  
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The extent of the SAPs autonomy shifted throughout the years until they gained a close-to-equal 
status with the SRs in the last 1974 Constitution.1145 In it, the SAPs were made constituent units of 
the SFRY that could forge direct links with federal authorities and bypass Serbia altogether, giving 
them a ‘de facto republican status’.1146 The SAPs gained a right to have their own Constitution, 
assemblies, and executive councils, with ‘no vertical superiority or subordination’ between their 
organs and Serbia’s.1147 For example, the Kosovo Assembly was the highest authority in the Kosovo 
SAP. It had the power to change the SAP Constitution and veto changes to the Constitution of the 
SFRY or Serbia that would have affected Kosovo’s legal position. In addition, the Kosovo Assembly 
had the power to issue laws and budgets and to appoint and recall presidents, judges, and high officials 
in the province. Finally, the SAPs territory could no longer be altered without their consent.1148  
While the Constitution retained some asymmetry between the SRs and SAPs, the line was blurred 
considerably with references to the SAPs ‘sovereign rights’,1149 and by giving them equal right to 
introduce bills for all-Union laws1150 and a 2:3 ratio in the number of federal representatives.1151 
Several articles of the Constitution reaffirmed their equality with the SRs.1152 Inversely, Serbia felt 
its territorial integrity threatened by the highly autonomous statuses of the SAPs.  
After taking control over Serbia, in the summer of 1988 Milošević started undermining the SFRY 
central authority.1153 In the spring of 1989, Serbia passed a series of constitutional amendments, 
severely curtailing the SAPs autonomies, for example, by taking away their veto right over changes 
                                                 
1145 Later reproduced in the subsequent 1974 Constitutions of the SR Serbia, the SAP of Vojvodina, and the SAP of Kosovo. For more 
on the changing statuses of the SAPs, see subchapters 4.2.2-4.2.6. 
1146 Pavlović (n 663) 16. 
1147 Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 30. 
1148 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Art. 5. As summarized in the Written Comments of Slovenia, ‘[a]t the federal level, 
autonomous provinces were equal to republics also with regard to decision making powers on the following main issues: Republics 
and autonomous provinces took decisions on amendments to the SFRY Constitution on an equal footing (Arts. 398-402 of the SFRY 
Constitution), meaning the consent of autonomous provinces was required for the adoption of an amendment to the SFRY Constitution; 
Federal bodies decided on laws and other issues stipulated by the Constitution (Arts. 398-402 of the SFRY Constitution and amendment 
No. 40) on the basis of the agreement of republic and provincial assemblies; The Federation concluded certain treaties in agreement 
with the competent republic or provincial bodies (Art. 271 of the SFRY Constitution); Republics and autonomous provinces cooperated 
with foreign bodies, organisations and international organisations (amendment No. 36 to the SFRY Constitution); Republics and 
autonomous provinces could request a special decision-making procedure in the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly (Art. 294 of 
the SFRY Constitution)’. Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 10. 
1149 Ibid. Art. 4. 
1150 Ibid. Art. 293. 
1151 Ibid. Arts. 291-292. The main legislative body, the Federal Chamber, had 30 representatives from each SR and 20 from each SAP. 
The secondary body, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, had 12 from each SR and eight from each SAP. The Constitutional 
Court of the SFRY had two judges from each SR and one from each SAP. The highest authority of the federation, the SFRY Presidium, 
had one representative from each SR and one from each SAP.  
1152 E.g., Arts. 1 and 3. A leading Yugoslav constitutional lawyer Mirić held an opinion that ‘under article 4 of the SFRY Constitution, 
the socialist autonomous province is not only autonomous, but even sovereign: it is the locus of the exercise of the sovereign rights of 
the working people and citizens and of the nationalities and ethnic minorities’. Quoted in East Europe Report (n 670) 97. 
1153 See subchapter 4.2.7. 
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in the Serbian SR Constitution and giving the Serbian Constitutional Court vertical superiority over 
the Constitutional Courts of the SAPs.1154  
Because Vojvodina was more malleable than Kosovo, Serbia left it with some autonomous functions, 
including its parliament and government, in its 1990 SR Constitution.1155 However, Serbian relations 
with Kosovo deteriorated quickly when the Kosovo Assembly contested Serbian constitutional 
amendments. The Kosovo Assembly was forced to consent to the changes under a state of emergency 
and without the required two-thirds of a majority. When it further protested, Serbia dissolved the 
Assembly altogether and assumed its functions.1156 The process for dismantling the autonomous 
structures of Kosovo was continued with a series of measures and laws in the summer of 1990,1157 
culminating in a new Serbian SR Constitution that abolished most of Kosovo’s autonomy.1158 In turn, 
members of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly declared independence from Serbia on 2 July 1990, 
demanding Kosovo to be recognized as a SR of the restructured SFRY.1159 
Despite these unilateral actions by Serbia, there were no changes to the status of Kosovo in the 
applicable SFRY Constitution.1160 The abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy was contrary to several 
articles of the 1974 SFRY Constitution,1161 and violated several individual federal laws1162 and the 
principle of vacatio legis.1163 The assumption of the Kosovo Assembly’s functions had no basis in 
                                                 
1154 The most important were the following: Amendment 29 made certain provision of the constitutions of SAPs not applicable if the 
assembly of the SAP did not harmonize them within one year. Amendment 33 considerably weakened the SAPs’ status in relation to 
passing laws relating to legislation applicable throughout the SR Serbia. Amendment 44 stipulated that the Serbian Constitutional Court 
could begin to decide on certain matters without the Kosovo Constitutional Court having yet concluded its proceedings on the matter. 
Amendment 47 abolished Art. 427 of the Constitution of Serbia, which stated that Serbia decided on the amendments to its constitution 
on the basis of agreement with the SAP assemblies, which now could only give ‘opinions’. However, the SAPs retained the right to 
give their consent to amendments of the SFRY Constitution, which the Serbian amendments were breaking. 
1155 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted on 28 September 1990, Art. 111. 
1156 Janjic, Lalaj and Pula (n 701) 279. 
1157 See subchapter 4.2.7. 
1158 ‘In the constitutional order of Serbia there still are autonomous provinces, but now as units of territorial autonomy, such as the 
provinces in Italy, and autonomous communities in Spain, in other words - without state functions. In such a way, the autonomy in 
Serbia is returned to its standard theoretical frameworks, where it should be and where it is the only possible form of democratic state 
order of a single State’. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (n 1152) Preface. See more in March and Sil (n 702) 5. Finally, the 1992 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (n 783) does not mention the SAPs. 
1159 Tierney (n 296) 269. However, when the SFRY dissolved the Constitution of Kosovo was amended to include the eventual goal of 
independence. Koinova (n 877) 104. 
1160 Both the SFRY Constitutional Court and the Federal Assembly tried to intervene in 1990 to make the SRs change their constitutions 
(the Constitutional Court concluded that all the SRs except Montenegro had violated the 1974 SFRY Constitution with their 1988-
1989 amendments), but none of them did as the SFRY was becoming increasingly paralyzed. 
1161 The 1974 SFRY Constitution (n 189), Arts 2 and 5. The abolishment of the SAP autonomy was, in effect, a territorial modification 
of the SFRY territory, which was not left for the discretion of the SRs but needed the federal government’s constitutional ratification. 
1162 For example, Law on the Foundations of State Administration and Federal Executive Council, Law on General Administrative 
Procedure, and Law on Administrative Disputes. Summarized in Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 20. 
1163 The principle of vacatio legis requires that a certain time limit must elapse from the date of the promulgation of the law until its 
entry into force. For example, three legal acts by Serbia were adopted, published in the Official Journal, and entered into force on the 
very same day, 26 June 1990. Ibid. at 23. 
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the 1974 SFRY Constitution as it was not in a subordinate position to the Serbian Assembly. I 
conclude that the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy was not in accordance with the legal order of 
the SFRY. Thus, it was an invalid act and will not affect the utilization of uti possidetis, which is 
based on the last legal order at the moment of the dissolution.  
While Serbia had insisted that the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy was an internal affair, the issue 
became internationalized with the dissolution of the SFRY and the need for the FRY to be recognized 
either as a sole continuation state or as one of the successor states of the SFRY. Using this leeway, 
the EC and the Badinter Commission tried to force Serbia to re-establish Kosovo’s autonomy. In 
March 1991, the European Parliament issued a declaration where they demanded that ‘the constituent 
republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right to freely determine their own 
future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal 
borders’.1164 In June 1992, European Council called for the Serbian leadership to ‘refrain from further 
repression and to engage in serious dialogue’ with representatives of Kosovo on autonomy in the 
framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia.1165 
The Badinter Commission’s opinions 2 and 4-7 all demanded the implementation of the provisions 
of Chapter II of the November 1991 Draft Convention.1166 Moreover, all the relevant international 
instruments that the Badinter Commission was referring to - the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of 
Paris, and the EC Guidelines - demand the inviolability of all frontiers. While Opinion No. 8 ruled 
that ‘the process of dissolution of the SFRY, referred to in Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 is 
now complete and that the SFRY no longer exists’,1167 Opinion No. 10 added that the FRY ‘is a new 
state which cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY’ and that the EC’s recognition of it 
would be subject to its compliance with the conditions laid down by general international law and the 
Guidelines of 16 December 1991.1168 
In accordance with these demands, the EC was holding out its recognition of the FRY. In order to 
gain recognition, on 27 April 1992 the FRY produced a declaration in which it promised to accept 
                                                 
1164 S. Woodward, ‘Redrawing Borders in a Period of Systemic Transition’ in M. Esman and S. Telhani (Eds), International 
Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts (Cornell, 1995) at 208. 
1165 Declaration on Former Yugoslavia (n 786).  
1166 The most important opinion in relation to the status of Kosovo was Opinion No. 5, in which the Badinter Commission considered 
whether Croatia had fulfilled the conditions in the Guidelines and whether it had fulfilled all the provisions of the Draft Convention on 
4 November 1991. Opinion No. 5 (n 226). 
1167 Opinion No. 8 (n 785). On the same day, Opinion No. 9 concerned the state succession was given. 
1168 Opinion No. 10 (n 788). In addition, the UN Security Council resolutions 757 (30 May 1992) and 777 (16 September 1992) had 
explicitly denied the continuation of the SFRY. 
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‘all basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act and the 
Paris Charter, and particularly the principles of parliamentary democracy, market economy and 
respect for human rights and the rights of national minorities’ and that it ‘shall ensure the highest 
standards of the protection of human rights and the rights of national minorities provided for in 
international legal instruments and CSCE documents’.1169 In November, the Serbian parliament 
declared that the minority rights granted to Albanians were well above the international standards and 
that international law did not grant a right to secession to minorities. The parliament stated willingness 
to start a dialogue but only within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.1170 
The international community kept on putting pressure on the FRY over Kosovo. On 15 June and 
again on 27 June 1992, the EC declared that it ‘reminds the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate 
quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the Peace Conference’.1171 In July 1992, 
G7 demanded the re-establishment of the autonomy status according to the Draft Convention,1172 
while the CSCE insisted that the Serb authorities stop repression and engage in serious dialogue with 
Albanians.1173 In August, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia obliged that the 
FRY authorities ‘restore in full the civil and constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the Kosovo and 
Vojvodina’.1174 In December, European Council demanded unambiguously that the ‘autonomy of 
Kosovo within Serbia must be restored’.1175 In November 1993, the EU endorsed the re-establishment 
of Kosovo’s autonomy in its European Action Program for Yugoslavia.1176  
In contrast to the demands of international organizations, there was no serious dialogue in the FRY 
on the autonomy of Kosovo. On the contrary, the situation was getting worse, with several reports 
affirming the grave situation in the province.1177 For example, in December 1994, the UN General 
Assembly Resolution demanded that the FRY revokes ‘all discriminatory legislation, in particular 
                                                 
1169 Finally, the FRY promised to grant the national minorities in its territory all those rights which would be recognized and enjoyed 
by the national minorities in the other CSCE States. Declaration on a New Yugoslavia, Belgrade 27 April 1992.  
1170 Declaration on Human Rights and the Rights of the National Minorities, Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, 27 November 1992. 
1171 The EC Press Statement, Luxembourg, 15 June 1992 (Quoted in Tierney (n 296) 266); and Declaration on Former Yugoslavia (n 
786), italics mine. Tierney continues that ‘[a]s a consequence, Kosovo had a right only of internal self-determination’ and the Peace 
Conference did not consider its right to external self-determination. Ibid. 
1172 G7 urged ‘the Serbian leadership to respect minority rights in full’ and to ‘engage in serious dialogue with representatives of 
Kosovo to define a status of autonomy according to the Draft Convention’. Declaration on Former Yugoslavia, 6-8 July 1992. 
1173 The CSCE Summit Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis, 10 July 1992.  
1174 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 26-28 August 1992 Paper by the Co-Chairman (No. 246h). 
1175 Declaration on former Yugoslavia, European Council, Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992.  
1176 The Kosovo Report (n 797) 58.  
1177 Sixth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, 1 March 1994; and Statement of the Chairman of the CSCE Permanent Committee, 28 April 1994.  
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that which has entered into force since 1989, and establish genuine democratic institution in Kosovo, 
including the parliament and the judiciary’.1178 
Notwithstanding their own criteria and other cumulating international pressure, on 9 April 1996 the 
EU member states collectively recognized the FRY. Their joint declaration stated that good relations 
with the FRY would depend on ‘the granting of a large degree of autonomy for Kosovo within the 
FRY’.1179 In effect, the EU chose a formal relationship with the FRY over the status of Kosovo. This 
proved to be an error as the national relations in the province continued to escalate. In August 1996, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights indicated its grave concern on the deterioration of the human 
rights situation and promoted for the establishment of an international presence in Kosovo.1180 The 
violence spiralled out of control, and the last international effort to peacefully restore Kosovo’s 
autonomy via the Rambouillet Accords in March 1999 failed when the FRY refused to sign.1181  
To summarize, in relation to the third level requirements as portrayed in the EC Guidelines and the 
Declaration of Yugoslavia, at the moment of its international recognition the FRY was in an obvious 
breach. It had not abided by the rights of ethnic and national groups in accordance with the CSCE 
framework,1182 and the wholesale abolishment of its internal autonomies was in stark violation of the 
Guidelines’ criteria on the ‘inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means 
and by common agreement’ and the ‘commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate 
by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes’.1183 Even 
more grievously, the FRY was in clear defiance of the Draft Convention’s demands on the rights of 
ethnic groups, including autonomy,1184 the framework which had also been endorsed on several 
occasions by the CSCE, the EC/EU, G7, the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, and the UN General Assembly.1185 
Therefore, I can only conclude that the recognition of the FRY in 1996 was premature. With it came 
the consequences we should already be familiar with from the Soviet examples - ethnic violence, 
outside intervention, and the fragmentation of the successor state. The international community’s 
                                                 
1178 UN GA Resolution 49/204, 23 December 1994. 
1179 Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Recognition by EU Member States of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (n 799). 
1180 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1996/2, 19 August 1996.  
1181 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (n 55). The Agreement was signed by the Albanian, American, and 
British delegations.  
1182 Guidelines (n 4) para. 4; and Arts. 32-33 and 35 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting (n 815).  
1183 Guidelines (n 4). 
1184 ‘Arrangements for a General Settlement’ (n 1135) Chapter II Art. 2c. 
1185 N 1171-1178. 
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failure to pressure the Serbian leadership to re-establish Kosovo’s autonomy contributed to the 
escalation of the situation into a full-scale war in 1998-1999. After a controversial North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, the UN Security Council resolution 1244 had established 
UN administration over Kosovo, and obligated Serbs and Albanians to negotiate over the province’s 
future status. Here, the international community regained leeway over the FRY to establish a 
meaningful autonomy for Kosovo. However, it was too late at this point as the national relations had 
become too polarized due to the prolonged period of mutual distrust and violence.  
5.5.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska 
The strange case of Republika Srpska differs from the other post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav territorial 
disputes. Along with Gagauzia, it is only the second instance where a state decided to create a 
territorial autonomy to a national group without any previous self-governing status.1186 Notably, 
unlike Gagauzia that was a sovereign decision of Moldova and made without foreign pressure, 
Republika Srpska was created, recognized, and guaranteed by the international community. 
After its first free elections in November 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina held an independence 
referendum in March 1992 and was recognized independent without any inherited internal 
administrative lines in April 1992.1187 However, it succumbed to the Civil War almost instantly. A 
devastating three and a half years of conflict between the Bosniaks and the Croats on the one side and 
a self-proclaimed Serb-entity called the ‘Republika Srpska’ supported militarily by the FRY on the 
other side ensued.1188 After a series of international mediation efforts,1189 the Bosnian War was finally 
put to an end with the Dayton Accords on 21 November 1995,1190 where the intervening states re-
wrote the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.1191 The Dayton Accords established a new three-
member presidency to act as a head of state and decentralized the state into two radically autonomous 
                                                 
1186 There were other self-proclaimed entities without prior ethnofederal status during the Yugoslav Wars - such as the Republic of 
Serbian Krajina (rɛpǔblika sr̩̂pskaː krâjina), proclaimed independent from Croatia - but they received no international recognition and 
were incorporated back to their host state. 
1187 By the EC on April 6th and by the US in the following day. Bosnia-Herzegovina became a UN member state on 22 May 1992.  
1188 For a good overview of the conflict with special attention to its internal and international politics, see Burg and Shoup (n 791).  
1189 There were three major attempts to end the Bosnian War via power-sharing agreement prior to the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 
February 1992, the EC Peace Conference produced a Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan (also known as the Lisbon Agreement), which 
called for ethnic power-sharing and devolution of power to local ethnic communities. Next, in January 1993, a Vance-Owen plan would 
have divided Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions. The plan was accepted by the ‘President’ of Republika Srpska on 30 April 
1993 but was rejected by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska a week later. Finally, in July 1993, a Stoltenberg plan called for 
the division of Bosnia into three ethnic mini-states, but the Bosniak side rejected the plan in August, and the war continued until 1995. 
1190 General Framework Agreement (n 790). While the Agreement ended the wars between the former SRs, the omission of Kosovo 
led to the armed separatist uprising there a few years later. 
1191 Indeed, the new Constitution was first produced as Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords. General Framework Agreement (n 790). 
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entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.1192 The former consisted of 10 
cantons, each with their government, parliament, and courts.1193 The Constitution provides for 
proportional representation to the three constituent peoples in the government and gives mutual vetoes 
to all of them in the case of a ‘vital national interest’ of the group. In addition, all the groups need to 
be proportionally represented also in the executive, the legislative, and judiciary branch of the 
government.1194 The Dayton Accords also established a special international body called the Office 
of the High Representative, which was put in charge of the implementation of the Accords.1195 Finally 
and most importantly, the Dayton framework was backed by extensive internal guarantees by the UN 
Peace Implementation Council, the EU Special Representative, and NATO.1196 
As the territorial modifications created by the Dayton Accords brought a de facto re-partition of the 
state, it conflicted with the general policy of retaining the former internal borders via uti possidetis 
favoured by the international community and the Badinter Commission.1197 Eventually, Bosnia-
Herzegovina was forced to accept a major reconfiguration of the state’s internal borders in order to 
satisfy the self-determination demands of the Serb minority.1198 What is worse, the recognition of 
Republika Srpska as a constituent unit of a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina is a blatant example of a case 
where a minority achieved an internationally recognized and highly inclusive autonomy via the use 
of force, whereas the ASSRs and SAPs that had already possessed this kind of status were ignored.1199 
As observed by Trbovich, ‘[t]he force employed affected the application of the right to self-
determination, translating this right to territorial autonomy in Bosnia, self-government under 
international supervision in Kosovo and Metohia, decentralization and group rights in Macedonia, or 
nominal human rights without a right to territorial autonomy in Croatia’.1200 
The Dayton Accords were the last plausible venue that could have provided legal guarantees for the 
rights of Kosovo, as should have been the case considering the EC Guidelines, The Hague Peace 
                                                 
1192 Ibid. Arts. V and 1(3).  
1193 According to Jenne and Huszka, this was supposed to represent the right balance between centripetalism and centrifugalism. E. 
Jenne and B. Huszka, ‘The Importance of Being Balanced: Lessons from Negotiated Settlement to Self-Determination Movements in 
Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo’ in J. Alterman and W. Todman (Eds), Independence Movements and Their Aftermath: Self-
Determination and the Struggle for Success (CSIS, 2019) 117-137 at 121. 
1194 Summarized in E. Đonlić, ‘Protection of the Vital National Interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ES Think Tank, 4 December 2017.  
1195 R. Cohen and A. Radin, ‘Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe’ (Rand, 2019) at 75-76.  
1196 Jenne and Huszka (n 1193) 126.  
1197 Bartos (n 19) 77.  
1198 General Framework Agreement (n 790) Art. 3. The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina had had no ethnofederal status under the SFRY 
Constitution.  
1199 The Dayton Accords were generous to the Serb side in order o end the three-year Civil War in Bosnia-Herzegovina rapidly. 
1200 Trbovich (n 282) 293. 
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Conference Draft Conventions and the Badinter Commission opinions.1201 Nevertheless, the chance 
was missed, and the FRY was recognized in the following year, with notorious consequences.1202  
While lacking the former ethnofederal subunits, as a former SR Bosnia-Herzegovina was still obliged 
to fulfil the requirements listed the EC Guidelines, to make an application to the Badinter Commission 
and to accept the provisions on human rights and the rights of national and ethnic groups as laid down 
in the Conference on Yugoslavia’s Draft Convention. According to the Badinter Commission, after 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had undertaken to apply the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of 
Paris, the ICCPR and other similar instruments of human rights, and guaranteed these in its new 
Constitution on 31 July 1990, it was in accordance with the Draft Convention’s requirements on the 
rights of national groups.1203 However, the Badinter Commission concluded that the will of the people 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish a common state had not been sufficiently established, and thus, it 
should not be recognized until there would be a referendum under international supervision. 
Nonetheless, the international community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina - already in a Civil War - 
a few months later. This was premature, as admitted later by the UN Secretary-General.1204  
When comparing the cases of Kosovo and Republika Srpska, the EU’s recognition policy in the early 
1990s is rather troubling. Kosovo, a previously constituent autonomous unit of the SFRY, did not 
receive even the same rights as Bosnian Serbs without any prior status. The status of Republika 
Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina is comparable to Kosovo’s autonomy in the 1974 SFRY Constitution, 
especially on the ability of the Serb minority to participate within the political organs of the federation 
and to use a veto right in constitutional matters.1205 Yet, the fact remains that this status upgrade was 
accomplished by the use of force and was built upon no previous legal basis, while the international 
community chose to ignore Kosovo’s peaceful demands until they likewise chose to seek recognition 
via armed uprising in 1998. The outcome is an antithesis of uti possidetis’ main function - to secure 
the peaceful transfer of sovereignty in a case of independence or state dissolution.  
                                                 
1201 According to Russell, the reason for Kosovo’s exclusion from the Dayton Accords was that the ‘one man whose cooperation was 
deemed to be absolutely essential, Slobodan Milosević, was adamantly opposed to any discussion of Kosovo at Dayton. The success 
of Ibrahim Rugova in keeping the Kosovo Albanian independence movement peaceful failed to garner international support for their 
cause, but made it easier for the West to acquiesce to Milosević’s demands and look the other way’. Russell (n 794) 504-505. 
1202 The disappointment caused by the exclusion then drove some Kosovars to pursue self-determination in similar extra-legal means, 
via an armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army, not unlike the separatists in several of the former ASSRs since 1991. 
1203 Opinion No. 4 (n 226). 
1204 Accounted for in D. Cruise, ‘The Premature Recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Letters from Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’ 1(1) Brown 
Journal of Foreign Affairs (Winter 1993-1994) at 133-144. 
1205 For example, Republika Srpska was guaranteed one-third of the seats in both the upper and lower chambers of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, the House of Peoples (Art. IV.9) and the House of Representatives (Art. IV.10). The veto right was affirmed in Art.V.7. 
General Framework Agreement (n 790), Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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5.5.4 Macedonia and Ilirida 
The international community’s decisions to prematurely recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and to leave 
Kosovars on the mercy of Milošević’s Serbia led to armed ethnic conflicts and subsequent NATO 
military interventions to stop these conflicts. In 2001, the pattern continued in Macedonia, but 
fortunately the intervention was done early enough to avoid large scale conflict.  
Despite having a significant ethnic Albanian minority, the SR of Macedonia was not ethnofederalized 
during the SFRY era. After its first free election in November 1990, Macedonia held a referendum 
for independence on 8 September 1991 with overwhelming support. Subsequently, it declared 
independence on 25 September and adopted a new Constitution on 17 November 1991. The 
Constitution did not establish any territorial autonomies, but it promised that Albanians and other 
minorities enjoy full equality as citizens and that human rights, freedoms, and ethnic equality are 
guaranteed.1206 The national minorities - ‘nationalities’1207 - were guaranteed the right to freely 
express, foster, and develop their identity and national attributes, as well as the protection of their 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity.1208  
These guarantees were not seen as sufficient by the large Albanian majority, presiding over Western 
Macedonia.1209 They held their own referendum on the status of the Albanians in Macedonia in 
January 1992, with a clear majority for the option of autonomy. On 31 March 1992, Albanians held 
a great demonstration in the capital Skopje, demanding that the international community refrain from 
recognizing Macedonia until Albanians are autonomous.1210 They also declared the area as the 
‘Autonomous Republic of Ilirida’,1211 which did not gain international recognition.  
Macedonia’s recognition was delayed, but this was due to a name dispute with Greece rather than its 
minority protection.1212 Nevertheless, Macedonia became a UN member state on 8 April 1993, and 
was recognized independent by the EC in December 1993 and by the US on 8 February 1994. The 
national relations remained tense, with the Kosovo conflict (1998-1999) aggravating the situation 
                                                 
1206 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, adopted on 17 November 1991, Preamble.  
1207 ‘Nationalities’ was an SFRY term for non-titular nations of the federation. See subchapter 4.2.5. 
1208 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (n 1206), Art. 48.  
1209 The Albanians constituted 25,2% of the Macedonian population in the 2002 census. As noted by Maria Koinova, the demands of 
the Albanians in Macedonia were blocked precisely at the time when the system was opened, and they were allowed to organize 
politically. Koinova (n 877) 96. 
1210 Z. Daskalovski, Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia, 1989-2004 (Globic Press, 2006) at 68. 
1211 ‘Republika e Iliridës’. S. Vaknin, ‘The Disingenuous Dialogue’, The Eurasian Politician, Issue 4 (2001).  
1212 Due to the name dispute and Greece’s objections, Macedonia joined the UN as a ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ and 
could not pursue the EU or NATO memberships. The dispute was finally solved with the Prespa Agreement on 12 June 2018, which 
changed Macedonian name to North Macedonia. The Agreement was ratified on 25 January and became effective on 12 February 2019.  
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further. Finally, in early 2001 a group of veterans from the Kosovo War began a low-intensity armed 
insurgency against the Macedonian authorities under the name ‘Albanian National Liberation 
Army’.1213 However, this time the international reaction was quick, and NATO pressured the rebels 
and the Macedonian leadership into signing the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’1214 in order to settle 
the competing claims to self-determination within the single Macedonian state.  
The Framework Agreement established a meaningful autonomy for the Albanian minority. They 
received a veto right on laws concerning culture, language, education, state symbols, local finances 
and elections, and boundaries of municipalities.1215 Furthermore, the Agreement promised to assure 
equitable representations of minorities in public administration, with particular attention to the police 
force and the Constitutional Court.1216 Finally and crucially, the functionality of the Framework 
Agreement was assured via extensive external guarantees, with the introduction of a 3500 NATO 
peace-keepers in Macedonia and the EU appointed a special representative to oversee the 
implementation of the Agreement.1217 Soon afterwards, Macedonia amended its Constitution on 16 
November 2001 to take into account the Framework Agreement.1218 Thus, eventually, the crisis in 
Macedonia was solved by reproducing the ethnofederal model as a desirable alternative to the ethnic 
clashes and frozen conflicts all around the other successor states.  
To conclude, just as in the cases of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia was obliged to fulfil 
the third level self-determination requirements. While it was treating its nationalities better than 
neighbouring Serbia at a time, it was unclear whether the situation in Macedonia was in accordance 
with the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention’s demands, which guaranteed for any group ‘forming a 
substantial percentage of the population in the Republic’ a ‘general right of participation in public 
affairs, including participation in the government of the Republics concerning their affairs’.1219 
Moreover, it gave the right for the recognized national groups to have their own national emblems, 
legislative bodies, regional police forces, and judiciaries, subjected to international monitoring.1220  
The 1991 Constitution of Macedonia guaranteed its nationalities the right to freely express, foster, 
and develop their identity and national attributes, as well as the protection of their ethnic, cultural, 
                                                 
1213 Jenne and Huszka (n 1193) 121-122.  
1214 Framework Agreement, signed at Skopje on 13 August 2001. 
1215 Ibid. Art. 5.2.  
1216 Ibid. Arts. 4.2 and 4.3. 
1217 Jenne and Huszka (n 1193) 122. 
1218 Constitution of Macedonia, amended on 16 November 2001.  
1219 Treaty Provisions for the Convention (n 751) Art. 2.B.3. Italics in the original. 
1220 Ibid. Art. 2.B.2. 
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linguistic, and religious identity, thus providing a better minority protection regime than most of its 
SR counterparts. Moreover, the Badinter Commission evaluated the 1991 Constitution in its Opinion 
No. 6. According to the Badinter Commission, in response to the question what measures Macedonia 
has taken to guarantee the rights of the ethnic and national groups and minorities on its territory, the 
‘Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia provides for the establishment for Council for Interethnic 
Relations, which will deal with such matters at Republic level. All nationalities are equally 
represented on the Council’.1221 Moreover, the Badinter Commission confirmed that Macedonia had 
accepted the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention, especially Chapter II on the rights of national and 
ethnic groups, which were expressed in the 1991 Constitution’s Articles 7, 9, 19, 45 and 48. Finally, 
it concluded that Macedonia satisfied the tests of the EC Guidelines and Declaration on 
Yugoslavia.1222 Thus, the international recognition of Macedonia in 1993-1994 was not premature. 
5.5.5 Conclusions 
The ethnic clashes following the SFRY dissolution are prime examples of the problems related to the 
ethnofederal categorization of populations as either ‘nations’ such as Serbia, ‘nationalities’ such as 
Kosovo Albanians, or ‘ethnic groups’ lacking ethnoterritorial autonomy, such as Bosnian Serbs and 
Macedonian Albanians.1223 The international community’s interpretation equated the rights of the 
nationalities and ethnic groups on the disadvantage of the former,1224 and downgraded peoples outside 
their titular SR to this category as well.1225  
To their credit, the international community did try to advance the socialist federal dissolutions within 
the general international law framework, which meant, among other things, ensuring the respect of 
the rights of minorities in the successor states of the USSR and the SFRY. Due to the potentially more 
precarious national relations, the successor states of the SFRY were demanded even more 
comprehensive minority rights protection. However, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia, the ‘minorities’ evaluated even this minority protection framework as insufficient. As 
                                                 
1221 Opinion No. 6 (n 226). A constitutional amendment established the Council for Interethnic Relations in 1991. It consisted of the 
President of the Macedonian Assembly and two members from each of the nationalities. According to Art. 78: ‘The Council considers 
issues of inter-ethnic relations in the Republic and makes appraisals and proposals for their solution. The Assembly is obliged to take 
into consideration the appraisals and proposals of the Council and to make decisions regarding them’. The Badinter Commission also 
stated that Macedonia has pledged not to try to alter its borders by force, to participate in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to 
settle by agreement all questions relating to the state succession of the SFRY.  
1222 Ibid. Art. 5.  
1223 See subchapter 5.1. 
1224 Kosovo, the constituent part of the SFRY with a veto right over the decisions of Serbian parliament concerning its rights, was not 
recognized to have any more rights than any single ethnic group in the SFRY. This amounted to a de facto non-recognition of its 
substantial SAP status, which led to disillusionment and separatism.  
1225 I.e., the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, although in the latter case they eventually received more substantive rights.  
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their legitimate grievances were not addressed, first the downgraded Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and then the ignored Kosovo Albanians in Serbia started to pursue independence via armed uprisings 
against the central state. Finally, in 2001 their examples encouraged the Macedonian Albanians to 
demand a recognized territorial autonomy. Fortunately, an international intervention was timely 
enough to curtail violence before the situation escalated further.1226  
In retrospect, one can observe a major loophole in the international recognition system, as the 
promotion of peace and security eventually overturned national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the successor states. After having resorted to violence, Bosnian Serbs and Macedonian Albanians 
received a de facto status elevation to the second-level ethnofederal tier of ‘nationalities’, with similar 
rights than the former ASSRs and SAPs. Furthermore, the actual former SAP of Kosovo received no 
recognized rights whatsoever before following suit on the path to the ethnic uprising, after which it 
received a de facto promotion to the SR status,1227 and its independence was duly recognized. 
The international community was eventually able to mediate some kind of a solution in all three cases, 
but only after armed conflicts. Moreover, the solutions in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have 
major flaws.1228 The key is to realize that a more decisive international mediation before awarding 
recognition could produce more acceptable outcomes to all parties concerned, taking advantage of 
the period when there is still enough goodwill to achieve multinational unity. Next, I present the main 
problems of the current frozen conflict mediation efforts. 
5.6 The Contemporary International Mediation Framework of the Frozen 
Conflicts  
In 2002, Dov Lynch lamented that there had been virtually no comparative study on the post-Soviet 
territorial conflicts and separatist states and that a ‘critical gap has emerged in our understanding of 
security developments in the former Soviet Union’.1229 While a few scholarly contributions on this 
                                                 
1226 The overall number of persons killed numbered around 150-250. K. Bender, ‘How the EU and the US Stopped a War and Nobody 
Noticed: The Containment of the Macedonian Conflict and EU Soft Power’ in M. Berdal and D. Zaum (Eds), Political Economy of 
Statebuilding: Power After Peace (Routledge, 2013) 324-341 at 341. These numbers, while significant, pale in comparison to the 
bloody conflicts of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
1227 In their recognition letters, many states referred to Kosovo as one of the unresolved status questions of the dissolution of the SFRY. 
For example, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom commented on the independence of Kosovo the very same day that ‘[f]irstly, 
I want to close the chapter that has followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Kosovo has been and is the last unresolved status issue. 
<https://www.gettyimages.fi/detail/video/independence-declaration-statement-by-rpime-minister-news-footage/685378950>. 
1228 Bosnia-Herzegovina only barely functions as a state and is dependent on international aid and presence, whereas Kosovo has been 
unable to normalize its relations with Serbia and lacks universal recognition as an independent state.  
1229 D. Lynch, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’ 78 International Affairs (2002) 831-848 at 832.  
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topic have emerged since,1230 the field remains, in general, an underdeveloped area of study, 
especially in regard to the effect of the application of uti possidetis in these conflicts.  
Frozen conflicts remain a prominent international problem for several reasons. First, even when they 
stay frozen - i.e., non-violent - they hinder reforms and development in the affected states.1231 In 
addition, these cases do not necessarily remain frozen, as displayed by the 2016 flare-up of violence 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-Karabakh.1232 Thus, the frozen conflicts present 
a consistent and continuing threat to regional development and security. Fortunately, international 
organizations recognize this problem. Already in the 1992 Helsinki Summit Meeting, the OSCE 
created an office for the High Commissioner on National Minorities ‘as an instrument for conflict 
prevention at the earliest possible stage’. It focuses on disputes involving national minorities that 
have an international character and that have the propensity to cause inter-state tension or to ignite 
international armed conflict.1233 Moreover, the EU has taken a more assertive stance towards the 
secessionist conflicts, especially after launching the Eastern Partnership in 2009.1234 For instance, the 
EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus stated in 2011 that ‘EU cannot afford white spots 
to develop on the map of its immediate neighborhood’,1235 and the 2015 European Neighborhood 
Policy review states that ‘[p]rotracted conflicts continue to hamper development in the region’.1236 
Second, a comparative study on separatist movements shows that those groups who had autonomy 
and lost it are likeliest to launch separatist campaigns.1237 According to Cuffe and Siroky, 89% of the 
groups who had lost their autonomy have launched separatist campaigns. In contrast, only 2% of the 
groups that were never autonomous and 21% of those that remained autonomous have done so.1238 
                                                 
1230 See, for example, Zürcher (n 174); M. Kapitonenko, ‘Resolving Post-Soviet “Frozen Conflicts”: Is Regional Integration Helpful?’ 
3(1) Caucasian Review of International Affairs (2009) 37-44; D. Trenin, I. Fediukin, A. Ryabov et al, ‘Post-Soviet Conflicts’, Carnegie 
Moscow Center, 1 September 2006; and Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge for European Security, Warsaw Institute Special 
Report, 14 March 2019.  
1231 Including a possible integration with the EU in the cases of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
1232 Also, one could list the 2014 annexation of Crimea as a case where a legally frozen peaceful conflict erupted into armed aggression. 
1233 Under the High Commissioner’s mandate, the ‘human dimension’ of the conflicts includes human rights and humanitarian affairs. 
‘From the perspective of comprehensive security, respect for human dimension commitments, including respect for the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities, is fundamental to achieving and maintaining peace and security in the region’. ‘High Commissioner 
on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ in United Nations Guide for Minorities, Pamphlet 
No. 9 (2011).  
1234 <https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership_en>. 
1235 Statement by the EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby, OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 10 February 2011. In addition, 
Semneby was the main author of the EU’s Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. T. De Waal, 
Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe’s De Facto State and Breakaway Territories (Carnegie Europe, 2018) at 15. 
1236 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, High Presentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 18 November 2015.  
1237 J. Cuffe and D. Siroky, ‘Paradise Lost: Autonomy and Separatism in the South Caucasus and Beyond’ in J. Cabestan and A. 
Pavković (Eds), Secessionism and Separatism in Europe and Asia: To Have a State of One’s Own (Routledge, 2013) 37-52 at 38. 
1238 Ibid. at 42.  
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As I demonstrated earlier, all but one of the ethnofederalized successor states of the USSR and the 
SFRY that retained meaningful parts of the ethnofederal arrangement were spared of separatism. In 
contrast, all of those rejecting the ethnofederal legacy have faced conflicts with the former subunits. 
Third, the number of people living in these conflict areas has been growing. There are nearly one 
million people combined in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. Crimea 
had a population of almost 2,3 million in the last census,1239 and the rebel areas of Donbas are home 
for another 2,7 million. Simultaneously, the affected areas are getting empty. For example, in 2003-
2013, around 10% of the total population of Donbas emigrated from the area. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the population has shrunk since the Dayton Accords by another 11%.1240 Therewith, despite the 
increasing emigration from the affected areas, the number of people suffering due to frozen conflicts 
is large and increasing. 
Finally, the potential target group of states is significant. According to Roeder, there were altogether 
115 ‘Segment states’ in 20001241 - i.e., separate communities of peoples who have been allocated 
different decision rights that are linked to specific territories.1242 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
went even further and called Kosovo a precedent for an estimated ‘200 territories’ around the 
world.1243 In addition, 20 UN member states have a specific area with a constitutionally guaranteed 
autonomy, with at least three of them having invested upon the autonomous unit a right to 
secession.1244 Thus, the potential impact of the ‘domestic and international politics of self-
determination’1245 cannot be overstated. 
                                                 
1239 Conducted by Russia in December 2014. <https://web.archive.org/web/20151104175105/http://en.krymedia.ru/society/3365334-
Results-of-Census-Population-of-Crimea-is-2284-Million-People>. 
1240 From 36% in 1995 to 47% in 2017. M. Samorukov, ‘A New Approach for Conflict Resolution in Eastern Europe’, Mad’an, 26 
May 2018. 
1241 Roeder (n 884) 47. 
1242 ‘These states are based on varying notions of sovereignty - that is, their answers to the question, what population possesses the 
power to allocate and reallocate decision rights? Second, they vary in the ways their constitutions have allocated decision rights - 
specifically, the extent to which they empower the people of each segment-state to design their political institutions, and to participate 
in the governance of the common-state’. Ibid. at 63. 
1243 ‘Russia Says Kosovo Creates Precedent for Separatists’, Reuters, 23 January 2008.  
1244 The states with constitutional territorial autonomy arrangements are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine, and 
the United Kingdom. T. Benedikter (Ed) Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government A Short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and 
South Asia (EURAC Research, 2009) at 134. Benedikter’s qualification omits states such as the Russian Federation. 
In addition, three Constitutions stipulate a right to external self-determination in the form of independence; Ethiopia, the Netherlands, 
and Saint Kitts and Nevis. The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia proclaims the unrestricted right of ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ 
to ‘self-determination up to secession’ (Art. 39.1). The 1983 Constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, grants the smaller island of Nevis 
the unilateral right to secede if supported by the people of Nevis in a referendum by a two-thirds majority (Art. 113). Finally, the Statute 
of the Kingdom of Netherlands Art. 58 states that Aruba can launch, at any time, the procedure to declare its independence. 
1245 As paraphrased by Stefan Wolff in Wolff (n 1063) 16.  
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In sum, this phenomenon already directly affects several UN member states and millions of people, 
and has a great potential to be even more prevalent in the future. It has been internationally recognized 
as a severe issue, and research has shown that peoples who have lost a previously held autonomous 
status display an overwhelming tendency to challenge the sovereignty of the host state.1246  
As the international community has acknowledged its partial failure in facilitating a peaceful 
dissolution process and as the subsequent conflicts posit a threat to international peace and security, 
an extensive series of international mediation efforts have been initiated to solve the frozen conflicts. 
For Azerbaijan, the Minsk Process spearheads the OSCE’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Process is co-chaired by France, Russia, and the US. For Georgia, 
there is the Geneva International Discussions, a series of international talks that are co-chaired by 
the OSCE, the EU, and the UN. The Discussions bring together representatives of Georgia, Russia, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the US. For Moldova, there is the ‘5+2 format’1247 involving Moldova, 
Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the US.1248 For Kosovo, there was the UN-
sponsored Kosovo status process in 2006-2007, terminated after the UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari 
proposed to settle the conflict via ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo.1249  
Despite international efforts, misunderstandings over the nature of these conflicts has made mediation 
reactive, prolonged, and ineffective. While ceasefires have mostly held, the following negotiations 
over the future status of the separatist areas has led to a dead-end with a seemingly pointless 
negotiation simulation taking place periodically without any progress. The international community 
has failed to preempt the conflicts via the existing legal framework or to mediate them in any 
meaningful way. This is an unacceptable state of affairs in an area of international law that is essential 
to the peace and prosperity of the affected areas and to the international community as a whole. 
Only by understanding the logic that is sustaining the current impasse can there be a chance to start 
to remedy the situation. The greatest misassumption is the one relating to the aims of the separatists. 
Usually it is assumed that while they are officially proclaiming the goal of sovereignty, they would 
accept a lower form of self-governance in the form of autonomy.1250 This was undoubtedly the 
                                                 
1246 N 1237. 
1247 Officially the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transnistrian 
Settlement. 
1248 All three mediation formats can be found in <https://www.osce.org/conflict-prevention-and-resolution>. 
1249 Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271). 
1250 D. Lynch, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’ in W. Slater and A. Wilson (Eds), The Legacy of the Soviet Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004) 61-82 at 68.  
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situation in the early 1990s when all of the separatist areas voted to stay in the USSR as autonomous 
subjects. However, the current negotiations should acknowledge that the demands of separatists have 
changed after their experiences in 1992-1994. Thus, the negotiations should be based on the reality 
of the 2020s and not put forward proposals based on the reality of 1991. It should be recognized that 
the separatists are highly suspicious of the motives of the parent state and of whether it will respect 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda without firm outside guarantees. Moreover, apart from the shared 
Soviet past, there is a notable absence of shared destiny and a common state idea between the 
successor states and the former subunits, which makes any power-sharing very difficult.1251 Finally, 
the passage of time contributes to the further drifting apart of the host state’s and subunit’s competing 
national projects. 
Just prior to the armed separatist uprisings in the post-Soviet space in 1992-1994, the international 
mediation system gained valuable experience in mediating peace in Cambodia. The 1991 ‘Agreement 
Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and 
National Unity of Cambodia’1252 was a product of three years of negations.1253 It contained all the 
important elements that the international community has tried to reproduce in later mediation efforts, 
including extensive international guarantees and constitutionally enshrined commitments by 
Cambodia.1254 In exchange, the signatory states promised ‘to recognize and to respect in every way 
the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity’ of 
Cambodia.1255 A UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established to act as a peacekeeping 
mission and - for the first time in the Organization’s history - to take over the administration of an 
independent state for a limited period of time.1256 The subsequent mediation efforts for the frozen 
conflicts were based on the Cambodian model.1257  
                                                 
1251 Ibid. at 71 and 80. 
1252 Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords), signed 23 October 1991.  
1253 S. Ratner, ‘The Cambodia Settlement Agreements’ 87(19) The American Journal of International Law (1993) 1-41 at 1. 
1254 Such as its future domestic and international conduct and the adoption of ‘perpetual neutrality’ status in the Constitution. 
1255 N 1252, Art. 2(1). 
1256 The UN Transitional Authority held a mandate from March 1992 to September 1993. Its important mission was to guarantee all 
the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. 
1257 First process was the OSCE initiated the Minsk Process on 24 March 1992 to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, followed by Moldova in 1997, when the OSCE established a Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework 
of the Negotiating Process on the Transnistrian Settlement involving Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and 
the US. N 1248. 
While the Cambodian case did not involve a predominantly ethnic dispute, it had several common characteristics with the post-Soviet 
frozen conflicts: internal conflict with external involvement, gross human rights violations and a significant flux of refugees. 
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5.6.1 Nagorno-Karabakh 
In the late 1980s, Azerbaijan became the first SSR with an ethnic uprising of a separatist subunit 
when the Armenian minority in the Nagorno-Karabakh AO began pursuing an upgrade to their status 
or joining the neighboring Armenian SSR. After the dissolution of the USSR, the conflict evolved 
into open warfare, with Armenia joining on the side of Nagorno-Karabakh. While the Nagorno-
Karabakh authorities signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994, since 1998 Armenia has taken over the 
responsibility of representing them in the Minsk Group negotiations as Azerbaijan refuses to 
recognize the separatists as a negotiating party. The most comprehensive product of the efforts of the 
Minsk Group are the ‘Madrid Principles’ put forward on 29 November 2007. The Principles include 
provisions for the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined through a plebiscite 
allowing the free and genuine expression of the will of the population; an interim period until the 
final status determination, during which the inhabitants will have the right to ‘protect and control their 
political and economic viability and security within a democratic society committed to the rule of 
law’, with their human rights and fundamental freedoms being secured; a land corridor linking 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia;1258 the right to return of all internally displaced persons and refugees 
from the conflict areas on voluntary basis when the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has 
determined that conditions are appropriate; a joint supervisory commission led by the Minsk Group 
countries that will monitor and settle all issues related to the implementation of the Peace Agreement; 
and the provision to request the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution endorsing the Peace 
Agreement.1259  
While the resolution of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh seemed to be moving forward with the 
Madrid Principles, the negotiations have hit an impasse. This is due to the mutual distrust caused by 
the conflict, manifested today as the virtual non-existence of any relations between Azerbaijan and 
the separatist authorities.1260 Nevertheless, the Madrid Principles offer us valuable lessons on the 
topics that such negotiations should entail. First, a plebiscite could be used to settle the final legal 
status, but only after the forcibly displaced peoples are allowed to return on a voluntary basis. Second, 
before the final status is settled, the basic human rights and freedoms of the population have to be 
guaranteed and monitored by external forces. Finally, there needs to be a Peace Agreement endorsed 
                                                 
1258 In its uti possidetis borders, Nagorno-Karabakh is completely surrounded by Azerbaijan.  
1259 Basic principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, transmitted at the OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, 
29 November 2007), principles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13. 
1260 Azerbaijan only negotiates with Armenia and fails to see that Armenia cannot impose any kind of solution to Nagorno-Karabakh.  
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by a UN Security Council resolution and an impartial supervisory commission that settles any issues 
relating to fulfilling the obligations of the Agreement.  
5.6.2 Transnistria 
In Moldova, a four-month war took place in 1992 between the central authorities and the former 
ASSR of Transnistria that had a significant Russian and Ukrainian minorities. Apart from being less 
violent, this was a very typical post-Soviet separatist conflict where an outside intervention secured 
the victory of the smaller separatist entity. The first attempt of international mediation came with 
‘quadripartite’ political consultations involving Moldova, Romania, Russian, and Ukraine, launched 
on 23 March 1992 in the auspices of the CSCE Ministerial Conference.1261 The four parties issued a 
declaration that promised to guarantee both the territorial integrity of Moldova and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities.1262 In 1993, the CSCE got more involved and released 
a Report, which noted that ‘[s]ome of the Mission’s interlocutors claim that “international guarantees” 
are needed to buttress any agreement on special status for Transdniestria’ and that ‘the conclusion of 
an agreement under the auspices of the CSCE could enhance the trust of both sides in its duration and 
reliability’.1263 Notwithstanding, Russia came to dominate the mediation efforts, which resulted in 
the signing of a Memorandum on the normalization of relations in May 1997.1264 The Memorandum 
made Russia and Ukraine both mediators and guarantors of the future status agreement for 
Transnistria.1265 It included some federalization aspects, such as ‘Transdniestria shall participate in 
the conduct of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova - a subject of international law - on 
questions touching its interests. Decision of such questions shall be taken by agreement of the Parties. 
Transdniestria has the right to unilaterally establish and maintain international contacts in the 
economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres, and in other spheres by agreement of the 
Parties’.1266 On the basis of the Memorandum, a series of negotiations took place. They resulted in 
settlement proposals by Russia in 2003,1267 jointly by Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE in 2004,1268 and 
                                                 
1261 C. Vacaru, ‘Resolution Mechanisms of the Transnistrian Conflict’ 6(4) Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review (2006) 
905-121 at 907. 
1262 V. Chiver, ‘Role of Ukraine in the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement’, Institutul de Politici si Reforme Europene, May 2016 at 4. 
1263 Report No. 13 (n 1064) 5(g). Transdniestria is another form to type the name of the area, but I am using the version used by the 
official Moldovan sources, Transnistria.  
1264 Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of the Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, signed in Moscow 
on 8 May 1997.  
1265 Ibid. para. 1. 
1266 Ibid. para. 3. 
1267 Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova, 17 November 2003. 
1268 Proposals and Recommendations of the Mediators from the OSCE, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine with regard to the 
Transdniestrian Settlement, 13 February 2004. 
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finally one by Ukraine in 2005.1269 Throughout the negotiations, both parties agreed to refrain from 
exerting pressure on the other, giving Transnistria a chance to build a de facto state undisturbed.1270  
The Russian proposal included articles to federalize Moldova with separate autonomy agreements for 
Transnistria and Gagauzia. It included exclusive and joint competences for the federal units and 
proportional power-sharing with a reserved seat in the Constitutional Court and the Senate for 
Transnistria and Gagauzia, supplemented with qualified majorities.1271 It obliged international treaties 
being concluded after joint consultation, declared Moldova as a neutral and demilitarized state ‘with 
the borders of the Moldovan SSR on 1 January 1990’, and gave Transnistria a right to secession that 
was entrenched into the Constitution with qualified majorities needed for amendments.1272 However, 
Moldova rejected the proposal due to the excessive leverage it would have given to the federal units 
to determine the country’s foreign policy.1273  
The 2004 Joint Proposal proposed Transnistria to become a federal subject of Moldova and listed 
exclusive and joint competences in detail. It required a two-thirds majority in both houses of 
parliament to amend the Constitution and that any disagreements over the implementation of the 
power-sharing to be resolved via international mediation. Finally, just like the Russian proposal, it 
included the option for Transnistrian secession and called for the creation of an integrated system of 
international guarantees with an enforcement mechanism.1274 Moldova rejected the proposal. 
The Ukrainian proposal envisioned a unitary state with autonomy for Transnistria. It called for 
Moldova to draft a law on division of powers jointly with Transnistria and to form a Conciliation 
Committee with international participation to resolve disputes over the interpretation of the law.1275 
It included the secession option for Transnistria and promised that Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE 
would guarantee the proposal. Moldova accepted the proposal with some reservations.1276 
                                                 
1269 Plan for the Settlement of the Transdniestrian Problem, 16 May 2005. 
1270 Russia has a dual role as both a mediator and a conflict party and, thus, shares responsibility for the emergence and development 
of Transnistrian statehood. ‘The extent of Moscow’s support - security guarantees through a military presence, consistent diplomatic 
and propaganda backing, political advice and cooperation, and economic and financial support on a considerable scale - led the 
European Court of Human Rights to conclude in four separate cases that Russia exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction and therefore 
shares responsibility for human rights violations’. S. Fischer (Ed), Not Frozen! The Unresolved Conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Light of the Crisis over Ukraine (SWP Research Paper, 9/2016) at 30. 
1271 Russia Draft Memorandum (2003), paras. 4, 5, 6, 9(b), 10(a), and 13(2). 
1272 Ibid. preamble and paras. 1, 3(14), and 15. 
1273 Ibid. para. 3(11). The proposal would have entailed a long-term continuance of Russian military presence, which Moldova rejected. 
1274 N 1268.  
1275 Wolff (n 1063) 16. 
1276 Ibid. at 29. Notably, all the proposals included the option for Transnistria secession. However, it was always conditioned with the 
possible unification of Moldova and Romania. 
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Following, as an important confidence-building measure demanded by the Ukrainian proposal, 
Moldova passed a framework law on Transnistria in July 2005.1277 It granted Transnistria ‘territorial 
autonomy’ without a clear definition of its limits. Controversially, it gave Moldova a right to change 
the boundary of Transnistria ‘on the basis of local referenda conducted according to the legislation of 
the Republic of Moldova’. Finally, it conditioned further negotiations with Transnistria to the 
withdrawal of the Russian troops from the area, as stipulated in the OSCE Summit in 1999.1278  
Unfortunately, just like in Nagorno-Karabakh, the process towards a settlement has stalled since 2005 
and remains unsolved. In 2016, the Parliament of Moldova issued unilaterally as another confidence-
building measure a declaration that affirmed the ‘inviolability, sovereignty, independence and 
permanent neutrality of Moldova’.1279 It is revealing that by using strikingly similar terminology than 
the 1991 Cambodian settlement, Moldova was demonstrating what it thought it is required to provide 
in order to have its territorial integrity guaranteed and respected by the international community. 
Nevertheless, this has failed to break the deadlock in the negotiations.  
5.6.3 Kosovo 
The dissolution of the SFRY began in the late 1980s with the conflict between Serbia and its 
autonomous subunit Kosovo. After a decade of worsening relations, the situation escalated into open 
armed conflict in 1998. In 1999, after the controversial NATO intervention and similarly to Cambodia 
in 1991, a UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244. It stipulated that one of the main responsibilities of the UN administration 
was to facilitate ‘a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account 
the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)’.1280 For the first years of international administration, the 
official policy of UNMIK was ‘Standards before Status’, which in effect froze the status negotiations 
in favor of protection of human and minority rights, and implementing the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and effective mechanisms in 
response to any violations.1281  
                                                 
1277 On Fundamental Regulations of the Special Legal Status of Settlements on the Left Bank of the River Nistru (Transnistria), 27 July 
2005. 
1278 Ibid. Arts. 2(2), 3(1), and 3(3).  
1279 M. Popșoi, ‘Transnistria Moves Towards Russia Despite Talk of Rapprochement With Moldova’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5 April 
2016. 
1280 The UN Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999. The Rambouillet Accords were a mediation proposal put 
forward in early 1999 to settle the conflict via extensive autonomy to Kosovo. The Annex of the Resolution 1244 stated that the political 
solution should take ‘full account of […] the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’. 
1281 NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established to enforce the agreement. 
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The UN-led status talks led by the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari got underway in 
2006. After a series of negotiation rounds, Ahtisaari presented his settlement proposal in early 
2007.1282 It called for a sovereign Kosovo operating within a framework of ‘supervised independence’ 
that would embody significant protections of human rights and provide the Serb communities with 
extensive minority rights, along with guarantees for legislative representation and local competencies 
for regional self-administration.1283 This consisted of devolving state powers to municipalities - 
giving local majorities de facto control over their affairs - and reserving seats for minorities in the 
Parliament. Moreover, the proposal established a double-majority requirement for changing the 
Constitution and adopting laws of vital minority interest.1284 Finally, it called for extensive external 
guarantees by the UN, NATO, the EU, and a newly established body called the International Steering 
Group of Kosovo, consisted of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and the 
EU.1285 However, the proposal was rejected by Serbia and abandoned on 20 July 2007. After Kosovo 
and Serbia had failed to make any progress by a deadline set by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon,1286 Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed independence on 17 February 2008.  
Ahtisaari acknowledged his proposal being far from optimal, but due to the diametrically opposed 
positions of the parties, there was no other choice than a compromise that would not satisfy either 
side’s hopes in full. In contrast, the Russian view had been that any solution must be acceptable to 
both Kosovars and Serbians.1287 In the end, Kosovo’s leadership accepted the demands of the 
settlement proposal. While they realized it would create a weak state, they understood that this was 
the price to pay for international support for their independence. In turn, Serbian leadership rejected 
the proposal on the grounds of it violating the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 framework.1288 
While Serbia has consistently rejected Kosovo’s independence, an EU-mediated dialogue process 
between the parties has been underway since 2011.1289 Predictably, it suffers from the same problem 
than the original status process - the two sides have diametrically opposed views and are unwilling to 
                                                 
1282 Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271). 
1283 M. Rossi, ‘Ending the Impasse in Kosovo: Partition, Decentralization, or Consociationalism’ 42(5) Nationalist Papers (2014) 867-
889 at 870. 
1284 Jenne and Huszka (n 1193)125. 
1285 Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271) Annex IX. 
1286 N. Wood, ‘Momentum Seems to Build for an Independent Kosovo’, The New York Times, 2 October 2007. 
1287 M. Nichols, ‘U.N report recommends Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 26 March 2007.  
1288 Rossi (n 1283) 870. Revealingly, a Kosovo Albanian politician Veton Surroi commented on the Kosovo status process negotiations 
in 2006 as ‘Belgrade is trying for Dayton; we are trying for Ohrid’ in relation to the decentralization of the state. Ibid. at 878. 
1289 In March 2012, Serbia agreed to dismantle its parallel structures in the north of Kosovo as part of EU accession negotiations. Soon 
after, northern municipalities indicated their willingness to integrate into Kosovo.  
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compromise. Kosovo will most likely reject any further decentralization, as they see themselves 
having already conceded a lot in 2007 for the price of their independent statehood.1290 However, due 
to Serbia’s and Kosovo’s hopes for European integration, the EU has leverage over them and has 
insisted upon Serbia fulfilling certain benchmarks for any progress on its membership aspirations. 
5.6.4 Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
Georgia inherited three Soviet subunits, two of which were in the early 1990s willing and capable of 
challenging the host state’s territorial integrity. The cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue 
the Soviet separatism pattern - in 1992-1994, an externally supported armed uprising by former 
ethnofederal units had led to a ceasefire but not to a peace treaty. International mediation efforts 
ensued and after lengthy consultations among the ‘Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General on 
Georgia’ - Germany, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US - the UN Special 
Representative for Georgia Dieter Boden outlined a series of principles informally known as the 
‘Boden Document’. He hoped that the principles would form the basis for negotiations towards a final 
settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. They defined Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within 
Georgia, affirmed the equality between the governments of Georgia and Abkhazia, and that either of 
them could unilaterally terminate or modify the federal agreement.1291 However, in the end, Abkhazia 
rejected the proposal. One reason was that the lack of trust between the parties was enhanced by the 
new autonomy arrangement that Georgia provided for Ajara in 2004, which curtailed its rights and 
have made Abkhazia and South Ossetia wary of trusting Georgian proposals. On the other hand, 
Georgia is in a rather delicate position as it fears that if it gives too much autonomy to its subunits, 
the significant Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities in Kverno Kartli and Samtskhe-Jakaveti could 
demand similar treatment, possibly inviting Armenia and Azerbaijan to intervene on their behalf.1292  
                                                 
1290 Rossi (n 1283) 881.  
1291 J. Wheatley, ‘The Case for Asymmetric Federalism in Georgia: A Missed Opportunity’ in M. Weller and K. Nobbs (Eds), 
Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (Penn, 2010) 213-230 at 219. 
1292 Il. Abbasov, H. Delihuseyinoglu et al, ‘Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in the South Caucasus and Turkey’ The Caucasus Edition - 
Journal of Conflict Transformation (2016) 1-30 at 12. 
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In 2008, the frozen conflicts of Georgia received new international attention after the Five Days War 
between Georgia and Russia. After the event, the old ineffective mediation formats1293 were 
succeeded by the Geneva International Discussions, co-chaired by the OSCE, the UN, and the EU. 
Both conflicts of Georgia are now negotiated jointly. The role of Russia in the mediation is 
problematic - it continues to insist on a mediating role alongside the other co-chairs, but Georgia 
refuses to acknowledge Abkhazia and South Ossetia as direct parties to the conflict and argues that 
they are under Russian occupation. The Geneva International Discussions have not been able to put 
forward any settlement proposals. This is partly due to an even more hostile environment between 
the parties than is the case in the other post-Soviet conflicts.1294 
5.6.5 Donbas and Crimea 
Finally, since 2014 there has been a crisis in Ukraine that began with the Russian takeover of Crimea, 
followed by a Russian supported uprising in the Donbas area of Eastern Ukraine. Here, the mediation 
efforts have - again - been ineffective, and they only concern the conflict in Donbas.1295 Moreover, in 
Crimea, the role of Russia as a direct participant to hostilities and the stakes involved have made any 
international mediation impossible thus far. In Donbas - where Russia denies direct involvement - the 
negotiations have taken place and have resulted in the signing of the two Minsk Agreements in 2014-
2015. In terms of uti possidetis, it is important to keep in mind that only Crimea is a ‘legitimate’ post-
Soviet conflict with a former self-determination unit seeking enhanced legal status,1296 whereas the 
self-proclaimed ‘People’s Republics’ in Donbas lack a former ethnofederal status. 
                                                 
1293 The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had been established in 1993 after the ceasefire between Georgia 
and Abkhazia was concluded. In 1997, the ‘Geneva peace process’ was launched, with Russia as a ‘facilitator’ and the OSCE and the 
‘Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia’ as observers. S. Stewart, ‘The Role of the United Nations in the Georgian-
Abkhazian Conflict’ 2 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2003) 1-30 at 1-3.  
In South Ossetia, the CSCE had set up a mission on 6 November 1992 to monitor the peacekeeping operation of Georgians, Russian 
and Ossetian, stipulated by the 24 June 1992 Sochi Ceasefire Agreement. Furthermore, a special position was created for the Personal 
Representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office for Georgia whose mission was to ‘facilitate the creation of a broader political 
framework, in which a lasting political conciliation can be achieved based on the CSCE principles and commitments.’ The CSCE, 
Personal Representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office for Georgia (November 1992), ‘17-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 2’.  
Both formats were replaced in 2008 by Geneva International Discussion that attempts to produce a joint resolution to both conflicts.  
1294 Displayed, for instance, by Georgian official documents and legislation, including a State Strategy on Occupied Territories: 
Engagement through Cooperation (n 1116); and Law On Occupied Territories (n 1116). 
1295 It has been given priority due to some 13 000 people have died and two million having been displaced. S. Pifer, ‘Five Years After 
Crimea’s Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution’, Order From Chaos, Brookings Institute, 18 March 2019.  
1296 Moreover, this definition obscures the conflict somewhat, as it could be argued that it is more between Russian and Ukraine than 
any real grievances between the peoples of Crimea and the host state Ukraine. For instance, in the last internationally recognized 
election, the pro-Russia party that later gained power in murky circumstances and accomplished the transfer of Crimea to Russia only 
gained 4% of the vote in the peninsula.  
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The first Minsk Agreement was concluded under the auspices of the OSCE in September 2014 by the 
representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk.1297 
The Agreement and the subsequent Package of Measures for its implementation1298 stipulated an 
immediate ceasefire monitored by the OSCE; decentralization of power in Ukraine; amnesty for the 
rebel forces and leaders; and setting up an OSCE mission to monitor the implementation of the 
Agreement.1299 Notwithstanding, the ceasefire did not hold. After a series of tense international 
negotiations,1300 a joint Franco-German plan that revived the original Minsk Agreement was signed 
in Minsk in February 2015. Like its predecessor, ‘Minsk II’ called for an immediate and an OSCE 
monitored ceasefire; amnesty to the rebels; and constitutional reform in Ukraine agreed together with 
the Donetsk and Luhansk representatives.1301 However, Minsk II went significantly further than the 
original Agreement. It demanded that Ukraine specifies within 30 days which areas in Donbas will 
fall under the specification of a territory subject to a special self-governing regime as stipulated by 
the Ukrainian law ‘On Temporary Order of Local Government in Some Regions of the Donetsk and 
Luhansk Regions’. In addition, Minsk II demanded that Ukraine begins a dialogue to hold elections 
in these areas and that all foreign armed forces must be withdrawn from Ukraine.1302 Finally, it states 
that the Trilateral Contact Group would monitor the implementation of the Agreement, with special 
emphasis on ‘the right to self-determination with regard to language’, on Ukraine supporting Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions and assisting them with cross border cooperation with the Russian Federation, 
and that the regions can create their own people’s militias (police) to maintain public order.1303 
Following, Ukraine adopted the agreed-upon law on the ‘special status’ for the regions on 17 March 
2015, but the government faced immediate criticism by the opposition.1304 Furthermore, Ukraine and 
the regions were unable to agree on how to hold elections in the rebel-held areas, and the OSCE 
refused to send election observers to the conflict zone without an invitation by Ukraine.1305 A chain 
reaction ensued - since there were no recognized elections held in the regions, they had no legitimate 
representatives that Ukraine could negotiate a decentralizing constitutional reform with. As the parties 
                                                 
1297 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk 5 September 2014. 
1298 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, signed in Minsk 15 February 2015. 
1299 Ibid. paras. 1, 3, 4, 5, 11, and 13. 
1300 For example, in February 2015, President Hollande of France called the proposed Minsk II plan as ‘one of the last chances’ for 
peace in Ukraine. ‘Ukraine crisis: “Last chance” for peace says Hollande’, BBC, 7 February 2015. 
1301 Ibid. paras. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 11. 
1302 Ibid. paras. 4 and 10. In this case, Ukraine almost made it by the deadline, but several other deadlines passed a long time ago.  
1303 Ibid. para. 13.  
1304 For example, the leader of the Ukrainian Party Right Sector called Minsk II unconstitutional. ‘Dmytro Yarosh: “Right Sector” to 
fight until complete liberation of Ukraine from Russian occupants’, Euromaidanpress, 14 February 2015. 
1305 Ukrayinska Pravda, 3 July 2015. 
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failed to meet this demand, the advancement in fulfilling the other requirements stalled.1306 The latest 
meeting between the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia in the Paris Normandy Summit on 9 December 
2019 made moderate progress in terms of exchange of prisoners of war but failed otherwise to break 
the deadlock of the Minsk Process.  
While the mediation efforts over the Donbas conflict have failed because of the lack of 
implementation, the mediation over the conflict in Crimea has not even begun. According to 
Pastukhov, the problem in Crimea is that it is impossible to agree on the status questions because of 
the diametrically opposite approaches of Ukraine and Russia.1307 Both have a basis for claims for 
sovereignty over Crimea, and neither is prepared to compromise on this question.1308  
This sounds rather familiar. Just like with the other post-Soviet territorial disputes, the overlapping 
claims on Crimea and the lack of trust generated by the armed conflict has forced the parties into a 
frozen conflict, a dead-end situation where they are unwilling to compromise on their irreconcilable 
demands for complete sovereignty.1309 As Ukraine cannot accept any other solution than the return 
of Crimea and Russia has invested an incredible amount of political will and funds in cementing its 
hold over the peninsula, the sides have seen negotiations futile. This uncompromising attitude is 
missing in Donbas, and thus negotiations and international mediation there has been possible.  
5.6.6 Conclusions on International Mediation Efforts 
There are several lessons to be learned from international mediation attempts. First, extensive 
international participation does not guarantee results. Second, the lack of ethnic component or an 
external ethnic stakeholder in Cambodia made a lasting solution possible, whereas most of the 
territorial conflicts of the post-Soviet space remain unresolved. Thirdly and most importantly, the 
very metaphor of frozen conflict is misleading. In reality, the conflicts are not ‘frozen’ as several facts 
                                                 
1306 According to Max Bader, the Minsk II failed because it was designed to fail: the separatists in Donbas and their Russian backers 
never intended to implement several of its articles, while Ukraine could not implement point 11 (giving Donbas special autonomy 
status) even if it wanted to, as this would never receive the needed majority in the Ukrainian parliament. According to Francisco de 
Borja Lasheras, the West must avoid ‘Daytonization of Ukraine’, meaning a process of entrenching partly artificial divisions and 
empowering spoilers for the sake of immediate peace at the expense of democracy and progress. Comments by Bader and de Borja 
Lasheras in J. Dempsey, ‘Can the Minsk Agreement Succeed?’, Carnegie Europe, 22 February 2017.  
In December 2018, a Ukrainian news agency reported that not a single provision of Minsk II had been fully implemented. ‘Almost 
entire “grey” zone in Donbas liberated by Ukraine without Minsk deal breach - adviser’, UNIAN, 27 December 2018. 
1307 V. Pastukhov, ‘Krymkong. What to Do When you cannot Leave, and It Is Impossible to Return’, Opinion, Republic, 18 March 
2019. Pastukhov concludes that the situation in Crimea is extraordinary and thus requires a joint Ukrainian-Russian administration. 
1308 P. Goble, ‘Pastukhov Floats Idea of Joint Ukrainian-Russian Administration of Crimea’, Window on Eurasia, 18 March 2019.  
1309 While the ethnofederal background is decisive in relation to the conflict starting and escalating in Crimea, I need to note that the 
underlying reasons for the conflicts go far deeper than the right to self-determination of the Russian speaking population in Crimea or 
Ukraine’s East. For the political drivers of the conflict, see, inter alia, D. Treisman, ‘Why Putin Took Crimea - The Gambler in the 
Kremlin’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016. 
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have changed on the ground, making the situation very different from the early 1990s context.1310 
Indeed, what is frozen is the mindset of the conflicting parties and international mediators.  
The disputing parties in frozen conflicts have been unable to move one inch from their political and 
legal dugouts, leaving no space between their stances for a compromise to form. The same dynamic 
has been present in all of the separatist conflicts of the successor states of socialist federal 
dissolutions. By participating in international mediation, the host state feels that it has walked the 
extra mile. Furthermore, it has been willing to meet the separatist halfway, offering autonomy in 
exchange for the recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In contrast, the separatist side 
sees this as insufficient and is unwilling to settle for anything but independence. In one case, the host 
state was able to finally move from its trenched position towards a compromise that would grant the 
separatists everything short of a full independence - but only when it was already too late to 
realistically reach an agreement. This happened between Serbia and Kosovo in November 2009,1311 
after Kosovo had taken its fateful step of the unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 
and a significant number of the UN member states had taken equally fateful steps to recognize it.  
As I have accounted for previously, it is essential for the international community to mediate a 
solution to a territorial dispute before the diametrically opposing positions of the parties have been 
entrenched by mutual distrust due to armed clashes. The most important leverage that external actors 
can have on these internal disputes of a newly-independent state is over recognition and membership 
in international organizations. In some cases, international actors can hold additional leverage based 
on the political aspirations of the target state - the opinions of the EU had an enormous effect on the 
successor states of the SFRY and on those of the USSR that have aspirations for European integration.  
Although the international community erroneously forfeited its leverage of recognition and 
withholding the UN membership in the 1990s, the EU still has a second chance to use its soft power 
to force a compromise on those successor states that have indicated their willingness to join the EU: 
Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine.1312 Moreover, the EU has additional soft power towards these 
states as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan through its European Neighborhood policy, which offers 
financial assistance to the countries close to the EU that meet the strict conditions of governmental 
                                                 
1310 D. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (United States Institute of Peace, 2004) 
at 42. 
1311 A. Vasović, ‘Serbia must reach agreement with Kosovo to join EU by 2025’, Reuters, 7 February 2018.  
1312 However, this leverage does not extend to the separatists in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, all of which lean towards Russia and 
aim to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead of the EU. 
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and economic reform.1313 The process is normally underpinned by a detailed Action Plan agreed by 
Brussels and the target country, and it can include conditions regarding national minorities.1314 
5.7 Between Peoplehood and Minority: Conclusions on the Socialist Federal 
Dissolutions 
In this Chapter, I have demonstrated how all ethnofederalized successor states experienced either 
calls for autonomy or outright separatism of varying intensity. The ones that chose to continue the 
autonomous statuses of their subunits in some meaningful manner were able to secure a peaceful 
balance between the right to internal self-determination and territorial integrity, whereas the ones who 
chose to curtail seriously or to revoke previous autonomies have succumbed to separatist violence. 
What is notable in these cases is that the choice of whether to continue or to completely ignore the 
former autonomous subunits was left to the successor states themselves, especially in the cases of the 
USSR. This troubling interpretation of the right to self-determination reveals the main legal problem 
in the socialist federal dissolutions. The lower-level subunits lacked the status to be recognized as 
peoples entitled to independence, but categorizing them as simple ‘minorities’ entitled to the 
minimum level of minority protection under the international conventions was such a fundamental 
decrease in their status and self-governing rights that a few of them chose to accept their new position. 
This, in turn, delegitimized the central authorities of the host state and led to state fragmentation. In 
most of the cases, the successor states lost the ensuing conflicts because of foreign intervention,1315 
whereas the separatists lost the aftermath of the conflicts, remaining stuck with an unrecognized 
status, which is highly unfavourable within a state-centrist international law framework.  
As demonstrated by Maria Koinova using the examples of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, the key 
to whether a minority will challenge the new rule after the transformation from communism is not 
the absolute scope of the rights given to it in the new constitution of the host state, but rather the 
                                                 
1313 In addition to other issues surrounding positive transformation. The 16 countries that comprise the European Neighborhood under 
this policy are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. A. Staab, The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact 
(Indiana University Press, 2011) at 156-157. 
1314 See, for example, European Commission, ‘North Macedonia 2019 Report’, 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
Brussels, 29 May 2019.  
1315 By Russia in Georgia and Moldova, by Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, by Serbia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by NATO in Kosovo 
and by Kosovo War veterans in Macedonia.  
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relative change of minority’s status in comparison to its prior constitutional position.1316 The 
ethnofederal conflicts in the post-Soviet space support her argument.  
As I have argued in the previous Chapters, in order for uti possidetis to fulfil its role as the guarantor 
of peaceful change of sovereignty via retention of the old administrative borders, the recognizing 
states - wielding prominent power with their recognition decision - must take into account both 
internal and external frameworks at the moment of the dissolution. The legal status of an ASSR in 
1990 is a case in point. Under the USSR constitutional framework, it was a constituent part of both 
the USSR and the host SSR but only on the basis of ‘free self-determination of peoples’; it possessed 
all state power on its territory that was not expressly transferred to the USSR or the host SSR; it was 
governed by its governments under its Constitution; it had its set of national emblems; and it held a 
veto right to any changes on its territory.1317 It is quite understandable that when the newly-
independent host state decided to abolish unilaterally all these rights and the international community 
promised them only the minimum minority rights framework amounting to a little more than the right 
to use their own language and choose their own nationality,1318 the situation escalated into a separatist 
uprising in most of the ethnofederalized successor states within months of independence. One should 
approach the situation using the terminology that the parties are used to, in this case, by negotiating 
a settlement between the center and the subunits with different levels of self-determination rights. As 
the Soviet theory of sovereignty allowed a hierarchy of sovereign powers, the non-recognition of the 
lower-level subunits’ rights by the recognizing states was not just ignorant, it was outright dangerous. 
In addition to the distrust that the former ASSRs and AOs have had in relation to their host state, they 
have inherited a reciprocal trust towards Russia. This is quite natural - in the Soviet era Moscow often 
acted as a mediator over the disputes between the SSRs and their subunits, and the ASSRs had even 
had a right to stay within the USSR if their host state would choose to secede.1319 Since the early 
1990s, Russia has been involved in the conflicts, both as a mediator and as an indirect participant.  
                                                 
1316 Koinova (n 877) 84. The Bulgarian case not covered in this Chapter was about the rights of the minorities there, most prominently 
Turks who made up around 9% of the population at the end of the Cold War. As demonstrated by Koinova, Bulgaria has not suffered 
from serious ethnic clashes even though it prohibited the formation of nationalist parties and any kind of territorial devolution due to 
the fact that the relative change of the minorities’ position was not significant compared to the socialist era. Ibid. at 12.  
1317 See subchapter 3.7.4. The case of Kosovo is even more blatant example of downgrading in status, as it held even stronger autonomy 
than the ASSRs.  
1318 Referring to the case of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission demanded that ‘the Republics 
must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in 
international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their nationality’. Opinion No. 2 (n 289). 
1319 However, no ASSR was able utilize this law as the USSR dissolved before any of them could hold the mandatory referendums.  
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The tragedy and irony in the international mediation efforts is that they are trying to achieve the same 
thing that the ‘minorities’ had been demanding in the early 1990s - internationally guaranteed 
territorial autonomy and internal self-determination. For example, in 2009, the parties of the Minsk 
Process agreed on the set of principles to settle the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as ‘a reasonable 
compromise based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, 
and the Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples’. The principles included the return of 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan with international security guarantees for its self-governance.1320 
Similarly, on 30 May 2006 the Serb side finally tried to offer Kosovo a UN-supervised autonomy.1321 
Notwithstanding, this is not a case of better late than never. The ethnic conflicts of the 1990s - in 
1992 over Transnistria, in 1992-1993 over Abkhazia, in 1991-1992 over South Ossetia, in 1992-1994 
over Nagorno-Karabakh and in 1998-1999 over Kosovo – mostly annihilated any potential 
compromises between the parties, complicated the national building processes in the affected 
successor states and brought into power veterans of the secessionist wars in the subunits’ side whose 
legitimacy was partially bound with the tough line against any re-incorporation. The fact that the 
OSCE, the UN, the EU, and other international organizations and individual countries have invested 
so much time and resources into the mediation processes without much progress in over 25 years 
speaks volumes on the irreconcilable positions of the parties. This is why there needs to be adequate 
international involvement at the time of the dissolution before the conflict erupts and while the 
international community still wields the political weapon of recognition.   
                                                 
1320 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, 10 July 2009. 
1321 <https://www.rferl.org/a/1068774.html>. Kosovo rejected the proposal as unacceptable and unrealistic. 
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6. The Theory of Orderly State Dissolution: Uti Possidetis 
Meritus 
In the previous five Chapters, I have presented the evolutionary logic of the uti possidetis (juris) 
doctrine, alongside the internal and external frameworks that have to be taken into account with its 
application. Moreover, I have analyzed the endemic territorial conflicts that are direct symptoms of 
the inadequate adaptation of uti possidetis in the socialist federal dissolutions, demonstrating both the 
original legal problem and its real-life impact. In this Chapter, I formulate my (uti possidetis) meritus 
proposal based on the key findings of the dissertation. 
Meritus is a modified version of the uti possidetis doctrine, based on the latter’s evolutionary nature. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, uti possidetis needs to evolve alongside other international law 
principles. This evolution took place insufficiently in the socialist federal dissolutions, producing 
territorial conflicts. I claim that the current version is still based on its latest successful application 
cycle in the 1960s and is inadequate to settle the competing claims of self-determination in a different 
post-Cold War setting. However, uti possidetis can be restored to a functioning mode via updating it 
into the contemporary international law framework by utilizing the meritus formula. As presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4, under the meritus variant uti possidetis is applied in a manner that takes fully into 
account both internal and external legal frameworks relating to a particular state dissolution. This 
amounts to establishing the exact level that public international law and the constitutional order of a 
state provided for the ethnic group in question at the moment of the dissolution or independence.  
6.1 Introduction: Two Sides of Uti Possidetis Meritus 
As a modification of existing international law doctrine and relying on its authority, meritus has two 
notable uses for the contemporary international law - one oriented in the past and one in the future. 
First, in the cases of state dissolution or independence that have taken place since the third cycle of 
uti possidetis in the early 1990s, meritus can be used to look backwards in order to understand the 
claims of a particular separatist movement and to re-start that particular conflict mediation from a 
more realistic basic assumption. In relation to the territorial conflicts of the post-Soviet space, meritus 
can provide insights from the internal dynamics of ethnofederalism that are needed to coordinate the 
conflicting parties’ competing claims. In this role, meritus advances as a baseline solution for these 
conflicts an asymmetric territorial settlement that acknowledges the former ethnofederal subject as a 
self-governing unit. Accordingly, the new self-governance arrangement is based on the previous 
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status of the unit. It is realized via territorial autonomy with distributed powers supplemented with 
consociation agreement and a clear mechanism for policy coordination and dispute resolution. 
Moreover, this solution has to be entrenched in both internal and international law while 
simultaneously re-affirming and solidifying the host state’s territorial integrity and sovereign 
status.1322 In this role, meritus seeks to find feasible solutions to territorial conflicts by conceptualizing 
a particular state dissolution dynamic. By providing an ex post facto framework for the mediation 
efforts of a given post-Soviet territorial conflict, meritus demonstrates what the lower-level units 
should have been awarded according to a legally more consistent interpretation of the uti possidetis 
doctrine. This, in turn, can provide fresh ideas and proposals into the cases currently under 
international mediation that I analyzed in Chapter 5 - Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and Transnistria.1323 In sum, the settlement of overlapping claims on territory and self-determination 
in a state dissolution context is possible only after understanding the background and scope of the 
subunits’ demands.1324  
The second form of application of meritus is a de lege ferenda proposal to ensure that an erroneous 
utilization of uti possidetis does not again bring about territorial conflicts. The bipartition formula 
that was applied in the early 1990s gave ethnic groups either all rights or no rights jeopardized the 
promotion of internal self-determination and was not in accordance with the evolution of uti 
possidetis. By rejecting this artificial division, meritus can find the middle ground between the 
competing and overlapping territorial claims before there is a point of no return in the form of armed 
conflict and the resulting loss of goodwill between the parties. Further, by factoring in both internal 
and external dimensions of state dissolution, meritus possesses the capacity to secure all internal 
borders. This is done via an expanded recognition of internal borders in accordance with the internal 
and external self-determination dichotomy, which bases recognition in the acknowledgement of the 
actual political divisions in place at the moment of the dissolution. In this role, meritus is a framework 
under which the rights of ethnic groups and minorities can be guaranteed and protected in a state 
dissolution context via uti possidetis juris.  
                                                 
1322 In relation to Transnistria, Wolff has argued that any future agreement could provide ‘an “international anchor” for Moldova’s 
sovereignty (thus emphasising that Moldova is the sole subject of international law) and territorial integrity’. Wolff (n 1063) 20. 
1323 In addition, in a bit of a different context, there are still negotiations taking place in the cases of Kosovo and Ukrainian Donbas.  
1324 Notwithstanding, it is equally important to understand the irrefutable changes that have taken place in the attitudes of the conflicting 
parties. Any mediation proposal has to be based on the situation of the 2020s, not on that of the early 1990s.  
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Therefore, when a new state is emerging, meritus can be used to recognize areas that have a potential 
for ethnic conflict and to find a balance between the competing territorial claims before the situation 
escalates and while the international community still has leverage over recognition.1325 Subsequently, 
meritus can prevent incompatible self-determination claims from escalating into the false choice of 
providing for an ethnic group either all rights or no rights. This zero-sum approach ignited the 
territorial disputes in the successor states in the first place. This, in turn, can restore uti possidetis into 
its original role as a peace project, aiming to achieve a peaceful change of sovereignty in the case of 
state dissolution. In sum, I propose that the international community changes its black-or-white 
categorization and expands its view of the internal borders. This varies on a case by case basis, but in 
the case of the socialist federations, the essential component is to include the notion of different levels 
of sovereignties that the dissolved state entity used to recognize. To paraphrase the ICJ, this is the 
only way to take a correct ‘photograph’1326 of the situation prior to the dissolution.  
Many scholars have noted that the abolishment of the socialist era autonomies has led to territorial 
conflicts in the successor states.1327 While my approach shares this premise, it has two distinct features 
that can provide a fresh perspective to the issue. I argue for a new legal framework based on the 
existing international law, especially on the uti possidetis doctrine. Moreover, my formula utilizes the 
tools that exist by default in a state dissolution or independence context - the issue of recognition and 
a set of soft power instruments, especially effective with those states that see their future in the EU.1328 
Timing is of the essence. For example, after the fact of recognition that particular leverage is lost.1329 
There are three key insights that meritus builds upon when establishing a new framework for an 
orderly state dissolution that settles the overlapping claims on territory based on the right to self-
                                                 
1325 After which it is usually much harder to find common ground. See subchapter 5.7. 
1326 ‘It (uti possidetis) applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing’ (Frontier Dispute (n 
2) para. 30). 
1327 See, inter alia, Cuffe and Siroky (n 1237) 46; and T. De Waal, ‘Revenge of the Border’, Carnegie Europe, 8 December 2016. 
1328 For example, the fact that Macedonia was seeking membership of the EU and NATO gave these organizations a certain amount of 
leverage over the Macedonian leadership. When Macedonia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in April 
2001, Prime Minister Georgievski promised to meet a June deadline for improved relations between Macedonians and Albanians. K. 
Kubo, ‘Host State Responses to Ethnic Rebellion: Serbia and Macedonia in Comparison’ in Cabestan and Pavković (n 1234) 82-98 at 
93. This also explains the EU’s passivity and poor record in trying to help to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: as neither Armenia 
nor Azerbaijan are aiming for EU integration, the Union lacks leverage over the parties.  
In relation to the secessionist attempts in Scotland and Catalonia, the EU has taken the stance that if independent these states would 
not get an automatic membership. S. Carrell, ‘Barroso Casts Doubt on Independent Scotland’s EU Membership Rights’, The Guardian, 
12 September 2012; R. Emmott and G. Jones, ‘Independent Catalonia Would Need to Apply to Join EU: Juncker’, Reuters, 14 
September 2017. This factor would certainly have to be taken into account if Scotland or Catalonia would renew its bid for 
independence. This reflects the EU’s continuous soft power leverage over self-determination disputes in Europe and adjacent areas.  
1329 There is no applicable doctrine on withdrawing recognition, although this has taken place in a few instances. For example, Tuvalu 
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent in 2011 but withdrew its recognition in 2014. Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
has received 84 recognitions by the UN member states altogether, but of these 40 have withdrawn of ‘frozen’ their recognition since.  
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determination and territorial integrity. First, when coordinating the level of rights of the emerging 
state’s national groups, there needs to be a reasonable balance between the division of power, 
including territorial autonomy and power-sharing in the common state institutions.1330 The latter 
includes political consociation, i.e., guaranteed group representation in the executive and legislative 
organs of the state. The determinant of a successful political consociation is the right balance. For 
example, the settlements in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina yielded notably different 
results - Macedonia achieved a workable agreement between minority empowerment and state 
functionality,1331 whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina is so heavily tilted towards the former that it fails to 
deliver a functioning state model.1332 Kosovo has a mostly operational state structure but with 
implementation problems.1333  
Second, when there is an attempt to empower a national group through territorial autonomy or 
inclusion into the state organs, the main factor whether the group in question will accept the new 
framework is not the actual scope of these rights but the relative change of their status in comparison 
to the previous position.1334 This is what has obviously gone wrong with the post-Soviet mediation 
efforts. The inadequate understanding or knowledge of the ethnofederal system led the international 
community to misinterpret the emerging ethnic conflicts and amounted to the mediation proposals 
being way too little way too late. As ethnofederalism continues to affect the discourse of the 
participants, it is also the frame of reference where possible solutions might be accessible.  
Third, there is no credible alternative to updating uti possidetis in the international legal system. As 
the CSCE Report in 1991 noted that ‘[i]ssues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance 
with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, 
are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an 
internal affair of the respective State’.1335 The only alternative to an orderly uti possidetis dissolution 
is that the competing claims to statehood in ethnically mixed areas are solved by the use of force, 
which in turn contributes negatively to the preservation of international peace and security. 
                                                 
1330 Jenne and Huszka (n 1193) 118. 
1331 Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed on 13 August 2001. 
1332 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 790). 
1333 Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (n 271) and the subsequent Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, signed 
on 7 April 2008. 
1334 Koinova (n 877) 84. 
1335 Report from the Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (n 867), Chapter II. Italics mine.  
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In sum and as accounted for in Chapter 4, the international community made the right decision to 
insist upon the rights of national groups and minorities in exchange for recognition in the early 1990s, 
but sadly did not follow through with this commitment. As noted by Ian Brownlie, according to uti 
possidetis ‘the change of sovereignty does not as such change the status of a boundary, and thus pre-
existing disputes will subsist as an aspect of the principle of continuity’.1336  
Therewith, in order to demonstrate how the pre-existing disputes continue to linger on despite uti 
possidetis supposedly having solved the self-determination questions in the post-Soviet area, in the 
following pages, I advance my argument for meritus that does not exclude the lower-level 
ethnofederal boundaries. I begin by presenting the two forms of application for uti possidetis meritus 
that unite the key insights from the past Chapters and the different proposals advanced in territorial 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space and elsewhere since the end of the Cold War.1337  
6.2 Uti Possidetis Meritus as a Mediation Tool 
The first potential application field for meritus is in the current international mediation efforts. 
Although I am using the post-Soviet cases as examples in this subchapter, meritus is a principle of 
general scope. As such, by using uti possidetis to delineate borders while simultaneously taking into 
account the combination of internal (former constitutional order) and external (contemporary public 
international law) factors at the moment of host state’s independence, meritus specifies the extent of 
the right to self-determination of a designated internal border. 
While there are several comprehensive proposals to solve a particular post-Soviet or post-SFRY 
ethnic conflict,1338 systematic proposals for the general framework have been lacking. The current 
research of frozen conflicts is fragmented, and mostly on the field of political science. Meritus 
complements the research field by proposing a conclusive framework for the ethnofederal conflicts 
of the post-Soviet space that is based on general principles of international law - mainly, an updated 
version of the uti possidetis doctrine, the right to self-determination, and territorial integrity of states. 
It has a clear advantage to the proposals advanced thus far, as the understanding of the asymmetrical 
                                                 
1336 N 225. 
1337 For example, by the European Center for Minority Issues: Kosovo. See also A. Zeqiri, P. Troch et al, ‘The Association/Community 
of Serb-Majority Municipalities: Breaking the Impasse’, European Center for Minority Issues: Kosovo, June 2016; Rossi (n 1283) 867-
889; S. Wolff, ‘Cases of Asymmetrical Approaches to State Design’ in M. Weller and K. Nobbs (Eds), Asymmetric Autonomy and the 
Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (Penn, 2010) 17-47; and Wolff (n 1063). In addition, I have utilized Will Kymlicka’s theory on ‘group-
differentiated rights’ and commentaries on it. The theory explains why certain rights in a state are group-differentiated, i.e., why the 
members of certain groups should have rights regarding language, representation, etc., that the members of other groups do not have. 
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995) at 34. 
1338 See, inter alia, Wolff (n 1063) on Transnistria, Rossi (n 1283) on Kosovo, and Wheatley (Wheatley in Weller and Nobbs (n 1291) 
213-230) on Georgia.  
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ethnofederal model helps to mold compromise solutions that both of the parties have already found 
acceptable during the socialist federal era. Finally, meritus gains legitimacy from the conflicting 
parties by an in-depth understanding of the ethnofederal system and by being derived from public 
international law. In sum, assuming that there is any room left for compromise in these prolonged 
frozen conflicts, meritus has a better chance of succeeding than the numerous previous attempts.  
That being said, one should not oversimplify the situation as there are two major difficulties in trying 
to reproduce the mostly harmonious coexistence of the federal times. First, previously there existed 
a central government that mediated between a host state and its subunits. This problem should be 
acknowledged, and any lasting resolution should consist of mechanism for dispute or be entrenched 
to international law, for example, via a UN Security Council resolution.1339 Second, as I mentioned 
earlier, the events since the successor states achieved their independencies, including outright 
rejection of their subunits’ right to autonomy and subsequent armed clashes, have destroyed a 
significant amount of goodwill needed to achieve a compromise solution through international 
mediation. While there are no easy answers to this problem, credible international guarantees for any 
settlement would certainly increase the chances for the parties to reach and uphold an agreement.1340  
I have identified five main components that have to be included in any compromise proposal for a 
post-Soviet territorial conflict involving former ethnofederal subunits: territorial autonomy, a power-
sharing agreement with systemic policy coordination, a consociation agreement, mechanism for 
dispute resolution, and some form of international guarantees. In addition to these, every case has its 
unique elements, and meritus can contain special provisions such as exclusions, demilitarization, or 
other international concerns.1341 Finally, while the negotiations are ongoing and the final status is 
being settled, the basic human rights and freedoms of the population have to be guaranteed and 
monitored by external forces. A suitable model for this was UNMIK’s ‘Standards before Status’ 
policy, which in effect froze the status negotiations temporarily to ensure first the protection of human 
and minority rights, the implementation of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, and effective mechanisms in response to any violations.  
                                                 
1339 For example, the UN Security Council resolution 1371 confirmed the Ohrid Agreement between Macedonia and its Albanian 
minority. S/RES/1371, 26 September 2001.  
1340 One good example is the 1997 Memorandum on Transnistrian autonomy in which the Russian Federation and Ukraine are specified 
as the guarantor states of the autonomy arrangement. The 2005 Law on the Main Notes about Special Legal Status of Settlements of 
Left Bank of Dniestr (n 1067) Art. 12 likewise calls for international guarantees. 
1341 For example, the Cambodian Peace Agreement called for the ‘permanent neutrality’ of Cambodia. See subchapter 6.2.1. 
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6.2.1 Territorial Autonomy 
As the post-Soviet internal conflicts revolve exclusively around territory, there is no credible 
alternative to the territorialization of autonomy.1342 The Soviet ethnofederal model was based and 
found legitimacy in providing ‘homelands’ for the multinational peoples of the federation. It is no 
coincidence that all but one of the eight ethnofederalized successor states faced separatist challenges 
from their subunits, compared to none of the non-ethnofederalized successor states.1343 Indeed, 
territorial autonomy is the most workable solution as it is seemingly equally acceptable to both the 
conflicting parties and to the international community - it is in accordance with the ethnofederal 
system that conflicting parties have found legitimate in the past, and with territorial integrity of the 
successor states that the international community posits such a value to and has insisted upon. 
For a territorial autonomy to work, it requires clearly demarcated borders. The baseline scenario 
should be the obvious, stemming from the raison d’etre of uti possidetis: to advance the peaceful 
resolution of territorial disputes by preserving the former administrative borders. Therewith, the 
territorial autonomy for Abkhazia in an independent Georgian state should be within the confines of 
the former ASSR of Abkhazia.1344 In some special cases, there might be a need to determine the will 
of the population in question by a referendum, which could be used either to map out possible 
alternatives for self-governing status or to approve the final status after negotiations have been 
concluded. However, as the status is based on uti possidetis, before a referendum takes place, the 
forcibly displaced peoples need to be allowed to return on a voluntary basis.1345  
6.2.2 A Power-Sharing Agreement  
The question of power-sharing is essential for the success of an autonomy model, but also a potential 
flashpoint in negotiations. This is due to the fact that the former lower-level ethnofederal units are 
very aware that there is no longer a federal center to intervene on their behalf and will thus certainly 
aim to maximize their power within the organs of the parent state. Conversely, the successor state 
wants to keep the subunits’ interference at a minimum so that they cannot compromise the functioning 
                                                 
1342 Other autonomy alternatives include personal and cultural autonomy (see M. Weller, ‘Introduction’ in M. Weller and K. Nobbs 
(Eds), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (Penn, 2010) 1-16 at 3), but these would be unsuitable and 
unacceptable for the former post-Soviet minorities with ethnofederal background.  
1343 See Chapter 5. 
1344 In some cases involving ethnic minorities that did not possess a prior ethnofederal unit, there might be a need for a referendum to 
establish which communities would be willing to join the new autonomous entity. This has taken place in Moldova (Gagauzia) and 
Macedonia (Ilirida). As neither of these peoples had a former ethnofederal unit, there was a pressing need to demarcate the new entity. 
1345 After an external monitoring body has deemed the situation safe for them to return. This is a particularly important issue in Abkhazia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh, increasingly important in Ukraine, and less important in Moldova. 
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of an independent, sovereign state. These are equally legitimate concerns, and they need to be 
carefully balanced in any settlement proposal.  
Therefore, while there can certainly be almost endless possibilities for a power-sharing agreement, 
the mediation history in the post-Soviet context proves that for an agreement to be perceived 
legitimate, it has to be based on the previous power-sharing arrangements. Consequently, we need to 
revisit the legal statuses of the ASSRs, the AOs, and the SAPs. 
In brief, the ASSRs were the second-level ethnofederal units with extensive self-governance. They 
had a governmental structure that was almost an exact parallel to its host state’s, including their own 
legislative, executive, and judicial systems. The ASSR territory could not be altered without its 
consent, and significant downgrading of its autonomy would have to be codified in the federal 
Constitution. However, as a major and noteworthy limitation in relation to their status, the ASSRs 
did not have the right to independent foreign relations or secession.  
This status should form the fundamentals when drafting a sustainable autonomy arrangement for a 
former ASSR. These units have been particularly prone to ethnic conflicts, as Abkhazia, Chechnya, 
Crimea, and Transnistria all held the ASSR status during the Soviet era. The international mediators 
should acknowledge that these peoples were recognized as ‘nations’ in the ethnofederal system and 
had comprehensive self-governance arrangements that enabled them to run their mini-states relatively 
freely under their own state structure and state emblems. Following, based on these factors, any 
attempt for abolishing or significantly curtailing these autonomies would certainly be challenged.  
Nevertheless, a closer look at the legal position of the ASSRs in relation to the federal center reveals 
that it remained notably lower than the host SSR’s, and an appropriate continuation of the ASSR 
status does not entail a right to independent statehood. It does not even have to mean confederalization 
or federalization of the host state, as it can be accomplished via an autonomy arrangement.1346 Since 
the ASSRs did not have a right to have independent foreign relations or a right to secession, it is 
within the parameters of meritus that they remain as a part of the host state and that their territorial 
autonomy does not have external dimensions, apart from possible international guarantees or dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
                                                 
1346 For example, in the early 2000s, Moldova was ready to accept for Transnistria a degree of autonomy that would have been even 
more advanced than that of Gagauzia, which is frequently mentioned as an international model. However, Transnistria insisted on a 
confederation, allowing it to block any major foreign policy decisions and giving it a right to secession. 
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Consequently, when forming a sustainable autonomy arrangement for the former AOs, the 
international mediators should begin by acknowledging their decisively more limited legal position. 
The AOs were on the third, pronouncedly lower status of self-governance than the ‘nations’ that 
received their own ASSRs. In contrast, the status of an AO was given to smaller ‘nationalities’ that 
were lower in the ethnofederal hierarchy. The AOs did not possess any state-like attributes such as 
their own parliaments, governments, or constitutions, and even their territory could be changed 
without their consent. Yet, one should not dismiss these autonomous statuses as their continuing 
existence as self-governance units were constitutionally guaranteed - it was only possible to abolish 
an AO with its consent and this would have to be codified in the federal Constitution. Due to this 
feeling of entitlement, the former AOs of Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia have risen to fight 
for their internal self-determination and to challenge their host state. 
To summarize, the status of an AO resembled more of a ‘normal’ autonomy with constitutional 
guarantees. In this sense, solving the status of a former AO should be easier than that of the former 
ASSRs. A limited autonomy arrangement should not be seen as any compromise of the sovereignty 
of the host state, especially in those cases where the AO was only included in the host’s territory 
during the federal era.1347 Nevertheless, international guarantees play a decisive role given the power 
imbalance and the lack of goodwill between the former AOs and SSRs, as well as their history of 
using the federal center as an outside mediator in the case of a dispute.  
Finally, there is the case of the former SAP of Kosovo, the second-level unit of the SFRY. It is very 
illustrative as it shows that no matter how much international involvement was invested upon the 
negotiations, there was no way around the Kosovo status impasse. Additionally, it is not a coincidence 
that this is the only former ethnofederal subunit that has received a substantial recognition for its 
independence. The crux of the matter is that the last SFRY Constitution (1974) had created a de facto 
confederation, with Kosovo as a de facto Republic (equivalent to the SSRs of the USSR), albeit 
without the right to secession. Under the Constitution, Kosovo was a constituent unit of the SFRY, 
with its governmental structure that had ‘no vertical superiority or subordination’ towards the host 
state’s organs.1348 Moreover, through the system of ‘consensus in decision-making’, Kosovo held the 
                                                 
1347 This took place in the cases of the ASSRs of Transnistria and Crimea, and the AO of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
1348 Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 30. 
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same veto right as the Republics over many aspects of the federal legislation, including any changes 
to its status or territory.1349  
This arrangement produced two problems. First, any disagreement between the Republics or SAPs 
could paralyze the federal organs, as happened in 1991, culminating in the federal collapse. Second, 
when the SFRY dissolved, the international community was at first unsure how to handle the question 
of Kosovo. Eventually, it was decided that only the Republics should be recognized independent. 
When added to the gradual abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989-1992, this led to the rejection of 
the legitimacy of the Serb rule. After the situation escalated into open violence and NATO and UN 
had to intervene, the status settlement process led into an inevitable dead-end: realistically, to 
Kosovars, an acceptable compromise solution could not amount to less than the confederal 
arrangement of the 1974 SFRY Constitution - but this, in turn, could never be acceptable to Serbia. 
Thus, when this compromise was in effect taken from the table, there were just two uncompromising 
alternatives available: an autonomy arrangement giving Kosovo fewer rights than in the late SFRY 
era,1350 or an internationally supervised independence that ultimately took place in 2008.  
Under meritus, the application of uti possidetis should recognize and include the self-government 
institutions as they legally were at the moment of state dissolution. The level of self-governing rights 
should be determined by the former ethnofederal position of the subunit in question. Every power-
sharing agreement would naturally be unique, but in a crude form, there would be three main types 
of agreements stemming from the previous statuses of the subunits and the application of uti 
possidetis. The highest level of internal self-determination should be provided for the former ASSRs, 
second-level for the former AOs, and the lowest level for those units that did not have an active 
ethnofederal status at the moment of the federal dissolutions.  
The last variant would be the most pervasive and the only one applicable in a non-ethnofederal 
setting.1351 It should entail enhanced local governance of some demographically distinct 
                                                 
1349 See subchapter 4.2.5. 
1350 This, while seemingly less controversial of the two options, was in fact not realistic. The bloody war and ethnic cleansing of 1998-
1999 had destroyed the last vestiges of a common state idea. The only workable solution would have been something that took place 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have amounted to almost the same situation as what we have today - an aspirant state of Kosovo 
that functions on a daily basis outside Serbian state framework.  
1351 Potential target areas are numerous. For example, just to name a few in Europe, there are active separatist political movements in 
Basque, Catalonia, Corsica, Donbas, Flanders, Republika Srpska, and Scotland. A hypothetical dissolution of, for example, Bosnia-
Herzegovina without consensual agreement between the parties would create two independent states. However, uti possidetis meritus 
would also recognize the rights of the lower-level units - the cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - as well as the 
recognized minorities in the successor states. 
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municipalities, an exemplar of which is the Ohrid settlement in Macedonia.1352 This level should be 
provided for all the recognized minorities lacking a previous self-determination unit1353 and would be 
based on the CSCE/OSCE framework for minority protection, the EC Guidelines, and the 4 
November 1991 Draft Convention of The Hague Peace Conference on Yugoslavia.1354 This solution 
would provide a compromise that would be in accordance with both uti possidetis’ evolutionary 
nature and the previous status quo that both the host states and the subunits had learned to accept. 
The self-governance institutions should be modelled on the previous experiences and could contain 
symbols of statehood, such as own assembly, statehood symbols, and a constitution or a statute. In 
general, the symbolism should be taken seriously, and especially the former highest level units usually 
insist upon this. Some have argued that providing ethnic minorities with the vestiges of statehood 
might encourage them to demand more and more, eventually amounting to independence.1355 
However, my proposal is based on uti possidetis - these vestiges of statehood were already the norm 
for the ethnofederal units for decades, and reintroducing them would build up the goodwill needed to 
give a negotiated solution a chance of success. Thus, under meritus, the comprehensive settlement 
would give the subunits statute-making powers based on their previous position.1356 
Just as in the Soviet era, a power-sharing agreement should have an exhaustive list of exclusive and 
joint competences. Again, every case would be different, as the rights of the ethnofederal units 
changed significantly in the late Soviet era transformation in 1990-1991, and there was considerable 
differentiation between the host SSRs.1357 Notwithstanding, an important element of the asymmetric 
ethnofederalism is that the power-sharing needs to be accomplished through devolution, not 
                                                 
1352 Weller (n 1342) 6. 
1353 These minorities could have had clearly demarcated autonomous borders with varying degrees of territorial self-governance (such 
as Catalonia and Scotland), but without federal history that used to realize the right to self-determination to its minorities by giving 
them territorial self-determination units. Subsequently, these minorities would certainly settle for less of status, as the main factor in 
igniting separatist uprisings was the relative change of minorities’ position after dissolution of a former state.  
1354 E.g., in the Guidelines (n 4) the EC demanded that in order to gain recognition, the SSRs had to ‘[r]espect for the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially 
with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights’ and the ‘[g]uarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE’. In addition, there would be the highest 
level for the former SAP of Kosovo. However, in that case, it is of my opinion that the only realistic way forward is to accept Kosovo’s 
independence as a fait accompli, even as I do not think this is unproblematic in terms of the general principles of international law. 
1355 According to Basta, the ‘integrationist’ school arguing for the slippery slope of autonomy leading into calls for independence 
includes Valerie Bunce, David Ciepley and Eric Nordlinger. K. Basta, ‘The State between Minority and Majority Nationalism: 
Decentralization, Symbolic Recognition, and Secessionist Crises in Spain and Canada’ 48(1) The Journal of Federalism (2017) 51-75 
at 53. 
1356 For the ASSRs, this would mean a right to have their own constitution, for the AOs their own charter. Both instruments would 
obviously have to stay within the limits of their area of competence. The existence of the constitutions/charters and the inability of the 
host state to unilaterally make changes to them should be constitutionally guaranteed, just as in the federal era.  
1357 For example, the ASSRs of Karakalpakstan and Crimea obtained a significant raise in status and increase in their competences in 
1991. See more in subchapters 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.  
245 
 
decentralization. In the latter case, a unitary state gives a territorial unit a chance to exercise public 
power on its behalf, in a clear subordinate position. This would not work in the post-Soviet context. 
Instead, there should be a full devolution of public authority, giving the autonomous a right to exercise 
direct public power in their own domain.1358 This should be accommodated with the minority’s own 
police force.1359 Finally, there should be encompassing policy coordination in relation to both joint 
and exclusive competences. 
One example of an extensive power-sharing agreement is that of the SAP of Kosovo in the 1974 
SFRY Constitution, under which it had the same decision making powers than the first-level SRs on 
many grounds. Among other things, its consent was needed on any constitutional amendments, all-
Union laws were decided on the basis of the agreement of the SR and the SAP assemblies, and both 
the SRs and the SAPs could request a special decision-making procedure in the SFRY Assembly.1360  
Finally, a genuine self-governance arrangement should include power-sharing in the field of the 
judiciary. This should take the form of regional courts that - while being part of the unified judicial 
system of the state - would serve as the highest-instance court for the matters within the self-
governance framework.1361 
The inspection of the legal statuses given to the former Soviet subunits offers us an interesting legal 
archipelago with some recurring themes. In general and unsurprisingly, the former ASSRs have 
received a more comprehensive set of distributed powers. Furthermore, those SSRs that more or less 
continued the ethnofederal autonomy have fared notably better. This took place in Uzbekistan, 
Ukraine, partially in Georgia and, to a lesser extent, in Russia. Uzbekistan gave its former ASSR of 
Karakalpakstan an extensive autonomy to regulate its local affairs and governance, complimented 
with concurrent decision-making in the parliament of Uzbekistan that gives it a virtual veto right on 
constitutional changes.1362 The power-sharing agreement between the Russian Federation and the 
ASSR of Tatarstan proclaimed the latter to be ‘a sovereign state, a subject of international law 
                                                 
1358 Weller (n 1342) 4. 
1359 In Kosovo - where there was no inherited ethnofederal subunit for the Serbs - the unitary state has adopted symmetrical 
representation in the civil service, according to which in the central level at least 10% of the positions are reserved for persons belonging 
to communities that are not majority in Kosovo and who fulfil the specific employment criteria. Law No.03/L-149 on the Civil Service, 
14 June 2010, Art. 11.3. 
1360 Written Comments of Slovenia (n 664) 10. 
1361 This is what Stefan Wolff has argued for in the case of Transnistria. S. Wolff, ‘A Resolvable Frozen Conflict? Designing a 
Settlement for Transnistria’, ECMI Brief 26 (November 2011) at 7. This has also being exercised, for instance, in Kosovo, where 
according to the Constitution of Kosovo Art. 114, 15% of Supreme Court judges must be members of minority communities.  
1362 See subchapter 5.3.1.  
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associated to the Russian Federation’, which reserved for itself the right to conduct foreign relations, 
hold exclusive ownership of natural resources, and restrict military service of its citizens to its 
territorial jurisdiction.1363 While Georgia breached the rights of Abkhazians and Ossetians, it 
managed to build a functioning autonomy for the former ASSR of Ajara, which obtained under a 
2004 Constitutional Law a right to state symbols and its Constitution.1364Ajaran Parliament was given 
a right to legislate over its Government and Parliament, and cover such areas as agriculture, education, 
culture, and infrastructure.1365 Finally, even after a decrease in its autonomous rights in 1996, Crimea 
continued to exercise normative regulation over numerous areas.1366 The successor states have been 
notably less accommodating with their former AOs. Only Tajikistan and Russia have continued their 
autonomies,1367 whereas the rights of the other former AOs have been outright abolished.  
To conclude, the continuation of the Soviet-era autonomies in some meaningful form was both in 
accordance with uti possidetis and has produced peaceful national relations in the subject states. 
Accordingly, for any settlement proposals to be acceptable to the former ethnofederal subunits, the 
baseline scenario should be the continuation of the power-sharing agreement as it stood at the moment 
of the dissolution of the USSR in late 1991.  
6.2.3 A Consociation Agreement 
A reasonable autonomy arrangement often requires an appropriate consociation agreement, which is 
also found as a condition for meaningful minority protection in many of the EU’s Accession 
Agreements.1368 However, when trying to find a balanced solution for the territorial conflicts 
involving former ethnofederal units, it is crucial to recognize that - apart from the RSFSR - the 
successor states of the USSR were federal components but not federations in themselves. 
Consequently, meritus advocates for the continuation of the ethnofederal system, i.e., asymmetrical 
territorial autonomy, which does not have to include federalizing the host state. This is an important 
                                                 
1363 Quoted in Hughes (n 892) 52. However, Tatarstan’s autonomy was severely curtailed in 2017 when the Russian Federation refused 
to extend the power-sharing agreement between the two.  
1364 Constitutional Law of Georgia on the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara (n 1106) Art. 2. 
1365 It also had a right to approve the local budget and the composition of the local Government. Ibid. Arts. 14 and 7.  
1366 These areas are agriculture and forestry; land reclamation and mining; public works, crafts and trades; charity; city construction 
and housing management; tourism, hotel business, fairs; museums, libraries, theatres, other cultural establishments, historical and 
cultural preserves; public transportation, roadways, water supply; hunting and fishing; and sanitary and hospital services. Constitution 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (n 987) Art. 18(2). 
1367 Gorno-Badakhshan retains the AO title. It is described as an integral part of Tajikistan, and while notably not sovereign, its territory 
cannot be changed without its consent. It has its parliament, which has a right of ‘legislative initiative’. See subchapter 5.3.2.  
Russia inherited five AOs at the dissolution of the USSR. It promoted four of them to the ‘Republic’ status with somewhat enhanced 
rights and has retained the AO title for the only remaining Jewish Autonomous Oblast. See subchapter 5.2. 
1368 Rossi (n 1283) at 872. 
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distinction to make, as many of the mediation attempts have failed because they have insisted on 
federalizing the host state.1369 For example, the deal breaker in the 2003 Kozak Memorandum to settle 
the Transnistrian issue was the demand to federalize Moldova, which would have given Transnistria 
a veto right in foreign policy decisions. The ASSRs, let alone AOs, did not have a right to independent 
foreign relations or a veto right to the host SSRs’ relations.1370 
Thus, any mediation attempts that are based on uti possidetis should start from the premise that the 
former ethnofederal unit is unlikely to accept a less of a position than a corresponding internal self-
governing position than the one of the Soviet-era. This should not include the right to disrupt the 
activities of the host state outside its territorial autonomy. That being said, in some cases, a 
meaningful autonomy should contain a right to have an appropriate - but not decisive - say in the 
running of the state. This could be accomplished by qualified majorities in the host state’s parliament 
in some specific policy areas that are important for the subunit. These qualified majorities could be 
predetermined or triggered according to a procedure. The aim is to give the subunit a limited veto 
power in areas that could be seen as absolutely essential to a functional autonomy arrangement.1371  
For example, under the current constitutional system of Kosovo, a permanent Committee on the 
Rights and Interest of Communities within the Kosovo Assembly guarantees the ‘vital interests’ of 
communities in the legislative process. An interlocking regime promoting and protecting minorities 
includes Kosovo’s ethnic groups into the running of the state.1372 This has been accomplished via 
enhanced political representation and the entrenchment of parliamentary double-majorities in the 
                                                 
1369 According to Wolff, by embracing asymmetry, ‘states can avoid the dreaded “f-word” federalization’. Moreover, asymmetry gives 
‘a significant degree of flexibility to cater to the very specific situational characteristics that a conflict might bring with it, and that 
need to be addressed in its settlement’. Wolff (n 1334) 24. 
1370 The right of the ASSRs to establish foreign relations was before the 1990s rather symbolic but gained real meaning at the last stages 
of the Soviet federal era.  
1371 One could use as an example here of the 2007 Kosovo Status Settlement Proposal that envisioned a double-majority requirement 
for changing the subunit’s Constitution and adopting laws of ‘vital minority interest’. This should not be an expansive category. The 
key to a workable autonomy arrangement is that it does not paralyze the functioning of the state. Bosnia-Herzegovina could be seen as 
a cautionary example of this.  
1372 The UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 followed the ‘group-differentiated rights’ model of minority protection (n 1334) when setting up 
the ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government’. According to Benedek, it went beyond the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (n 561) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages. W. Benedek, ‘Final Status of Kosovo: The Role of Human Rights and Minority Rights’ 80(1) Chicago-Kent Law Review 
(2005) 215-233 at 221. 
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areas affecting them.1373 However, the implementation of the minority protection regime has not been 
entirely successful.1374 
Every individual autonomy arrangement would require the determination of the appropriate level of 
representation for the minority units based on numerous factors. Nevertheless, according to meritus, 
the guideline should be the previous consociation levels. In relation to the federal center, these were 
around one-third of the host state’s representatives for the ASSRs and one-sixth for the AOs,1375 and 
varied between equal and two-thirds representation for Kosovo. However, as there were significant 
differences between the ASSRs and the AOs, more relevant quota to be followed is the one of the 
subunit’s representation in the host state’s parliament. For example, this was around 3,33% for 
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan’s parliament and 4% for Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan’s 
parliament. In addition, in the more heterogeneous minority units, there would have to be consociation 
agreements for the subunit’s parliament as well.1376 
The autonomy settlement should be constitutionally entrenched in the legal system of the host state, 
and in some instances, it could be included in international agreements.1377 The key is to find a balance 
between stability and flexibility: the autonomy arrangement should be hard to change (in order to 
have stability), but still flexible and dynamic rather than static arrangement.1378 In other words, there 
need to be clear rules on how to jointly change the rules if need be. 
Finally, consociation should be extended to judicial power-sharing, as an autonomy agreement cannot 
function without an impartial dispute resolution system. Moreover, minority representation in the 
                                                 
1373 A double-majority requires that both all of the representatives and of all of the minority representatives voting in favor. M. Warren 
and A. Zeqiri, ‘Decentralization or Destabilization? Striking an Ethnic Balance in the Balkans’, IPI Global Observatory, 8 July 2016. 
1374 According to Adem Beha, while Kosovo’s Constitution and subsequent legislation - most importantly Law on Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Communities - embeds almost all key international legal standards on minority rights, many of these remain 
unimplemented in practice. A. Beha, ‘Minority Rights: An Opportunity for Adjustment of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo?’ 13(4) Journal 
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2014) 85-110 at 86.  
1375 While the SSRs had 32 representatives in the main Soviet legislative body, the ASSRs had 11, and the AOs had five. The 1936 
Constitution of the USSR (n 399) Art. 35, and the 1977 Constitution of the USSR (n 200), Art. 110. 
1376 This would be especially important in Abkhazia and Crimea. It has already happened in Kosovo, where the Constitution reserves 
20 of the 120 parliamentary seats to minorities and guarantees that at least one minister has to be a Serb and one minister has to belong 
to another minority. Moreover, the Constitution created the ‘Consultative Council for Communities’ (started working in 2009), which 
serves as a channel of inter-ethnic coordination and consultation. Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (n 1332) Arts. 60, 81, and 96. 
According to the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, the Consultative Council provides ‘a forum for regular exchange between communities 
and institutions’ that aims to ‘provide a link between communities and Kosovo institutions; and to review draft legislation and policy 
the government endorses it, and ensure that the views of communities are taken into consideration’. The Consultative Council is 
composed primarily of representatives of all non-Albanian communities in Kosovo and of selected central-level institutions that address 
issues of special concern for communities. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo regularly monitors the Council’s work. ‘Performance and 
Impact of the Consultative Council for Communities: 2015-2016’, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 14 December 2017 at 4-5.  
1377 Weller and Nobbs (n 1342) 4. 
1378 As observed by Wolff, all successful autonomies have seen significant changes to their frameworks over time. Wolff (n 1361) 22.  
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judiciary will build up trust for the common cause. Therefore, the highest courts of the state, including 
the Constitutional Court, should, in some cases, have a mandatory representation of the minorities.1379 
6.2.4 International Guarantees and Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution 
In addition to securing an autonomy arrangement through consociation in parliament - likely through 
a right to veto - and judicial system, the undeniable fact is that the long and consuming frozen conflicts 
have built up so much distrust between the parties that any credible agreement is going to need 
international guarantees. Throughout the Soviet-era, there was a need for an external guarantor and 
mediator, with the federal center assuming this role. Building up on this legacy is an obvious way to 
establish the amount of trust between the parties needed to reach and maintain a self-governance 
arrangement. International guarantees are also an effective way to commit external parties to the 
maintenance of the settlement. The obvious gain for the international community is to decrease threats 
to international peace and security, which all these conflicts spread even in their ‘frozen’ state.  
There are several ways to guarantee an autonomy agreement internationally. First, a settlement can 
be achieved via an international peace treaty that has multiple signatories, such as the one in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.1380 Second, it can be confirmed by the UN Security Council resolution, as was done in 
the Cambodian settlement.1381 This is very beneficial, as it gives the agreement added weight and has 
the potential to involve the Security Council to any violations. Finally, in the most difficult cases, a 
temporary international administration of the conflict area - such as UNMIK in Kosovo - might be 
needed. This could ensure the maintenance of the protection of human and minority rights, which in 
Europe would consist of fulfilling the OSCE’s and Council of Europe’s minority protection standards. 
In addition to international guarantees, there might be a need to ensure that the autonomy agreement 
continues to function even when there are disputes. This should be secured primarily through 
consociation - in both the parliament and the Constitutional Court - that would give the protected 
minority a possible veto right over changes to its constitutional position. In some trickier cases, the 
need for outside mediation in dispute resolution would be imperative. This could be accomplished by 
a predetermined panel of mediators, involving quotas from both the disputing parties as well as from 
                                                 
1379 Ibid.  
1380 Dayton Peace Agreement Documents, initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995. 
1381 S/RES/718, adopted on 31 October 1991.  
250 
 
external countries.1382 One possible model would be the Council for Interethnic Relations introduced 
by Macedonia in a constitutional amendment in 1991.1383 It consists of the President of the 
Macedonian Assembly and two members from each of the nationalities and has the main function of 
considering issues of inter-ethnic relations in the country and making appraisals and proposals for 
their solution. The Macedonian Assembly is obliged to take into consideration the appraisals and 
proposals of the Council and to make decisions regarding them.1384  
6.2.5 Special Provisions 
The list of requirements for a functioning autonomy settlement for the post-Soviet frozen conflicts 
that I have provided in the previous subchapters is, naturally, a general set. By an in-depth 
understanding of the affected peoples’ ethnofederal background, meritus is flexible and moldable 
enough to take into account the special circumstances of any particular case and can thus offer 
particular solutions. In addition to the previously listed requirements, these special provisions may 
include exclusion clauses, demilitarization options, international core issues, or referendums. 
The exclusion clauses could address some potentially problematic areas between the host state and 
its subunits. For instance, to reassure the remaining Serb minority, the possibility of Kosovo joining 
Albania was banned by the UN Security Council resolution 1244. Likewise, the settlement with 
Gagauzia1385 and the proposals for Transnistria1386 have contained clauses that would allow the 
subunit to exercise external self-determination in the event of unification of Moldova with Romania.  
Special provisions could also address international concerns, such as demilitarization or a non-aligned 
policy imposed upon the host state. This took place in Cambodia and has been suggested in 
Transnistria. They might also include such external concerns as language rights, for example, in the 
cases of Crimea and Donbas. Finally, special provisions could include an option for an internationally 
supervised referendum. It could be used to settle the status question in some future date,1387 or to 
choose between competing proposals for autonomy. In the cases of minorities lacking a history of 
                                                 
1382 Many international peace agreements include provisions for an impartial supervisory commission that settles disputes relating to 
the fulfilment of the peace agreement. See, for example, Verification/Monitoring Mechanism: General Peace Agreement for 
Mozambique, signed 4 October 1992.  
1383 N 1221. The Council  was also mentioned in the Opinion No. 6 (n 226).  
1384 Amended Art. 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, quoted in V. Neofotistos, The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality 
in the Republic of Macedonia (University of Pennsylvania, 2012) at 140. 
1385 In 1994, the OSCE was able to obtain a wide-ranging settlement between Gagauzia and the central Moldovan government, later 
adopted in Moldovan organic law.  
1386 See subchapter 5.6.2. 
1387 This has been suggested in Nagorno-Karabakh, but only after the forcibly displaced persons have been allowed to return. 
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territorial autonomy, a referendum could establish which areas with a certain amount of minority 
peoples would be included in the territorial autonomy unit.1388 
6.2.6 Conclusions on Meritus as a Mediation Tool 
There have been two main, insurmountable obstacles to reach a compromise in the post-Soviet 
mediation formats since the early 1990s. First, the insufficient application of the otherwise correct 
legal rule breached the right to internal self-determination and territorial integrity of the subunits, 
causing the complete breakup of relations between them and the host state. Consequently, the 
international mediation efforts began as a reaction to the conflict, already in a far from ideal position 
to reach a mutually acceptable agreement between the parties.  
Second, the negotiations have not acknowledged the legal breach that ignited the conflicts in the first 
place, but have instead focused on reaching a political solution based on the ‘earned’ right of the 
separatists to be a part of the negotiations based on their military successes. This is a reoccurring but 
fundamentally problematic framing of the right to self-determination that has taken place Abkhazia, 
Ilirida, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.1389 
Meritus advances an argument against the current reactive system that, in effect, invites and rewards 
the use of force as a tool to settle self-determination disputes. Under meritus, the ethnic group’s right 
to self-determination is acknowledged based on the combination of their previous position and uti 
possidetis, thus producing predictable and legitimate territorial solutions to competing territorial 
claims. The currently deadlocked mediation formats are in a dire need for new approaches. As phrased 
by Japaridze and Rondeli: 
‘These conflicts are not frozen at all - far from it: they are alive, brewing, draining our resources, 
obstructing the development plans and deteriorating our relations with neighbors. What is frozen, is the 
conflict resolution process, which perpetuates the existence of absolutely uncontrolled territories’.1390 
                                                 
1388 This took place in Gagauzia in 1995.  
1389 In all of these cases, previously unrecognized or non-existent territorial units have earned a right for a seat in the negotiation table 
based on an armed uprising against the parent state. The cases of Ilirida, Kosovo, and Republika Srpska have already been successful 
- Kosovo is recognized independent by a majority of states, whereas Ilirida and Republika Srpska have received a constitutionally 
guaranteed, strong autonomy within their host state. Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria are all taking part 
in the seemingly never-ending international mediation efforts on their future status.  
1390 T. Japaridze and A. Rodenli, ‘Europe is on Georgia’s Mind’ in R. Asmus, K. Dimitrov and J. Forbrig (Eds), A New Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Black Sea Region (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004) 40-47 at 45. 
252 
 
6.3 Uti Possidetis Meritus as a Principle of the Preservation of Boundaries 
The second potential mode of application of meritus is in the future state dissolution or independence 
frameworks. As accounted for in Chapter 2, the first two cycles of uti possidetis in the 1810s Latin 
America and the 1960s Africa and South-East Asia can be considered successes, and the borders 
drawn at the time remain mostly unchanged. Despite the fears of many, the maintenance of the ‘non-
natural’ borders in Africa has produced relatively few territorial conflicts.1391 Hence, the key 
accomplishment of uti possidetis is evident. Apart from a peaceful agreement between the parties - 
rarely forthcoming - there remain no plausible alternatives to drawing borders in the case of a state 
dissolution or independence. A more ‘self-determination friendly’ solution in the form of series of 
internationally supervised plebiscites would likely produce non-viable mini-states and never-ending 
mini-secessions. This leaves then only the ‘might makes right’ argument,1392 an armed conflict to 
settle competing self-determination claims, which is in its very essence contrary to international law.  
In conclusion, the problem with the third cycle of uti possidetis was the existence of several subsets 
of internal administrative borders. I argue that uti possidetis has always been successful in relation to 
the borders it has recognized. In the early 1990s, this meant the highest level of SSRs in the USSR 
and the SRs in the SFRY. However, the bypassing of the other internal borders left the lower-level 
subunits with a few choices. They could either hope that their newly-independent host state would 
continue to respect their autonomy - which took place only in a few cases1393 - or they could choose 
to challenge the territorial integrity of the host state via an armed uprising. 
Therewith, the third cycle of uti possidetis ended up producing ethnic violence and frozen conflicts 
that international law has been unable to solve ever since. This is an unsustainable situation from both 
legal and policy perspectives. Uti possidetis has to be updated for it to be relevant in the future. 
Meritus offers this update and aims to accomplish the original mission of uti possidetis: promoting 
the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. In essence, my proposal calls for an expanded 
recognition of internal borders, which amounts to inheriting territorial autonomy and systemic 
power-sharing. Furthermore, meritus secures the compliance of the conflicting parties via three 
means: the authority of uti possidetis, external commitment in the form of international guarantees, 
and international recognition alongside other possible soft power tools. 
                                                 
1391 There are few exceptions - the unilaterally declared states of Biafra and Katanga, the independence of Eritrea and the fragmentation 
of Somalia - but still significantly less than the expectations were in a Continent with most borders relative to its area in the world.  
1392 See n 158. 
1393 See subchapter 5.3. 
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6.3.1 Expanded Recognition of Internal Borders in Accordance with the Internal and External 
Self-Determination Dichotomy 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the failure of uti possidetis in the 1990s was that its application did 
not take into account the evolution of the right to self-determination that had taken place since the 
second cycle. A clearly recognized content of the right to internal self-determination would have 
made it impossible to ignore the legitimate grievances of the lower-level ethnofederal subunits. 
However, the current version of the right to self-determination under international law is ambiguous 
- it gives ‘all peoples’ this right, but outside decolonization context, the right cannot seem to overrule 
territorial integrity. Thus, in a conflicting situation, territorial integrity triumphs, and the right to self-
determination has to be accomplished in its internal variant, i.e., within the host state’s borders.  
In the cases of federal dissolution, the constituent peoples are not bound by the territorial integrity of 
the federal state as it ceases to exist. Therefore, in the socialist federal dissolutions, the right to self-
determination of the first-level ethnofederal units was unchallenged, amounting to a right to 
independent statehood. Consequently, all of them were recognized as independent states.  
The lower-level subunits likewise used to have a right to self-determination as recognized by the 
earlier federal state. After the dissolutions, this right was qualified by their - now independent - host 
state’s territorial integrity, and thus they could not secede without the host state’s approval. Hence, 
their self-determination should have been recognized as the internal variant. Notwithstanding, the 
international community erroneously recognized only the rights of the first-level units and left the 
lower-level subunits to the mercy of their new host states. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, all the 
successor states that inherited ethnofederal units and tried to abolish their autonomy faced ethnic 
uprisings and armed conflict. These tragedies were not simply political failings, as the insufficient 
application of the relevant international law principles played its part. 
The key insight of meritus is that the feeling of entitlement plays a decisive role in whether a territorial 
conflict will erupt. For example, under the ethnofederal system, the subunits received their self-
determination level based on merit, which amounted to a feeling of earned sovereignty.1394 In 1991, 
this produced incompatible territorial claims - the SSRs felt entitled to unqualified sovereignty while 
the lower-level subunits felt equally entitled to the continuation of their autonomies. In addition, there 
was often a problem with the transfer of territory. In many cases, the lower-level subunits were only 
                                                 
1394 Promotions and demotions of one ethnofederal tier were possible and quite frequent. For example, Karelian and Abkhazian SSRs 
were demoted, and four AOs were promoted to the ASSR status during the Soviet-era. See subchapter 3.5. 
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made a part of the host state during the federal era. This combination has made many of them 
emphasize that they have earned their autonomy and that they have never been a part of a unitary host 
state without it. Consequently and logically, they do not find the host state’s unitary rule legitimate. 
In the 1986 Frontier Dispute case, the ICJ clarified the content of uti possidetis: 
‘It (uti possidetis) applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then 
existing. The principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back 
the hands’.1395 
While this is an entertaining metaphor, uti possidetis, in its current form, is not a ‘photograph’ of the 
territorial situation then existing. If it was, Abkhazians and Ossetians would not have been ignored 
and would not have started their armed challenge against the Georgian state. Rather, uti possidetis is 
a sketch, or a photograph after some editing has taken place. It affirms the borders after there has 
been a critical choice of which borders to include in the picture. In reality, the closer you zoom into 
the original picture, the more dividing administrative lines appear. In the early 1990s, the international 
community made a value choice, after which the chosen borders were highlighted, and the rest 
photoshopped out of the picture.  
In general, the borders created by uti possidetis have great potential to be challenged by minorities. 
As long as there is no generally accepted solution to the clash between self-determination and 
territorial integrity, uti possidetis has to address their grievances. However, the current version of uti 
possidetis produces clear cut divisions between winners and losers. For example, in Georgia, its 
application led to giving all rights to the former SSR of Georgia while giving no rights whatsoever to 
the former ASSR of Abkhazia.1396 As this is the latest major round of application of uti possidetis, if 
reapplied to a case of a state dissolution in the future, it has enormous potential to fail again.1397  
Accordingly, meritus bases recognition in the acknowledgement of all political divisions in place at 
the moment of the dissolution. It aims to ‘freeze’ the internal legal order of the dissolving state entity 
and to establish which administrative borders have significance in the self-determination context. 
Most importantly, this includes territorial entities1398 that have been designated as self-determination 
                                                 
1395 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 30. 
1396 Abkhazia is even more controversial, as it held a SSR status until 1931, after which it had been demoted to the status of an ASSR. 
1397 Many scholars have called for reformation of the uti possidetis doctrine after the third cycle of the socialist federal dissolutions. 
See Klabbers and Lefeber in Brölmann (n 49) 76), and Allen and Castellino (n 49) 24).  
1398 Uti possidetis is concentrated exclusively on borders, and thus, I focus here on territorial autonomy and not on its personal or 
cultural manifestations.  
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units or that have been provided with a territorial autonomy.1399 After the target group has been 
established, meritus can proceed to provide content for the retention of borders.  
6.3.2 Inheriting Territorial Autonomy and Constitutional Power-Sharing 
After identifying the affected internal borders, meritus salvages these borders and the self-governance 
arrangements that come with them into the new state.1400 Accordingly, the emerging state inherits the 
internal borders as drawn by the former sovereign. While this certainly qualifies its territorial 
sovereignty, it is how uti possidetis functions. If the emerging state that has self-determination units 
within its borders wants to maintain its full territorial extent - often only acquired under the former 
sovereign - it has to accept the limitations over some of this territory. If it is unwilling to do so, the 
only alternative is to accept the external form of self-determination for its subunits and the partial 
forfeiting of its territorial integrity.  
Therewith, the main function of meritus is to maintain all relevant borders and the rights contained 
within those borders. For the host state, this amounts to its borders being internationalized and its 
status promoted to seemingly full sovereignty, which is simultaneously qualified by the continued 
existence of its internal borders that meritus recognizes and brings into international attention. The 
combination of internal (former constitutional order) and external (public international law) factors 
at the moment of the host state’s independence specifies the extent of the right to self-determination 
of its subunits. In essence, this means that the former power-sharing agreement is inherited as 
appropriate. Still using the socialist federations as examples, Table 2 presents the constitutional 
statuses of the ASSRs, the AOs and the SAP of Kosovo at the moment of the dissolutions: 
                                                 
1399 For example, the USSR had built its ethnofederal model on the basis of different levels of self-determination units, with the term 
itself used in the 1977 Constitution and in the late Soviet national legislation. The same applied to an even greater extent in the SFRY. 
1400 This is due to the fact that under uti possidetis ‘the change of sovereignty does not as such change the status of a boundary’ and 
the principle of continuity applies. Brownlie (n 225) 58. 
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Table 2: The Constitutional Statuses of the Autonomous Ethnofederal Subunits 
 
The SSR Constitutions provided the details on how powers were distributed, what areas were under 
exclusive and joint jurisdictions of the parties, and the details on consociation in the host state’s 
Supreme Soviet (legislative).1401 Meritus starts from the premise that while the consociation within 
the federal center organs is obsolete, within the SSR level it remains in force as the last legal order of 
the dissolved federal state. As the SSRs were given their borders via uti possidetis according to the 
last Constitution, it is within the logic of the rule that the lower-level borders, i.e., power-sharing and 
consociation agreements, are inherited alongside the internationalized SSR borders. In Table 3, I have 
listed some examples of the kind of arrangements that have been acceptable to the ethnofederal units: 
                                                 
1401 For example, usually around 3-4% for the AOs. See subchapter 6.2.3. 
 Own constitution, 
government, and 
assembly 
Relations with the 
host state 
Consent needed 
for territorial 
alteration 
Distribution of 
powers 
Consociation The direct 
subject of the 
federation 
 
Autonomous 
Soviet 
Socialist 
Republics 
 
 
Yes 
 
Defined by treaties 
and agreements. No 
right to secession or 
external relations, 
but a right to remain 
within the USSR if 
the host state secedes 
 
 
Yes 
ASSRs possess all 
state power on 
their territory 
apart from 
powers expressly 
transferred to the 
USSR or the host 
SSR 
11 representatives 
from each ASSR 
(32 from each SSR) 
in the USSR 
Assembly, 
individual 
representation 
quotas in the host 
state’s parliament 
 
 
Yes 
 
Autonomous 
Oblasts 
 
No 
Defined by treaties 
and agreements 
concluded within the 
USSR constitutional 
framework. No right 
to secession or 
external relations 
 
No 
AOs possess all 
state power  on 
their territory 
apart from 
powers expressly 
transferred to the 
USSR of the host 
SSR 
Five 
representatives 
from each AO in 
the USSR 
Assembly, 
individual 
representation 
quotas in the host 
state’s parliament 
 
No 
 
Socialist 
Autonomous 
Province of 
Kosovo 
 
 
Yes 
 
Could bypass the 
host state’s 
authorities 
completely. No right 
to secession 
 
Yes, and a veto 
over most of the 
federal 
legislation 
 
Kosovo could 
introduce bills 
for all-Union 
laws 
Equal in the 
Presidium, 2:3 in 
the Assembly, 1:2 
in the 
Constitutional 
Court 
 
 
Yes 
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Table 3: The Self-Governing Statuses Granted to a Few Selected Former Ethnofederal Units 
  
  
Own constitution, 
government, and 
assembly 
 
Relations with 
the host state 
 
The sovereignty 
of the 
autonomous 
entity 
 
Distribution of 
powers 
 
Consociation 
 
International 
guarantees 
 
Karakalpakstan 
(former ASSR 
of Uzbekistan) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Treaties and 
agreements. A 
right to 
secession. 
Disputes ‘shall 
be settled by 
reconciliation’ 
 
Sovereign, 
consent needed 
for territorial 
changes 
 
Extensive 
autonomy to 
regulate local 
affairs and 
governance 
 
Concurrent 
decision-making 
with mutual 
vetoes 
 
 
No 
 
Gorno-
Badakhshan 
(former AO of 
Tajikistan) 
 
 
No 
 
Set by the host’s 
Constitution, 
authorities 
accountable to 
the host’s 
President 
 
‘Integral part’ of 
the host, not 
sovereign but 
consent needed 
for territorial 
changes 
 
Own parliament 
 
1/33 (3%) 
representation 
and a ‘legislative 
initiative’ in the 
host’s parliament 
 
 
No 
 
Crimea 
(former ASSR 
of Ukraine) 
 
Yes, since 1996 the 
Constitution has to 
be approved by the 
host 
 
Treaties and 
agreements. No 
right to 
secession 
 
Under the 1992 
Constitution 
sovereign, since 
1996 not 
sovereign but 
consent needed 
for territorial 
changes 
 
Only powers 
delegated by the 
host, may pass 
local laws that do 
not contradict 
the host’s 
 
12/450 (2,7%) 
representation in 
the host state’s 
parliament. Host 
state appoints the 
local prime 
minister 
 
 
No 
 
Nakhchivan 
(former ASSR 
of Azerbaijan) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Subordinate, set 
by the host 
state’s 
Constitution, all 
laws have to 
comply 
 
Not sovereign 
 
Only local affairs, 
all key 
appointments 
made by the 
host’s President 
 
No quota 
representation in 
the Parliament of 
Azerbaijan 
 
Treaty of Kars 
(1921) 
 
Ajara 
(former ASSR 
of Georgia) 
 
Yes 
Subordinate, set 
by the host 
state’s 
Constitution, all 
laws have to 
comply 
No, ‘inseparable 
part’ of the host 
state, but 
consent needed 
for territorial 
changes 
‘Financial 
autonomy’, may 
pass local laws 
and in areas that 
host delegates 
Provided when 
the entire 
territory is under 
host state’s 
jurisdictions, can 
suggest all-Union 
bills 
 
No 
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In sum, meritus aims to provide stability and security by recognizing the former subunits, not as 
independent states but as internal sub-state entities. Moreover, meritus ensures the continuation of 
the previous national coexistence by requiring the host state to either maintain the former ethnofederal 
agreement or to agree on letting its subunits pursue external self-determination via independent 
statehood. Next, I demonstrate the three means that meritus utilizes in order to accomplish the 
ambitious goal of continuing the former ethnofederal agreement: the authority of uti possidetis, 
international guarantees, and soft power tools, including state recognition.  
6.3.3 The Need for Compromises and the Authority of Uti Possidetis 
Uti possidetis juris borders are often contested. Some of the former SSRs argue that the ethnofederal 
borders did not reflect the actual location of ethnic groups or the will of the people, e.g., as happened 
in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea after 1991. Some minorities feel neglected 
as they were either not provided with ethnofederal units at all,1402 or had been demoted in the federal 
era and thus did not have a right to the full extent of self-determination that they feel entitled to.1403  
Notwithstanding these legitimate grievances, apart from a mutual agreement between the parties, uti 
possidetis cannot take them into account. Its raison d’etre is to be the backstop in case everything 
else fails and to provide an acceptable compromise, which itself does not contain a room for further 
compromises. Therefore, uti possidetis internationalizes the borders of the emerging entity as they 
were under the constitutional order of the previous sovereign. As described by the ICJ in 1986: 
‘These frontiers, however unsatisfactory they may be, possess the authority of the uti possidetis and are 
thus fully in conformity with contemporary international law’.1404 
That being said, while there is no room for compromise within the ‘internationalized’ borders - e.g., 
Georgia becoming independent within the borders of the former SSR of Georgia and containing two 
ASSRs and one AO - under meritus the lower-level borders provide room for negotiations to maintain 
the territorial integrity of the successor state. The above-mentioned quote from the ICJ works both 
ways. However unsatisfactory for Abkhazians, under meritus, they have to remain within Georgian 
state as long as it respects their right to internal self-determination, and this is in full conformity with 
contemporary international law. Conversely, no matter how unsatisfactory for Georgians, under 
meritus, they have to accept that their territorial sovereignty is qualified in relation to Abkhazia, 
Ajara, and - to a lesser extent - South Ossetia. In other words, both the successor states and their 
                                                 
1402 Such as was the case with Gagauzians in Moldova. 
1403 For example, former SSRs of Abkhazia.  
1404 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 149.  
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ethnofederal units can plead under the same legal rule that the other cannot have full sovereignty over 
their territorial possession. Using the same example, Georgia can claim that uti possidetis gives it 
territorial ownership over Abkhazia, whereas Abkhazia can claim that uti possidetis gives it a right 
to internal self-determination over its former ASSR territory, thus restricting Georgian rights over it. 
The personal scope of application of uti possidetis gives both the subunits a right to plead for it being 
used to internationalize their internal borders. These claims were not incompatible under the USSR, 
and they are not incompatible now. In sum, if Georgia wants to maintain the entire territorial extent 
of the former SSR of Georgia, including its three ethnofederal subunits, it has to recognize that it 
contains three ethnofederal subunits.  
6.3.4 International Guarantees 
Just like in the case of settling the post-Soviet frozen conflicts, international guarantees can be used 
in a state dissolution context to commit the parties to the maintenance of the former ethnofederal 
settlement. While this requires some considerable international effort, the advantage is that this is a 
law-based and cost-effective way to decrease potential threats to international peace and security.  
There are several ways the international community can guarantee the continuation of a former 
autonomous agreement. This can be done via a multilateral agreement,1405 a UN Security Council 
resolution,1406 or, in the most difficult cases, a temporary international administration of the conflict 
area.1407 International involvement is very beneficial, as it potentially binds external actors to react to 
any violations and could ensure the protection of human and minority rights.1408 Finally, there might 
be a need to ensure that the autonomy agreement continues to function even when there are disputes. 
This should be secured through consociation and a possible veto right to any changes on autonomy.  
6.3.5 State Recognition and Soft Power Tools 
Finally, if the successor state continues to breach the rights of its subunits after all other means have 
been exhausted, there are several soft power tools that the international community can utilize. The 
most important one is state recognition. The desperate need for the emerging state authorities to 
establish an internationally recognized state should be used as leverage.1409 After all, the recognition 
is given to a state in its uti possidetis borders. Meritus is calling the external states to recognize all 
                                                 
1405 Like the one that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement Documents (n 1380). 
1406 N 1252. 
1407 Such as UNMIK in Kosovo. 
1408 In Europe, this would consist of fulfilling the OSCE’s and Council of Europe’s minority protection standards. 
1409 For more on conditioned recognition, see subchapter 5.1. 
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the relevant borders. In some cases, the target state might resist for a long period. However, the breach 
of its autonomy agreement should be seen as an internationally wrongful act that under ex injuria jus 
non oritur cannot be recognized.1410 For example, the inhabitants of Kosovo challenged the Serbian 
authorities peacefully until 1996, when the EU recognized Serbia independent containing Kosovo. 
Only after this event did a group of Kosovars establish the Kosovo Liberation Army, which started 
an armed uprising against Serbia in 1998. Therefore, the EU and the international community that 
followed suit with the recognition of Serbia made things worse by recognizing the illegitimate 
situation that the inhabitants could not accept. Moreover, having obtained recognition, the Serbian 
authorities felt less need to restrain themselves, which led to the Kosovo War in 1998-1999. 
Recognition, especially when done in a collective form such as in the auspices of the UN or the EU, 
is a powerful coercion tool. The added advantage is that recognition is a passive way to handle the 
situation, as withholding it does not require any formal act. Other tools include using the leverage of 
membership in regional organizations. A possibility for more advanced European integration can be 
an especially significant incentive. For example, the EU has been able to force Serbia and Kosovo to 
resume their negotiations by making the advancement of their European integration contingent upon 
these negotiations. Moreover, many EU accession agreements contain clauses on consociationalism 
as a part of minority protection policies.1411 All things considered, the effect of conditioning 
membership in some organizations cannot be overstated - Macedonia was even willing to change its 
official state name in order to advance its applications to the EU and NATO.  
6.4 Case Study: Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Uti Possidetis Meritus 
The seemingly never-ending territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and its ethnofederal subunit 
Nagorno-Karabakh can be used as a descriptive example of the functioning of meritus on a real-life 
case. Briefly, after being recognized territorially fully sovereign by the international community in 
the early 1990s, Azerbaijan proceeded to abolish the autonomy of its former AO, which had a 
predominantly Armenian population. Neighboring kin-state Armenia intervened militarily, which led 
to six years of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia backed Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite extensive 
international mediation for the past 25 years, the conflict remains as deadlocked as ever.1412 
                                                 
1410 The annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR (1940) and of Crimea by Russia (2014) have not been recognized in state practice.  
1411 Rossi (n 1283) 872.  
1412 I have chosen Nagorno-Karabakh for its relative non-complexity in the post-Soviet conflict setting: the ASSR of Abkhazia used to 
be a SSR, Transnistria lacked official status in 1991, and the ASSR of Crimea and the former AO of South Ossetia have been recognized 
independent by Russia (former has even been annexed). These issues naturally complicate international mediation efforts.  
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The impossibility of resolving the dispute is an attestation of the fact that the conflict is not just 
political but has legal origins. Under international law, if there is a conflict between the right to self-
determination and territorial integrity, all else being equal, the latter will prevail. However, the 
problem in Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is due to the third international legal principle - uti 
possidetis - which ended up distorting both self-determination and territorial integrity. It 
internationalized the SSR borders of Azerbaijan but ignored the lower-level borders. Consequently, 
as the lower-level borders delineated the location of a self-determination unit, bypassing it ended up 
breaching both the right to (internal) self-determination of the Armenian minority and Nagorno-
Karabakh’s (constitutionally guaranteed) right to territorial integrity. Hence, in order to rebalance the 
first two, we need to re-think the third international legal principle relating to territory, uti possidetis. 
As summarized in Chapter 5, Azerbaijan’s recognition was conditioned upon it guaranteeing the 
rights of its minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the 
CSCE, respecting the inviolability of all frontiers, and committing to settle by agreement or 
arbitration all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes.1413 At the moment of the 
dissolution of the USSR, Nagorno-Karabakh was a lower-level ethnofederal unit that did not possess 
any state like attributes but held a veto right over any changes to its autonomy.1414 At first glance, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh status question seems relatively simple to solve as it would only be entitled to a 
limited autonomy arrangement that should not be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the host 
state. Moreover, the former AO is situated entirely inside the borders of Azerbaijan, making unilateral 
independence even more remote possibility. Finally, no country has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
independence, which in turn increases the possibilities to find a compromise through negotiations. 
Yet, despite persistent international mediation, the conflict resolution is at an impasse. There is a 
pressing need for a fresh perspective by utilizing meritus, which establishes the framework to transfer 
the Soviet-era status of Nagorno-Karabakh to contemporary international law setting on four 
domains: power-sharing, consociation, external guarantees, and special provisions.  
In relation to power-sharing, the former AOs’ territorial autonomy did not include a right to secession 
or external relations. Consequently, Nagorno-Karabakh should continue to enjoy similar territorial 
                                                 
1413 Guidelines (n 4). 
1414 The abolition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy breached Art. 86 of the USSR Constitution (it was only possible upon submission 
by the Council of the People’s Deputies of the AO concerned) and Azerbaijan’s own Law on Nagorno-Karabakh AO. It was condemned 
by the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee (Avakian (n 1026) 17). 
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self-governance,1415 including a relatively wide range of powers on local issues1416 and guaranteed 
language rights.1417 Notably, this should include a veto right over changes to its status,1418 but should 
not include overrepresentation in the field of external relations of the host state.  
Under the Soviet system of consociation, Nagorno-Karabakh had 12 representatives in the Supreme 
Soviet (Parliament) of the SSR of Azerbaijan, which had a total of 360 deputies.1419 A mutually 
acceptable compromise should maintain this level.1420 For instance - and not by coincidence - 
Tajikistan chose to uphold the exact representational quota and the right to a legislative initiative for 
its AO of Gorno-Badakhshan, and this agreement has held since.1421 Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh would 
likely have viewed the continuation of its representation quotas legitimate, decreasing support for 
separatism. Moreover, the continuation of its self-governing status would have affected Azerbaijan’s 
domestic policies only in a limited manner and would not have affected its external policies. 
In terms of external guarantees, if Azerbaijan would have continued the legal status of Nagorno-
Karabakh, there would not have been the ethnic conflict that has produced the lack of trust between 
the parties.1422 Furthermore, Armenia would probably have reacted if Azerbaijan would have 
unilaterally breached its Constitution and tried to abolish the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh.1423 
Therewith, the continuation of the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh in 
the early 1990s would probably not have needed explicit international guarantees. That being said, if 
Armenia (representing Nagorno-Karabakh) and Azerbaijan would come to an agreement in the 2020s, 
any subsequent autonomy arrangement would likely need extensive external guarantees.1424  
                                                 
1415 According to uti possidetis, the area should correspond with the borders of the AO of Nagorno-Karabakh as they stood in December 
1991 when the federal center ceased to exist. Moreover, it would be advisable to accommodate territorial autonomy with the minority’s 
own police force and symmetrical representation in the civil service, as was done in Kosovo (see n 1359). 
1416 For example, the former ASSR of Ajara was given rights over such areas as local education, science, culture, tourism, agriculture, 
and infrastructure. Constitutional Law of Georgia on the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara (n 1106) Art. 7. 
1417 For example, under the UN administration in the 2000s and in the 2008 Constitution, Kosovo developed a regime protecting its 
minorities, including through legally secured equal citizenship and language rights. Warren and Zeqiri (n 1373). 
1418 Finally, any genuine power-sharing agreement should reach the field of the judiciary, and quota representation (with possible 
double majority requirements) should be considered for the highest courts.  
1419 I.e., 3,33%. Nagorno-Karabakh also had five deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet, whereas the ASSRs had 11 and SSRs 32.  
1420 The current Parliament of Azerbaijan - Milli Majlis - has 125 deputies. The retention of the Soviet-era representation for Nagorno-
Karabakh would amount to four deputies.  
1421 Under the Constitution of Tajikistan (n 951), Gorno-Badakhshan has one deputy in the 33 member Upper Chamber (Majlisi Milli) 
of Tajikistan, which constitutes exactly the same percentage (~3%) that the AOs had representatives in the Supreme Soviet of their 
host SSR in the Soviet-era. Similarly, under the 1998 Constitution, Crimea had ~2,7% representation in the Parliament of Ukraine.  
1422 Azerbaijan has proposed to raise Nagorno-Karabakh’s status to an autonomous republic with a significant self-governance, 
conditioned on it renouncing its claim to full statehood. This compromise would certainly need extensive international guarantees. 
1423 Indeed, in 1991 Armenia was even willing to intervene militarily to help the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan.  
1424 This could be done by designating Guarantor States, which was suggested in the case of Transnistria in 2003 (see subchapter 5.6.2), 
by international multilateral agreement, signed by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group (France, Russia and the US), by a UN Security 
Council resolution, or by a temporary international administration over the conflict area, such as the UNMIK in 1999.  
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Furthermore, a fair and accountable dispute resolution framework should be put in place. A useful 
model for this could be the previously mentioned Council for Interethnic Relations in Macedonia,1425 
which guarantees representation for each of the nationalities and offers proposals for inter-ethnic 
issues that the Macedonian Assembly is obliged to take into consideration.1426 
Finally, while the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the early 1990s would likely not 
have required any special provisions, a settlement in the 2020s would need to uphold the 2007 Madrid 
Principles. These include the return of the territories currently under Armenian occupation to 
Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for its security and 
self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final 
legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding referendum after all internally displaced 
persons and refugees have been given a chance to return to their former places of residence; and 
international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.1427 
In sum, according to meritus, the international community should have extended the application of 
uti possidetis into the lower-level ethnofederal borders. It should have recognized the right to internal 
self-determination for the Armenian minority in the ethnofederal unit of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Consequently, the international recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence within its uti possidetis 
borders would have been conditioned on it, in turn, recognizing that it has an ethnofederal unit within 
these borders. Nagorno-Karabakh would have inherited its constitutionally guaranteed territorial 
autonomy with the corresponding level of consociation within Azerbaijan’s governance. However, 
this did not take place. Instead, despite its pledges, Azerbaijan breached the rights of its minority, 
and, despite its criteria, the international community turned the blind eye and awarded it with 
recognition. To find a mutually acceptable and legitimate solution, the contemporary mediation 
efforts of the Minsk Group should start from the baseline, as described above.1428  
6.5 Conclusion: Resolving Territorial Conflicts with Territorial Solutions 
The research topic of this dissertation has been the international law framework applicable to a state 
dissolution. More precisely, I have analyzed the interplay of the tools provided by international law 
to settle overlapping claims on territory - self-determination of peoples, territorial integrity of states, 
                                                 
1425 See subchapter 6.2.4. 
1426 Neofotistos (n 1384) 140. 
1427 Basic principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (n 1259). 
1428 As an AO, Nagorno-Karabakh did not have a right to secession (or to join Armenia) in 1991 and does not have it in the 2020s 
either. Conversely, Azerbaijan never had unqualified territorial sovereignty. The compromise is to be found in the middle, via meritus. 
It suggests using the formula that both sides have already been able to agree upon and live by during the Soviet-era.  
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and uti possidetis. The main claim has been that while uti possidetis is meant to be only the final 
backstop in case the parties fail to reach an agreement, this is more of a rule than an exception. For 
this reason, I find it unsettling that the latest application rounds of uti possidetis have produced 
territorial conflicts and breached the right to self-determination. In order to regain the balance 
between self-determination and territorial integrity, uti possidetis as the third piece of the international 
legal toolkit concerning territorial disputes needs to be reinvented for it to remain relevant and to 
produce legitimate territorial solutions in the future. Meritus is my proposal for achieving this.  
Revisiting the socialist federal dissolutions demonstrates the problem. One of the key insights that 
the external actors failed to recognize in relation to the territorial conflicts of the former USSR and 
SFRY is that, in essence, these conflicts have not been ethnic but territorial. This is due to the fact 
that the peoples there have thought of the conflict on ethnofederal terms, with the legitimate unit of 
their self-determination aspirations consistently being the territorially autonomous entity assigned to 
a particular group, not the ethnicity per se. Subsequently, the attempt to update uti possidetis juris in 
the third cycle turned out to be incomplete, distorting the contemporary right to self-determination 
and producing territorial conflicts. Simply put, the former ethnofederal units saw minority rights as 
insufficient in contrast to their previous (territorial) self-governing statuses.  
In order for a particular state dissolution to be as orderly as possible, the international community has 
to acknowledge and understand the applicable internal and external components of that case. In the 
internal realm, there needs to be a sufficient understanding of the way the parties themselves approach 
the question of self-determination. If this had been the case in the third cycle of uti possidetis in 1991, 
it is unlikely that the outside states would have ignored the abolishing of the internal self-
determination units in the successor states as soon as they were free from the federal constitutional 
framework that rejected the possibility of doing this without the subunit’s consent. Furthermore, 
under the external framework - i.e., public international law, most importantly the right to self-
determination as it was in the early 1990s - one simply cannot justify the all rights/no rights 
dichotomy1429 that the recognizing states chose in the third cycle. 
While the successor states may abolish their inherited internal borders, they do not disappear in 
international law sense if and when they are recognized by uti possidetis.1430 As the continuation of 
                                                 
1429 I.e., recognizing full and unqualified territorial sovereignty for Serbia over Kosovo (all rights) while making polite requests to the 
Serb leadership to uphold the rights of its minorities without any remedies if this would not be the case (no (executable) rights).  
1430 Similarly, the internal administrative borders of Ukraine do not disappear just because Crimea is currently under foreign occupation. 
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the previous autonomy arrangements is both in accordance with the evolutionary logic of uti 
possidetis and has empirically produced peaceful national relations in this area otherwise prone to 
ethnic conflicts, the need to update uti possidetis in the form of meritus is evident. While there have 
been several proposals to solve a particular post-Soviet or SFRY conflict, meritus has several benefits 
- being based on existing international law framework, it has a more encompassing scope, and it 
provides solutions that have already been accepted by the conflicting parties in the past. Thus, meritus 
has both internal and external legitimacy to provide solutions to these competing territorial claims. 
Essentially territorial conflicts can be remedied with territorial solutions.1431 In this dissertation, I 
have presented the origins of territorial conflicts that have taken place in the areas of the two late 
socialist federations, i.e., their ethnofederal background and the misapplication of uti possidetis 
ignoring this background in the early 1990s. These conflicts remain unsolvable and continue to hinder 
the development and security of the areas concerned. Yet, there is a key to both finding solutions for 
the existing conflicts and preempting them in the future. In sum, here are my main propositions: 
As a baseline solution for the conflicts involving former autonomous entities, meritus advances 
asymmetric territorialization1432 that recognizes the former territorial subject as a self-governing unit.  
In order to find feasible solutions for ethnic conflicts that result from a particular state dissolution, its 
particular dissolution dynamic has to be conceptualized. There needs to be an in-depth understanding 
of the content of self-determination under the constitutional order of the dissolved entity. I propose 
that the international community changes its black-or-white categorization and expands its view of 
the internal borders by including - when relevant - the set of different levels of sovereignties that the 
dissolved state entity used to recognize. This is essential, as the relative change on the rights of 
minorities is often the determining factor on whether they will pursue separatism.  
Therewith, finally and most importantly, meritus calls for expanded recognition of internal borders 
in accordance with the internal and external self-determination dichotomy. In this manner, it is a 
framework under which both the right to self-determination as well as minority rights can be 
guaranteed and protected in a state dissolution context via uti possidetis juris. 
  
                                                 
1431 For the essentially non-territorial conflicts, enhanced local governance of demographically distinct municipalities based on the 
CSCE/OSCE framework for minority protection, the EC Guidelines, and the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention. See subchapter 6.2.1. 
1432 This does not require federalizing the host state. See n 1369.  
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7. Conclusions: Salvaging Uti Possidetis Juris 
In essence, this dissertation has focused on state succession and border delineation in the broadest 
meaning of these terms under international law. In the introductory Chapter 1, I posed the following 
research question: what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions for international 
law in general and the post-federal successor states in particular? I then divided this question into 
three sub-questions: What mistakes were made with the application of uti possidetis in the socialist 
federal dissolutions? What would have been a more orthodox application of uti possidetis? Finally, 
in conclusion, what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal dissolutions?  
To answer the first research question, I have to establish how uti possidetis was applied in the early 
1990s, and what was wrong with this interpretation of the rule. Consequently, in Chapter 2, I 
presented the default legal rule in the cases of state dissolution and independence - uti possidetis - 
and reconstructed from the events an evolutionary process that has carried this old Roman legal 
principle into the contemporary international setting. I then demonstrated how and why the 
international community chose a particular version of uti possidetis regarding the latest grand 
application round, the socialist federal dissolutions of the 1990s. The regretful distortions in this 
application illustrate the need to update the doctrine. My main argument is that the transformation 
into a non-colonial context disrupted the vital evolution of uti possidetis, generating a series of 
territorial conflicts in the affected areas.  
Part II proceeded to answer the second question - what would have been a more correct version of 
the doctrine in the early 1990s setting - by providing two components for a doctrinally justifiable 
update of uti possidetis. Chapter 3 accounted for the lex specialis of the socialist federal dissolutions, 
the internal legal context at the moment of the dissolution, i.e., the socialist ethnofederal model. 
Chapter 4 construed the external component, the international legal framework, at the moment of the 
dissolution. It focused especially on the division of the right to self-determination into its external 
and internal variants since the 1960s. Together, the two components presented in Part II give us access 
to what should be the content of uti possidetis according to its evolutionary logic. 
Part III answers the last research question, i.e., what are the legal legacies of the socialist federal 
dissolutions. Chapter 5 analyzed the legal fallout of uti possidetis in the successor states of the USSR 
and the SFRY: how they chose to confront their national minorities and on what legal basis, the 
regional territorial conflicts that followed, and why the extensive international mediation efforts have 
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seen no success since. In sum, it is a damning account on a series of mistakes made, and it explains 
why the post-Soviet space has become a region of endemic territorial conflicts. Finally, Chapter 6 
concluded the dissertation by bringing together the lessons learned from all the previous chapters: 
why uti possidetis needs to evolve (Chapter 2), the two missing components of this evolution 
(Chapters 3 and 4), and the inescapable price of not updating it (Chapter 5). The synthesis of these 
lessons contains the solution to the dilemma of uti possidetis, which Chapter 6 provides in the form 
of (uti possidetis) meritus (‘as you have earned, so you may possess’). This needed update of the 
doctrine is my contribution to the research field. My aim has been nothing less than to provide a tool 
that can be used to rebalance the legal principles of the right to self-determination and territorial 
integrity in the future cases of state dissolution.  
The socialist federal dissolutions have left behind a two-fold legal legacy. First, in relation to 
international law in general, they have distorted the essential legal formula used by default in a state 
dissolution context. The application of uti possidetis in the socialist federal dissolutions failed to 
guarantee the right to self-determination in the affected states, both in terms of the right in general as 
well as how it was perceived in the socialist system in particular. This negative development 
decreases the chances of peaceful solutions to territorial conflicts in the future. Second, in relation to 
the successor states, the 1990s misapplication has left many of them fragmented and plagued with 
territorial conflicts. Most of these conflicts remain unresolved almost 30 years later.  
The proposed meritus formula recognizes the need to salvage uti possidetis, and aims to contribute to 
repairing both these negative legal legacies. Meritus can be used to settle the already existing 
territorial disputes and to preempt new ones from occurring in the cases of independence or state 
dissolution. It calls for expanded recognition of internal borders in accordance with the 
contemporary right to self-determination. It draws legitimation from and is in full conformity with 
the old uti possidetis framework. In this role, meritus aims to restore uti possidetis into a functioning 
mode by updating it into being in accordance with the other contemporary international law 
principles. This amounts to establishing the exact level that the public international law and the 
constitutional order of the state provided for the ethnic group in question at the moment of the 
dissolution, i.e., the legitimate expectation (meritus) of a former autonomous unit to self-rule in the 
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form of a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. In sum, meritus is a formula for a comprehensive 
interpretation of the ‘photograph’ of the frozen ‘territorial title’ as portrayed by the ICJ in 1986.1433 
In my opinion, the controversial decision to insist upon the process of dissolution taking place in the 
SFRY was the right one: in the absence of an agreement on borders and state succession, uti possidetis 
is the doctrine of last resort. For example, the Serbian rejection of both the dissolution of the SFRY 
and the notion that the Yugoslav internal borders would be used as a blueprint for dissolution 
demanded a decisive international legal response. Despite its shortcomings, in absence of agreement 
between the parties, there are no plausible alternatives to uti possidetis in the cases of dissolution.  
In complete conformity with the doctrine’s earlier evolutionary logic, the EC, The Hague Peace 
Conference, and the Badinter Commission attempted to update it by adding new conditions to be 
fulfilled in order for a state to be awarded recognition. These included a mostly overlapping 
combination of criteria provided in the Guidelines, the Declaration on Yugoslavia, and The Hague 
Peace Conference’s 4 November 1991 Draft Convention. In this manner, they aspired to highlight all 
the internal borders of the metaphorical ‘photograph’ of Yugoslavia in 1991. 
In the end, the update attempt turned out to be incomplete. In effect, the EC recognized internal self-
determination to be the right for ethnic groups but incoherently did not provide this for the established, 
constituent self-determination units. The lower-level ethnofederal units became victims of this 
failure. Moreover, the EC reasonably strived for as little fragmentation of the SFRY as possible, and 
the SRs seemed like a logical instrument to draw the line on minority secessions. I agree with this 
decision to the extent of limiting secessions.1434 However, the subsequent relentless categorization 
and all rights-no rights dichotomy between the first level and the lower-level ethnoterritorial units 
inevitably jeopardized the promotion of internal self-determination.1435 In essence, the EC and, 
subsequently, the international community failed to guarantee the right to self-determination to all 
the stakeholders. According to the applied version of uti possidetis, the successor states had only 
limited obligations towards their autonomous subunits, whose internal borders - and, with it, legal 
                                                 
1433 Frontier Dispute (n 2) para. 30. However, as accounted for previously, uti possidetis has never been a photograph but rather a 
modified version of the reality. See subchapter 6.3.1. 
1434 As recognized by the EC, only the highest ethnofederal level possessed the right to secede from the federation. Now, since the 
successor states were formed on the basis of uti possidetis, the right to the secession of the SSRs has no legal relevance, and it becomes 
harder to argue that the ASSRs had simply no rights. In addition, the ASSRs were direct subjects of the federation and the host SSR. 
Thus I argue that they did not have a right to independence but had a special legal status. 
1435 As pointed out by Peters, in the socialist federal dissolutions, uti possidetis ‘has only been applied to the boundaries of first-order 
sub-units […]. In practice, no “new” uti possidetis has emerged so far which would protect second- or third-level entities within the 
Soviet Union, ranging from Abkhazia to Chechnya. So the fiction was upheld that below that level, no ethnic or social differences exist 
which would demand the further fragmentation of territories’. Peters (n 25) 121.  
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guarantees - were airbrushed out of the ‘photograph’. With no reason to compromise further, the host 
states took a hard line towards their former autonomous units. This led to incompatible demands and, 
eventually, armed separatism.  
The policy failures of the early 1990s have two valuable lessons, both of which relate to my proposal 
for meritus and are exhibited in Chapter 6. First, state dissolutions and independencies will almost 
certainly happen again in the future. If uti possidetis is reapplied, it is of utmost importance to update 
it into contemporary international law setting. Only by rediscovering the legal nature of uti possidetis 
can the international community avoid the appearance of more Abkhazias, Kosovos, and Crimeas. 
Second, while the post-Soviet and post-SFRY territorial conflicts are a lot more challenging to settle 
in the 2020s that they would have been in the 1990s, they are not beyond solutions. Meritus seeks to 
find feasible settlements by conceptualizing a particular state dissolution dynamic. By providing an 
ex post facto framework for the mediation, meritus demonstrates what the lower-level units should 
have been awarded according to a legally more consistent interpretation of the uti possidetis doctrine. 
Meritus has an undeniable advantage to other proposals to solve a particular post-Soviet conflict due 
to it possessing both internal and external legitimacy to provide solutions to these competing 
territorial claims.1436 
There are plenty of territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav areas to choose from, 
but let us take Kosovo as an example. In 1996, Serbia was recognized as independent,1437 possessing 
the entire territorial extent of the former SR of Serbia that included two former SAPs of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina.1438 As the conceptual logic of uti possidetis determines, a change of sovereignty by itself 
does not change the status of a boundary.1439 Since Serbia wanted to maintain its entire SR area, it 
should have then inherited the autonomous status that the SFRY had instilled upon Kosovo, in 
accordance with its international legal obligations. In effect, if applied in 1991, meritus would have 
awarded Kosovo the continuation of its substantial autonomy via leverage over recognition. This 
would have been accomplished by recognition of the continuation of Kosovo’s autonomous borders, 
                                                 
1436 Being based on existing international law framework, it has a more encompassing scope than a proposal to solve just a particular 
conflict, and it provides solutions that have already been accepted by the conflicting parties in the past. 
1437 At this point, under the name of the FRY and in a confederation with Montenegro. In 2003, the name of the state was changed to 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, the Union was dissolved with the independence of Montenegro. 
Concerning uti possidetis, it is noteworthy that there remains a border dispute between Montenegro and Croatia over an area in the Bay 
of Kotor which, in the SFRY-era, did not belong to either SR but was under the control of the Army of Yugoslavia. B. Huszka, ‘The 
Power of Perspective: Why EU Membership Still Matters in the Western Balkans’, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy 
Brief, January 2020 at 29. 
1438 While Vojvodina held the same rights, its case differs from the others and is beyond the scope of this dissertation. See n 630. 
1439 N 63.  
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with the rights instilled on those borders. Notably, these right would not have included the right to 
(unilateral) secession, and the territorial integrity of Serbia would thus have been upheld.  
At first, the EC insisted on the continuation of Kosovo’s autonomy. However, importantly and unlike 
the meritus formula, they did not portray it as a legal right of Kosovars derived from uti possidetis, 
but rather as a political compromise. The incontrovertible difference between a political compromise 
and a legal obligation is that the former is notably easier to breach afterwards, as indeed took place 
with the unconditional recognition of Serbia a few years later. This decision came back to haunt the 
international community in the late 1990s, when the betrayed Kosovars started an armed uprising 
against Serbia, thereby demonstrating that all rights/no rights dichotomy is not a realistic solution to 
the conflicts over territory.  
Just like Serbia, all ethnofederalized successor states experienced either the calls for autonomy or 
separatism. The general pattern was clear: the ones that chose to continue autonomy in some 
meaningful manner were able to secure a peaceful balance between the right to internal self-
determination and territorial integrity. In contrast, the ones who chose to curtail severely or to revoke 
previous autonomies succumbed to separatist violence. Finally, the tragedy of international mediation 
of these crises has been that they aim more-or-less to achieve the same thing that the more consistent 
version of uti possidetis would have awarded to the minorities in the first place - territorial autonomy 
and internal self-determination - but from a considerably weaker negotiating standpoint.  
Due to the bipartition formula that was applied in the early 1990s, the lower-level subunits, some of 
them with larger populations than many EU member states, were caught in a legally vicious place, in 
between ‘peoplehood’ and ‘minority’ statuses.1440 By rejecting the EC’s artificial division that gave 
ethnic groups either all rights or no rights, meritus can find the middle ground between the competing 
and overlapping territorial claims before there is a point of no return in the form of armed conflict 
and the resulting loss of goodwill between the parties. By factoring in both internal and external 
dimensions of state dissolution, meritus possesses the capacity to secure all internal borders and 
protecting the rights of all ethnic groups and minorities. 
In the end, uti possidetis exists at the crossroads of law and policy. The main problem that meritus 
seeks to remedy is that while it is common sense that certain pre-existing borders have to be used to 
delineate the emerging entities, the current form of uti possidetis fails to determine which of those 
                                                 
1440 See subchapter 5.7. 
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borders to use. The politics steps in to fill the vacuum, thus compromising the predictable nature 
inherent in a legal principle. Uti possidetis requires a fundamental overhaul, as it cannot be expected 
to contribute to the promotion of peace and security as long as it continues to be in contradiction with 
other international legal principles. Therewith, meritus aims to bring back the law to the doctrine.  
 
* * * * 
Given the importance of both the topics of the current international mediation efforts of the post-
Soviet frozen conflicts and the future state succession in the cases of dissolution or independence, I 
cannot but conclude that much remains to be done in terms of research. Fortunately, the keys to 
solving each of the post-Soviet territorial disputes are contained within the uti possidetis doctrine. 
Here are my final takeaways in relation to the socialist federal dissolutions: 
First, the ethnoterritorial conflicts in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav areas have not been ethnic 
but territorial. Peoples have thought of the conflict on ethnofederal terms, with the legitimate unit of 
their self-determination aspirations being the territorially autonomous entity, not the ethnicity per se. 
This insight offers a basic formula. Essentially territorial conflicts can be remedied with territorial 
solutions.1441 As a baseline solution for conflicts involving autonomous entities, meritus advances 
asymmetric territorialization recognizing the former territorial subject as a self-governing unit. This 
process should begin with conceptualizing a particular dissolution dynamic that has created the 
territorial dispute. There needs to be an in-depth understanding of the content of self-determination 
under the constitutional order of the dissolved entity. I propose that the international community 
changes its black-or-white categorization and expands its view of the internal borders by including - 
when relevant - the set of different levels of sovereignties that the dissolved state entity used to 
recognize. This is essential, as the relative change on the rights of minorities is often the determining 
factor on whether they will pursue separatism.  
Finally and most importantly, meritus calls for expanded recognition of internal borders in 
accordance with the internal and external self-determination dichotomy. In this manner, it is a 
framework under which both the right to self-determination and minority rights can be guaranteed 
and protected in future state dissolutions. The uti possidetis doctrine can be salvaged in the process.  
                                                 
1441 For the essentially non-territorial conflicts, enhanced local governance of demographically distinct municipalities based on the 
CSCE/OSCE framework for minority protection, the EC Guidelines, and the 4 November 1991 Draft Convention. See subchapter 6.2.1. 
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